Tag: Iran
It isn’t going to be easy to choose what to do
Tony Cordesman offers a set of “negative” policy options for the US in dealing with the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan:
- Threaten to attack any terrorist groups that launch attacks outside Afghanistan.
- Withhold recognition of the new government.
- Pressure other states, including Afghanistan’s neighbors.
- Cut off the aid that funded some 80% of the former government’s operations and security efforts.
- Introduce yet another mix of sanctions to exert maximum pressure.
But he thinks incorporating in addition a more “positive,” conditional approach would be more effective. These boil down to “carefully planned and executed” diplomatic recognition and economic aid. Peter Galbraith likewise argued on BBC today that diplomatic recognition should be considered, not because the US approves of the Taliban takeover but because it could enable more rescue of people who want to leave. Without consular officers in Kabul, getting people out is going to be difficult, mainly because of US bureaucratic requirements. An embassy might also be able to exert some influence on Taliban behavior, provided of course that Washington gets iron-clad security guarantees for the Americans returning to Kabul.
The financial cut-off has already begun. Taliban access to Afghanistan government accounts in the United States has been blocked and scheduled dollar cash transfers suspended. The next big move may be suspension of IMF and World Bank activities. The kind of targeted sanctions in fashion these days–focused on the personal finances and travel of miscreants–is mostly ineffective with the Taliban, since they presumably are too smart to keep their savings in dollars and uninterested in international travel.
The threat to attack international terrorist groups hardly needs reiteration. The problem will be identifying and locating them. Past cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan had little real impact. Even the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan did not destroy Al Qaeda, which has burrowed in to many different countries even if it hasn’t been able to mount attacks on the US for most of the last two decades.
Afghanistan’s neighbors are likely beyond pressuring: Pakistan because it is delighted with the Taliban victory and Iran because it is already profoundly unhappy with it. Russia will suck up to the Taliban until they either support terrorists inside Russia or in the stans that are its northern neighbors. China will likely be a bit more cautious, fearing the Taliban might just care about the treatment of the Uygurs, or even support tererorist attacks, from across the short border with Xinjiang. The commercial temptation for the Chinese will be great, as Afghanistan has appetizing mineral deposits, but the risks will loom large.
So the diplomatic option starts to look good when you realize how limited the other options are. But its feasibility depends on how the Taliban treat the Afghan population, especially women, minorities, journalists, and people who supported the effort to build a democratic states for the past twenty years, either directly or indirectly. There is a reason the Taliban are making friendly noises about women’s rights and amnesty for those who fought against them. They are savvy enough to know that surviving this time around depends on not offending international sensibilities too dramatically.
But the Taliban are not pluralists. They will not tolerate competition for power, even in the limited forms it existed under Presidents Karzai and Ghani. The Taliban are totalitarians who intend to govern by their own, fundamentalist, interpretation of Sharia. We know well what that meant 25 years ago: little or no education for women, abuse of minorities, no elections, no press (much less freedom of), catastrophically poor health care, and heavy reliance on drug trafficking for income. It is difficult to picture any organized opposition to Taliban authority, which they claim comes not from the people but from God.
There is a hint of insurgency in the Panjshir valley, the majority-Tajik center of resistance to the Soviets and the Taliban in the 1990s. You can expect the Taliban to be merciless in cracking down there, when the time comes. Taliban forces have already fired on demonstrators in Herat and Jalalabad. We’ve seen in Hong Kong and Belarus how autocracies can succeed against popular, nonviolent rebellion. The Taliban are likely to make the Chinese and Belarusians look like softies.
The Taliban are still allowing the evacuation of thousands of people from the Kabul airport. No one should be fooled: this is ridding them of many of their most capable, internationally well-connected, opponents. At some point, they will decide enough is enough and either start blocking access–there are reports that is already happening, especially to women trying to get to the airport–or demand the US and other Western powers start paying for the privilege.
Our options are limited. Diplomatic recognition could bring an onslaught of domestic US criticism. It isn’t going to be easy to choose what to do.
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Peace Picks | August 16-20, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- What’s Next for Cross-Strait Relations? Trends, Drivers, and Challenges | Aug 17, 2021 | 8:30 AM EST | CSIS | Register Here
Please join CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies Jude Blanchette for a discussion on the future opportunities and challenges that confront cross-Strait relations with Chiu Chui-cheng, Deputy Minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council.
