Tag: Russia
Peace Picks | August 2-6, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Restoring a federal governance system in Sudan | Aug 2, 2021 | 9:00 AM EST | Chatham House | Register Here
The signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020, and a constitutional decree issued in March 2021 by the Chairman of the Sovereign Council, are both significant markers towards the restoration of a federal governance system in Sudan. Establishing a decentralized system of governance that bridges the development gap between the centre and the regions is a significant challenge. But it is hoped that the genuine devolution of power will support peace-building, result in more equitable distribution of wealth and resources, and amplify local priorities in Sudan’s regions.
At this event, panellists will discuss the implementation of a new federal governance architecture in Sudan, the establishment of structures that will ensure more equitable development across the country and priorities for local governance.
Speakers:
Hon. Adeeb Yousif
Governor of Central Darfur, Republic of Sudan
Anwar Elhaj
Researcher and Political Analyst
Dr. Mona Mohamed Taha Ayoub
Lecturer, Institute of Public Administration and Federalism, University of Khartoum
Dr. Louise Walker
Chargé d’Affaires, British Embassy in Sudan
Ahmed Soliman (Chair)
Research Fellow at the Africa Programme, Chatham House
- Turkey-Israel relations in a changing geopolitical landscape | Aug 4, 2021 | 8:30 AM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Relations between Turkey and Israel have been historically low since a diplomatic rift in 2010, characterized by an atmosphere of mutual distrust and punctuated by recurring crises. Historically, as the United States’ two closest allies in the region, Turkey and Israel had enjoyed a close strategic relationship. Now, with changing regional dynamics in the form of the Abraham Accords, mutual concerns about the Syrian War and Iran’s role in the region, and the recent change in Israel’s government present new opportunities and environments for the two countries to engage in dialogue.
This panel will discuss the outlook for the relation between these two regional powers.
Speakers:
Jonathan H. Ferziger
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs, Atlantic Council
Former Bloomberg Middle East Correspondent
Amb. Mithat Rende
Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OECD
Prof. Brenda Shaffer
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council
Amb. Matthew J. Bryza (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, Global Energy Center & Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
Defne Arslan (welcoming remarks)
Director, Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, Atlantic Council
- Enhancing security in the Black Sea: The future of security cooperation | Aug 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Since Moscow launched its war on Ukraine in 2014, NATO has taken substantial steps to bolster security for its eastern members, particularly with a stronger presence in the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania. The NATO approach to security in the Baltic Sea has been comprehensive, as all NATO members in the region and other states recognize the dangers posed by a revisionist Kremlin. But NATO efforts along the southern flank, in the Black Sea region, are not as far along.
This panel will discuss NATO’s role in the Black Sea region and what security cooperation among these states will look like in the future.
Speakers:
Leah Scheunemann (welcoming remarks)
Deputy Director, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Alton Buland
Director, South and Central Europe, US Department of Defense
Dr. Can Kasapoğlu
Director of Security and Defense Research, The Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM)
Ambassador Elena Poptodorova
Vice President, Atlantic Club of Bulgaria
Dr. Harlan Ullman
Senior Advisor, Atlantic Council; Chairman, The Killowen Group
Irina Zidaru
Director General for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania
Amb. John Herbst (moderator)
Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
- Why Tunisia’s democratic transition still matters? | Aug 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Chatham House | Register Here
Late on Sunday 25 July 2021, the 64th anniversary of the proclamation of the Tunisian Republic, the Tunisian president, Kais Saied declared he will assume the executive power in country, dismissing the government of the Prime Minster Hichem Mechichi and suspending the parliament. He also declared the suspension of the legal immunity of parliament members and taking control of the general prosecutor’s office.
Struggle over powers and mandates has been characteristic of the Tunisian political system over the past decade. Since the eruption of the Tunisian revolution in 2011, significant political progress towards democracy has been achieved. However, over the past year, Tunisia has witnessed disagreements over cabinet reshuffles and control of the security forces, complicating the efforts to handle a recent fierce COVID-19 wave, structural economic hardship and a looming fiscal crisis. Are the shaky political progress and the sluggish economic progress a threat to the nascent democratic transition in Tunisia? Or are the ongoing developments part of Tunisia’s democratization process?
