Tag: European Union
Surprise!
Yes, the “leave” vote surprised me. I expected economic rationality and political equanimity to prevail over distaste for immigrants and flag-waving England firsters. Identity politics has triumphed once again. Let it be a lesson to me.
The immediate economic implications are already clear: a sharp fall in the British pound, a sell-off in stock markets worldwide, an even shakier euro, and more than likely renewed recession in Europe as well as a sharp slowdown elsewhere. The US may be the exception for a while, as many people will seek safe haven in the dollar, but that will drive it up, weaken exports, and slow already slow growth. Uncertainty will persist: Scotland will proceed with a second referendum, Wales may follow suit, and Catalonia will try to do so. Will the Netherlands or France put the EU to a vote?
What about the Balkans and Middle East, where my attention is focused?
In the Balkans, both the immediate and longer term effects are dire. The region is heavily dependent on European trade and investment, which are going to be hit hard right away. But perhaps more important will be the political impact. Balkanites (that’s what I call people who live in the Balkans) have already been finding it hard to believe in their European prospects, which seem farther away than they did five years ago. Now they would be fools not to doubt the willingness of Europe minus UK to accommodate their membership.
These doubts will open the door to increased Russian influence, not only in the Balkans but also in Ukraine. No one gains more politically than Putin does from the UK referendum: it weakens his antagonists in the UK and the EU, makes his annexation of Crimea and occupation of southeastern Ukraine look more acceptable, and validates his ethnic nationalism. The vodka should be flowing freely at the Kremlin today. It will also flow into the Balkans. Putin will no doubt intensify his efforts in Serbia, in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska and in Macedonia to wean Slavs from their EU and NATO dreams.
The Middle East is a harder call. There are a lot of wealthy Gulf sheikhs with money and property in Britain. They won’t like seeing the pound collapse, and some may already be so strapped by low oil prices that they panic and get out. But my guess is that most will hang on. Slowed world economic growth will however crimp oil prices once again, after their recent rise to $50 and change. So the future of Gulf money in Britain is likely dimmer than it was in the past.
Britain’s role in the Middle East may also change. It has been a major European contributor to intervention not only in Iraq but also in Libya and Syria. A more inward-looking and reduced Britain is not going to have the same resources and will to underwrite such efforts.
Britain will of course raise its barriers to Middle Eastern immigrants, but it hasn’t been taking many of them in any event. The main focus of resentment has been against East Europeans and the threat of immigration from the Balkans. Young Albanians, Serbs, Bosniaks and Macedonians are going to lose both education and job opportunities that many have been enjoying in recent years.
Ironically, one of the many problems that need to be resolved during the two-year negotiation to implement Brexit, will be Brits abroad living in the rest of Europe, who number 1.2 million. Three million people from other EU countries live in the UK. If no accommodation is reached to allow these people to stay, we could see a massive population movement with unpredictable implications. Even if they are allowed to stay, this kind of migration is finished. The next British government will have to do everything it can to prevent foreigners from reaching its soon to be diminished shores.
Net net: Brexit is bad news for the UK, the EU, the US, the Balkans and the Middle East. It is good news for Vladimir Putin. My friends and I will not be celebrating.
PS: It took a couple of days, but John Oliver did a great, if pretty gross, explainer:
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Counting on the census
A: I doubt that is the path President Ivanic wants to go down. But the way Bosnia and Herzegovina works he has to always appear to be protecting Serb interests. The problem is constitutional. The Dayton constitution provides no incentives for politicians to gain support across ethnic lines. This is just the latest exemplar.
The political controversy around the census results is a serious embarrassment for anyone who is concerned about the country as a whole, which is what a president would normally be concerned about. A census should be a technical exercise with political implications, not a political exercise that affects the techniques used.
Q: At the same time Dodik is calling the Assembly of Republika Srpska (RS) to reject the census results as irrelevant.
A: I assume the RS Assembly will do as Dodik commands.
