Tag: sanctions
Marching towards different wars
Both Iran and the United States are signaling escalation in the wake of the assassination of Quds force commander Qasem Soleimani. Tehran said it had identified 35 targets. President Trump responded with a tweet threat against 52:
Let this serve as a WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA wants no more threats!
Both have the capability, and perhaps the will. It all sounds strikingly symmetrical.
But there the parallel ends. The wars they are contemplating are different. Iran can hit 35 US targets, but only using proxy forces in other countries or cyber attacks. The US can hit 52 sites, but only with stand-off weapons like drones and cruise missiles, in addition to cyber attacks. That I suspect makes cyber attacks less likely: the Americans presumably have the greater capability in that domain, but they also have far more to lose if the Iranians prove even marginally competent. Will Tehran care much if its citizens don’t have internet access?
Neither the US nor Iran wants a traditional ground war. The Iranians because they would lose, should the Americans deploy the kind of force they did in attacking Iraq in 2003. But that isn’t happening. The American electorate is not prepared to support that kind of effort, and the Administration has done nothing to try to mobilize it. President Trump can deploy a few thousand additional troops to the Middle East to protect American embassies and other facilities, but hundreds of thousands are not in the cards.
Trump is hoping his threats of escalation will bring Iran to the negotiating table, where he hopes to get a “better” agreement than President Obama’s nuclear deal. It’s the North Korea gambit: loud threats, some action, then hugs and kisses. If that fails, he will try a stand-off and cyber attack. If he has a game plan beyond that, he has kept it a good secret. He has so far been unwilling to loosen sanctions, which is what the Iranians want.
The Iranians are fighting on different battlefields. They may threaten proxy and cyber attacks, and even indulge in some, but their better bets are forcing the US troops out of Iraq (there is an advisory vote tomorrow on that in the Iraqi parliament) and acquiring all the material and technology they need to build nuclear weapons. Kim Jong-un got respect once he had nukes. Why shouldn’t the Supreme Leader expect the same?
Nothing about American intervention in the Middle East in the past two decades has brought much more than grief to the United States. Trillions of dollars and thousands of American deaths later, we have accomplished little. Iran has gained from the removal of arch-rival Saddam Hussein, protected its ally Bashar al Assad from insurgency, strengthened its position on Israel’s northern borders, and helped the Houthis in Yemen to harass Saudi Arabia.
President Trump had it right when he ran in 2016 on avoiding new Middle East wars and bringing American troops home. But that requires a serious strategy and commitment to diplomacy and alliances that he has been unwilling to make. Now he risks getting the Americans sent home and confronting an Iran that has nuclear capabilities. You tell me who is fighting on the right battlefield.
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Stevenson’s army December 5 and 6
December 6
– DIA has done a big unclassified report on Iran’s military power.
– A law firm has done a good summary of recent sanctions policy.
– FP says State is excluding officials from information on senior officials’ phone calls.
-David Ignatius says State blocked a contract to train Saudi intelligence.
December 5
Something’s going on. I don’t know whether there has been a genuine increase in the threat from Iran or whether the administration is creating a pretext for military action in the region. Here are the dots that seem to connect: US officials are now revealing that Iran has secretly moved short range ballistic missiles into Iraq. Despite public denials, Pentagon reporters hear that the military wants to send an additional 14,000 US troops to the Middle East [but no details on location or types]. SecState Pompeo had an urgently scheduled meeting with IsraeliPM Netanyahu, where the key topic was said to be Iran. Under Secretary Rood made an even more explicit warning of Iranian military action.
Meanwhile, a former senior intelligence official says Trump often disputes what IC briefers tell him.
Kim Jong-un also seems to be ratcheting up his threats to change policy at the New Year.
Reuters says Jared Kushner is now playing a big role in China trade talks.
NYT study says US cluster munitions have caused many US friendly fire deaths.
A Syracuse professor burns a straw man in a WSJ op-ed. He decries any value in the “interagency process” because the president is in charge of foreign policy. Of course the president is the ultimate authority. But wise and successful presidents over the years have used the process to vet and revise their policies, and to implement them. Many of Trump’s setbacks have come precisely because he acted impulsively or ignorance of contextual details. [See, I don’t only send things I agree with.]
