Tag: Israel/Palestine
Yes, things have changed, but…
I’ve been skeptical about the prospects for a ceasefire in Gaza. I wrote just three weeks ago that the conditions for a negotiated outcome did not exist. Those three conditions are a mutually hurting stalemate, a mutually enticing outcome, and security for the belligerents. Has something changed?
What has changed
Yes, as usual. War is dynamic affair.
For Israel, the big change is on its northern border with Lebanon. The tit-for-tat strikes across that border with Hizbollah are escalating. Yesterday Hizbollah fired 200 rockets into Israel, in retaliation for an Israeli assassination of one of its field commanders. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) leaders are rightly concerned about fighting on two fronts at the same time. Having achieved what they could in Rafah, at the southern end of Gaza, the IDF is open to quieting Gaza so it can focus on Hizbollah. A temporary ceasefire has become more attractive than it was three weeks ago.
It is more difficult to fathom Hamas’ current attitude. It has certainly suffered more losses in the last three weeks, but there is no evidence it has suffered a clear defeat. More important than its military losses may be the growing complaints about Hamas among Palestinians. A ceasefire would provide a much-needed opportunity to improve living conditions conditions in Gaza.*
What has not changed
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu remains opposed to a ceasefire, despite the IDF attitude. He still wants to fulfill Israel’s war objectives: an end to Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. That presumably includes the death (or maybe exile) of Hamas’ military and political leaders, which would give Netanyahu the victory he needs to try to ensure his own hold on power.
Hamas leaders want any ceasefire to be permanent and complete, thus enabling their own survival. No outcome that leaves Israel free to continue striking in Gaza will be attractive to them.
The known unknown
What we know we don’t know are the details of the negotiations. Negotiators were supposedly assembling again in Doha today. But the Mossad chief has already returned to Jerusalem. The latest draft agreement I’ve seen is from June 6, when Israel was still proposing “a sustainable calm which would achieve a permanent ceasefire.” That was not acceptable to Hamas, which wanted a guaranteed permanent ceasefire.
Now @DavidMakovsky, for whom I have a lot of respect, is suggesting the question of a limited hostage/prisoner exchange may advance without a ceasefire, or perhaps a limited one. Certainly that is what Netanyahu would want. He stands to gain a great deal politically with release of more hostages, as Hamas does with release of Palestinians from Israeli prisons.
So yes, things have changed, but the outcome is still unclear. It could be far short of the negotiated end to the Gaza war many of us would like to see.
*The Wall Street Journal adds that Qatar has threatened to throw Hamas’ political leadership out of Doha and Turkey has refused to take them in. It also notes that Israeli seizure of the Philadelphi corridor on Gaza’s southern end may be heightening pressure on Hamas.
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Why a negotiated Gaza peace isn’t happening
Israel has been backing away from the Gaza peace plan the Americans say it proposed. After indicating it welcomed the proposal, Hamas is asking for major changes. Here are the good reasons why a negotiated peace in Gaza is not possible right now:
- No mutually hurting stalemate.
- No mutually enticing way out.
- No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents.
Any of these factors might change. But for now all the usual pre-conditions for a successful negotiation are missing.
No mutually hurting stalemate
Neither Hamas nor Israel is hurting enough to prefer negotiations over continued fighting. Military leader Yahya Sinwar thinks civilian casualties help Hamas. He is prepared to continue fighting, as he believes he has the Israelis where he wants them. Israeli officials are letting everyone know the war might last until the end of this year. Prime Minister Netanyahu figures that will postpone an Israeli election that might bring down his government. He imagines an election only after he can claim credit for a complete Israeli victory.
There isn’t even a stalemate. The Israelis are continuing their offensive into Rafah. Hamas is resorting to guerilla tactics in several parts of Gaza. The military situation is still dynamic. It is far from the kind of stasis that would convince belligerents think they can gain more from talking than fighting.
No mutually enticing way out
Even if there were a mutually hurting stalemate, it is hard to imagine a mutually enticing way out that could convince the belligerents to try to negotiate a deal. Israel wants to destroy Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas might give up the governing role, but it cannot give up its military capability without surrendering completely. Hamas wants to destroy Israel. No one in Jerusalem will agree to that.