I doubt the crisis has peaked. Dodik will take any opportunity he is offered to reject whatever the state government decides. He seems to me quite determined to take RS down a road that keeps himself in power right now but leads to disaster for his constituents in the longer term.
Q: Can the international community tolerate manufacturing crisis from RS officials in such an important moment for BiH?
A: Can Bosnians tolerate it?
So long as Dodik continues to be reelected you will face crises of this sort. The international community has a lot bigger problems right now than publication of the census results in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU has delineated a clear path for Bosnia and Herzegovina towards reform. It also pays a lot of the country’s bills. The war ended over 20 years ago. Isn’t it time Bosnians accepted responsibility for their own census?
Q: At the same time we have a meeting of [Serbian Prime Minister] Vucic and [Croatian President] Grabar-Kitarovic who signed a declaration on relations between Serbia and Croatian, but problem child is against – RS! Their leaders obviously do not want reconciliation. Your comment?
A: RS under Dodik defines itself as opposed to Croat and Bosniak interests. Why would it welcome reconciliation?
It seems to me the divide between Belgrade and Banja Luka is getting bigger. What Dodik is doing is clearly not in Serbia’s interest. He is damaging Serbia’s EU prospects and championing a diehard Serb nationalist cause that has been defeated repeatedly both in war and in peacetime elections, except in RS.
I imagine Vucic will try to rein Dodik in, but I am not certain he’ll succeed. Dodik likes EU hard currency, but he is bent on making RS a Russian satellite. He has no serious interest in EU membership, unless he can achieve it as an independent and sovereign state. That isn’t going to happen.
I think the census results should be published, along with all the technical issues and how they have been resolved. Let the chips fall where they may.
Erol Avdo, also of Avaz, followed up with some additional questions later today:
Q: In today’s interview you are quoted to say that Aleksandar Vučić “will try to curb Dodik.” In what way and with which instruments Mr. Vučić can really curb Dodik, and does the Serbian leader want to do that? Or could it be that there is a change of mood in Belgrade (could they become more openly pro-Russian, with pro-Russian position (Šešelj radicals and others) in Serbian parliament?
A: You’ll have to ask Prime Minister Vucic whether he is comfortable with the Russophiles in Belgrade and whether he feels the pressure coming from them. It seems to me that giving in to them is a sure way of blocking his goal of EU membership.
As for curbing Dodik, the reasons to do so are clear: Dodik’s advocacy of RS independence puts Serbia in a lose-lose position. I’ll leave it to the Prime Minister to figure out what instruments to use, but I suspect that money is the prime leverage that would work with RS right now. Dodik is pretty desperate.
Q: Also, could Mladen Ivanic, who is an experienced and old politician, actually have a new assessment of that “change of heart” in Belgrade — and — in the worst case scenario — decide to show more resistance to all this EU accession process?
A: Ask him, not me, whether he has had a change of heart. In my way of thinking, he is not going to be able to outflank Dodik on the nationalism side, so he may as well stick with the EU.
Q: Or this is only all about census? Could Ivanic become more pro-Russian as well?
A: Russia is a declining regional power. Anyone who wants to tie the future of his country to a petro-state that lacks enough revenue to fund its budget is welcome to do so. Just don’t expect the U.S. or the EU to pay your bills or welcome you into their clubs if that is the choice you make.
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In
Of course I prefer that the UK stay in the European Union. The economic arguments are compelling, both for Brits and for Americans. Britain is clearly much better off today than it was when it joined the EU in 1973. Its economic future outside the EU is highly uncertain, causing stock markets worldwide to tremble until yesterday. Then they strengthened in response to indications the “remain” camp might win. A lot of US companies are established in Great Britain. Leaving would reduce trans-Atlantic trade and investment, hinder London’s role as a financial hub, reduce British and American access to European markets and hurt the fragile European recovery now just barely beginning.
But none of that has mattered much. Instead the “leave” campaign has gained momentum as a largely a populist rebellion against immigration, European bureaucrats and British (principally English) identity. Many Brits want out despite the economic arguments. The parallels to Donald Trump’s successful campaign for the Republican presidential nomination are all to obvious.
