Tag: Gulf states
Stevenson’s army, July 14
But let’s avoid “Aux armes, citoyens,
Formez vos bataillons,
Marchons, marchons !”
– NYT says there is an emerging deal to allow Ukrainian grain exports.
– Economist has background on the grain shortage.
– NYT says Israel has been cooperating with Arab states to shoot down Iranian drones.
– FP says China is a loser in the Sri Lanka conflict.
– US & China trade blame in South China Sea incident.
– After classified briefing on semiconductors, suggestions that Congress may carve out a separate bill.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The time to remember has come
My esteemed Middle East Institute colleagues Paul Salem and Brian Katulis have set a low bar for President Biden’s trip to the Middle East this week. They want him to send a signal of renewed diplomatic commitment to the region.
There’s a hitch
It’s an important objective, but there is a hitch. It is the signs of reduced US commitment that have incentivized many improvements in relations among Middle Eastern countries. This is clear in Yemen. The current ceasefire came about in part because of US reluctance to continue supporting Saudi efforts to counter the Houthis. Iraq’s current role mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia would be inconceivable if the Americans hadn’t withdrawn most of their forces. The wars in Syria are calming partly because the Americans have mostly withdrawn. The remainder are limiting action exclusively to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.
Israel’s newfound ambition to help guard Arab Gulf security is also a consequence of reduced American commitment. The Ibrahim/Abraham accords that President Trump initiated essentially trade Arab recognition for Israeli security assistance. The Arab Gulf monarchies regard that as better than American help. The Israelis don’t demand respect for human rights. Spyware and air defense have proven attractive propositions. Diplomatic recognition hasn’t proven costly to the Arab states that have done it so far (UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco), but the Saudis have hesitated.
And a fly in the Saudi ointment
That’s because of the fly in the ointment. Israel is refusing not only to make peace with the Palestinians but even to accept two states as the basis for a future peace. Israel’s current ambitions are clear: to keep the Golan Heights and all of Jerusalem as well as many of the settlements on the West Bank. The Palestinians would then get only a “state-minus.” That would lack not only an army but sovereign control over its very limited territory. Israel’s attitude is unlikely to change, even after its next election. Prime Minister Netanyahu is gone, but not his singular accomplishment: killing the spirit of Oslo.
Plus an elephant in the room
The elephant in the room is Iran. Negotiations for re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are faltering. If they fail, Iran will have the option within a year of producing enough enriched uranium to make several atomic bombs. Attacks on its nuclear facilities and personnel would only delay the inevitable, perhaps by years but more likely by months. They would also give Tehran reason to attack the Gulf states, either directly or through proxies.
The situation will improve only marginally if the JCPOA is revived. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will then use sanctions relief to reinvigorate their proxy military interventions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. That is precisely what the Gulf states don’t want.
Diplomacy>military
Paul and Brian rightly underline the good things American diplomacy could try to do: improve governance, encourage regional de-escalation and integration, and build civilian ties to the United States, both with citizens and institutions. But Washington has proven inept so far at beefing up diplomatic efforts once the troops are gone. Witness Iraq, where a mostly civilian-focused strategic framework agreement has languished after the military withdrawal. As Chas Freeman pointed out years ago, our diplomats have forgotten diplomacy without force. The time to remember has come.
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We know for sure there will be surprises
The New Year doesn’t look all that happy: Russia is threatening to invade Ukraine, China is threatening Taiwan, Iran is progressing toward nuclear weapons, the Taliban are retrogressing, and ongoing conflicts in many parts of the world remain unresolved (Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Israel/Palestine…). COVID-19 is appearing in its most virulent version yet. Flights are being cancelled worldwide, school openings after the holidays are at risk, recovering economies are teetering, democracies are faltering, and autocracies are proclaiming victory.