As an example of this process internationally, look at the detailed official statement from the NATO summit.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Peace Picks | October 21 – October 25
U.S. Policy Priorities for Afghanistan: A Conversation with U.S. Representative Mike Waltz | October 21, 2019 | 3:00 PM – 4:00 PM | Middle East Institute, 1763 N Street NW, Washington, District of Columbia 2003 | Register Here
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host U.S. Representative (FL) Michael Waltz to address U.S. policy priorities for Afghanistan. In conversation with Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, director of Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies at MEI, Rep. Waltz will discuss the many complicated challenges facing Afghanistan, key regional challenges to consider, and policy prescriptions given the fallout of the deal with the Taliban.
Yemen and International Humanitarian Law: Briefing from UN Experts | October 21, 2019 | 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036-2103 | Register Here
The conflict in Yemen has killed more than 90,000 Yemenis and put more than 20 million in need of humanitarian assistance. The UN Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen (GEE) have just released a new report describing a “pervasive lack of accountability” for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. How will the latest developments in the conflict, including the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, affect the dire conditions in the country and the prospects for accountability?
Please join the Carnegie Middle East Program and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies for a briefing by the experts on their recent report. Chair Kamel Jendoubi as well as members Melissa Parke and Charles Garraway will present their findings. Yemeni human rights defender Radhya al-Mutawakel will add her perspective. Carnegie’s Michele Dunne will moderate the conversation.
This event is co-sponsored by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.
More in the Med: Revitalizing NATO’s Southern Strategy for an Era of Great Power Competition | October 22, 2019 | 3:00 PM – 4:30 PM | Atlantic Council Headquarters, 1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor, Washington, DC 20005 | Register Here
Over the last 5 years, NATO has made huge strides to defend and deter against Russia in Europe’s northeast – what NATO does best. But its work in Europe’s south – in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa – continues to fall short. This is not only a missed opportunity to mitigate the real, and growing, challenges along NATO’s Mediterranean and Black Sea frontiers, such as instability, terrorism, and uncontrolled migration, together with a more aggressive Russia and rising China; neglecting the threats closest to home for southern allies also threatens the solidarity and cohesion among allies that are essential to transatlantic security in an era of intensifying great power competition.
To help reinvigorate NATO’s southern strategy for today’s environment, the Transatlantic Security Initiative is launching a new report, co-authored by Ambassador Alexander Vershbow and Lauren Speranza. The paper argues that NATO’s south is not just about projecting stability, but also defense, deterrence, and containment. It outlines specific recommendations for how to project stability better, make the south ‘the new east’ through an enhanced Southern presence, and bolster regional leadership – particularly from Italy, a key ally at the heart of NATO’s south.
Opening Remarks
Damon Wilson
Executive Vice President
Atlantic Council
Alessandro Profumo
Chief Executive Officer
Leonardo S.p.A.
Keynote Address
General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC (Ret.)
Executive Chairman Emeritus
Atlantic Council
Discussion
Ambassador Philip Reeker
Acting Assistant Secretary of European and Eurasian Affairs
US Department of State
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
Distinguished Fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Atlantic Council
Ambassador Armando Varicchio
Ambassador
Embassy of Italy to the United States
Kirsten Fontenrose
Director, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative
Atlantic Council
Moderator
Lauren Speranza
Deputy Director, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Atlantic Council
Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela? | October 23, 2019 | 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM | CSIS Headquarters | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
As the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela continues to deteriorate, a debate has risen among policymakers as to whether or not sanctions may be worsening conditions for Venezuelan citizens.
While the United States, the Lima Group, the European Union, and other like-minded nations continue to increase pressure on the regime of Nicolás Maduro with diplomatic measures such as challenging his government’s legitimacy, the question remains as to whether sanctions are an effective measure for changing the behavior of the Venezuelan regime and pushing Maduro to step down. Despite external support by Russia, Cuba, China, and a few other countries, Maduro is more alienated on the world stage than ever before. However, stiff sanctions and diplomatic isolation have not yet convinced Maduro to negotiate his exit, as his regime has proven to be resilient and adaptable.
The expert panel will assess the efficacy
of sanctions, including what is and is not working, as well as implications for
U.S. foreign policy, the energy sector, and the impact on Venezuela’s
humanitarian crisis and its struggle for democracy.
Panel Discussion Featuring:
Eric B. Lorber, Director, Financial Integrity
Network
Elizabeth
Rosenberg, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics,
and Security Program, Center for a New American Security
David
Smolansky, Coordinator of the OAS Working Group on Venezuelan
Migrants and Refugees; Former Mayor of El Hatillo, Venezuela
Francisco J.