I hope the parallel does not end there. Trump’s effort so far is clearly a minority one. Assuming the polls are correct, the US election if held today would end in a landslide victory for Hillary Clinton, despite all the heavy baggage she carries. Great Britain will do the world, and the American election campaign, a great deal of good if it rejects “leave,” which has run a campaign only slightly less objectionable than Trump’s. The murder of “remain” parliamentarian Jo Cox cannot be pinned on the campaign itself, but it betrays the level of division and violence associated with this referendum. By the same token, if “leave” wins, it will put wind in Trump’s sails.
Both “leave” and Trump are drawing on a reservoir of resentment from globalization’s losers. They are protesting, loudly, and all too often with good reason: many have not seen an increase in wages for 20 years. Some blame that on trade agreements, immigration or people whose skin is not “white.” The real reasons are often tax policies that favor wealthy real estate investors like Donald Trump, lack of appropriate education to take on the new jobs globalization has created, the union-breaking Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher initiated, and a dearth of retraining opportunities or desire to exploit those that exist.
Ironically, a “leave” win will likely lead to at least one other “leave” vote. Most Scots are far more comfortable with Brussels Eurocrats than the English are. The First Minister has already indicated that Scotland will conduct another referendum on leaving Great Britain if Great Britain votes to leave the EU. Northern Ireland can’t be expected to follow suit, but what about Wales?
And what about other EU countries? We can expect several of them to want to follow Britain’s lead, which will mean a very hard line against concessions in the two years of departure negotiations that would follow the referendum. Germany and France in particular will be hard over not to make departure easy for Britain, in hopes of discouraging other members from following suit. Not to mention Spain, which faces a possible secession of Catalonia.
Nothing could please Vladimir Putin more than to watch the Europe that has united with the US in imposing sanctions in response to Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine, in particular on the basis of a referendum, since that is the meretricious device he used in Crimea. Never mind the possibility that parts of the Russian Federation might want to follow the precedent. Putin knows well how to deal with that, as he demonstrated in putting down the Chechnya rebellion.
So “out” is bad for the US and bad for the rest of Europe. It is good for Trump and Putin. That is enough reason for me to want the United Kingdom to remain “in.”
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One thing not to worry about
Yesterday’s front-page New York Times piece on radicalization in Kosovo is every diplomat’s nightmare: a well-written, prominent story with solid facts that contradict what his or her government wants the Americans to believe. But there is another two-thirds of the story that got short shrift:
- the Kosovo government has already reacted vigorously and effectively to the inroads Islamic extremists have made, and
- Kosovo Albanians as well as their government remain overwhelmingly and enthusiastically pro-American and pro-European.
The article would have been a clarion call to action three or four years ago. But today it is largely old news. The story of relatively high levels of extremist recruitment and Saudi funding Carlotta Gall tells has already been amply documented. In fact, radicalization according to Adrian Shtuni is not uniform across Kosovo but focused in four municipalities:
The Kosovars themselves have spilled a lot of electrons on the subject, in particular the Saudi connection that is one of Gall’s main, and well-told, points. They figure:
In terms of the number of foreign fighters per capita amongst their Muslim population, Kosovo is in the bottom half of the list of countries, ranked 14th among 22 countries with the highest number of foreign fighters per capita of their respective Muslim populations.
The Kosovo government is claiming there have been no known Kosovar recruits to the Islamic State (ISIS) in the past year or so. To my knowledge, no one is denying that claim.
ISIS recruitment worldwide is down overall, due to its loss of territory and fighters over the past year. But in addition Pristina has been conducting a legal crackdown, described by the Police Director earlier this month in Brussels. It includes 110 arrests, 67 indictments and 26 convictions so far. This is not an easy thing to do for a young country still not a member of Interpol with lots of other problems. But it is getting done. The government has also prepared a 2015/20 strategy for countering violent extremism covering early identification, prevention, intervention and de-radicalization and reintegration.