I am still optimistic, partly because it is far easier to improve from a lousy situation than from a good one. This applies in particular to COVID. The Omicron version is far more in infectious than even its Delta predecessor, but it also appears to be less deadly. Evolution favors a mutant virus that spreads easily, not one that kills its host. That’s good news. COVID is on its way to becoming endemic and far less acute. Not quite the common cold, but closer to it than the disease we have seen ravage the world over the past two years, at least for those who get vaccinated and don’t have pre-existing conditions.
The Russian threat to Ukraine is looking like a negotiating ploy, albeit a dangerous one that could still lead to military action. Moscow wants Washington to agree that Ukraine and other former Soviet states will never join NATO but become instead Russian fiefdoms. It also wants NATO to withdraw forces from member states that border the Russian “near abroad.” The former is a non-starter. The latter is conceivable. Remember that Kennedy withdrew (obsolete) missiles from Turkey to get Soviet missiles out of Cuba. A full-scale invasion of Ukraine seems unlikely at this point, but President Putin could still opt to expand the area controlled by the insurgents he backs or to seize critical infrastructure he envies, if Washington is uncompromising.
A full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan is also unlikely. Cross-strait trade is enormous: $150 billion or so. Millions of Taiwanese visit China each year and millions more Chinese visit Taiwan. Taiwanese are big investors in China and Chinese are big investors in Taiwan. These economic relations do not preclude political tension, in particular over Taiwan’s status, but they will make Beijing hesitate to try to seize Taiwan by force. Taiwan is not Hong Kong. The US, Japan, and South Korea all have interests in ensuring its independence (not its sovereignty). China can make life hard for Taiwan and squeeze it for political concessions, but violating its air space is a long way from an amphibious assault on its coasts.
Iran’s nuclear progress is looking unstoppable. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are no doubt trying to match it, quietly so as not to arouse the US. A Middle East nuclear arms race is an ugly prospect, but it is not one that in the first instance threatens the US. We are going to have to learn to live with it, hoping that the Iranians decide not to go all the way but rather remain a “threshold” nuclear state. Actually making and deploying nuclear weapons would put all of Iran at risk of an Israeli nuclear strike, a scenario bad enough to make even hardliners in Tehran hesitate.
It is hard to be as sanguine about some of the other conflicts. Syrian President Bashar al Assad is not going anywhere, but the conflict there is no longer killing as many people as once it did. Nor are the Houthis and Taliban likely to stop oppressing Yemenis and Afghans, though there too the killing has likely passed its peak. Arab/Israeli relations have generally improved with the Abrahamic accords, but that has made peace with the Palestinians look even more distant. Why should Israel concede a state to Ramallah if the Gulf Arabs are willing to recognize Israel (either de facto or de jure) without insisting on it? In Somalia, DRC, Myanmar and some other states conflict and instability are now endemic. Like COVID-19, it is hard to see how they could get rid of its entirely.
So the world isn’t pretty on the first day of 2022. But like the domestic situation, I think it marginally more likely to improve than to deteriorate. Of course that assumes no surprises. The one thing we know for sure is that there will be surprises, which usually don’t bode well.
Happy New Year!
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Democracy on the defensive, but not lost yet
I read the Biden/Putin phone call on Tuesday and the Summit of Democracies differently from many others. The former was a clear even if not conclusive win for the US. The latter is more equivocal.
President Putin went into the phone call having mounted most of an invasion force and demanding a binding legal prohibition on Ukraine joining NATO. He came out accepting an official-level dialogue with Washington on European security. That is a win for Biden, even if the invasion force remains in place for now. Moscow will continue at the dialogue to demand a commitment that Ukraine not join NATO, but the Americans won’t yield on that.
Ironically, the best guarantee that Kiev won’t join NATO lies in the current NATO members, few of whom are prepared to take on an obligation to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression. Redoubling the irony: Putin’s mounting of an invasion force has convinced any loyal Ukrainian that NATO membership is highly desirable. That makes two own goals for Putin: he has spent a fortune on an invasion force that was unnecessary and counterproductive.
