Tag: European Union
One thing not to worry about
Yesterday’s front-page New York Times piece on radicalization in Kosovo is every diplomat’s nightmare: a well-written, prominent story with solid facts that contradict what his or her government wants the Americans to believe. But there is another two-thirds of the story that got short shrift:
- the Kosovo government has already reacted vigorously and effectively to the inroads Islamic extremists have made, and
- Kosovo Albanians as well as their government remain overwhelmingly and enthusiastically pro-American and pro-European.
The article would have been a clarion call to action three or four years ago. But today it is largely old news. The story of relatively high levels of extremist recruitment and Saudi funding Carlotta Gall tells has already been amply documented. In fact, radicalization according to Adrian Shtuni is not uniform across Kosovo but focused in four municipalities:
The Kosovars themselves have spilled a lot of electrons on the subject, in particular the Saudi connection that is one of Gall’s main, and well-told, points. They figure:
In terms of the number of foreign fighters per capita amongst their Muslim population, Kosovo is in the bottom half of the list of countries, ranked 14th among 22 countries with the highest number of foreign fighters per capita of their respective Muslim populations.
The Kosovo government is claiming there have been no known Kosovar recruits to the Islamic State (ISIS) in the past year or so. To my knowledge, no one is denying that claim.
ISIS recruitment worldwide is down overall, due to its loss of territory and fighters over the past year. But in addition Pristina has been conducting a legal crackdown, described by the Police Director earlier this month in Brussels. It includes 110 arrests, 67 indictments and 26 convictions so far. This is not an easy thing to do for a young country still not a member of Interpol with lots of other problems. But it is getting done. The government has also prepared a 2015/20 strategy for countering violent extremism covering early identification, prevention, intervention and de-radicalization and reintegration.
The overall political environment is favorable to blocking ISIS recruitment: Kosovars are remarkably pro-NATO and pro-Europe, with over 90% supporting membership in the Alliance and the European Union. Despite divisive domestic politics that have led to street demonstrations focused on the wisdom of continuing Pristina’s dialogue with Belgrade, dissenters from the Euroatlantic path Kosovo has chosen are few and far between.
Americans are quick these days to see threats, in particular from Muslim populations. Kosovo however is a constitutionally secular state whose mostly Muslim population is as friendly to the West as any on earth. The Alliance saved Kosovo Albanians from Serbia’s effort to expel them in 1999, has protected the country ever since and is now in the process of helping it to build up its security forces. The European Union has been generous and helpful, providing most of the NATO troops deployed there and much of the international aid. It is not surprising that most Kosovars view Washington and Brussels as friends and protectors, not enemies.
Of course there are some individuals who feel differently. Unprovoked, a Kosovar killed two US airmen five years ago in Frankfurt. Other incidents may happen. What we need to do to ensure they are few and far between is to continue to help ensure the success of Kosovo’s democracy and economy, as well as its application of the rule of law. Despite the Times’ front-page article, Kosovo is one of the last things Americans should have to worry about.
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Peace Picks May 23-27
- Economic Sanctions on Russia | Monday, May 23rd | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With the proliferation of new hybrid threats in the global economy, the United States and its transatlantic partners have increasingly used economic sanctions to make broad geopolitical and state-sponsored threats not financially viable. The design and approval of sanctions against globally recognized threats is in the hands of governments that must coordinate on the objective and scope of sanctions, while their implementation relies on the compliance of the private sector that must bear the burden of reduced trade. After a keynote speech on where the United States stand on economic sanctions on Russia, Ambassador Fried will take part in a high-level panel discussion on “US Sanctions Obligations.” Please join the Atlantic Council and Baker & McKenzie for an offsite conversation on Economic Sanctions on Russia, featuring the US State Department’s Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, Daniel Fried. Nicholas F. Coward, Baker & McKenzie Partner, and Caroline Vicini, Deputy Head of Delegation, Delegation of the European Union to the United States, will join the discussion. Anders Aslund, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, will introduce and moderate.
