Tag: European Union
A foreigner’s view of Belgrade today
I’ve been the darling of the pro-government press in Serbia the last few days, largely because I called on Prime Minister Vucic in front of a lot of photographers. As I’ve sometimes been highly critical of Serbia (especially its behavior in Bosnia and Kosovo), I’m alleged to have changed my opinion, as if that accords a democratic seal of approval.
First: let’s be clear about who I am: just a private citizen with long experience in the Balkans, starting with my first trip to Sarajevo in November 1995. That does not make me more than a devotee of the region whose views are strictly unofficial. If you want to know what the US government thinks, ask its ambassador.
I suppose it is true that I’ve changed my view of Serbia, most of all because Serbia has changed in important ways since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic going on 16 years ago. I’ve given a detailed account of those changes in a recent book chapter that I recommend highly, as any self-respecting professor would. Serbia today has made significant progress away from the electoral autocracy Milosevic ran. Progress towards the European Union was slow under President Tadic but has accelerated under Prime Minister Vucic. Serbia is headed in the right direction.
But that doesn’t mean the road ahead is clear. Here I’ll give a quick summary of just the more important challenges Serbia’s democracy faces today, all of which have more to do with values rather than the more technical requirements of Europe’s acquis communautaire:
- The government exercises excessive influence on the media. This is well-documented by the OSCE as well as others and is the most common complaint I hear from friends across the political spectrum in Serbia. Editors are too often court-appointed, journalists are intimidated, self-censorship is common, media are heavily dependent on government advertising, and the prime minister too often attacks the questioners rather than the questions.
- The courts are neither independent nor efficacious. This makes a difference in many spheres: cases like that of the murdered Albanian American Bytyqi brothers remain unsolved despite many promises to prosecute the perpetrators, impunity for corruption and abuse of state resources is still more the rule than the exception, citizens feel alienated and abused, and investors are wary of risking their resources.
- The security services still require reform. Higher-level war criminals have not been brought to justice, eavesdropping and other domestic spying is too common, police are still not trained to serve and protect, and civilian control is not strictly observed.
Let me add a fourth:
- Russia’s anti-democratic influence has grown by leaps and bounds. Moscow subsidizes candidates, high officials embrace Putin’s autocratic behavior, emotional pan-Slavism is all too common, Belgrade refuses to align itself with European Union sanctions levied in response to the invasion of Ukraine and some even suggest that the US is attempting to mount a Euromaidan type coup in Republika Srpska.
Now one Serb wag or another will respond that all those problems exist in one form or the other in the US as well, even the last. Donald Trump has made no secret of his admiration of Vladimir Putin.
My response would be: yes. That’s true. Putin’s Russophilia is just as ridiculous as some of what I’ve heard in Belgrade. Washington also has trouble bringing war criminals to justice, our police mistreat too many citizens, our courts are sometimes subject to too much political influence, and the White House is often accused of manipulating the media, most recently on the Iran nuclear deal. There are differences of degree, and validity, but all democracies continue to struggle with these important issues. Neither the US nor Serbia is an exception.
But I hasten to add that a lot of what I’ve seen here is positive. Last night in Belgrade I attended a packed documentary film about the wholesale murder of Albanians in Kosovo in 1999 and the hiding of their bodies at a police installation in Serbia because Milosevic thought “no bodies–no crime.” The Albanian diplomat who represents Kosovo here came up to introduce himself. I also enjoyed a beer with two friends from Kosovo I met on the street here: one is Serb and the other Albanian. They had driven from Kosovo together yesterday afternoon. Picture that happening 10 years ago.
But it is still is incumbent on a foreign visitor to hold up a mirror and point out the most glaring things needing correction. If he is lucky–and I think I am–he might be heard by those with some power and authority, or those in civil society with energy and influence, to do something to fix things. He can also offer a helping hand, if the local people want it.
If not, he can still write another book chapter, or a blog post.