The Summit of Democracies convening remotely today is harder to judge. It is one more sign of what we already know: democracy is under attack both in the US and in many places abroad. The Republican campaign against the validity of the 2020 US election and Republican legislation limiting the franchise in many states have cast doubt on whether the US can survive as a democracy. Events in Myanmar, Sudan, Belarus, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and other places have cast more than doubts. Democracy in all those places has suffered severe setbacks in the past year. Not to mention Russia, Serbia, Hungary, Brazil, and other countries that are suffering longer-term erosion of at least semi-democratic institutions and processes. Not to mention the survival of long-standing authoritarian regimes in Syria, Jordan, the Gulf, China, Thailand, and Vietnam.
What good can the Summit of Democracies do? It is difficult to judge. I suppose preparations for it in countries invited and reactions to it in countries not invited may marginally increase pressure for upholding democratic values. Certainly Washington is well aware of its own limitations as a leader of the democratic world and convener of the Summit. The Biden Administration isn’t doing all it might, as it has hesitated to eliminate the anti-democratic filibuster in order to pass Federal voting rights legislation, but it is prosecuting January 6 rioters and suing states that limit voting rights in Federal court.
There is a possibility that some would-be authoritarians in other places will find themselves pressured and even on the ropes, but the overall trend appears to be in their direction. Authoritarians have learned how to weather less draconian political environments, as totalitarian control has become far more difficult due to modern communications and social media. They have also learned how to help each other survive, in order to avoid any domino effects, especially among neighbors. The pendulum has swung in the authoritarian direction, due in part to the corona virus epidemic and the consequent economic slowdown as well as the rallying cries of ethnic/sectarian/linguistic/racial nationalists.
The pendulum can also swing in the other direction, but the Summit looks incapable of making that happen. A successful Russian invasion of Ukraine, or US agreement to block Ukraine from NATO membership, would make things much worse than they already are. Democracy is on the defensive, but not lost yet.
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US withdrawal makes everyone in the Middle East recalibrate
I have long believed the US is overcommitted in the Middle East, given its declining interests in the region, and needed to draw down. I confess I did not anticipate how clumsily we would manage to do it. I also did not fully anticipate how others would react. The American withdrawal has set off a cascade of efforts at improving relations both within the region and with external powers, mainly China and Russia. Not all the improvements are in the US interest, but several are interesting.
First example: the Abrahamic accords. The Saudis, Emiratis, and Bahrainis have understood for some time that the American commitment to their autocracies was weakening. The failure of Washington to react to the drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 confirmed that perception. They needed to think about replacing Washington’s security guarantees, which in any event were aimed at external enemies, while the main threat is in these three countries increasingly internal. They have turned to Israel for the technology required to guarantee that their monarchies remain stable.
But, you may object, Saudi Arabia hasn’t yet recognized Israel, as the UAE and Bahrain have. On that, I only have anecdata, but it is compelling. Sitting in a business class lounge in Riyadh some 2+years ago, I found myself surrounded by 40-something males speaking Hebrew. They carried an unusual number of hard-sided cases. When I asked the Israeli next to me why I was hearing so much Hebrew in Riyadh, he smiled coldly and said: “If I told you, I would have to kill you.” I concluded they were techies carrying lots of electronics after providing assistance to Saudi internal intelligence agencies. I suspect Israel’s improving relations with Egypt have a lot to do with internal security as well, inaddition to President Sissi’s attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Second I would cite the response to Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter plane in 2015. It initially caused tension in the bilateral relationship, but Turkey had a problem: the US and NATO were not backing Ankara up and instead the Americans were beginning to ally with Kurds, whom President Erdogan regards as terrorists and mortal enemies. Soon Ankara was apologizing, relations between Ankara and Moscow were improving and Turkey was participating in the Russian-sponsored Astana process for ceasefire/surrenders of the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime. Russian and Turkish troops have even patrolled together in both Idlib and northern Syria, though the relationship remains parlous.
