Tag: European Union
Radicalization thrives as French Muslims lack a coherent identity
The position of French Muslims has become increasingly controversial. The experience of several terrorist attacks and the proliferation of Salafism met a government response. A new “Islamist separatism” bill, which would further expand separation of church and state, is currently being passed through the French parliament. It would prohibit any civil servant or contractor for the public sector from wearing religious symbols. Although the bill does not explicitly mention Islam as such, many fear that it could unfairly target and further alienate Muslims in France.
The Wilson Center June 16 held a seminar on the position of French Muslims in the French state. The panel agreed that the current bill is an attempt by President Macron to appeal to right-wing voters. He faces reelection in 2022. Extreme right-wing candidate Marine Le Pen is polling well. France’s “Muslim Question” emerged from the political tradition of laïcité, which enforces strict separation of church and state, and decades of marginalization and exclusion of French Muslims. If French society doesn’t find better ways to engage this community, radicalization will continue. Nonetheless, the panel conceded that internal discussions in the Muslim community to find alternative Islamic narratives are also needed.
The speakers were:
Amel Boubekeur
Sociologist
EHESS (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales)
Steven Philip Kramer
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Professor of National Security Studies
Eisenhower School, National Defense University
Hakim El Karoui
Senior Fellow
Institut Montaigne
Senior Partner & Paris Office Head
Brunswick
William Drozdiak (moderator)
Global Fellow
Wilson Center
Author of “The Last President of Europe: Emmanuel Macron’s Race to Revive France and Save the World”
A history of laïcité
Drozdiak introduced the tradition of ‘laïcité’ (secularism) in French politics. He mentioned that it is central to French political life, as it is enshrined in the first article of the constitution since 1905. It is more far-reaching than the separation of church and state in most democracies, and essentially relegates religious affiliation to the private sphere. Today it is a controversial topic. To some it is the glue that allows the French to live together despite their religious differences, but to others it has become an anti-religious tool used to discriminate against Muslims in France. El Karoui further nuanced this controversy. To him there are three visions of laïcité:
- Laïcité as an essentially legal term: the separation of church and state, a core democratic right.
- Laïcité as a historical battle between the Catholic church and the state that some think is being waged today between Islam and the state.
- Laïcité as a tenet of the Enlightenment. Here the discussion is cast in terms of reason as opposed to religion. The protection of the rational political process requires the exclusion of religious considerations.
Failed integration of Muslims in France
Muslims today often feel disconnected from the French state and society. Kramer outlined five historical reasons for this based on his forthcoming book:
- The shadow of colonialism and harsh decolonization processes scarred and uprooted huge populations of Muslims in the 20th century. Around a million Muslims left for France from Algeria alone. The atrocities of colonialism left deep impressions on these migrants.
- The historical timing of Muslim migration to France also affected their integration. The major wave of immigration came during the industrializing boom after World War II. Muslim men migrated to France to work and eventually brought their families. After this initial boom, however, the economy slowed down and began to deindustrialize, leaving many Muslims unemployed and marginalized.
- French urban policy also pushed Muslims to the fringes. During the boom period, massive social housing projects were set-up on the peripheries of cities. Many French natives left these areas when mortgages became more easily attainable in the 1970s, leaving behind Muslim ghettos in the ‘banlieues’.
- Kramer sees laïcité as part of the issue as well. He believes that opposition to public religiosity has turned anti-religious ideas against Muslims in particular. This is worsened by the Rassemblement National party, which was founded by returning white settlers from North Africa and has always held anti-Islamic sentiments.
- Most recently, the impact of Islamic terrorism on the Western world and in France has led to a mutual cycle of distrust and alienation between French society and its Muslim members. This has also pushed politicians such as Macron into security-based thinking surrounding Islam to counter the political rise of his main rival, Marine Le Pen.
The position of Muslims today and the new law
Boubekeur and El Karoui then spoke on the current issues the Muslim community in France faces. Boubekeur believes that the way the French state engages with Muslim communities has been entirely unsuccessful. It focuses on using appointed representatives of the Muslim community to speak for Muslims. However, this treats French Muslims as believers, rather than citizens. Furthermore, these representatives (often foreign Imams) lack local legitimacy. Their inability to address Islamophobia in France has left young Muslims disillusioned with their leadership.