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Serbia wants stability
I am finishing up a first day of meetings and interviews in Belgrade. I hadn’t been here for I don’t remember how many years. Commerce is notably more active and everything a bit spiffier, except for the rather tired Hyatt hotel, once the glitziest place in town. Prime Minister Vucic, whom I saw this morning, is readying a new government for parliamentary approval following on his good performance in the April 24 election.
Serbia today worries about stability in its neighborhood. That alone is good news, since under Slobodan Milosevic it spent a good deal of time and effort creating instability throughout the Balkans. There is unfortunately a lot to worry about. Macedonia is suffering a major political crisis, initiated over illegal wiretapping but now extending far beyond that. Bosnia and Herzegovina has its perpetual political problem: Republika Srpska President Dodik wants his 49% “entity” to be independent and is doing his best to render the Sarajevo government dysfunctional. Kosovo has weathered a normal succession of presidents but faces continuing violent opposition, in particular to talks with Belgrade, and advocacy of union with Albania, which Kosovo’s constitution prohibits. Scandal allegations and political ambiguity are buffeting Croatia.
Things in Serbia are relatively calm and clear. Vucic may not have won quite as many seats as he would have liked, but he has a clear majority and will bring in a few other parties to consolidate his hold on power. His more challenging opposition, part of which will be within the government and even the presidency, is from nationalists and Russophiles who really don’t stand a chance. Their Greater Serbia program has been rejected in both war and peace. Moscow, while thumping its chest quite a bit, really has little to offer anyone in the Balkans, as its treasury is running dry due to low oil and gas prices. Moscow is also exhausting its military and credibility in wars in Ukraine and Syria.
On the more democratic and civic left of the political spectrum fragmentation and confusion reign in Serbia. Former President Tadic has been unable to assemble a critical mass and has prevented others from doing so.
Vucic is therefore as free as any Serbian prime minister has been for a long time to set Serbia’s direction. My hope is that he will double down on the more politically difficult parts of qualifying for EU membership, in particular by allowing far more media freedom, instituting significant security sector reforms and developing a more independent and efficacious judicial system. I discuss these issues in a recently published book chapter on “Challenges of Democratization in Serbia, which I know the PM has read.
Beyond that, it seems to me the regional issues really are very important. The priorities include completing the Durres/Pristina road to Nis, the Belgrade/Bar road through Montenegro, railway improvements and added intra-regional flights, especially between Belgrade and Pristina. The Kosovo/Serbia boundary/border needs demarcation. These are the subjects of what former Croatian Foreign Minister Pusic calls “boring politics”(as opposed to the heroic politics of state formation) but they are vital in providing the kind of economic stimulus and interconnectedness required for stability in a place like the Balkans.
I’ll also hope that Belgrade will prepared to restart talks with Pristina, focusing initially on implementation of the existing agreements but eventually extending to a settlement of all outstanding issues, including entry of Kosovo into the United Nations and establishment of diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Pristina. With respect to Bosnia, Belgrade needs somehow to rein in Dodik and convince him to throw in his lot with a government in Sarajevo that can credibly begin to prepare the country for EU membership. Solutions in Bosnia and Kosovo would do a great deal to ensure the kind of stability democratic Belgrade needs.
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Montenegro looks pretty good from DC
I am speaking at the University of Montenegro in an hour or so. Here are my notes:
It is a great pleasure to be back in Montenegro. I enormously enjoyed my visit over the weekend to the coast, which I had never seen, with Sinisa Vukovic, a star professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Montenegro has exports it can be very proud of.
My last visit to Montenegro was well before independence, so this is a new country for me. I think you should be pleased with what you have achieved, but anxious to improve on it in the future. Let me explain.
Ten years of independence have wrought significant economic and political progress. Montenegro’s economic freedom score according to the Heritage Foundation has improved, even if rapid growth took a big hit from the 2008 financial crisis. Adoption of the euro as your currency has avoided many difficult issues, but also tied the country to Europe’s current recession and to a difficult competition with other producers within the eurozone. Democracy, while still a bit better than the Balkans average, has not improved overall according to Freedom House, even if the media have become more independent and the World Bank reports slowly improving government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law.
