Tag: Iran
Stevenson’s army, November 16
– NYT has a report on the Biden-Xi discussions as well as an analysis with insider comments.
– NBC reports drone strike at Iraqi PM likely came from militias, not Iran.
– WSJ reports secret Chinese purchase of Italian drone maker.
– US criticizes Russian anti-satellite test.
– Jeff Schogol hits DOD failures to admit errors.
And WOTR has a sad but too often true story of military weapon design and procurement — in this case the Littoral Combat Ship.
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Siyasa Podcast: Episode 1: US-Iran negotiations and the region — with Vali Nasr
The first episode of podcast Siyasa, which discusses Middle East policy and politics.
Episode 1: Are both sides interested in reaching a new deal? What are the main obstacles? What do the Saudi-Iranian negotiations in Baghdad mean for the region? The podcast’s host Ibrahim Al-Assil discusses these and other questions with professor Vali Nasr.
You can also listen to the podcast on:
Spotify
Google Podcast
The podcast will be available on Apple podcast within a few days.
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Taking political risks and settling for less than you want
Mohammad Lotfollahi of the Iranian newspaper Etemad asked questions. I replied on Thursday:
Q: Iran, the P5 + 1 and the United States will begin talks on reviving the nuclear deal in late November. What do you think is the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the previous six rounds of talks?
A: Iran has wanted firm guarantees that the US would never again leave the agreement. No US government can guarantee that, except by ratification of an agreement in the Senate, which political circumstances do not permit. The US has wanted Iran to agree to talk about regional issues, which Tehran has been unwilling to do.
Q: Many in the media have criticized Iran for delaying its return to talks, but while Biden continues to pursue of maximum pressure policy, everyone has forgotten about Trump’s withdrawal from the deal. Isn’t America to blame for the current situation?
A: Yes. I don’t think anyone doubts that Trump’s withdrawal is the cause of the difficult current situation.
Q: One of the stories often repeated by opponents of the JCPOA is that it offered “maximum concessions” and led to a “bonanza” for Iran. How do you see JCPOA? Is this still a win-win agreement for everyone?
A: Iran did get serious benefits from the deal, which were cancelled when the US withdrew. The EU, US, Russia, and China also benefited. I believe it was a win-win.
Q: The United States wants Iran to be flexible in its negotiations. But in practice, it does not show any flexibility under the pretext of democracy and separation of powers in America. Doesn’t this hurt the negotiations?
A: It may, but you can’t convince the US to give up democracy and separation of powers.
Q: Is there basically an agreement that both major US parties agree on?
A: No, not so far as I can see. The Republicans are mostly committed to maximum pressure, which hasn’t worked. The Democrats liked the original deal, which was working.
Q: How much does the element of time affect the success of future negotiations? Are the concerns about losing the JCPOA non-proliferation benefit if the negotiation process is prolonged real and serious?
A: Yes. Iran is acquiring know-how, especially for enrichment of uranium, that it will be impossible to erase. Delay is the enemy of nonproliferation.
Q: What is your proposal to get out of the current impasse? Is there a way to defuse tensions and reach an agreement?
A: Sure there is. Both sides will have to settle for less than they want and take political risks in doing so.
Q: Israel threatens to launch a military attack on Iran. Israel even has nuclear weapons and is not a member of the NPT. Isn’t the West’s attitude towards Iran and Israel an example of a double standard?
Q: The entire nonproliferation regime is based on a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states. Iran chose to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapons state. Israel has not signed it. Both exercised their sovereign rights, presumably because the choices they made best served their national interests. Tehran continues to say it will never develop nuclear weapons. The main issue is ensuring verification of that commitment. Israel has no obligation to verification one way or the other.
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Normalization won’t normalize, but UAE and Russia will gain
Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat, and Venus Mohammed write:
The visit of the UAE Foreign Minister can be analyzed in two complementary ways:
- Washington’s silence reflects its disinterest in the Syrian file in general and also preparation for an upcoming strategic dialogue with Moscow in Geneva next week, which will focus on keeping the cross-border routes for humanitarian aid open. Washington is offering an initial reward to Moscow by remaining silent on the Emirati openness to Damascus and thus indirectly encouraging it tacitly. In return, Washington expects Damascus to reciprocate, with support or pressure from Moscow. This could mean a new step-by-step road map in Syria, which the US hopes will emerge in the meeting with Moscow next week.
- The visit came within the framework of coordination between Tel Aviv and the UAE to support Moscow, which coordinates extensively with Tel Aviv to target Iranian sites in Syria. Israel and Russia want to weaken Iran in Syria. Israel has three times within a week attacked storage sites for Iranian weapons, drones, and missiles in Damascus, at T-4 airport, Shayrat and Homs countryside, and even the coastal regiment In Tartous, where American reconnaissance aircraft are operating over the Syrian coast.
The Americans want to stabilize the balance of power in Syria as it is. Having lost influence Trump’s departure from the White House, the UAE wants to show itself useful to the Biden Administration. Abu Dhabi is trying in to tell Washington that it can provide services even if immoral, such as normalization with Assad. The UAE Foreign Minister had informed his American counterpart about this visit and its goals last week, which helped neuter the American position.
As Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said, the situation in Syria is frozen. The UAE visit has some symbolic significance, but there will be no serious impact on the ground as long as Washington insists on the status quo until a ceasefire paves the way for a new political settlement. The UAE wants to be the main Arab country that has a relationship with the Assad regime so it can function as the link between Damascus and the West in general, hoping that it can influence the the Assad regime to change some of its behavior, in particular limiting the Iranian presence.
It is possible that Washington and the UAE can benefit in the short term by improving their own bilateral relations, but this does not spell the success for the Emirati efforts in achieving any results in Syria. The Iranian alliance with the Assad regime dates back four decades, when the Assad regime sided with the Iran against Iraq. Iran founded Hezbollah, which expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon. Iran also financed the construction of the Syrian nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israel in 2007. Without the Iranian presence, the Assad regime would have collapsed years ago. The UAE has nothing to give Assad to pry him away from Iran. Normalization with the regime, including Assad’s return to the Arab League or the extension of a gas pipeline, will do nothing other than strengthen Iran in Syria, as has already happened in Lebanon and Iraq.
But if the UAE’s goal is to please the Americans by offering Syria as a gift to Iran in exchange for a return to the nuclear agreement, that is a different issue. Only time will tell if Washington’s reticence is Machiavellian.
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Stevenson’s army, October 31
Boo!
On this day my elementary school teachers insisted it be spelled Hallowe’en.
The Biden administration is ending its steel and aluminum tariffs and substituting quotas, NYT reports, as does Politico.
LA Times says US has made new offer to Iran.
NYT ponders why Pres. Xi hasn’t left China in 21 months.
History lesson: why Pres. Kennedy decided not to match Soviet super bomb.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, October 30
– WaPo summarizes the intelligence report on Covid19’s origins. Here’s the document.
– NSA Sullivan & USTR Tai clash over China sanctions.
– NYT notes complications facing nuclear subs for Australia.
– CRS has some interesting new reports — on emerging military technologies and on legislation related to foreign coups.
– NYT tells of US efforts to head off Sudan coup.
– Politico says Mike Pence spoke to rally of anti-Iranian group once listed as terrorist.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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