Tag: Nuclear weapons
Beyond DADT and New START
As New START heads for ratification and the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell gets signed, I am feeling the need to explain why I’ve devoted so little time to both, even though my Twitter feed talks about little else.
In my way of thinking, both New START and DADT are peripheral to the main war and peace issues of our time. Even though New START was bought with a giant increase in funding for modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons, far more than even proponents of modernization envisaged at the beginning of the process, it can be argued that without the treaty efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime through measures like a cut-off in production of fissile material would be harder. It can also be argued that eliminating DADT will grow the pool of competent people interested in entering the U.S. military and eliminate a hypocritical restriction unworthy of a country dedicated to the proposition that all people are created equal.
But these are indirect arguments, secondary effects that do not deal directly with the main war and peace issues of our day. People are fighting and dying in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia–if peacebuilding efforts are not handled well more will die. Iran poses a serious challenge to American goals in the Middle East, with consequences for friends and allies as well as ourselves. The United States faces difficult choices: are we right to devote so many troops and so much money to Iraq and Afghanistan, or should we be paying more attention to Yemen and Somalia, or Iran? Will our beefed up diplomatic efforts in Sudan avoid catastrophe there after the January 9 referendum on independence for the South? There are real trade-offs among the conflict issues of our day, with life and death consequences for real people.
Let me be clear: I support repeal of DADT as well as ratification of New START. These are good things that respectively improve America’s record of consistency with its own ideals and increase the prospects for controlling proliferation of nuclear weapons. But they are mainly about us: our foolish discrimination against people who want to serve the nation, our nuclear weapons and their modernization.
The Administration should not rest on these laurels, important and deserved as they are. There is a dangerous world beyond DADT and New START that needs American attention.
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Iran: still hope for an enrichment agreement
As I’ve been keen on the idea of an enrichment agreement with Iran, one that would allow Iran to exercise its “right” to enrich but limit the extent and quantity, the question arises: how might the appointment of Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, as Acting Foreign Minister affect the prospects for such an agreement?
The most detailed recent interview with the MIT doctorate Salehi I have been able to find in English was done by CBS in April. He says there:
we have been consistent. That we are against nuclear weapons. That we are not looking for nuclear weapons. That we are a member of the NPT. That we should stay in the NPT. That we allow the inspectors to visit our sites. And we don’t want nuclear weapons. We want peaceful nuclear technology and this is our right in accordance with Article 4 of the NPT.
The interview with CBS’ Elizabeth Palmer ends this way:
the mere fact that we’ve offered not to enrich uranium to 20% …this was a big message sent to the West. But unfortunately they did not receive the message. I remember in many interviews I said ‘Please. Please Listen. This is a big offer…that Iran is offering. OK? We keep our promise of [only enriching up to] 5%… although it is our right to enrich to whatever level we want. But we keep our promise to 5%. And please enrich for us the 20%. But they didn’t. They started putting conditions after conditions after conditions. And then we had to start 20% enrichment. And now I am saying we are ready if they – today – say ‘OK we will supply you the fuel’, we will stop the 20% enrichment process. What else do they want?
Palmer: And you will give up the LEU equivalent to what you’d get back [in the plates for the Tehran Research Reactor].
Salehi: Yes, in fact [in a proposal for…] partial shipment. We said ‘No. We will give it in one go….the 1,000 kilos of 3.5% enriched uranium, in return for the 100 kilos of 20% enriched uranium. You can put that 100 kilos of uranium under the custody of the Agency in Iran.
Palmer: So that deal is on the table?
Salehi: Yes. That deal is on the table.
It is not clear to me whether it is still on the table, but on the face it seems pretty close to what Hillary Clinton has been hinting for some time. You can also watch Salehi in an Al Jazeera interview from February, where he seems to be saying the same things he said to CBS in April.
It would be a mistake to conclude that an agreement at the late January meeting in Turkey of the P5+1 with Iran is therefore likely, or even possible. Iran and the U.S. are both countries with multiple power centers that will be difficult to satisfy. Salehi’s relationship to the emerging praetorian Iran is not clear to me: is he close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps? What does his appointment by President Ahmedinejad signify? Is he just window dressing, or can he deliver a serious agreement with verification measures sufficient to satisfy not only the Obama Administration but also the Congress? These are critical questions I am not seeing answered–they would of course be key questions for a U.S. embassy in Tehran, if we had one.
For those who are interested, Salehi’s MIT Ph.D. thesis, “Resonance region neutronics of unit cells in fast and thermal reactors,” is available on line. Whatever his political connections and clout, I hope the Americans have negotiators at the same technical level.
PS: In my original post three days ago, I omitted this link, which is an excellent 360 of the issues Salehi faces. It is as good as I’ve seen on the subject.
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The Iranian enrichment gambit gets more explicit
This is from a BBC interview, as reported by Foreign Policy: Hillary Clinton says
We’ve told them that they are entitled to the peaceful use of civil nuclear energy, but they haven’t yet restored the confidence of the international community to the extent where the international community would feel comfortable allowing them to enrich. They can enrich uranium at some future date once they have demonstrated that they can do so in a responsible manner in accordance with international obligations.
In diplospeak, she is clearly floating the idea that there might be a deal if Iran will agree not to enrich too much. This is published under a headline that reads Clinton on Iran: The regime is on the ropes. Nice cover for a soft message to Tehran.
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Can the Lady deliver?
Simon Henderson at the Washington Institute has a sharper eye than I do, as he detected this from SecState Clinton this week: “Iran is entitled to the use of civil nuclear power for peaceful purposes.” In his well-crafted scenesetter, Simon bemoans that “this formulation could allow Iran to continue enriching uranium.”
I doubt we are going to be able to stop that. The best we can hope for is to limit the degree of enrichment and amount of material.
Monday’s P5+1 meeting in Geneva is a big test for the EU. If Lady Ashton can deliver, Brussels will gain serious credibility.
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Pakistan: what me worry?
Islamabad is busy pooh-poohing U.S. concerns and treating them as signs of bias against Pakistan, but anyone sensible would worry about that country’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) as well as about the security of its nuclear weapons.
As a science counselor at the American Embassy in Rome in the late 1970s, I visited one of Italy’s research reactors, which like Pakistan’s ran on HEU. It contained, as my guide pointed out, more than enough HEU to make a nuclear weapon. The U.S. has been busy collecting this material, and replacing it with less dangerous stuff, for some years now. No one responsible would pooh-pooh the concerns–and lots of proud countries have collaborated in getting the HEU into more secure places, including well-known U.S. toady Belarus.
We won’t I imagine find much about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the diploleaks, since those cables will likely be more restricted in distribution. But if Pakistan can’t respond more responsibly on HEU, it makes me worry even more about their nukes.
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Scientist sees centrifuges, others see international catastrophe
The press has underlined the risks North Korea’s recently revealed centrifuges entail,and others have been quick to draw broad international conclusions (see Simon Henderson, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3274). But it is well worth reading Siegfried Hecker’s original report, which is cautiously judicious, while raising many important questions.
Certainly Henderson goes a bit far in speculating about hydrogen bombs. He is on more solid ground in his discussion of possible nuclear and missile trade, once considered unlikely to happen by nonproliferation experts.
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