Hamas and Israel did live side by side since 2007, albeit with repeated attacks and small wars (compared to the current one). But going back to that from the current situation seems impossible. Hamas isn’t going to trust Israel to leave it alone. Israel isn’t going to trust Hamas to leave the Jewish state alone.
No guarantee of post-settlement security for the belligerents
The only way to square that circle is with outside military and police forces committed to keeping the peace. Tens of thousands would be required. The 4000 police would need to be Arabic-speaking. The 32,000 soldiers would need to be well-equipped and trained. These would need to operate in coordination with 7500 local troops and 4500 local police. Where do you get those in Gaza? Wouldn’t any you find there likely be Hamas-affiliated, one way or the other? The Palestinian Authority has fewer than 10,000 police in the West Bank. What percentage of those could be moved to Gaza?
These are among the issues Tony Blinken is criss-crossing the Middle East to discuss. The Gulfies will likely be willing to write checks, but will the Saudis, Qataris, or Emiratis be putting thousands of their police and soldiers into Gaza? The Egyptians won’t want to either. They controlled Gaza until 1967 and were glad to give it up. They don’t want to re-acquire it.
Scholarship demonstrates that belligerents won’t want to negotiate a settlement that spells doom to themselves. Both Israel and Hamas have reason to fear a settlement without a heavy enforcement presence would do just that.
Wishing Tony Blinken well
I do hope Tony Blinken succeeds, despite the odds. But the circumstances suggest he won’t. The Hamas/Israel war seems destined to continue without a negotiated settlement, until there is a mutually hurting stalemate, a mutually enticing way out, and security for whatever remains of the belligerents. Nothing less will allow a successful negotiation.
Victory by one side or the other is still a possibility. But not one likely to happen soon.
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What’s missing from the Gaza peace plan
The Israeli proposal for “General Principles for an agreement between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side in Gaza on the exchange of hostages and prisoners and restoring a sustainable calm” in Gaza seems stalled, despite President Biden’s concerted efforts. What are its prospects?
Security, security, security
In real estate, it’s all about location, location, location. In post-war stabilization and reconstruction, it’s all about security, security, security.
The first security concern is that of the belligerents. They won’t agree to an end to the fighting if they think their own security will be at greater risk. This is especially true in the current case, as Israel has vowed to eliminate Hamas and Hamas’ strategic goal is the elimination of Israel. If Israel is responsible for security in Gaza after the ceasefire, Hamas has good reason to fear the Israel Defense Force will continue to target it, especially its leaders.
The second security concern focuses on civilians. The international community should not be interested in a ceasefire that fails to improve conditions for non-Hamas affiliated Gazans. They need not only to be housed and fed but also protected from gangs and chaos. That requires some sort of police force and rudimentary justice system. Without them, civilians have no recourse when a guy with a gun steals their food, water, shelter, and property.
The third security concern is the region. If war ends in Gaza only to start up between Lebanese Hizbollah and Israel, the Middle East will have gained little. The broader war the region has long feared is already brewing. Iran’s allies and proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria have all been attacking Israel. The missile and drone tit for tat between Iran and Israel in April suggested what a broader war might entail.
The gaping hole in the draft agreement
The peace plan lacks provisions for the first two categories of security. It details the time lines for hostage/prisoner exchanges, withdrawal of Israeli forces, humanitarian relief, return of Gazans to the north, and other requirements. But it refers only vaguely to Egypt, Qatar, and the US as “guarantors” of the agreement. That means little if it doesn’t include provision of security, or at least a leadership role in doing so.
But it is hard to see what those three countries can realistically do about security. Whoever does that will need to speak Arabic. The US has individuals but no military or police units who speak Arabic. Qatar’s army has fewer than 12,000 soldiers. It is hard to picture Doha providing more than 10% to a peacekeeping presence in Gaza. It is much more likely to write the necessary checks. Egypt has many more soldiers, but Cairo does not want to deploy troops in Gaza, for fear of ending up in charge there, as it was until 1967.