Speakers:
Chiu Chui-Cheng
Deputy Minister, Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China
Jude Blanchette
Freemand Chair in Asia Studies, CSIS
- Karun: The tragedy of Iran’s longest river | Aug 17, 2021 | 12:00 PM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Recent protests in Iran’s Khuzestan province have brought new attention to the country’s serious and mounting water shortages caused by decades of mismanagement, exacerbated by droughts and climate change. To delve deeper into these issues, the Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to view “Karun,” an award-winning documentary by filmmaker Mohammad Ehsani. It traces the path and the environs of the Karun River, Iran’s longest waterway, which used to be an important source for agriculture and drinking water in Khuzestan. Kaveh Madani, a noted Iranian environmental expert, will provide commentary.
Speakers:
Kaveh Madani
Visiting Fellow, MacMillan Center, Yale University
Barbara Slavin (moderator)
Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council
- Against the Clock: Saving America’s Afghan Partners | Aug 19, 2021 | 2:30 PM EST | Center for a New American Security | Register Here
With the departure of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s rapid military gains, the United States must act urgently to protect thousands of Afghans who aided the war effort as local translators, fixers, drivers, guides, security guards, and in other critical roles.
While the first group of Afghans recently touched down in the U.S., the vast majority of the nearly twenty thousand special immigrant visa (SIV) applicants and their families await relocation—part of a lengthy process that, as it stands, will long surpass next month’s troop withdrawal deadline. This is not the first time the U.S. has been faced with this challenge: in 1975 the Ford administration evacuated more than 100,000 Vietnamese refugees to the U.S. via Guam; and the U.S. similarly airlifted thousands of Iraqis and Kosovar Albanians to safety in 1996 and 1999, respectively. Today, as the Taliban seizes key ground across Afghanistan, there is little time to spare.
This panel will discuss the status of U.S. efforts to relocate Afghan visa applicants, lessons learned from similar evacuations in the past, and what must be done next.
Speakers:
Rep. Seth Moulton
Co-Chair, Honoring Our Promises Working Group
Member, House Armed Services Committee
Amb. Richard Armitage
President, Armitage International
Former Deputy Secretary of State (2001-2005)
Richard Fontaine
Chief Executive Officer, CNAS
Lisa Curtis
Senior Fellow and Director, Indo-Pacific Security Program, CNAS
Former Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Council Senior
Director for South and Central Asia, National Security Council
- The Deeper Consequences of the War on Terror | Aug 19, 2021 | 3:00 PM EST | CSIS | Register Here
The January 6 Capitol attack stunned the nation, but Karen J. Greenberg argues in her new book that the pernicious effects of disinformation, xenophobia, and disdain for the law are rooted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International Security Program will host this conversation on how the war on terror may have resulted in unseen effects on democratic norms, and how those democratic norms have evolved over time.
Speakers:
Karen J. Greenberg
Director, Center on National Security, Fordham University School of Law
Emily Harding
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS
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Biden was right and wrong
Afghanistan is falling to the Taliban much faster than most anticipated. So was President Biden right to get American troops out of harm’s way, or was he wrong to abandon friends and allies?
Right
The great virtue of his decision is apparent: the remaining 2500 or so American troops in Afghanistan, along with the diplomats and other officials, were in danger. Twenty years of American support, equipment, and training had not turned the tide. The Americans were doing little fighting, but the Afghan security forces were declining in effectiveness. There was little or no reason to believe that they would improve and considerable reason to doubt that they could continue to hold the Taliban at bay. Enlarging the US presence in Afghanistan would have been foolhardy. It is hard to give credit for a tragedy averted, especially when a different tragedy (for Afghans rather than Americans) ensues, but that is what Biden deserves.
Wrong
Abandoning the Afghans to the Taliban puts a lot more than 2500 human beings at risk. Even if every single one of the translators and others who helped the Americans is evacuated, thousands of Afghans will die, hundreds of thousands will be displaced, property, careers, and lives will be ruined. A relatively open society will close once again: women will be cloistered, media shuttered, health facilities closed, and education devalued. People who believed in democracy and the rule of law will be lucky to escape the country. Many will be killed, imprisoned, or at the least disempowered.