The webinar will explore the factors that paved the way to the dramatic moment of the evening of 25 July 2021, assess the options for Tunisia’s democratic transition, and why this transition is still relevant in the first place.
Speakers:
Dr Laryssa Chomiak
Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
Fadil Aliriza
Editor In Chief, Meshkal
Prof Daniel Brumberg
Director of Democracy and Governance Studies, Georgetown University; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Arab Center Washington DC
Aymen Bessalah
Advocacy and Policy Analyst, Al Bawsala
Dr Lina Khatib (moderator)
Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House
- A New Transatlantic Policy Approach Towards the Western Balkans | Aug 4, 2021 | 11:30 AM EST | CSIS | Register Here
As the Biden administration pledges to work closely with its European allies, new policy approaches, development tools, and dialogue mechanisms to revitalize transatlantic policy across the region are essential as these countries grapple with weak institutions, endemic corruption, democratic backsliding, and are increasingly influenced by strategic competition.
The panel will engage in an in-depth regional conversation that explores German policy toward the region and how the U.S. and Germany and the EU can achieve better policy outcomes in the Western Balkans.
Speakers:
MdB Peter Beyer
Coordinator of Transatlantic Cooperation, German Federal Foreign Office; Western Balkans Rapporteur, German Parliament
James O’Brien
Vice Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic & Director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, CSIS
Paul Linnarz (opening remarks)
Director, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Office USA
- Tunisia’s Constitutional Crisis and Yearning for Democracy in Northwest Africa | Aug 5, 2021 | 10:00 AM EST | Arab Center Washington DC | Register Here
On July 25, 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied fired the prime minister and suspended Parliament in what some have called a coup. The move followed nationwide protests demanding the premier’s resignation and the dissolution of the parliament as the coronavirus outbreak pushed the healthcare system to collapse and worsened economic conditions.
In light of these developments in Tunisia, site of the Arab Spring’s only democratic success story, Arab Center Washington DC is organizing a webinar to discuss the status of democratization in Northwest Africa, specifically focusing on Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Morocco. Panelists will discuss the implications of President Saied’s move and its constitutionality, the state of democratization in the region and the impact of events in Tunisia, the role and interventions by regional powers like Egypt and Gulf countries, and policy recommendation to support democratic processes and governance reform across Northwest Africa.
Speakers:
Yasmina Abouzzohour
Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Khaoula Ben Gayesse
Tunisian Journalist
Dalia Ghanem Yazbeck
Resident Scholar, Carnegie Middle East Center
- Pakistan’s National Security Outlook: A Conversation with Pakistani National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf | Aug 5, 2021 | 11:00 AM EST | The United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Since the country’s founding, Pakistan’s national security priorities have been largely defined by the realities of its geopolitical neighborhood. Now, with escalating violence in Afghanistan, intensifying competition between the United States and China, limited hopes for rapprochement with India, and the COVID-19 pandemic, Pakistan’s neighborhood is evolving — and Pakistan’s national security approach will have to evolve with it.
This discussion with Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf will look at what these developments mean for Pakistan’s national security outlook towards its neighbors and its relationship with the United States, as well as how the pandemic impacts Pakistan’s security and economic policy.
Speakers:
Dr. Moeed Yusuf
National Security Advisor, Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Hon. Stephen J. Hadley (moderator)
Chair of the Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace
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No good options for Syria
The Assad regime is undertaking yet one more effort to suppress resistance in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The brutality will no doubt be extreme, as it has been through more than 10 years of war against the civilian population. The question is Lenin’s: “What is to be done?”
Syria presents Washington with a quandary: American administrations from President Obama onwards find President Assad’s attacks on his own citizens odious and criminal, but they don’t see a risk to US national security that would justify putting American troops at risk to stop it. Once in a great while, Presidents Obama and Trump have used cruise missiles, which entail no risk to Americans, in response to Assad’s egregious use of chemical weapons, but without much effect.
American troops were sent to Syria, and remain there, to fight Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, not Assad. The Americans have sent lots of humanitarian assistance, but that does nothing to weaken or punish Assad. In fact, the portion of that assistance that goes through UN agencies via Damascus helps him a good deal. The Russians have been persistent in making it hard for aid to get to Syrian opposition-held areas from Turkey.