Using Jim Dobbins’ numbers for a heavy peace enforcement operation, Gaza would require something like 32,000 troops and 4000 police, in addition to 7500 local troops and 5500 local police. As the available local forces in Gaza would be mostly Hamas-affiliated, which Israel will not allow, the international presence will have to be beefed up accordingly.
I just don’t see how to fill that gaping hole. Are the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis going to deploy large parts of their armies to Gaza?
The other security requirement
The third security requirement is the regional one. This need not be in the plan, but it has to be real. The US has worked hard to prevent the wider regional war, but Israel and some of Iran’s friends seem increasingly eager for one. Israel wants to move Hizbollah back from its border so that tens of thousands of civilians can return to their homes in the north. The Houthis want to demonstrate their importance in the region and gain additional aid from Iran.
The Iranians will elect a new president June 28. The Supreme Leader will retain control of foreign and security policy. But that election will likely provide some indication of the direction Tehran wants to take in the future. If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has its way, which seems likely, the regional situation could deteriorate quickly.
Prove me wrong
I’ll be glad to be wrong. I hope this peace plan succeeds. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
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One key to Gaza’s future is inside Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu refuses to define an end-state for Gaza, beyond Israeli control of security there. But it is becoming clear what he intends. Along with his extreme-right coalition partners, Netanyahu wants to reproduce something like the West Bank in Gaza. The Palestinians would be limited to relatively small enclaves. Israeli security forces, possibly with support from Jewish settlements, would control corridors that separate them. The first of those already exists. Israel would control all movement in and out of the Strip, including from Egypt and the Mediterranean.
Occupation is occupation
In the West Bank, the Palestinians control security and civil administration only in Area A, which represents 18% of the territory. That control is often merely nominal. Nothing like it will be allowed in Netanyahu’s concept for Gaza. At best, the model for Gaza is Area B, where Israel controls security and the Palestinians nominally control civil administration. That represents 22% of the West Bank. But the reality will more than likely be close to Area C, where Israel controls both security and civil administration. Area C makes up 59% of the West Bank.
This is a formula for occupation but without the protection the 4th Geneva Convention affords. Israel claims the Convention does not apply because Palestine was not a state or legitimately part of one before Israel occupied it. Whatever the legalities, the fact is that Israel has not respected the Convention in the West Bank or Gaza in the past and cannot be expected to do so in the future. But occupation is occupation, even if you claim the Convention does not apply.
What could prevent it?
Netanyahu’s intentions are not however the only factor in determining what is going to happen. America, Europe, Arab states, Iran and its allies, and the rest of the world all have some influence. So too do the Palestinians.
US concurrence in this formula is possible if Donald Trump is re-elected. President Biden’s constituency would object vehemently. But Biden has demonstrated little capacity to influence the Israelis, even when he has had the will. Would he really cut off arms supplies to get a better deal for the Palestinians in Gaza? The Europeans have been mostly supportive of Israel so far. They aren’t likely reverse course. Even if they did, their influence is negligible.
Arab states will be under greater popular pressure not to accept Netanyahu’s ambitions. But they have not been willing during the war to levy any serious pressure on Israel. The fact is they are mostly glad to see Hamas battered. They are also interested in normalization with a state that will help them maintain internal security and improve their economic and technological prospects. The popular pressure has proven manageable. Why say or do anything that might make it less so?
Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen will speak up loudly against Israeli occupation and lob occasional missiles and drones at the Jewish state. But they have not been effective during the war and are unlikely to improve their performance afterwards. China and Russia will also shout denunciations of Israeli behavior, but they too have not been very effective in the past.
The rest of the world doesn’t like Israel’s occupation of the West Bank or Gaza, but what can they do about it?
Opposition has to come from within Israel
Within Israel, the main preoccupation so far among Netanyahu’s opponents has been the hostages. Israelis want them back. Netanyahu says military pressure will achieve that. A plurality of Israelis prefer a deal with Hamas. That implicitly would leave Hamas intact, even if weakened.