Further adding to Muslims’ alienation is the fact that the state’s relationship to them has always been led by political agenda:
- In the 1970s, this meant Islam was seen as an immigration issue (not French, but migrants);
- In the 1980s and 90s it was seen as a banlieue issue;
- In the 2000s it has become securitized and linked to threats of radicalization and terrorism.
El Karoui identified three main issues among the current Islamic community in France:
- There is now a real Muslim middle class (10% hold a Master’s degree or higher, 1/3 a Bachelor’s) but there remains an undereducation problem among Muslims.
- A portion of young Muslims are looking for an identity. They don’t feel fully French, but also don’t feel Algerian, Tunisian, etc. They have increasingly started to identify primarily as Muslims, and some have made a very conservative interpretation of Islam their identity.
- Other Muslims feel that there are no adequate representatives for them in society. They are not tied to foreign states, nor do they identify as Muslims (i.e. they don’t want the Islamic community leaders to represent them). If this group cannot be represented and engaged, Islamism will continue to be an issue and the far right will continue to abuse it.
New ways to engage Muslims and new narratives to counter radicalization
The panel offered some solutions. Boubekeur focused on the ways in which the French state interacts with Muslims. El Karoui emphasized the need for new, authentic, Islamic counternarratives.
Boubekeur said the state has two options:
- Let Muslims engage in discussions with the French state as citizens (whomight have certain special needs, e.g. their desire to wear the veil in public spaces) or;
- Stick to a neutral, secular state, and let French Muslims express themselves without the weight of being associated with terrorists. Also allow them to organize themselves better, which is now frustrated in the name of countering Islamist networks.
According to El Karoui, the current proliferation of Salafist and Islamist ideologies can only be solved if Muslims find their own solutions in the struggle between Salafism, Islamism, and faith. The solution is in their hands. Muslims need to create symbols against Salafism and alternative narratives of Islam that appeal to young people.
Watch the recording of the event here:
The Western Balkans the day after Covid-19 won’t be better
Alexandros P. Mallias, former Ambassador of Greece to the US and member of the International Advisory Council of the Greek House Davos, said in remarks to the Greek House Davos/Thessaloniki Forum June 10:
The Balkan region will not look much different after Covid-19 unless there develops a genuine sense of political accountability. Politics is meant to serve, not the other way around. Political egotism, nepotism and corruption adversely affect citizen expectations throughout the region. The region’s politicians –some at least—appear failing their countries, their peoples, and themselves.
This can change. The remedies include:
- Enhanced involvement of the younger generations, which need opportunities to participate. Politics should not be the privilege of self-styled elites.
- Independent judiciaries, which are needed to hold politicians accountable. In much of the Balkans the courts are subject to political influence.
In addition, change will require the region to rid itself of other endemic infections, especially unreliable, aggressive, and authoritarian politics. The processes of NATO and EU accession offer appropriate and calibrated sticks and carrots. Aristotle put it well in The Nicomachean Ethics: “impose punishments and penalties upon malefactors and bestow honors on those doing fine actions.”
Proposed changes in borders, and associated forced exodus of populations, could renew conflict in the Balkans once Covid-19 is gone. Such proposals are now circulated without names attached, as no one wants to own their paternity. But behind closed doors key political figures in Western Balkan countries have contemplated the idea. International players even appeared to be backing it, though denying authorship.
Such proposals would open Pandora’s box, which cannot be easily close. They will be used as alibis for malfeasance in the Caucasus, Crimea, and elsewhere. Border changes start with a known beginning but risk a hazardous end. The EU, US, and states of the region should rule out land and population swaps in the Western Balkans, lest the end of Covid-19 initiate an even less controllable contagion.
Stevenson’s army, June 22
– US & EU joined in new sanctions on Belarus.
-NYT says Eastern European populists aren’t popular nowadays.
– WOTR piece argues for State Dept reorganization to deal with digital issues.
– Retired army colonel Joe Collins says US civil-military relations aren’t broken.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, June 18
-Congress and administration fight over cyber jobs.
-Pentagon considers sending troops back to Somalia.
-Covid locks down Kabul embassy.
-Defense One writers call PDI a slush fund.
-House votes to repeal 2002 Iraq AUMF. [Hello. It’s the 2001 AUMF that has been stretched beyond the breaking point.]
-Ronan Farrow wonders if Blinken can rebuild the State Dept
-WSJ says US & EU are cooperating on emerging technologies.
