Tag: European Union
Libyans be damned
Reversing long-standing policy of supporting United Nations efforts in Libya, President Trump last week opted instead to back Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan National Army” march on Tripoli from his Benghazi stronghold. Haftar is a former Libyan army officer who spent two decades in Virginia and became a US citizen. Trump says he backs Haftar’s counterterrorism efforts. Haftar’s idea of counterterrorism is killing anyone who opposes him. He doesn’t even pretend to be pro-democratic and is seeking to install himself as Qaddafi’s successor.
Few Libya-watchers think Haftar has the firepower to take Tripoli by force. So far militia resistance appears to be slowing his advance, causing him to resort to airpower presumably provided by his Emirati or possibly Saudi backers. Qatar and Turkey will be supporting Islamist forces intent on holding on to Tripoli, where the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is hunkered down. It is no paragon: it has failed to gain control even of the capital and has precious little sway in the rest of the country.
Trump’s move to back Haftar was a surprise only because the President had previously indicated the US would not get involved in Libya but instead leave it to the UN and the Europeans. That a would-be autocrat would appeal to Trump should be no surprise, especially one the Saudis and Emiratis support. The French and Russians will be pleased, as they too support Haftar, but the Italians were backing the GNA. Once again, Trump has demonstrated that he is prepared to turn US policy 180 degrees on a dime, especially to favor an autocrat, thus ensuring that everyone who deals with Washington–especially those committed to democracy–needs to hedge.
Washington will presumably let the Emiratis and Saudis try to ensure Haftar’s victory. US forces, not previously known to have been in Libya, have supposedly withdrawn, though it is of course possible that they are still clandestinely shifting to help Haftar. The Emiratis and Saudis have proven inept at best, catastrophically incapable at worst, in Yemen, where their intervention against the Houthi rebellion has stretched into a years-long war of attrition, rendering most of the country in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. Something similar could of course happen in Libya.
If instead Haftar is able to conquer the capital and move on to the west, the picture will be different but not likely pretty. Islamist militias will go underground to continue their resistance and Haftar will react with the kind of blunt force used in Benghazi, where he demonstrated little concern for collateral damage to civilians. Even as civil war has raged on and off over the past eight years, Libyans have enjoyed self-government at the municipal level, where they are in the midst of holding elections. It seems unlikely Haftar, if he succeeds in chasing the GNA from Tripoli, will tolerate even that much democracy. He has been actively stacking local governments in areas he already controls.
President Trump certainly won’t be one to press Haftar, who if he wins will be beholden to the absolute monarchies in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The President has found another autocrat he likes, in addition to Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping, Rodrigo Duterte, Vladimir Putin, and others. Libyans be damned. Full steam ahead.
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Your Saturday video
I appeared with Middle East Institute President Paul Salem and Dialogue Director Randa Slim to discuss my From War to Peace in the Middle East, Balkans and Ukraine this week. I presented the lessons learned from peacebuilding in the Balkans that I believe should be applied in the Middle East. Here is the video:
Here are the powerpoint slides I used as my notes:
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Peace Picks March 25-29
1.The Contours of global security: Border line, critical security | Tuesday, March 26, 2019 | 1:30 am – 3:45pm | The Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20004-3027| Register Here |
As debate rages in Washington over President Trump’s characterization of the situation at the southern U.S. border as a national security emergency, the risks and stakes in several hot-spot regions around the world are far less open to question.
Agenda
1:30-2:30 pm: Borders as a National Security Crisis
Laura Dawson, Director of Canada Institute at Wilson Center
Rachel Schmidtke, Program Associate, Migration Policy, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
Duncan Wood, Director, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
Moderator:
The Honorable Earl Anthony Wayne,Public Policy Fellow; Advisory Board Co-chair, Mexico Institute, Wilson Center
2:45-3:45 pm: Hot-Spot Security Round-Up
Venezuela: Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Latin American Program, Wilson Center
North Korea: Jean H. Lee,Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Wilson Center
Iran and Syria: Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Moderator: John Milewski, Director of Digital Programming, Wilson Center
2. Constraining Iran’s nuclear and Missile capabilities| Thursday, March 28, 2019 | 2:00 am – 3:30pm | Brooking Institute |1775 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here|
The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure campaign” is putting Iran under great stress, but it is unlikely to compel Tehran to accept its far-reaching demands. The United States needs a new strategy for constraining Iran’s future nuclear capabilities as well as its missile program. Two new Brookings monographs—“Constraining Iran’s Future Nuclear Capabilities” by Robert Einhorn and Richard Nephew, and “Constraining Iran’s Missile Program” by Robert Einhorn and Vann Van Diepen—provide recommendations for addressing the challenges to regional and international security posed by Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
Agenda
Speakers
Vann H. Van Diepen, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Nephew, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Center for 21st Century
Discussant
Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow – Center for Middle East Policy
Moderator
Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy,Center for 21st Century
3. The MENA Region: from Transition to Transformation | Thursday, March 28, 2019 | 4:00 am – 5:30pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036-2103| Register Here |
Eight years after the Arab Spring and the collapse of commodity prices, full stabilization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remains elusive. Many countries have yet to enact the deep structural reforms deemed necessary to achieve economic transformation that yields sustainable, inclusive growth and employment opportunities.