If you are truly a humanitarian, then it doesn’t matter to you whether the people who suffer are Americans or Afghans. Nor does it matter whether they believe in democracy and the rule of law. They are entitled to a life with dignity. They won’t get it with the Taliban back in power.
Odds are that the Taliban will welcome back (clandestinely if not openly) Al Qaeda or even the Islamic State, which otherwise will present a risk to their rule. While Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are in no position today to represent a big international threat, a few years of rebuilding on Afghan soil could make them a threat once again. You can discount that threat because it is years off, but what is your discount rate? Will you be unhappy if international terrorists return to attack the US in 2 years, 5 years, 10 years?
It was no easy decision
President Biden has said the decision was easy. It should not have been. While he may have imagined that the Afghan security forces would hold, he should have known that there was a possibility of collapse. He also knew that there would be a real possibility the Taliban would not fulfill their commitment to disallow international terrorism.
Biden may have imagined that other countries closer to Afghanistan would step in to save the day. Iran has a great deal to lose from a Sunni extremist regime on its border that will depend on drug trafficking. China and Russia do too. While Pakistan has supported the Taliban, despite Islamabad’s denials, the Pakistani Taliban may gain renewed momentum from the change of regime in Kabul. All of these nearer neighbors have more at stake than the US, but none of them has been ready to shoulder the burden so long as the Americans were doing it for them. Nor is it likely they will do so now.
Bottom line
I don’t think the US presence in Afghanistan was sustainable, for two reasons: domestic US opposition was growing and the Taliban were gaining ground. Biden should have found a more fruitful exit with a better chance of preserving at least some of the gains of the past two decades. President Trump set the process of withdrawal in motion, but Biden had an opportunity to improve on the deal his predecessor unwisely cut. He’ll pay the political price for that at home, though it may not be a high one. Afghans will pay a much steeper price.
You can be right in one dimension and wrong in another.
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It’s all over but the shouting, in Kabul or not
It is hard to keep up with the Taliban advance in Afghanistan, which has now engulfed at least 12 provincial capitals and perhaps two-thirds of the country. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is collapsing in many places. Civilians who can are fleeing to the capital. Civilians who can’t are suffering dreadful Taliban depredations. There will soon be little left of the hard-won progress on women’s rights, relatively free media, improved health care, and property rights. The Taliban will take what they want, destroy the hospitals and clinics, dictate to radio and TV, and drive women into hiding. Their is no sign that their years out of power have moderated their extremist views.
The American withdrawal unquestionably precipitated this debacle. It was poorly executed and far too fast for the limited ANA capabilities. President Biden, who says he doesn’t regret it, will take the rap, but it was President Trump who agreed to it. Taliban promises have proven empty. They have not negotiated seriously with the government delegation in Doha and they have not broken with Al Qaeda. They may still do both, but only if the government forces are able to block their advance. That is unlikely.
It would be wrong however to conclude that everything would have been okay had the Americans stayed. The Taliban were already gaining territory before the American withdrawal. The ANA might well have collapsed, even if more slowly, had American support continued. A longer “decent interval” might have allowed for more negotiation in Doha, but the ultimate outcome would likely not have been a lot better than we are likely to see now.
What are we likely to see now? The Taliban will want to secure as much of the country as they can. The only big question is whether they will try to take Kabul by force. They could conceivably conclude it would be better not to do that, in hope of capturing some international aid, or avoiding international opprobrium, in the aftermath. But if they spare Kabul, they will still want President Ghani out and some sort of transitional regime friendly to their cause installed. There is no hope that the negotiations in Doha can produce better results than the military situation on the ground, which is catastrophic from Ghani’s perspective.
Western countries are busy threatening the Taliban with isolation if they continue the offensive. That is pointless. The Taliban don’t care about isolation from the West, which they assume will not provide assistance in the aftermath. The countries whose attitudes will count for the Taliban are the neighboring powers, especially Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia. Pakistan in particular has a lot of clout, because it provides the Taliban with safe haven, but Chinese or Russian aid might carry some weight as well. It will be interesting to see if the Taliban avoid atrocities against the (Shia) Hazaras, in order not to provoke Iran. It will also be interesting to see if the Taliban continue to maintain friendly relations with Al Qaeda and even allow it to use Afghanistan again as a platform for international terror.