Anyone with even a modicum of human feeling would want to do more to save Syrian civilians from Assad’s depredations. So Josh Rogin and Andrew Tabler call for more, hoping an ongoing policy review will produce at least a special envoy. But a special envoy could be meaningless without a purpose, which Andrew would like to define this way:
a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-27/search-syria-strategy
How realistic is that?
More sanctions can be imposed–there is rarely a limit to those, but Assad and his enablers are not wanting to travel to the US or Europe and presumably know how to keep their finances under cover. The Syrian economy is already a shambles. Even if Assad is successful militarily, he will be unable to do any significant reconstruction. Iran and Russia already own him and will use their influence in ways the US and Europe consider malign.
The Americans can cause some discomfort to both by maintaining their small military presence in eastern Syria, which supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there. But the Americans have been unable and unwilling to do much to stabilize the situation even where they are present, as that requires risk-taking they want to avoid. Hope that the SDF might develop into a serious military and political challenger to Assad seems to have expired quietly.
Just maintaining Assad’s current isolation requires a good deal of diplomatic heavy lifting. Some Arab countries–most notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates–have wanted to ease up on Assad. To bolster its lagging economy, Jordan would like to open its border and allow trade with Syria. The UAE sees Assad as a bulwark against the Islamists that Abu Dhabi dreads and loathes. Greece, anxious to avoid another outflux of Syrian refugees, has sent its Ambassador back to Damascus as an “envoy.” Other Europeans may be tempted, or blackmailed, to do something comparable.
The UN political process for Syria, focused on a committee that is supposed to be writing a new constitution, is essentially moribund. Initiative for years has fallen instead to the “Astana powers” (Iran, Russia, and Turkey), none of which are prepared to push for a political solution. All three are relying on their military forces to get what they want in Syria. Iran gets a bridge to Lebanese Hizbollah as well as a new confrontation line with Israel, Russia gets its bases and a foothold in the Middle East, and Turkey gets to repress the Syrian Kurds, some of whom have supported insurgency inside Turkey.
I am not appealing for inaction, just highlighting how difficult it is to think of anything that can be done to affect the situation in a serious way. That is even before we come to discussing Biden Administration priorities, which include reentering the Iran nuclear deal, withdrawing at least some US forces from the Middle East, and refocusing on strategic competition with Russia and China while managing the challenges posed by North Korea, Venezuela, and other bad actors. Never mind the domestic priorities. Syria looks distant in Biden’s perspective.
So sure, a special envoy if you like, but what will s/he do? Talk is cheap, and not bad. But there are no good options for Syria.
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Stevenson’s army, July 24
The beach weeks with grandchildren are over. What news did I miss?
-Some in Congress want to claw back some foreign policy powers. Sen. Murphy [D-CT] describes the bill –with changes to war powers, national emergencies, and foreign arms sales.
– Looks like the House is hooked on remote voting.
– Sen. Cruz has a hold on several State nominations. Remember, holds are a norm. not a rule. But Senators do them because the party leaders dare not ignore them.
– WSJ notes that Democrats also use budget games.
-US will shift to formal advisory role in Iraq.
– But it’s giving air support to Afghans and new drone strikes in Somalia
– Influence peddling is alive and well. Haiti factions are hiring. Trump buddy was indicted.
-There’s a Nordstream2 deal, but some doubts about enforcement.
–Chip shortage may last until 2023.
– Quincy Institute tallies Middle East interventions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Afghanistan after the Americans: it’s either peace or chaos
Hamid Bayati of Iran’s Mehr news agency asked questions yesterday. I responded:
Q: As you know new round of Afghans talks began in Qatar and CNN reported that US intelligence assessments paint an increasingly bleak picture of the Taliban’s quickening advance across Afghanistan and the potential threat it poses to the capital of Kabul, warning the militant group could soon have a stranglehold on much of the country in the wake of the US withdrawal of troops. So how do you predict Afghanistan’s future with this assessments?
A: I don’t predict Afghanistan’s future, which is a fool’s game. But its security forces are having a hard time with Taliban, there is no doubt about that.
Q: Some experts said that the situation in Afghanistan and Taliban quickening advance in Afghanistan is a result of an unwritten agreement between US and Taliban. In other words, if the US gives green light to take control of the country, what do you think about this issue?
