Tag: Nuclear weapons
An Iranian enrichment gambit
If New START has fallen into the abyss of partisan politics within the U.S., the issue of Iran’s effort to achieve nuclear weapons capability has fallen into the abyss of U.S.-Iranian relations, which seem capable of oscillating only between bad and worse, with an occasional move towards catastrophic. The Stimson Center and USIP have attempted to fish it out with a study group report advocating “strategic engagement.”
The approach is sagacious: while discounting the likelihood of any regime change stemming from the Green Movement in the near future, the expert group focuses on what can be done to strengthen those conservatives with reason to regret international sanctions and to want them ended, at the expense of hardliners who want nuclear weapons at any cost and have no interest in normalizing relations with the U.S. and the rest of the world. It rightly sees the tightening of sanctions as part of strategic engagement.
The group wants the U.S. (and the rest of the world) to acknowledge Iranian rights to enrichment, in the hope that doing so will enable an agreement that limits the degree and/or quantity of enrichment, hoping even for a phase-out. Here is the key sentence from the report: “Washington should signal its clear—if also clearly conditional—acceptance of Iran’s enrichment rights, providing that Tehran negotiates verifiable limits on the degree of enrichment and on the volume of enriched fuel stored in Iran.”
This is not a new idea, as a quick search reveals Matthew Bunn of Harvard put it out a year ago. Making a virtue of necessity is a tried and true approach in diplomacy. Iran is already enriching, why imagine you can stop it altogether?
It is easy to imagine how this idea will go over in some quarters, where even a substantial cut in Russian nuclear weapons is having a hard time getting a hearing. There are three rational criticisms likely: 1) Iran has lost its “right” to enrichment by violating its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 2) what reason is there to believe Iran will agree to anything on enrichment once its right is acknowledged, however conditionally? 3) what would prevent Iran from reneging on the agreement and enriching beyond the specified limits, either overtly or covertly?
Iran appears to have agreed to restart nuclear talks December 5. Will the enrichment gambit be tested then?
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New START needs a new start
Ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia has fallen into the partisan abyss we still call America. The left claims failure to ratify will encourage Iran to get nuclear weapons. The right fears grave impairment of the nation’s nuclear defenses.
Both claims are what the car guys call “BOOOOOOGUS.” Iran is likely to go for nuclear weapons capability no matter what happens to New START, which will only marginally decrease America’s nuclear forces. And failure to ratify will lead only to a pause in Washington’s reset with Moscow, which has good reason to react calmly.
That said, the Administration needs to get the treaty off to a new start if it expects ratification in either this lame duck Congress or the next. Turning down the rhetoric and turning up some careful analysis of the facts would be a good place to start. It is hard to believe that we can’t figure out a way to make a dispassionate and reasoned decision to reduce a number of weapons that hawks in both Washington and Moscow agree is excessive.
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