President Ghani is calling on civilians to arm and resist the Taliban, including the warlords whom he has rightly tried to marginalize in recent years. Even if he did not try to summon support, the prospect of insurgency against Taliban rule is real. That will make their behavior in victory more abusive, not less. They will want to squelch any armed resistance as quickly and decisively as possible. No one should doubt their level of brutality.
It’s all over but the shouting, in Kabul or not.
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Stevenson’s army, August 2
– Israel, US & others blame Iran for drone strike on Israeli oil tanker. Iran denies it, but WINEP report explains the Israeli-Iranian shadow war.
– WaPo reports Taliban advances into Afghan cities. At Lawfare, CNA analyst explains the problems with maps of control in Afghanistan.
– Impeachment witness and SAIS DIA student Alexander Vindman describes The Call in chapter from forthcoming book.
-FP says Japan & Australia pushed US to adopt “Indo_Pacific” framing,
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No good options for Syria
The Assad regime is undertaking yet one more effort to suppress resistance in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The brutality will no doubt be extreme, as it has been through more than 10 years of war against the civilian population. The question is Lenin’s: “What is to be done?”
Syria presents Washington with a quandary: American administrations from President Obama onwards find President Assad’s attacks on his own citizens odious and criminal, but they don’t see a risk to US national security that would justify putting American troops at risk to stop it. Once in a great while, Presidents Obama and Trump have used cruise missiles, which entail no risk to Americans, in response to Assad’s egregious use of chemical weapons, but without much effect.
American troops were sent to Syria, and remain there, to fight Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, not Assad. The Americans have sent lots of humanitarian assistance, but that does nothing to weaken or punish Assad. In fact, the portion of that assistance that goes through UN agencies via Damascus helps him a good deal. The Russians have been persistent in making it hard for aid to get to Syrian opposition-held areas from Turkey.
Anyone with even a modicum of human feeling would want to do more to save Syrian civilians from Assad’s depredations. So Josh Rogin and Andrew Tabler call for more, hoping an ongoing policy review will produce at least a special envoy. But a special envoy could be meaningless without a purpose, which Andrew would like to define this way:
a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-27/search-syria-strategy
How realistic is that?
More sanctions can be imposed–there is rarely a limit to those, but Assad and his enablers are not wanting to travel to the US or Europe and presumably know how to keep their finances under cover. The Syrian economy is already a shambles. Even if Assad is successful militarily, he will be unable to do any significant reconstruction. Iran and Russia already own him and will use their influence in ways the US and Europe consider malign.
The Americans can cause some discomfort to both by maintaining their small military presence in eastern Syria, which supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there. But the Americans have been unable and unwilling to do much to stabilize the situation even where they are present, as that requires risk-taking they want to avoid. Hope that the SDF might develop into a serious military and political challenger to Assad seems to have expired quietly.
Just maintaining Assad’s current isolation requires a good deal of diplomatic heavy lifting. Some Arab countries–most notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates–have wanted to ease up on Assad. To bolster its lagging economy, Jordan would like to open its border and allow trade with Syria. The UAE sees Assad as a bulwark against the Islamists that Abu Dhabi dreads and loathes. Greece, anxious to avoid another outflux of Syrian refugees, has sent its Ambassador back to Damascus as an “envoy.” Other Europeans may be tempted, or blackmailed, to do something comparable.
The UN political process for Syria, focused on a committee that is supposed to be writing a new constitution, is essentially moribund. Initiative for years has fallen instead to the “Astana powers” (Iran, Russia, and Turkey), none of which are prepared to push for a political solution. All three are relying on their military forces to get what they want in Syria. Iran gets a bridge to Lebanese Hizbollah as well as a new confrontation line with Israel, Russia gets its bases and a foothold in the Middle East, and Turkey gets to repress the Syrian Kurds, some of whom have supported insurgency inside Turkey.
I am not appealing for inaction, just highlighting how difficult it is to think of anything that can be done to affect the situation in a serious way. That is even before we come to discussing Biden Administration priorities, which include reentering the Iran nuclear deal, withdrawing at least some US forces from the Middle East, and refocusing on strategic competition with Russia and China while managing the challenges posed by North Korea, Venezuela, and other bad actors. Never mind the domestic priorities. Syria looks distant in Biden’s perspective.
So sure, a special envoy if you like, but what will s/he do? Talk is cheap, and not bad. But there are no good options for Syria.
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