- Belarus in Transition | Monday, May 23rd | 2:00-3:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With revolutionary changes in Ukraine, great power ambitions in Russia, and falling oil prices paired with sanctions, there are serious challenges to Belarus’ paternalistic model of governance. These challenges, however, may present an opportunity for Belarus to move towards a more modern political ideology and economy. Dr. Larissa G. Titarenko, Professor at Belarus State University, and Dr. Valery Yevarouski, Fulbright Research Scholar at the Kennan Institute, will discuss the current socio-economic situation in Belarus and potential models of transition.
- Challenges Facing Europe: A Conversation with British Ambassador Sir Kim Darroch | Wednesday, May 25th | 10:00-11:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Less than a month before the British referendum on EU membership, and as anti-refugee and anti-establishment narratives fuel forces of disintegration and nationalism across Europe, Sir Kim Darroch, British Ambassador to the United States, will address the geopolitical and economic issues facing Europe and explore a strategic transatlantic response. An experienced and innovative diplomat, Sir Kim became the British Ambassador to the United States in January 2016. Prior to that, he served as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron. In this capacity, he led the National Security Council in dealing with the rise of ISIS, nuclear threats from Iran, and Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Sir Kim, who also served as Britain’s Permanent Representative to the European Union, is particularly well-versed on the Brussels-centric debates surrounding enlargement, integration, and economic recovery. Frederick Kempe, Atlantic Council President and CEO, will join the discussion.
- Making Sense of Pakistan’s Sectarian Landscape | Wednesday, May 25th | 10:30-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Pakistan’s diverse Islamic landscape features Sunni sects, such as the Deobandis, Barelvis, and Ahl-e-Hadith, as well as Shia ones that include Twelvers, Ismailis, and Khojas. While sectarian tensions in Pakistan are commonly seen through a Sunni/Shia lens, significant divides within the Sunni groups tend to receive less attention. Competition between Deobandis, Barelvis, and Ahl-e-Hadith is intense, and understanding this intra-Sunni competition is essential in order to comprehend not just Pakistan’s sectarian dynamics, but also the roots of extremism in Pakistan and how to counter it. This event will examine intra-Sunni divides in Pakistan, and it will more broadly consider how best to understand the current state of the Sunni/Shia divide. It will also discuss how Pakistan’s contemporary sectarian climate is affected by the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and other developments in global geopolitics. Speakers include Farhat Haq, Wilson Center Fellow, and Marvin Weinbaum, Director, Center for Pakistan Studies, Middle East Institute.
- Turkey’s Defense-Industrial Policy | Thursday, May 26th | 10:30-12:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for the latest event in the Atlantic Council’s Defense-Industrial Policy Series, featuring a discussion on Turkey’s defense-industrial policy with Dr. Ismail Demir, Turkish undersecretary for defense industries. The Defense-Industrial Policy Series is a platform for senior government executives in defense and aerospace to address the public policies that shape these industries’ markets. By engaging the perspective of government leaders about issues at the interface of defense ministries and industries, the series aims to cultivate a constituency for practical solutions to these problems.
- A Conversation on the Middle East with Congressman Adam Kinzinger | Thursday, May 26th | 11:45-1:00 | Hudson Institute and The Foreign Policy Initiative | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join Hudson Institute and the Foreign Policy Initiative as we host Congressman Adam Kinzinger of Illinois for a discussion with journalist Josh Rogin of Bloomberg View. The focus of the discussion will be the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East, including ISIS and the resulting refugee crisis, the U.S. exit strategy for Afghanistan, terrorist safe havens in North Africa, the Iran nuclear deal, and a way forward in Syria. As a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a congressional leader on national security and foreign policy, Congressman Kinzinger will share his perspective on these challenging issues and how America can lead in ensuring greater global stability and prosperity.