Third are the tentative efforts by Saudi Arabia and Iran to come to some sort of modus vivendi. This has included high-level meetings in Baghdad as well as trips to Tehran and Riyadh. The Saudis and Iranians have no territorial dispute and many symmetrical interests, including not allowing an adversary to rile their respective Shia and Sunni minorities and maintaining their theologically-based and increasingly nationalist autocracies. A mutual stand-down from bilateral tensions could benefit both.
Fourth is the at least partial resolution of a conflict internal to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudis and Emiratis have essentially given up on their latest effort to bring Qatar to heel. Doha weathered the embargo and other sanctions better than the Kingdom and the Emirates anticipated, with assistance from Turkey, Iran, and the US, which wasn’t (yet) interested in abandoning its largest base in the region, Al Udeid. There was no point in continuing a fruitless campaign whose only real impact was to weaken the Gulf Arabs.
Fifth example: OPEC+. After a price war in 2020, the Saudis and Russians found common cause in maintaining higher oil prices, which are essential to both their national budgets. Riyadh and Moscow would prefer prices around $100/barrel, but they can’t push much above $70 or so because that would bring on unconventional sources in the US and elsewhere, especially in a low-interest-rate environment. So they are more or less content to leave prices where they have lingered for much of the epidemic, hoping that stronger growth later will bump up both interest rates and oil prices.
There are other examples: rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE, the UAE push for reconciliation with Syria, and Turkey’s sometime courting of Iran. The point is that US withdrawal is causing everyone to recalibrate and look for alternatives to American support that seems increasingly unlikely. I might like recalibration to push Israel into a more positive attitude toward Palestine, but that seems a bridge too far. Still, US withdrawal is getting the Middle East pregnant with possibilities.
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Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state, and it’s hard to see it go away
Chatham House’s Lina Khatib recently launched a paper entitled How Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state. The paper deals with the past trajectories through which Hezbollah has become the pivotal actor in Lebanese politics. To discuss her findings and their implications for the state of crisis that has gripped Lebanon for over a year, Chatham House convened a panel discussion July 8. The panel agreed that Hezbollah has played its cards well and has become engrained in Lebanon’s corrupt and non-functioning political system. In fact, it has become its most powerful player in many ways. The current crisis has made its transition from a purported ‘defender of the oppressed’ to an established and corrupt part of the political elite all the more clear. Unfortunately, the panel considered the most needed reforms that would actually benefit the Lebanese people unlikely to succeed in the near future.
The speakers were:
Joseph Daher
Visiting Professor,
University of Lausanne
Lina Khatib
Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme,
Chatham House
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Adviser,
U.S. Institute for Peace
Emile Hokayem (moderator)
Senior Fellow for Middle East Security,
IISS
Hezbollah as a unique, but entrenched part of the corrupt system
Lina Khatib summarized the findings of her new paper. She describes what is commonplace for Lebanese: that Hezbollah has become an entrenched part of the Lebanese system. There is no ‘state-within-a-state’: “Hezbollah permeates the state in Lebanon.” It employs many of the practices that have come to define the corrupt political system. There is no transparency on government tenders, and using ministries to provide rents to constituents is the standard.
Joseph Daher maintains that Hezbollah is the primary defender of the Lebanese neoliberal, sectarian political system. It presents itself as a defender of the oppressed (following the Iranian ideology of ‘Khomeinism‘), but this has proved mainly rhetorical. In practice, it oppresses labor unions and favors wealthy industrialists and crime bosses through the ministries it controls. In short, it behaves exactly as the other political entities in Lebanon.
Nonetheless, Khatib explained that Hezbollah is also unique in Lebanon. It has surveillance capacity. Not just within the state, but within its opponents too. This gives it a large advantage over others. Similarly, most parties take advantage of Lebanon’s corrupt political institutions. Hezbollah is different because they have been systematic in using any opportunity – no matter how small – to advance their influence. Hezbollah has political and coercive leverage over both its allies and its opponents, which gives it a great advantage within the Lebanese state. Even opponents of Hezbollah make deals with it behind closed doors – or sometimes even openly. This is what keeps the system in place. As Mona Yacoubian put it, Hezbollah has transformed into the “praetorian guard” of the corrupt Lebanese system.