-Rand analyst says US should understand what defeat in war means.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Border changes should be ruled out of bounds
In this interview with Radio Television Kosova (RTK) Wednesday, State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Palmer had this exchange with an interviewer (start at 14:28 in the video):
Q: Is still alive idea for changing borders?
A: I don’t think that’s on the agenda. It’s not up to me to identify the redlines in this process. It’s up to the parties. The Kosovo side has been pretty clear about that issue.
This answer is unwise, counterproductive, and inconsistent with stated Biden Administration policy.
Unwise
The question of border changes in the Balkans has been thoroughly aired, including in discussions between Serbian President Vucic and former Kosovo President Thaci, not to mention in a raft of papers and nonpapers. Vucic and Thaci failed to come to an agreement: each wanted territory in the other’s country but wasn’t willing to give up the territory required to cut a deal. Leaving the door open to further discussion is foolish, because it has already been tried and failed. Putting the burden of killing the idea on Kosovo is unfair, as it absolves Serbia of responsibility, though it is true that no parliament in Kosovo, including the current one with a wider majority governing coalition than usual, could approve a “land swap,” which would also suffer a resounding defeat in a referendum.
Leaving the door open is also foolish because of the regional and international implications. Any change of Kosovo’s borders would lead to demands for changing Bosnia’s borders by secession of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-controlled 49% of its territory. How do we know? The de facto autocratic leader of the RS, Milorad Dodik, has promised it. In addition, Russian President Putin would demand the same for Russian-controlled portions of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Every illiberal politician worldwide would feel free to unleash irredentist sentiments, which exist throughout Asia and Africa. There is no quicker way of killing the Biden Administration’s hopes for a revival of democracy than leaving the door open to border changes in the Balkans.
Counterproductive
The purpose of Matt’s trip to Kosovo and now Serbia is to display solidarity with the European Union in pursuing a Belgrade/Pristina dialogue that has been unproductive for the better part of a decade. The EU is now aiming to revive it. The lead EU negotiator, Miroslav Lajcak, has been firm in ruling out border changes, which several EU countries have indicated they will not accept, most notably Germany. Each EU member has a veto on this question, since accession of any new members requires all existing member states to agree. Solidarity with the EU requires clarity on this point, not a wishy-washy statement that leaves it up to Pristina. That approach is precisely what got the Trump Administration into several years of unproductive friction with the EU in the Western Balkans. If Washington really wants the dialogue to produce anything, it needs to be crystal clear in public and private that it will not accept border changes.
Inconsistent
Biden, both as candidate and president, has unequivocally supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries of the Western Balkans, including both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the right position for a liberal democrat who believes in liberal democracy, that is democracy based on individual rights of citizens protected by the rule of law.
The problem is that sincere liberal democrats are still few and far between at the leadership level in the Western Balkans. Ethnic nationalists dominate, especially in Serbia but also elsewhere. President Vucic and his minions have been touting what he calls a “Serbian home,” which is indistinguishable from the Greater Serbia whose pursuit led Slobodan Milosevic into four or five wars (depending on how you count). Prime Minister Kurti has sometimes aspired to a referendum in Kosovo on union with Albania. RS President Dodik has the same aspiration, for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some Bosnian Croats share the aspiration for themselves.
None of these propositions is consistent with aspirations for EU membership and should be ruled out of bounds both by the EU and the US.
PS: In case anyone wonders whether the video above was a slip-up, here is Matt declining again the same day, during an appearance with Lajcak, to rule out landswaps and saying that it is not up to the EU or the US to identify the compromises but up to “the parties determine the contents of the talks” (start at 6:14, apologies for the sound quality):
PPS: Then in Belgrade, Matt led out change of borders for Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not for Kosovo:
The borders of BiH and North Macedonia are fixed. Nobody talks about changing he borders of BiH, nobody talks about changing the borders of North Macedonia. That’s out of the question.
When it comes to Kosovo, Matt puts the burden entirely on Pristina:
When it comes to borders and territories, I do not see this as an issue that Kosovo is ready to engage on.
Stevenson’s army, May 31
[In memory of my ancestor, Captain Levi Ely of the Massachusetts militia, killed at the battle of Stone Arabia, October 19, 1780.]
– LTG [Ret.] Mike Flynn calls for a coup.
– Politico says the Danes helped NSA spy on Merkel.
– North Korea criticizes US decision on South Korea.
– Susan Glasser of the New Yorker wonders about threats to American democracy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).