- China’s Role in a Changing Middle East | Thursday, May 26th | 12:00-1:00 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | China is engaged in active, high-profile diplomacy in the Middle East, ranging from presidential visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran to a mediation effort in the Syrian civil war earlier this year. Beijing’s One Belt, One Road initiative to connect major Eurasian economies through infrastructure, trade, and investment relies in part on stability across the oil-supplying states of the Middle East. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Dr. Pan Guang (Chinese Association of Middle East Studies) for a discussion of the drivers and impacts of China’s increasingly complex role in the Middle East, the objectives Beijing and regional capitals are pursuing in their relations, and the implications for the United States. Paul Salem, MEI Vice President for Policy and Research, will moderate.
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Still works in progress
Home from the Balkans for a couple of days, I’ve had time to reflect a bit on my almost two weeks in Podgorica, Belgrade and Sarajevo. I was in Podgorica and Sarajevo for academically-sponsored conferences. I inserted the stop in Belgrade during the week between them. In all three places, I organized my own visit, with the cooperation of friends and colleagues. The US embassies were not involved, except that in Sarajevo it was one of the sponsors of the meeting.
All three capitals are wrestling with internal political issues with profound implications: Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic has taken some opposition figures into his cabinet to try to ensure wide acceptance of the October elections as well as NATO accession, Serbian Prime Minister Vucic is rejiggering his coalition in an effort to accelerate progress towards the EU, and the many levels of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina are trying to convince the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to release $800 million to support implementation of the EU-imposed Reform Agenda.
Montenegro, despite some recent Russian-promoted disorder in Podgorica’s streets and even in parliament, has the best chances of success. NATO issued its formal invitation yesterday. The Russians objected, demonstrating how false its avowals of feeling threatened by NATO expansion really are. Montenegro’s 2000-person army is not even a threat to its immediate neighbors, much less to Moscow. The 28 members of the Alliance still have to ratify the accession. Podgorica is nervous mainly about US ratification, because of the Trump factor, and would like to see it done during the lame duck Senate session following the November election, in particular if he becomes president.
The real significance of NATO accession for Montenegro is that it keeps up the momentum in the Balkans, where Macedonia and Kosovo are already committed to joining the Alliance. That leaves only Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has asked for a Membership Action Plan, and Serbia, which has not made a decision on joining and flirts with Russia incessantly. Montenegro’s entry into NATO doesn’t threaten Russia, but the continued attraction of the Alliance to Balkans countries could end Russia’s troublemaking in the region.
Belgrade’s infatuation with Moscow was one of the disappointments of my trip to the Balkans. Normally proud and self-reliant Serbs tell me they need Russia’s warm embrace and cultural affinity. The pan-Slavic sentiment I get. We all like to chum with those who speak our language, or something close to it, listen to similar music and worship in ways we recognize.
The warm embrace is harder to comprehend. Russia is a declining regional power that allowed its currency to appreciate unrealistically during the period of high oil and gas prices, making its other industries uncompetitive in world markets. With prices now less than half of what they once were, Moscow is unable to balance its budget and lacks the industrial infrastructure needed to diversify its economy and finance the solution of its many serious social problems. It is also stuck in wars in Syria and Ukraine, not to mention smaller and less arduous military interventions in Georgia and Moldova.
Prime Minister Vucic recognizes the sterility of Russophilia and ran a markedly pro-Europe re-election campaign in April. But getting to Europe is not done in one big leap. Even while I was in Belgrade, masked thugs destroyed allegedly illegal construction on the waterfront, in order apparently to avoid a drawn-out court procedure. Many think the government was involved, or at least turned a blind eye, at the behest of someone well-connected. Calls to the police for help went unanswered. That’s not how things are handled in European states with consolidated judicial systems.
Many more liberal democratic Serbs and others in the Balkans think Europe and the US are turning a blind eye too. Washington and Brussels appreciate the progress Vucic has made reaching agreements with the authorities in Kosovo. He has accepted the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its whole territory, including the Serb-majority north, and has acknowledged that Serbia and Kosovo will enter the EU as separate states, each at its own pace. This is not far from formal recognition of Kosovo’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. But are Washington and Brussels rewarding this progress on Kosovo by ignoring Serbian government control of the media and courts as well as failure to reform its security services?