Your country is a candidate for EU membership and seems to be progressing, even if slowly, in the accession process. NATO membership is imminent and most welcome. These are no small achievements. They bode well for the future. You need only look to nearby Macedonia to see what happens to a Balkan country that stalls in its progress towards Euroatlantic goals. The proverbial bicycle needs forward motion to prevent it from keeling over.
There are in my view two main obstacles blocking Montenegro’s bicycle path right now. There is no going around them. You have to clear them.
The first is rule of law. A weak judicial system has been unable to adequately counter organized crime, graft and other endemic forms of corruption, especially in public procurement and abuse of state institutions for political purposes. Major prosecutions are now ongoing, and I trust there will be more. I worry not when prosecutions happen but when they don’t. A year doesn’t go by in Washington DC without serious judicial accusations against two or three members of Congress, not to mention three or four governors in the rest of the country. I am pleased, not dismayed, when justice is done. I think you should be too. Not every prosecution will be successful, but every successful prosecution will be a warning to others.
The second major obstacle at the moment is the lack of a viable alternative to the main governing party. There has been no alternation in power since independence. While there are now small opposition forces that are Europe-focused, a big portion of the opposition has failed to detach itself from its Russian patron and end its campaign against independence. Montenegro needs a viable, constitutional, united Europe-focused alternative to your founding President and his dominant political party, who among other things have laudably earned allegiance from Montenegro’s substantial minorities.
The broad pro-independence coalition will not last forever, nor should it. At some point it will fragment—maybe that process has already started. This is a natural evolution that signals the beginning of the end of transition. It is necessary and unavoidable.
My saying this should not be interpreted as criticism of Prime Minister Djukanovic. To the contrary, he deserves a great deal of credit for the progress Montenegro has made, but it is time for Montenegro’s citizens to be thinking about how they can move beyond his long-dominant leadership to the normal democratic alternation in power of more conservative and more liberal political coalitions. Alternation in power cannot be done with an opposition that doesn’t accept the constitution of the state and seeks instead to create a greater Serbia, an idea defeated in four wars and during more than 16 years of peace. Nor can it be done with people who reject Montenegro’s European future and pine for a return to an alliance with Mother Russia. Read more
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Where is Serbia headed?
My SAIS colleagues Aylin Unver Noi and Sasha Toperich launched the Center for Transatlantic Relations’ Challenges of Democracy in the European Union and its Neighbors yesterday. Here are the remarks I prepared on my chapter, which deals with Serbia, where I’ll visit next week (after a stop in Montenegro):
- Let me give you the bottom line up front: I think Serbia is headed in what I consider the right direction. Ten years from now, I expect Serbia to be a far more prosperous, established democracy ready for EU membership and clearly aligned with the West, even if not a NATO member. I also think it will have taken major steps in the direction of normalizing relations with Kosovo.
- That may shock some of you. Right now, Serbia is still struggling to complete its April 24 early parliamentary election, with repeat voting at 15 polling stations and still no clarity about the overall result.
- It is clear however that nationalist, Russophile forces have done relatively well, while Western-oriented liberal democrats did poorly, not least because they are fragmented. Some harbor suspicions that the government is manipulating the results. Many would say the election was free but not fair, with the incumbents using their privileged position to gain unfair advantage.
- Even apart from the election it is easy enough to find well-founded criticism of Serbia’s still largely unreformed security services, government influence on its media and lack of independence and effectiveness of its court system. These are all serious long-term problems.
- But I would be far more worried if there were no criticism.
- It seems to me Serbia is struggling with what I would regard as the difficult middle period of its democratic transition.
- The initial period from the defeat of Milosevic to the end of President Tadic’s second term was a slow, and slowing, march toward the West.
- Prime Minister Vucic in the past couple of years accomplished a great deal, settling at least some issues with Kosovo, accelerating the opening of accession negotiations with the EU and signing a partnership agreement with NATO.
- But at the same time he faces a serious challenge on his nationalist right, including from President Nikolic and other anti-Western politicians determined to find in Moscow a counterbalance to the EU and NATO.
- The question we need to answer is what to do to keep Serbia moving in the right direction and prevent a relapse. Let me offer some ideas.