The overall political environment is favorable to blocking ISIS recruitment: Kosovars are remarkably pro-NATO and pro-Europe, with over 90% supporting membership in the Alliance and the European Union. Despite divisive domestic politics that have led to street demonstrations focused on the wisdom of continuing Pristina’s dialogue with Belgrade, dissenters from the Euroatlantic path Kosovo has chosen are few and far between.
Americans are quick these days to see threats, in particular from Muslim populations. Kosovo however is a constitutionally secular state whose mostly Muslim population is as friendly to the West as any on earth. The Alliance saved Kosovo Albanians from Serbia’s effort to expel them in 1999, has protected the country ever since and is now in the process of helping it to build up its security forces. The European Union has been generous and helpful, providing most of the NATO troops deployed there and much of the international aid. It is not surprising that most Kosovars view Washington and Brussels as friends and protectors, not enemies.
Of course there are some individuals who feel differently. Unprovoked, a Kosovar killed two US airmen five years ago in Frankfurt. Other incidents may happen. What we need to do to ensure they are few and far between is to continue to help ensure the success of Kosovo’s democracy and economy, as well as its application of the rule of law. Despite the Times’ front-page article, Kosovo is one of the last things Americans should have to worry about.
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Peace Picks May 23-27
- Economic Sanctions on Russia | Monday, May 23rd | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With the proliferation of new hybrid threats in the global economy, the United States and its transatlantic partners have increasingly used economic sanctions to make broad geopolitical and state-sponsored threats not financially viable. The design and approval of sanctions against globally recognized threats is in the hands of governments that must coordinate on the objective and scope of sanctions, while their implementation relies on the compliance of the private sector that must bear the burden of reduced trade. After a keynote speech on where the United States stand on economic sanctions on Russia, Ambassador Fried will take part in a high-level panel discussion on “US Sanctions Obligations.” Please join the Atlantic Council and Baker & McKenzie for an offsite conversation on Economic Sanctions on Russia, featuring the US State Department’s Coordinator for Sanctions Policy, Daniel Fried. Nicholas F. Coward, Baker & McKenzie Partner, and Caroline Vicini, Deputy Head of Delegation, Delegation of the European Union to the United States, will join the discussion. Anders Aslund, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, will introduce and moderate.
- Belarus in Transition | Monday, May 23rd | 2:00-3:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With revolutionary changes in Ukraine, great power ambitions in Russia, and falling oil prices paired with sanctions, there are serious challenges to Belarus’ paternalistic model of governance. These challenges, however, may present an opportunity for Belarus to move towards a more modern political ideology and economy. Dr. Larissa G. Titarenko, Professor at Belarus State University, and Dr. Valery Yevarouski, Fulbright Research Scholar at the Kennan Institute, will discuss the current socio-economic situation in Belarus and potential models of transition.
- Challenges Facing Europe: A Conversation with British Ambassador Sir Kim Darroch | Wednesday, May 25th | 10:00-11:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Less than a month before the British referendum on EU membership, and as anti-refugee and anti-establishment narratives fuel forces of disintegration and nationalism across Europe, Sir Kim Darroch, British Ambassador to the United States, will address the geopolitical and economic issues facing Europe and explore a strategic transatlantic response. An experienced and innovative diplomat, Sir Kim became the British Ambassador to the United States in January 2016. Prior to that, he served as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron. In this capacity, he led the National Security Council in dealing with the rise of ISIS, nuclear threats from Iran, and Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Sir Kim, who also served as Britain’s Permanent Representative to the European Union, is particularly well-versed on the Brussels-centric debates surrounding enlargement, integration, and economic recovery. Frederick Kempe, Atlantic Council President and CEO, will join the discussion.