This is a good question. I hope the answer is no, but I also hope that we will be patient as well as exigent. There are lots of things that can be done to assist Serbia’s progress towards Europe: improved road connections to the Mediterranean through Montenegro and Kosovo, for example, as well as gas supplies that do not come from Russia. There are also next steps with Kosovo: the Serbian and Kosovar chiefs of staff, who have apparently never met, should be talking with each other regularly, and the boundary/border between the two should be agreed and demarcated.
When it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I confess to being flummoxed. I’m not at all sure that the rather slow and rudimentary steps so far in the European Reform Agenda are worth $800 million, especially if some portion of that amount ends up feeding the corruption beast. The IMF and World Bank will tell you they can account for their funds, but part of the money will be displacing Bosnian funding that will then be diverted to less transparent purposes. Money is fungible. Some authorities in Bosnia are past masters at enriching themselves whenever it passes through their hands. That helps them to consolidate power and maintain their stranglehold on a country that deserves better.
Or it may help them defy the international community and make promises about independence for Republika Srpska, the Serb-dominated half of the country. That isn’t going to happen, because the international community won’t accept it. But those who support that goal are succeeding at making Bosnia and Herzegovina exceedingly difficult to govern effectively. A coffee at an outdoor cafe in Sniper Alley and a walk with an old friend to buy a Sarajevo football club tee shirt for my grandson are great pleasures, but I’d trade them happily for a Bosnia in which ordinary people could enjoy European standards of living and freedom from bombastic nationalism.
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A foreigner’s view of Belgrade today
I’ve been the darling of the pro-government press in Serbia the last few days, largely because I called on Prime Minister Vucic in front of a lot of photographers. As I’ve sometimes been highly critical of Serbia (especially its behavior in Bosnia and Kosovo), I’m alleged to have changed my opinion, as if that accords a democratic seal of approval.
First: let’s be clear about who I am: just a private citizen with long experience in the Balkans, starting with my first trip to Sarajevo in November 1995. That does not make me more than a devotee of the region whose views are strictly unofficial. If you want to know what the US government thinks, ask its ambassador.
I suppose it is true that I’ve changed my view of Serbia, most of all because Serbia has changed in important ways since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic going on 16 years ago. I’ve given a detailed account of those changes in a recent book chapter that I recommend highly, as any self-respecting professor would. Serbia today has made significant progress away from the electoral autocracy Milosevic ran. Progress towards the European Union was slow under President Tadic but has accelerated under Prime Minister Vucic. Serbia is headed in the right direction.
But that doesn’t mean the road ahead is clear. Here I’ll give a quick summary of just the more important challenges Serbia’s democracy faces today, all of which have more to do with values rather than the more technical requirements of Europe’s acquis communautaire:
- The government exercises excessive influence on the media. This is well-documented by the OSCE as well as others and is the most common complaint I hear from friends across the political spectrum in Serbia. Editors are too often court-appointed, journalists are intimidated, self-censorship is common, media are heavily dependent on government advertising, and the prime minister too often attacks the questioners rather than the questions.
- The courts are neither independent nor efficacious. This makes a difference in many spheres: cases like that of the murdered Albanian American Bytyqi brothers remain unsolved despite many promises to prosecute the perpetrators, impunity for corruption and abuse of state resources is still more the rule than the exception, citizens feel alienated and abused, and investors are wary of risking their resources.
- The security services still require reform. Higher-level war criminals have not been brought to justice, eavesdropping and other domestic spying is too common, police are still not trained to serve and protect, and civilian control is not strictly observed.
Let me add a fourth:
- Russia’s anti-democratic influence has grown by leaps and bounds. Moscow subsidizes candidates, high officials embrace Putin’s autocratic behavior, emotional pan-Slavism is all too common, Belgrade refuses to align itself with European Union sanctions levied in response to the invasion of Ukraine and some even suggest that the US is attempting to mount a Euromaidan type coup in Republika Srpska.