A: The U.S. agreed under President Trump to an unconditional withdrawal that President Biden is implementing. That was not intended as a green light to a military takeover by the Taliban, who however are taking advantage of it. Washington wanted them engaged seriously in negotiations, not conflict.
Q: Experts believe the US does not want peace and stability in Afghanistan, because if there is not any tension in Afghanistan there is no need for the presence of US troops in the region, so is it true or not and why?
A: The experts who think this need to think again. The US wants out of Afghanistan, not in. I see no reason Washington would not be happy with peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Q: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and the US have different interests in Afghanistan, so how is it possible these countries reach a common goal about it and end the conflict in Afghanistan?
A: The interests are different, but not entirely incompatible. All would be well-served by a more stable, unaligned Afghanistan. The question is whether they will allow that to happen. The US will no longer be a big player. The more immediate neighbors (Russia, China, India, and Pakistan) will need to collaborate to create an Afghanistan that threatens none of them and is threatened by none of them. It won’t be easy, but the alternative is chaos.
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What to expect from renewal of the Kosovo/Serbia dialogue
Alma Baxhaku of Klan Kosova asked some questions today; I answered:
Q: The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is resuming. The new Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, has said that this process is not a continuation of what it was until now. Do you think that Kosovo should radically change its approach to dialogue with Serbia?
A: The Prime Minister has good reason to want to underline that he will take a different approach, as the past several years of the dialogue have not been productive. I do think some changes are in order.
Q: What should be Kosovo’s position at the negotiating table?
A: Kosovo needs to insist on equality and reciprocity. If something is agreed for Serbs in Kosovo, an equivalent should be available to Albanians inside Serbia. The Specialist Chambers violated this principle. I’d like to see their jurisdiction extended to Serbia, where the Albanian American Bytyqi brothers were murdered after the war.
Kosovo also needs to be ready to walk away from a bad agreement in order to get a good one. And it needs to strengthen its international support.
Q: In the first meeting with President Vucic, PM Kurti came up with four new proposals. How did you see them?
A: I’m mostly in agreement. I obviously agree with him on reciprocity in general, though I might have some quarrels with how it is applied in practice. I also agree that the missing persons of all ethnicities need to be identified and their remains returned.
On CEFTA/SEFTA I’m inclined to agree as well. Mini-Schengen seems to me an ill-defined enterprise, one in which Kosovo’s equality is not clearly recognized. I also like the idea of a non-aggression agreement, though I imagine Serbia will hesitate because it implies Kosovo sovereignty and Belgrade would want NATO to sign on as well.
Q: PM Kurti said in front of the MEPs that the authors of the documents that would bring ideas for a final solution between Kosovo and Serbia are missing. Do you think the EU should offer a concrete solution to the parties?
A: Only if it is one that recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo. In the meanwhile, the EU should allow Kosovo into the visa waiver program.
Q: What should be the role of the US in this resumed process?
A: The US should be supporting the EU, but it will also be called on to “deliver” Kosovo. I think Brussels and Washington should form an entity like the International Civilian Office to monitor implementation of agreements reached in the dialogue as well as name and shame those who fail to implement them.
Q: According to the statements made public, both Kurti and Vucic have much opposite attitudes. Do you think that a final agreement between Kosovars and Serbs is near?
A: I don’t. President Vucic sees little prospect of EU membership in the near term and has consequently turned toward Moscow and Beijing rather than Brussels. He has made it eminently clear he is not prepared for a major move before next year’s Serbian presidential election.
Kosovo in these circumstances has to do what it can to use the time to strengthen its bargaining position. The recent movement of non-recognizers Greece and Spain toward upgrading their relationships with Kosovo is precisely the kind of thing needed. I’d like Pristina to improve relations with Beijing, which is more interested in commerce in the Balkans than politics. The Kosovo government should also be doing everything it can to improve relations with the Serb and other communities inside Kosovo, including identifying and returning the remains of missing people, implementing the Constitutional Court decision of the Decan/Decani monastery’s property, and protecting all of the communities from interethnic violence.
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Stevenson’s army, July 12
–Biggest protests in Cuba in years.
–Defense companies keep raking in the dollars.
–Russia has a new national security strategy and it includes climate change.
-WOTR reports on the fight over Diego Garcia. [I hope you can open this link, if not just go to Punchbowl]
-Punchbowl lays out the Congressional options for the next several busy weeks.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).–
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