Monaldi, Fellow, Latin American Energy Policy, Rice University
Moderated by:
Moises Rendon, Director, The Future of Venezuela Initiative; Fellow, CSIS Americas Program
The Navy in an era of great power competition | October 23, 2019 | 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM | Brookings Institution, Saul/Zilkha Room, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
America’s maritime forces are undergoing significant changes to address the realities of great power competition. Evolving technology, ongoing uncertainty about the budgetary and fiscal climate, and accelerating innovation by America’s competitors have forced the Navy and Marine Corps to adapt quickly and comprehensively to fulfill the vision laid out for them in the National Defense Strategy. Much work, though, remains to be done.
On October 23, the Brookings Institution will host Richard Spencer, the 76th secretary of the Navy, to discuss naval modernization, the budgetary environment, and the challenges posed by America’s great power rivals to America’s maritime forces. The keynote address will be followed by a discussion between Secretary Spencer and Michael E. O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy.
Partners against crime: Fighting cartels and corruption in the Americas | October 25, 2019 | 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM | AEI, 1789 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Transnational organized crime is a threat that reaches throughout the Western Hemisphere in the form of drug cartels, gangs, guerrilla groups, and crooked officials. These groups destabilize governments, spread violence, and undermine economic development. The United States relies on vital regional cooperation and partnerships to combat this threat, yet these partnerships can be disrupted by political shifts, corruption, and a lack of institutional capacity.
Please join AEI for a conversation on transnational organized crime, corruption, and the importance of regional partnerships. Attorney General of El Salvador Raúl Melara will deliver opening remarks, followed by a panel discussion with leading experts.
Panelists:
Ryan Berg, AEI
Roberto Gil Zuarth, President of the Senate of Mexico (2015–16)
Celina Realuyo, William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University
Moderator:
Juan José Daboub, AEI
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Iran options
As the complexity of the attack on Saudi oil facilities becomes apparent, the odds that it was state-sponsored go up. Iran is the prime suspect. So if convincing evidence is provided, what would an appropriate response be? Here are some options:
- Military
An attack on Iranian oil-producing facilities would be the obvious, proportional response. But Iran already is unable to export all the oil is producing, so the immediate additional damage to Tehran’s finances would be minimal. A US attack would increase the price for what oil it is able to sell, helping Iran’s finances rather than hurting them while alienating oil importing countries.
The US could skip the niceities and proceed directly to an attack on Iran’s nuclear program. That would give Iran an incentive to move as quickly as possible to build a nuclear weapon, requiring repeated American attacks to prevent the crash program from achieving success. In the meanwhile, Iran would certainly retaliate against US assets in the Middle East and perhaps also in the US, where Hizbollah is thought to maintain a network of sleeper cells. Iran would also retaliate against Israel, perhaps using the same sophisticated cruise missiles used against the Saudi oil facilities.
Neither of these options is appealing. There are others: the US could attack, overtly or covertly, Iranians in Syria or Iranian proxies in many countries, it could mount a massive cyber attack, and it could combine those options with the above. All these lead in the direction of long-term instability in the Middle East.
2. Diplomatic
The US could take its evidence of Iranian origins of the attack to the Security Council to seek a condemnation of Iran and renewed multilateral sanctions. The condemnation Washington should be able to get if the evidence is good. But neither the Russians nor the Chinese are likely to go along with multilateral sanctions in the absence of a US move back to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka nuclear deal) and loosening of American unilateral sanctions.
President Trump, while begging for Iran to come back to the negotiating table, has been unwilling to loosen or suspend unilateral sanctions that are causing serious damage to the Iranian economy. Doing so would be a major concession. We know how he would feel about that. If ever Iran is to get weakening of the sanctions, it will need to provide Trump with a TV moment, which the Supreme Leader has been loathe to do.
3. Political
Washington could resort to regime change efforts, likely clandestine, to try to collapse the Islamic Republic from within. This would entail extensive efforts to promote alternatives other than the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the exile group that John Bolton and Rudy Giuliani favor. The MEK is entirely lacking in support inside Iran. In addition to padding Bolton and Giuliani’s bank accounts, it may be useful for economic sabotage and assassinations but does not have the traction with the Iranian people (not least due to its terrorist history) that would be required to topple the Supreme Leader.
The US could also promote minority political movements within Iran willing to challenge Tehran’s authority. There are Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, and others who would be useful in such an effort. A bare majority of Iranians are Persians. But ethnic civil war risks causing even more instability in the region than currently exists, which is saying something.