- Making Sense of Pakistan’s Sectarian Landscape | Wednesday, May 25th | 10:30-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Pakistan’s diverse Islamic landscape features Sunni sects, such as the Deobandis, Barelvis, and Ahl-e-Hadith, as well as Shia ones that include Twelvers, Ismailis, and Khojas. While sectarian tensions in Pakistan are commonly seen through a Sunni/Shia lens, significant divides within the Sunni groups tend to receive less attention. Competition between Deobandis, Barelvis, and Ahl-e-Hadith is intense, and understanding this intra-Sunni competition is essential in order to comprehend not just Pakistan’s sectarian dynamics, but also the roots of extremism in Pakistan and how to counter it. This event will examine intra-Sunni divides in Pakistan, and it will more broadly consider how best to understand the current state of the Sunni/Shia divide. It will also discuss how Pakistan’s contemporary sectarian climate is affected by the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and other developments in global geopolitics. Speakers include Farhat Haq, Wilson Center Fellow, and Marvin Weinbaum, Director, Center for Pakistan Studies, Middle East Institute.
- Turkey’s Defense-Industrial Policy | Thursday, May 26th | 10:30-12:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please join us for the latest event in the Atlantic Council’s Defense-Industrial Policy Series, featuring a discussion on Turkey’s defense-industrial policy with Dr. Ismail Demir, Turkish undersecretary for defense industries. The Defense-Industrial Policy Series is a platform for senior government executives in defense and aerospace to address the public policies that shape these industries’ markets. By engaging the perspective of government leaders about issues at the interface of defense ministries and industries, the series aims to cultivate a constituency for practical solutions to these problems.
- A Conversation on the Middle East with Congressman Adam Kinzinger | Thursday, May 26th | 11:45-1:00 | Hudson Institute and The Foreign Policy Initiative | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Join Hudson Institute and the Foreign Policy Initiative as we host Congressman Adam Kinzinger of Illinois for a discussion with journalist Josh Rogin of Bloomberg View. The focus of the discussion will be the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East, including ISIS and the resulting refugee crisis, the U.S. exit strategy for Afghanistan, terrorist safe havens in North Africa, the Iran nuclear deal, and a way forward in Syria. As a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a congressional leader on national security and foreign policy, Congressman Kinzinger will share his perspective on these challenging issues and how America can lead in ensuring greater global stability and prosperity.
- China’s Role in a Changing Middle East | Thursday, May 26th | 12:00-1:00 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | China is engaged in active, high-profile diplomacy in the Middle East, ranging from presidential visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran to a mediation effort in the Syrian civil war earlier this year. Beijing’s One Belt, One Road initiative to connect major Eurasian economies through infrastructure, trade, and investment relies in part on stability across the oil-supplying states of the Middle East. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host Dr. Pan Guang (Chinese Association of Middle East Studies) for a discussion of the drivers and impacts of China’s increasingly complex role in the Middle East, the objectives Beijing and regional capitals are pursuing in their relations, and the implications for the United States. Paul Salem, MEI Vice President for Policy and Research, will moderate.
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Still works in progress
Home from the Balkans for a couple of days, I’ve had time to reflect a bit on my almost two weeks in Podgorica, Belgrade and Sarajevo. I was in Podgorica and Sarajevo for academically-sponsored conferences. I inserted the stop in Belgrade during the week between them. In all three places, I organized my own visit, with the cooperation of friends and colleagues. The US embassies were not involved, except that in Sarajevo it was one of the sponsors of the meeting.
All three capitals are wrestling with internal political issues with profound implications: Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic has taken some opposition figures into his cabinet to try to ensure wide acceptance of the October elections as well as NATO accession, Serbian Prime Minister Vucic is rejiggering his coalition in an effort to accelerate progress towards the EU, and the many levels of governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina are trying to convince the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to release $800 million to support implementation of the EU-imposed Reform Agenda.
Montenegro, despite some recent Russian-promoted disorder in Podgorica’s streets and even in parliament, has the best chances of success. NATO issued its formal invitation yesterday. The Russians objected, demonstrating how false its avowals of feeling threatened by NATO expansion really are. Montenegro’s 2000-person army is not even a threat to its immediate neighbors, much less to Moscow. The 28 members of the Alliance still have to ratify the accession. Podgorica is nervous mainly about US ratification, because of the Trump factor, and would like to see it done during the lame duck Senate session following the November election, in particular if he becomes president.