Now one Serb wag or another will respond that all those problems exist in one form or the other in the US as well, even the last. Donald Trump has made no secret of his admiration of Vladimir Putin.
My response would be: yes. That’s true. Putin’s Russophilia is just as ridiculous as some of what I’ve heard in Belgrade. Washington also has trouble bringing war criminals to justice, our police mistreat too many citizens, our courts are sometimes subject to too much political influence, and the White House is often accused of manipulating the media, most recently on the Iran nuclear deal. There are differences of degree, and validity, but all democracies continue to struggle with these important issues. Neither the US nor Serbia is an exception.
But I hasten to add that a lot of what I’ve seen here is positive. Last night in Belgrade I attended a packed documentary film about the wholesale murder of Albanians in Kosovo in 1999 and the hiding of their bodies at a police installation in Serbia because Milosevic thought “no bodies–no crime.” The Albanian diplomat who represents Kosovo here came up to introduce himself. I also enjoyed a beer with two friends from Kosovo I met on the street here: one is Serb and the other Albanian. They had driven from Kosovo together yesterday afternoon. Picture that happening 10 years ago.
But it is still is incumbent on a foreign visitor to hold up a mirror and point out the most glaring things needing correction. If he is lucky–and I think I am–he might be heard by those with some power and authority, or those in civil society with energy and influence, to do something to fix things. He can also offer a helping hand, if the local people want it.
If not, he can still write another book chapter, or a blog post.
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Serbia wants stability
I am finishing up a first day of meetings and interviews in Belgrade. I hadn’t been here for I don’t remember how many years. Commerce is notably more active and everything a bit spiffier, except for the rather tired Hyatt hotel, once the glitziest place in town. Prime Minister Vucic, whom I saw this morning, is readying a new government for parliamentary approval following on his good performance in the April 24 election.
Serbia today worries about stability in its neighborhood. That alone is good news, since under Slobodan Milosevic it spent a good deal of time and effort creating instability throughout the Balkans. There is unfortunately a lot to worry about. Macedonia is suffering a major political crisis, initiated over illegal wiretapping but now extending far beyond that. Bosnia and Herzegovina has its perpetual political problem: Republika Srpska President Dodik wants his 49% “entity” to be independent and is doing his best to render the Sarajevo government dysfunctional. Kosovo has weathered a normal succession of presidents but faces continuing violent opposition, in particular to talks with Belgrade, and advocacy of union with Albania, which Kosovo’s constitution prohibits. Scandal allegations and political ambiguity are buffeting Croatia.
Things in Serbia are relatively calm and clear. Vucic may not have won quite as many seats as he would have liked, but he has a clear majority and will bring in a few other parties to consolidate his hold on power. His more challenging opposition, part of which will be within the government and even the presidency, is from nationalists and Russophiles who really don’t stand a chance. Their Greater Serbia program has been rejected in both war and peace. Moscow, while thumping its chest quite a bit, really has little to offer anyone in the Balkans, as its treasury is running dry due to low oil and gas prices. Moscow is also exhausting its military and credibility in wars in Ukraine and Syria.
On the more democratic and civic left of the political spectrum fragmentation and confusion reign in Serbia. Former President Tadic has been unable to assemble a critical mass and has prevented others from doing so.
Vucic is therefore as free as any Serbian prime minister has been for a long time to set Serbia’s direction. My hope is that he will double down on the more politically difficult parts of qualifying for EU membership, in particular by allowing far more media freedom, instituting significant security sector reforms and developing a more independent and efficacious judicial system. I discuss these issues in a recently published book chapter on “Challenges of Democratization in Serbia, which I know the PM has read.