Through its updated MENA strategy, the World Bank Group aims to pursue a two-pronged approach to promote peace and stability through economic and social inclusion. This approach builds on the four pillars of the World Bank’s 2015 MENA strategy, which includes renewing the social contract, strengthening resilience to shocks, supporting regional cooperation, and supporting recovery and reconstruction in conflict-affected countries.
Speakers
The vice president for the Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank Group.
Maha Yahya, Director of the Carnegie Middle East Center.
Rabah Arezki, Chief economist for the Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank.
4. A New Parliament in Iraq | Friday, March 29, 2019 | 11:30 am – 12:30pm | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
| Register Here |
As Iraq’s new parliament and government come to power, the country has seen significant political, social, and economic pressures. While challenges remain, fresh leadership presents Iraq with the opportunity to overcome these obstacles and make progress by developing its economy, increasing security, and strengthening governance and social services. Speaker al-Halbousi, who will be meeting with senior Trump administration officials and Congressional leaders during his visit to Washington, will lead the Council of Representatives as it grapples with all of these issues and navigates the many challenges of Iraq’s democratic process.
Speakers
Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
His Excellency Mr. Mohammed Al-Halbousi, Council of Representatives, Republic of Iraq
5. The Outlook for Europe after EU elections| Tuesday, March 26, 2019 | 2:30 pm – 3:30pm | The Heritage Foundation |214 Massachusetts Ave NE Washington, DC 20002 | Register Here |
Europe remains in flux. The implications of populism, political fragmentation, and the upending of traditional political paradigms in many countries are not yet fully understood. The United Kingdom is leaving the European Union, and the continent continues to grapple with the repercussions of large-scale migration and the return of great power competition. Threats from Russia and terrorism remain potent, while Europe has only begun to grapple with rising Chinese assertiveness and economic investments. Upcoming European Parliamentary elections in May could be a defining moment. Join us as our panelists assess how EU elections could affect the future of Europe. How are shifting political dynamics in the EU influencing competing visions for Europe’s future? How will the role of the nation state in Europe likely evolve? What do changes to Europe’s political makeup mean for transatlantic relations? What areas of synergy should U.S. policymakers focus on for maximum impact?
A panel discussion featuring
Zsolt Németh, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee Parliament of Hungary
Nile Gardiner, Director, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom
Peter Rough, Fellow, The Hudson Institute
Hosted by
James Jay Carafano, Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
6.The Case for US Foreign Assistance | Thursday, March 26, 2019 | 1:30 am – 3:00pm | Center for Strategic and International Study | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036| Register Here|
The Marshall Plan and other initiatives that followed (such as the Alliance for Progress and USAID) were created in the context of great power competition. We are perhaps returning to an age of renewed great power competition. The developing world today is much richer, freer, and has more options. In this context, American foreign assistance is still needed, but in a radically changed world.
Foreign assistance in the United States has always operated in the context of enlightened self-interest. In Senator Vandenberg’s time there were significant critics of assistance who doubted the effectiveness of foreign aid just as there are today. How do we make the case for American foreign assistance in this new era? What are the major global challenges and opportunities that we might take advantage of by investing U.S. foreign assistance dollars?
Speakers
Senator Thomas A. Daschle, Former U.S. Senator (D-SD)
Senator Norm Coleman, Former U.S. Senator (R-MN)
Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development
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The Balkans in perspective
I did this interview for Al Jazeera Balkan March 1. How and why they waited until March 19 to publish it I don’t know, but it means I have little recall of what I said. I hope it is still current:
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Why the rush?
I spoke this morning via Skype to a conference in Pristina on the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue: Nomalization or an Aggravated Status Quo. These were my speaking notes, which I did not follow religiously:
1. Thank you all for accommodating me by Skype. I’ll miss the pleasure of your company but appreciate the opportunity for my views to be heard.
2. As I hope you all know, I am an opponent of land and people swaps in the Balkans, for many reasons:
- They would be an admission that neither Belgrade nor Pristina is able to treat all their citizens properly and equally under the law, which is the main requirement of NATO and EU membership.
- They would lead, sooner or later, to massive displacement of Serbs from south of the Ibar River and Albanians from Serbia proper.
- Germany, the Netherlands, and other EU members will not approve accession for partitioned countries.
- I don’t believe any of the deals I’ve seen could be welcomed by Presidents Vucic and Thaci or approved in parliament in either Belgrade or Pristina, and certainly not in a referendum in Kosovo.
- A land swap would destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Milorad Dodik has been clear about his intention to lead Republika Srpska to secession if Kosovo is partitioned.
- A land swap in the Balkans would strengthen Russian claims to the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the secession of Transnistria, Donetsk and Luhansk as well as the annexation of Crimea.
- UN membership for Kosovo would only be possible if Washington were to concede on those issues, which it has no interest in doing.