This situation is changing. Within the last week, Israeli officials, including the Defense Minister, have let it be known they are unhappy with not having a plan for how the war will end. They do not want the responsibility for a permanent occupation. Now Benny Gantz, by default Netanyahu’s key political rival, has demanded the Prime Minister enunciate a post-war plan by June 8.
Israelis would do well to contemplate what the failure to produce one could mean. Gaza may already be ungovernable. Chaos next door is never a good strategy. Burning down your neighbor’s house is a dangerous thing to do. Repression forever is no better. Like any agglomeration of more than 2 million people, Gaza reconstruction will need water, shelter, food, health, education, and security. That will require a major international effort. It is well past time to have begun thinking about it and organizing for it.
The odds of success for such a reconstruction effort are not high. But the outcome, even if only partly successful, would be a lot better than chaos or re-imposed occupation.
Resistance will continue
Whatever the Israelis decide–chaos, repression, or reconstruction–Palestinian resistance will continue until the Palestinian state becomes a reality. Jews should understand that better than they do, and better than those who have not suffered oppression, dispossession, and displacement. The question is whether the Palestinians will choose a more moderate path than the mass murder the Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades led them on, or an even more radical one.
There are signs of discontent with Hamas in Gaza. Encouraging the emergence of a more moderate resistance should be an Israeli priority. Israelis should be supporting aid into Gaza, not ransacking it. The International Criminal Court, whose prosecutor is seeking warrants for the arrest of Netanyahu and the Defense Minister as well as three top Hamas leaders, is doing so because of abuse of the civilian population of Gaza:
That gives Israelis an opportunity to reverse the decisions that have deprived Palestinians of the physical necessities of life. Israel can’t erase the past. But it can reverse counterproductive policies.
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The Gaza war will likely continue
That’s precisely what Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is doing. The Israel Defense Forces have seized the Rafah Crossing into Gaza. The attack is proceeding. Netanyahu hopes thereby to accomplish the complete victory over Hamas that has so far eluded him. Only that would have any chance of keeping him in power.
Netanyahu claims Hamas or Qatar made last-minute changes in the ceasefire agreement. Whatever they may be (or not be), it is hard to imagine that they justify an attack on a place where more than a million civilians are crammed together. This attack will be remembered for creating an even greater humanitarian catastrophe than the more than six months of war on Gaza have generated so far.
A test for Biden
President Biden has firmly opposed the attack on Rafah without a clear plan for protecting civilians. That is nowhere in sight. The Israelis are encouraging civilians to evacuate some areas, as they have previously, but the attacks are not limited to those. And there are few places left for civilians to go.
The question now is how Biden, who has supported Israel’s objective of eliminating Hamas’ military capabilities, will react. Axios has reported that the US has put a hold on some shipments of ammunition for Israel. But it is unclear how vital these are and how long the hold will last.
More important than a shipment or two of ammunition is the overall posture of the US towards Israel. In recent years, it has become “Israel right or wrong.” Netanyahu has taken advantage of that attitude not only in Gaza but also on the West Bank, where he has unleashed racist settlers to attack Palestinians. Arabs chant “from the river to the sea.” Netanyahu and his allies are doing it. They are also making Gaza uninhabitable.
Biden cannot continue to pose as a champion of democracy worldwide if he allows Israel to continue its disproportionate killing of civilians in Gaza. But stopping Netanyahu at this point will require a dramatic reversal of US policy.
The problem is domestic politics
That will be difficult. Biden faces some domestic pressure to rein in Israel. Many liberal Jews, as well as Arab and Muslim Americans, oppose continuation of the war. The campus protesters represent only the most visible part of that electorate. But the far more numerous evangelical Christians still favor “Israel right or wrong.” Most of them will vote Republican anyway, despite Donald Trump’s obvious disdain for religion and morality. But the center of gravity of American politics still favors Israel. Shifting toward more conditionality will not help Biden in November.
The opposite is true in much of the rest of the world. While much of Europe is still backing Israel, many in Africa and Asia view Israel as a colonial power and therefore support the Palestinians. America could benefit internationally from shifting policy away from “right or wrong,” as Eisenhower did when he got Israel, Britain, and France to back off the Suez Canal in 1956. But foreigners don’t get to vote in US elections.