Beyond that, it seems to me the regional issues really are very important. The priorities include completing the Durres/Pristina road to Nis, the Belgrade/Bar road through Montenegro, railway improvements and added intra-regional flights, especially between Belgrade and Pristina. The Kosovo/Serbia boundary/border needs demarcation. These are the subjects of what former Croatian Foreign Minister Pusic calls “boring politics”(as opposed to the heroic politics of state formation) but they are vital in providing the kind of economic stimulus and interconnectedness required for stability in a place like the Balkans.
I’ll also hope that Belgrade will prepared to restart talks with Pristina, focusing initially on implementation of the existing agreements but eventually extending to a settlement of all outstanding issues, including entry of Kosovo into the United Nations and establishment of diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Pristina. With respect to Bosnia, Belgrade needs somehow to rein in Dodik and convince him to throw in his lot with a government in Sarajevo that can credibly begin to prepare the country for EU membership. Solutions in Bosnia and Kosovo would do a great deal to ensure the kind of stability democratic Belgrade needs.
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Montenegro looks pretty good from DC
I am speaking at the University of Montenegro in an hour or so. Here are my notes:
It is a great pleasure to be back in Montenegro. I enormously enjoyed my visit over the weekend to the coast, which I had never seen, with Sinisa Vukovic, a star professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Montenegro has exports it can be very proud of.
My last visit to Montenegro was well before independence, so this is a new country for me. I think you should be pleased with what you have achieved, but anxious to improve on it in the future. Let me explain.
Ten years of independence have wrought significant economic and political progress. Montenegro’s economic freedom score according to the Heritage Foundation has improved, even if rapid growth took a big hit from the 2008 financial crisis. Adoption of the euro as your currency has avoided many difficult issues, but also tied the country to Europe’s current recession and to a difficult competition with other producers within the eurozone. Democracy, while still a bit better than the Balkans average, has not improved overall according to Freedom House, even if the media have become more independent and the World Bank reports slowly improving government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.
Your country is a candidate for EU membership and seems to be progressing, even if slowly, in the accession process. NATO membership is imminent and most welcome. These are no small achievements. They bode well for the future. You need only look to nearby Macedonia to see what happens to a Balkan country that stalls in its progress towards Euroatlantic goals. The proverbial bicycle needs forward motion to prevent it from keeling over.
There are in my view two main obstacles blocking Montenegro’s bicycle path right now. There is no going around them. You have to clear them.
The first is rule of law. A weak judicial system has been unable to adequately counter organized crime, graft and other endemic forms of corruption, especially in public procurement and abuse of state institutions for political purposes. Major prosecutions are now ongoing, and I trust there will be more. I worry not when prosecutions happen but when they don’t. A year doesn’t go by in Washington DC without serious judicial accusations against two or three members of Congress, not to mention three or four governors in the rest of the country. I am pleased, not dismayed, when justice is done. I think you should be too. Not every prosecution will be successful, but every successful prosecution will be a warning to others.
The second major obstacle at the moment is the lack of a viable alternative to the main governing party. There has been no alternation in power since independence. While there are now small opposition forces that are Europe-focused, a big portion of the opposition has failed to detach itself from its Russian patron and end its campaign against independence. Montenegro needs a viable, constitutional, united Europe-focused alternative to your founding President and his dominant political party, who among other things have laudably earned allegiance from Montenegro’s substantial minorities.
The broad pro-independence coalition will not last forever, nor should it. At some point it will fragment—maybe that process has already started. This is a natural evolution that signals the beginning of the end of transition. It is necessary and unavoidable.
My saying this should not be interpreted as criticism of Prime Minister Djukanovic. To the contrary, he deserves a great deal of credit for the progress Montenegro has made, but it is time for Montenegro’s citizens to be thinking about how they can move beyond his long-dominant leadership to the normal democratic alternation in power of more conservative and more liberal political coalitions. Alternation in power cannot be done with an opposition that doesn’t accept the constitution of the state and seeks instead to create a greater Serbia, an idea defeated in four wars and during more than 16 years of peace. Nor can it be done with people who reject Montenegro’s European future and pine for a return to an alliance with Mother Russia. Read more
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