3. Land and people swaps are a zombie idea: it wanders the earth looking for its next victim and is difficult to kill because it is dead already.
4. So why so much attention to a zombie idea and so much urgency about concluding an agreement?
5.Presidents Thaci and Vucic are both ethnic nationalists, not liberal democrats. Ethnic nationalists have a hard time dealing with numerical minorities. If they are equal, what use is being part of the supposedly privileged minority?
6. But President Thaci long resisted the idea of partitioning Kosovo. Why did he change his mind?
7. Best to ask him of course, but my explanation is this: he saw that Belgrade was making progress with the idea in Washington, where there is also an ethnic nationalist administration.
8. John Bolton was opposed to Kosovo independence and would be pleased to wreck a Clinton protégé, which Kosovo certainly is.
9. So when Bolton said he would entertain partition ideas if Vucic and Thaci could agree, President Thaci became concerned that he would be outflanked and end up with a one-sided proposition: northern Kosovo would go to Serbia without any gain for the Albanians.
10. So he invited the Presevo Albanians to Pristina and made it clear that no one-sided proposition would pass muster. It would have to be reciprocal.
11. That was a reasonable thing to do, but it does not mean that there really is an acceptable proposition, even a reciprocal one.
12. How can Vucic give up the territory in southern Serbia that Thaci wants, in defiance of concerns about the security of Serbia’s main route to the sea? How can he survive abandonment of Serb communities and religious sites south of the Ibar?
13. How can Thaci give up North Mitrovica, which was majority Albanian before the war, as well as Trepca and Gazivoda, his country’s main natural resources and water supply respectively?
14. So people come up with fantasies about 99 year leases, foreign management, and extra-territorial status that are simply too elaborate and risky to convince a serious person that they would last. The zombie emperor is wearing no clothes.
15. I’d like to finish with a question: why the urgency? I understand why Belgrade might feel some pressure for an early solution, as its EU accession is fewer years in the future than Kosovo’s.
16. But Kosovo should know that once Serbia enters the final stages of accession it will have to do whatever the EU member states ask. And one of the things they are certain to ask is complete normalization of relations with Pristina.
17. I fear, however, that some people in Belgrade and Pristina may feel some urgency because of President Trump’s promise of a Rose Garden ceremony.
18. They are unquestionably a nice occasion but let me be clear: a Rose Garden ceremony does not ensure impunity.
19. I’d be happy to see Presidents Vucic and Thaci cut a deal sooner rather than later. Kosovo might even want to offer concessions on payment of World Bank debts and the planned roles of the Kosovo army, as well as protection for the Serbs south of the Ibar.
20. But to sell your sovereignty for a bowl of porridge, or a Rose Garden ceremony, would be a historic and unforgivable mistake.
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Good and bad news
The good news is that the UK Labour Party is signaling it will back a second Brexit referendum. The bad news is that Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, partly responsible for negotiating the nuclear deal, has resigned.
Brexit: It has been apparent for some time now that the United Kingdom will be far worse off after it leaves the European Union. In fact, it is unlikely even to remain the United Kingdom, as Scotland and Northern Ireland could have good reasons for breaking up Her Majesty’s realm. Factories and financial institutions are fleeing. It is inconceivable that London can get a better trade deal with the US–or anyone else–acting alone rather than as a part of a more than 500-million person free trade area. Britain’s geopolitical weight is also vastly magnified inside the European Union compared to what it would be outside.
The problem has been how to cancel Brexit without defying the 2016 advisory referendum that launched it. Prime Minister May has been promising to deliver what the vote asked for by a margin of about 3.5 percentage points. Polls now indicate that Brexit might well be defeated in another referendum, if only because of demographic changes in the last three years. But a lot also depends on wording and the (unpredictable) political and economic circumstances in which a second referendum takes place. Nor is it clear yet whether Labour has the support in parliament to call a new referendum, though the defection of members from both Labour and the Conservatives in recent days increases the odds.
Zarif: The Iranian Foreign Minister resigned the same day he failed to appear in a video of Bashar al Assad meeting with the Supreme Leader. Whether that caused the resignation, or he had already resigned, is not clear, but Zarif was the relatively outward-looking face of the Iranian regime. His resignation will raise doubts about whether Iran intends to continue to comply with the nuclear deal, despite the American withdrawal and the failure of Europe to deliver the economic benefits anticipated. With Zarif out, a move by Tehran to abrogate the deal entirely is a step closer.
Some Americans would welcome that, as it might enable Washington to get the Europeans back in line and squeeze Tehran harder with sanctions. But it also opens the possibility of an Iranian push to develop nuclear weapons, sooner rather than later. Certainly anyone watching how well President Trump treats nuclear-armed Kim Jong-un could argue that Iran would be better off with a nuclear deterrent. The problem with that notion is Israel, which not only has nuclear weapons but might be inclined to use them to prevent Iran from getting close to a deployable nuclear weapon. Yes, it is possible that a deterrence relationship might emerge, but in the meanwhile the world could become a very dangerous place.
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