Toeing the line between state and non-state
Hezbollah’s other major advantage is its status as a hybrid actor. Khatib explains that toeing the line between state and non-state is an ideal situation for Hezbollah. It has influence and legitimacy due to its ties to the state, but is not really a state actor, and is not seen as really in charge of state institutions. There are four main reasons why Hezbollah has no intention of changing this situation:
- The Lebanese state is very weak and not appealing to take over
- There is no Shia majority in Lebanon; outright Hezbollah rule would not be tolerated
- Hezbollah avoids accountability by shirking ownership of the state
- Hezbollah is under sanctions as a terrorist organization in the West, complicating its role as would-be regime.
All of them means all of them
Yacoubian pointed out that Hezbollah’s image has been tarnished, even among its own constituency. The slogan of the Lebanese protest movement ‘all of them means all of them’ refuses to differentiate among the political class. “You see now a political class that is defined purely by self-enrichment and is utterly devoid of any pretense of representing any higher ideal or value.” Yacoubian would go so far as to maintain that there are few real political divisions left among Lebanon’s ruling class.
Hezbollah’s resilience: Iranian support and no alternatives
According to Khatib, Iran’s support to Hezbollah is absolute. Anyone who thinks that Hezbollah can Lebanonize and be removed from Iran’s orbit is dreaming. Steadfast Iranian support makes it stronger than its domestic opponents. With its constituency, it proves resilient because it argues that there is no alternative. Hezbollah’s constituency might not like the party, but they see that there is no realistic alternative to the services it provides. Daher added that Hezbollah’s humanitarian outreach is very large. It claims to have helped some 50.000 families on top of their normal activities in the months of April and May alone. No other actor in Lebanon can match that.
Prospects for reform
So how to move forward? Khatib made it clear that the solution is not to extract Hezbollah from Lebanon, as this would be impossible. A solution would be to reform the Lebanese political system. This needs to be Lebanese-led, but it will require foreign aid. Yacoubian agreed. She proposed a number of concrete reforms that foreign actors can contribute to:
- Support the Lebanese Armed Forces, the only state institution standing between where we are today and total chaos. This is one of the few policies that is continuing today, primarily by the US.
- Cabinet formation and the ability to move forward with reforms are essential. The US, Gulf, and EU can do more to pressure the political elite to form a technocratic government. Steps towards this could be sanctions against the most corrupt political leaders who are obstructing government formation. This is currently happening haphazardly, but it could be done more concertedly.
- The international community can and should do more in the way of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable Lebanese. Bypassing the government is vital to avoid corruption. Perhaps a special UN agency could be tasked with this.
Khatib warned that economic pressure and sanctions alone are unlikely to change Hezbollah’s behavior on its own. As with the IRGC, a weakened currency only benefits Hizbollah, as they make their money abroad, in US dollars. The same is true for Assad in Syria. Sanctions are important, but they aren’t a primary tool. They need to be part of a comprehensive approach.
The panel was pessimistic about the prospects of efficient foreign support for reform. Khatib warned that Hezbollah benefits from the common attitude that sees Lebanon as a lost cause. If the international community gives up and maintains the status quo, Hezbollah benefits. Therefore, bottom-up reform is key. But Daher believes that the Lebanese protest movement has failed to create a unified answer to the corrupt system. He sees the international response as lacking originality. They are now attempting to get Saudi Arabia back to the table and to resume cabinet formation. These efforts will sustain the sectarian parties and system in the paradigm that has been employed for the last several decades.
Khatib emphasized that incremental change must be possible. The gradual approach by which Hezbollah grew its influence can be reversed in small steps. Nonetheless, Hokayem summarized Daher’s pessimistic view. Reform won’t come from the top down in Lebanon, it isn’t emerging in an organized form from the bottom up, and meaningful change is unlikely to come from the outside.
Watch the recording of the event here:
https://www.facebook.com/CHMENAProg/videos/1419092855114088
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