4. Economic
There are basically two ways to go on sanctions: tighten up the unilateral ones, or loosen them in an effort to get others to impose multilateral sanctions. Iran is feeling the pain of unilateral sanctions, but their response is clear: escalate to cause damage to the world economy so long as Iran is suffering. I suppose it is possible they will throw in the towel one day, but there is no telling when that day might come.
Getting others to go along with multilateral sanctions will be a hard sell for an Administration that pulled the plug on the JCPOA, which the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and others liked. While it is conceivable that if they are convinced the attacks were Iranian that they would go along with multilateral sanctions without the US back in the JCPOA, it isn’t likely.
Bottom line: If the US wants multilateral sanctions, which look like the best option, and return of Iran to the negotiating table, President Trump is going to have to swallow a bitter pill: get the US back into the JCPOA. Otherwise, we can expect continued escalation from the Iranians. Better to reverse course now rather than after the next round of attacks. But it is unlikely Trump will do that.
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Confrontation intensifies
On September 12, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) hosted a panel discussion entitled, “As Maximum Pressure and Maximum Resistance Max Out, Where’s the Confrontation with Iran Headed?”. The panel consisted of Ali Alfoneh, Senior Fellow at AGSIW, Dina Esfandiary, International Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Kirsten Fontenrose, Director for Regional Security, Middle East at the Atlantic Council. The discussion was moderated by Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar at AGSIW.
Since President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, Washington has pursued a strategy of “maximum pressure,” largely through intensifying economic sanctions. Iran has responded with “maximum resistance,” mostly with low-intensity, and sometimes deniable, military provocations. Signs are growing that both strategies have maxed out and further escalation could lead to consequences unwanted by either side. Where do both parties go from here and can these strategies work?
Fontenrose argued that theoretically, the US policy of maximum pressure can work. The rationale beyond this is that every country has a finite amount of resources to dedicate to defense and domestic needs. The use of sanctions squeezes Iran and forces them to make difficult decisions. The US has a limited number of coercive tools. By maxing out sanctions, the Washington avoids using kinetic activities that could escalate potential conflict. Alfoneh and Esfandiary agreed that the US has not set clear goals for their use of sanctions. If the US established clear goals, Iran might respond in kind.
President Trump will benefit electorally if he is able to have a summit with Supreme Leader Khamenei. Alfoneh predicted that Trump will use increased tensions with Tehran to negotiate a deal that mirrors the JCPOA. By doing so, Trump would signal to his supporters that he can resolve global conflict. Esfandiary responded that Iran has no reason to trust the US. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran was abiding by the JCPOA, but the Trump Administration tore it up. Fontenrose agreed that trust building will be required before acceptable concessions can be made by either side.
Iran has few choices aside from continuing its low-level provocations. Alfoneh brought up an article published in an Iranian economic newspaper a month after the US left the JCPOA. The Supreme National Security Council outlined its strategy to counteract US sanctions. First, the impact of the sanctions will not be palpable because of trade deals with European countries and China. Second, Iran will limit the level of their obligations in the JCPOA. Third, if nothing works and Iran’s economy continues to fail, Tehran will provoke a crisis in the Persian Gulf. Iran clearly and publicly announced its plans and has followed through with the strategy.
The panel discussed the significance of John Bolton’s dismissal as the national security adviser. Fontenrose said that the Republicans will not allow Trump to choose someone who will threaten the election. Bolton’s hawkish tendencies could scare off voters. Brian Hook, the State Department’s point man on Iran, is on the short list of potential replacements. Hook is a known as a hawk in the international community and his appointment would signal to Iran that the US will continue to squeeze its economy.
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Putin’s dream President
Rachel Maddow last night did a particularly good job documenting President Trump’s efforts to comply with President Putin’s fondest dreams:
Trump is not merely mouthing belief in Putin. He is doing things to please him. Odds are that Russian money is part of the reason. Let’s hope the various ongoing investigations, in particular of Deutsche Bank, clarify that in the next few months.
The dismantling of NATO efforts to defend Europe is particularly worrisome, as it won’t generate the same kind of domestic political backlash that canceling construction projects in Virginia will. It will also more directly weaken deterrence of Russian aggression, not only in Ukraine.
Trump may not be a Russian agent, but he is certainly doing as much as the Congress will allow to serve Putin’s (not necessarily Russia’s) interests. But Vladimir’s popularity is waning in Russia like Trump’s in America and Boris Johnson’s in Britain. It will be a happy day when all three are out of power.
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