Biden isn’t likely to pass the test
I would not bet on Biden forcing Israel to back down in Rafah. He is more likely to try to get Netanyahu to make the attack shorter and less violent. But Netanyahu is looking for a real victory–the modern equivalent of Yahya Sinwar’s head on a pole–and won’t settle for less. The Gaza war isn’t over and may continue for a long time still.
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Good news, finally, but unlikely to last
Bits of good news all around. The US House of Representatives, after months of allowing a small number of dissenting Republicans to block vital expanded aid to Ukraine (as well as infusions for Israel and Taiwan), has now approved it. Israel has retaliated against Iran for last weekend’s massive barrage of missiles and drones. It managed to do so without provoking any further escalation. And on a much lesser scale of geopolitics, the Council of Europe appears to be readying itself to admit Kosovo as a member.
Better late than never
All of this is good news, even if much delayed.
The Congress should never have allowed its Russophile right-wingers to put Ukraine’s existence at risk. It is appalling that someone could become Speaker who required months of cajoling to recognize the importance of getting more assistance to Kyiv. Last year’s Russian dominance in the war of attrition has done real damage, not only to Ukrainian morale.
We can hope that the US will now send Ukraine everything it needs. The aim should be not only to resist Russian advances but also to roll back Moscow’s recent gains and the threat they now poses to Kharkiv. Ukrainian F-16s should arrive this summer. A big Ukrainian push with the right weapons could force Russian retreats in Donbas, the south, and even Crimea.
Israel needs to do more
Israel has been rampaging in Gaza as if it had nothing to fear. The Iranian attack, though a failure, is hopefully a reminder to Jerusalem that self-restraint and diplomacy can be virtues, not weaknesses. The Israelis need now to resuscitate the talks with Hamas and reach an agreement, however unsatisfactory, for the release of at least the civilian hostages.
They also need to get rid of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has repeatedly endangered Israeli security. His encouragement of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, his financial and political support for Hamas, his opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state, and the deplorable intelligence and military failures of October 7 qualify him as the worst Israeli prime minister, not just the longest-serving.
Serbia’s spite is shameful
The Council of Europe has dawdled far too long in approving Kosovo for membership. It is far more qualified than its principal opponent, Serbia. And allowing Kosovo in will give Serbs who live there a new and potentially fruitful avenue to pursue complaints, through the European Court of Human Rights.
The spitefulness of Belgrade’s opposition, which directly contradicts an agreement the European Union claims Serbia adhered to in February, may be expected, but it is still deplorable. Kosovo is demonstrably better qualified for CoE membership than Serbia.
Can we hope for more?
Good news is particularly welcome when it is a harbinger of more. Some may hope that the voting in Congress augurs a less polarized political atmosphere in which moderate Democrats and Republicans can cooperate to neutralize the nutty MAGAites. But I see little hope of that. Speaker Johnson will now face an effort to remove him. If he wins, the MAGAites will be embittered and he will be more cautious in the future. If he loses, we could face a truly dire situation, as then he would have to be replaced with an even more convinced MAGAite.
In the Middle East, Netanyahu still seems firmly in power. Though his margin in the Knesset is narrow, his allies stand no chance of remaining in power if he falls. He himself could end up in prison on corruption charges. Netanyahu is not going to be easy to displace. Let’s hope the civilians in Rafah won’t pay the price of keeping him in the prime ministry.
In the Balkans, Belgrade may lose the battle to keep Pristina out of the Council of Europe. But that is a minor skirmish in Kosovo’s effort to gain full international recognition. There is no sign of progress on UN membership. EU membership is far off. NATO will have to be the next major battle. Fortunately that excludes Serbia from having a veto or even a vote. But Hungary and now Slovakia will more than likely be prepared to do Belgrade’s dirty work.
A long road ahead
Those of us looking for a Ukrainian military victory, a Palestinian state that will live in peace with Israel, and UN membership for Kosovo still have a long wait ahead. But every step in the right direction today is one that doesn’t have to be taken tomorrow.
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