- The EU accession process is vital to curing what ails Serbia’s security services, its media and its judicial system.
- Beyond that, infrastructure and interconnectedness is important. Serbia is highly dependent on Russian gas and energy technology. With the cancellation of South Stream, there are lots of long-term options out there. Serbia’s road network needs better connections to the Mediterranean, both through Montenegro and through Kosovo and Albania.
- Regional issues are also important. Serbia needs to demarcate its boundary/border with Kosovo and establish a flexible regime for residents who need to cross it frequently. It also needs to fully implement the many technical agreements with Kosovo as well as make a clear break with Milorad Dodik’s ambitions of holding a referendum in Republika Srpska.
- Also important are improved and enhanced relations with NATO and American forces. That should come now from deployment, in a natural disaster area if not in a war zone, likely with the Ohio National Guard.
- It’s not clear that the door to the EU will be open when Serbia is ready to enter. The euro and migration crises, as well as Europe’s own turn to nativism, are all to evident.
- Serbia’s last challenge in transition will be convincing the 28 member states to ratify the accession treaty. That will not be the easiest of the tasks ahead, but it will be the most satisfying if it can be accomplished successfully, sometime after 2020 but I hope before 2025.
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Now comes the hard part
While it is still unclear how many seats he will have in parliament, Serbian Prime Minister Vucic has won a big victory, garnering close to 50% of the vote and far outdistancing his nearest competitors, his Socialist coalition partners at over 12% and Vojislav Seselj’s Radicals at close to 8%. The uncertainty about seats, which are awarded proportionately, derives from the results at the lower end, where several parties appear to have come in close to the 5% threshold. If any of those results changes, Vucic’s Progressives could gain or lose seats.
The Prime Minister’s victory is a big vote of confidence in his pro-European stance. His more nationalist opponents are much more inclined to view Serbia’s future as closely tied to Russia. His more liberal opponents share his commitment to EU membership but suffer from splitting into personality-based groups. Vucic may want to bring one or more of these personalities into his coalition, to strengthen its pro-European stance.
These election results were widely foretold. Vucic has managed to draw both on his nationalist past and his promise of a European future for wide support. Now comes the hard part: governing.
From the domestic perspective, the key issue will be the economy, which has been sputtering, along with the rest of the Balkans and Europe. Despite some real progress on economic reform, Serbia is in recession and unemployment is high. There isn’t a lot the government can do to promote recovery in the near term. Serbia, like most of the Balkans, is highly dependent on what happens elsewhere. Prospects in the euro zone and in Russia are not good.
From an international perspective, the main issues are corruption, the legal system and media freedom. When in the West Vucic appears comfortable and open in dealing with the media, but at home he is less comfortable and all too often attacks the questioner as much as he answers the question. He is widely believed to control appointment of editors, even in privately owned media. The courts are slow, disorganized and lack real independence, which Vucic acknowledges.
Looming on the horizon are difficult choices for Serbia with respect to Kosovo. Vucic has been vital to the progress made in years of talks with his Kosovar counterpart. Serbia has accepted the validity of the Kosovo constitution on its entire territory (including the Serb-majority north) and has acknowledged that Kosovo will qualify for EU membership separately and at its own pace. It seems to me a short step to mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors, but that short step is still regarded as a yawning chasm in Serbia, one its politicians all seek to avoid.
Fixing these things isn’t easy. Nor is it likely to garner a lot of votes unless the economy also recovers. But Vucic now has four years in which to deliver. If he does, Serbia will make serious progress in negotiating EU membership, though I doubt it can meet expectations that it complete the process before the next election. Failure could mean a turn backwards towards the nationalists who were Vucic’s closest competitors, albeit lagging far behind. Brussels and Washington will want to avoid that turn and encourage Vucic to proceed in the pro-European direction he campaigned on.
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Macedonia agonistes
My inbox continues to produce interesting material. Today it was this opposition perspective from Hristijan Gjorgievski, commenting on the situation in Macedonia (but read also President Ivanov’s government perspective, at the link below):
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