The real significance of NATO accession for Montenegro is that it keeps up the momentum in the Balkans, where Macedonia and Kosovo are already committed to joining the Alliance. That leaves only Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has asked for a Membership Action Plan, and Serbia, which has not made a decision on joining and flirts with Russia incessantly. Montenegro’s entry into NATO doesn’t threaten Russia, but the continued attraction of the Alliance to Balkans countries could end Russia’s troublemaking in the region.
Belgrade’s infatuation with Moscow was one of the disappointments of my trip to the Balkans. Normally proud and self-reliant Serbs tell me they need Russia’s warm embrace and cultural affinity. The pan-Slavic sentiment I get. We all like to chum with those who speak our language, or something close to it, listen to similar music and worship in ways we recognize.
The warm embrace is harder to comprehend. Russia is a declining regional power that allowed its currency to appreciate unrealistically during the period of high oil and gas prices, making its other industries uncompetitive in world markets. With prices now less than half of what they once were, Moscow is unable to balance its budget and lacks the industrial infrastructure needed to diversify its economy and finance the solution of its many serious social problems. It is also stuck in wars in Syria and Ukraine, not to mention smaller and less arduous military interventions in Georgia and Moldova.
Prime Minister Vucic recognizes the sterility of Russophilia and ran a markedly pro-Europe re-election campaign in April. But getting to Europe is not done in one big leap. Even while I was in Belgrade, masked thugs destroyed allegedly illegal construction on the waterfront, in order apparently to avoid a drawn-out court procedure. Many think the government was involved, or at least turned a blind eye, at the behest of someone well-connected. Calls to the police for help went unanswered. That’s not how things are handled in European states with consolidated judicial systems.
Many more liberal democratic Serbs and others in the Balkans think Europe and the US are turning a blind eye too. Washington and Brussels appreciate the progress Vucic has made reaching agreements with the authorities in Kosovo. He has accepted the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its whole territory, including the Serb-majority north, and has acknowledged that Serbia and Kosovo will enter the EU as separate states, each at its own pace. This is not far from formal recognition of Kosovo’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. But are Washington and Brussels rewarding this progress on Kosovo by ignoring Serbian government control of the media and courts as well as failure to reform its security services?
This is a good question. I hope the answer is no, but I also hope that we will be patient as well as exigent. There are lots of things that can be done to assist Serbia’s progress towards Europe: improved road connections to the Mediterranean through Montenegro and Kosovo, for example, as well as gas supplies that do not come from Russia. There are also next steps with Kosovo: the Serbian and Kosovar chiefs of staff, who have apparently never met, should be talking with each other regularly, and the boundary/border between the two should be agreed and demarcated.
When it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I confess to being flummoxed. I’m not at all sure that the rather slow and rudimentary steps so far in the European Reform Agenda are worth $800 million, especially if some portion of that amount ends up feeding the corruption beast. The IMF and World Bank will tell you they can account for their funds, but part of the money will be displacing Bosnian funding that will then be diverted to less transparent purposes. Money is fungible. Some authorities in Bosnia are past masters at enriching themselves whenever it passes through their hands. That helps them to consolidate power and maintain their stranglehold on a country that deserves better.
Or it may help them defy the international community and make promises about independence for Republika Srpska, the Serb-dominated half of the country. That isn’t going to happen, because the international community won’t accept it. But those who support that goal are succeeding at making Bosnia and Herzegovina exceedingly difficult to govern effectively. A coffee at an outdoor cafe in Sniper Alley and a walk with an old friend to buy a Sarajevo football club tee shirt for my grandson are great pleasures, but I’d trade them happily for a Bosnia in which ordinary people could enjoy European standards of living and freedom from bombastic nationalism.
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