Tag: Saudi Arabia
Middle East chaos: the Saudi-Iranian axis
Since the four following panelists last met at the Wilson Center on December 5, 2017 (click here for that event’s summary), turmoil and chaos in the Middle East seem to have only increased in range and intensity. Faced with developments across the region, the Wilson Center hosted a follow-up panel entitled “The Middle East: A Region in Chaos?” to discuss the current situation and the US government reaction. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, introduced the speakers before the moderator, Michael Yaffe, Vice President, Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace, provided a brief summary of the many developments in the region in 2018. The panel included:
Robin Wright – USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Bruce Riedel – Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution
Mona Yacoubian – Senior Advisor, Syria, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center.
This post will focus on the panel’s analysis of Iran and Saudi Arabia; a following post will consider the topics of Syria and Israel/Palestine.
Wright began by emphasizing how the past six months have seen the worst domestic turmoil in Iran since President Rouhani was elected in 2013. Economically, Iran has been on the defensive, with stubbornly low prices and the Trump Administration’s re-imposed sanctions creating a “vulnerable moment.” Iran has also been on the defensive politically; President Rouhani is failing to fulfill two of his campaign promises – preserve the JCPOA, and improve the economic situation.
Diplomatically, Iran has actually gone on the offensive by campaigning to convince the five other signatories of the JCPOA – France, the UK, Germany, China, and Russia – to uphold the agreement, despite U.S. sanctions for businesses investing in Iran. Militarily, Iran has been surprisingly restrained in the Persian Gulf, with incidents involving the Iranian navy at a record low. Iran has however ramped up its involvement in Syria, especially as a military confrontation with Israel in the south becomes likelier.
Wright concluded by speculating that the Trump Administration may be quietly pushing for regime change in Iran, although the prospect of such change is dim. While President Trump won 46% of the votes in an election with a 56% voter turnout, President Rouhani and his government were elected with 57% in an election with a 73% voter turnout. He thus commands a broad swath of popular support, despite the protests. The current system will be difficult to displace, especially by a hostile power such as the United States.
Riedel noted that in recent times, Saudi foreign policy has been characterized by recklessness, unpredictability, impulsiveness, and capriciousness, in a manner unprecedented in Saudi history. The best example of this is the civil war in Yemen, which King Salman and his son, Muhammad bin Salman (MbS), expected to be quick and painless. It has now dragged on for more than three years with no end in sight. It may now be reaching a more decisive stage with the ongoing battle for the port of Hodeida. Current Saudi recklessness is also evident in its blockade – or, as Riedel put it, the “siege” – of Qatar.
In the past six months, however, Riedel sees a trend away from recklessness and interventionism. The April 2018 Jerusalem Summit and the June 2018 Mecca Summit put King Salman at the center-stage at the expense of MbS, who seems to be getting sidelined as Saudi Arabia returns to a more risk-averse, conservative style of foreign policy.
As for the US, Riedel noted that while Saudi Arabia is happier dealing with the Trump Administration than with Obama’s, the Kingdom seems to pay little heed to American interests and advice – especially when it comes to the Qatar blockade, which the U.S. sees as playing into the hands of the Iranians. Riedel concluded by calling the legalization of women driving in Saudi Arabia a big deal, although the accompanying repression of female activists shows that there is no room for political dissent in the government’s Vision 2030 program.
The Bottom Line – the most interesting contrast between these two panelists was the way in which they qualified current Saudi-Iranian tensions. Riedel saw them as being based in sectarianism, with political tensions the way in which this sectarianism manifests itself, while Wright instead tried to avoid the usual “tribalist trap” by reminding the audience that there is more to Saudi-Iranian disputes than the Shi’a-Sunni divide. As traditional regional powerhouses – Egypt, Syria, Iraq – lose influence in the region, Saudi-Iranian relations will become one of the main determinants of Middle Eastern politics for years to come.
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From bad to worse
The Middle East strategic landscape is rapidly changing. The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, brewing hostilities between Iran and Israel over Syria, and elections in Iraq and Lebanon continue to jolt regional stability. On May 23, 2018, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), hosted a panel titled “Shake-Up in the Middle East: How Will Regional Powers Respond” to discuss current developments and their implications. The panel included:
1. Gregory Gause, Head of International Affairs Department, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University
2. Feisal Istrabadi, Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East, Indiana University
3. Gönül Tol, Founding Director, Center for Turkish Studies, Middle East Institute
4. Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar, AGSIW (Moderator)
Gause suggested that after one year, two Secretaries of State, and three national security advisors, Washington seems to finally have a strategy for the region, though some may label it a wish-list. Secretary Pompeo’s list includes demands that ranged from disarming and demobilizing Shia militias, to Iran’s withdrawal throughout the entirety of Syria.
Increased pressure on Iran will require increased cooperation with the Gulf Allies. The United States will want Saudi Arabia to send troops to Syria or perhaps to deflate oil prices so as to further squeeze Iran economically. Such demands will likely not be met with cooperation. The Saudis have spent the last two years trying to push oil prices up for internal reasons. The idea that the Saudis will do the opposite to enhance a US-led effort to pressure Iran is far-fetched if not entirely unreasonable.
Istrabadi sketched the geostrategic landscape of Iraq, which shows signs that it is emerging from the shadows and reasserting itself in a positive way. The current Prime Minister has managed to recalibrate the country’s relations with its neighbors by cooling tensions with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Gulf States; a goal that his predecessor failed to achieve. Iraq’s moment may however prove transient as the US is ratcheting up tensions in the region.
The Gulf States’ northern neighbor, Turkey, has not remained unaffected by geopolitical tremors in the MENA region. Tol, stressed that Turkey’s foreign policy fulcrum has become the Kurdish issue. Turkish-US relations have previously been tested; first in 1964 with Cyprus and the famous Johnson letter, then in 1974 when the US congress imposed sanctions and an arms embargo, and third in 2001 when Turkey decided not to allow US troops into its military bases. But ties remained unbroken due to the ruling center right parties and the military’s commitment to a pro-american Turkish foreign policy.
Today, Turkey-US relations are vastly different. The military, opposition, and the government are all on the same anti-American page. Problems today between the two countries are no longer contextual but structural. Democratic backsliding remains a concern, especially for the EU, while Turkish-Russian bilateral relations have warmed.
Bottom line: Saudi Arabia and Turkey are drifting away from the US, while Iraq will find it hard to fill the gap. Things are going from bad to worse for the Americans.
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Keeping our bases covered
The Persian Gulf region has seen a buildup in American military power in recent decades. With major bases in various countries – Kuwait (Ali Al Salem Air Base), Bahrain (headquarters of the Fifth Fleet), Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base), and the UAE (Al Dhafra Air Base) among them – the US has grown its military footprint across many of the Gulf.
Today, the operation of American bases has been complicated by the ongoing feud between Qatar and rival Arab Gulf states, most notable Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have cut diplomatic and trade relations since June of 2017. With the crisis showing no sign of resolution, the US is caught in the struggle between its Gulf allies, with America’s military bases put increasingly into question. Will the US follow the demands of its Gulf allies and cut its alliance with Qatar, as some in the White House have indicated?
On April 5, the American Security Project held an event to discuss US military bases in the Persian Gulf region, and their role in furthering American strategic interests in the wake of this crisis. The event featured the Inspector General of the Qatari Armed Forces, Staff Major General Nasser AbdulAziz Al-Attiyah. Joining him were USMP (Ret.) David Des Roches, Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, and Brigadier General (Ret.) Stephen Cheney, CEO of the American Security Project, along with Asha Castleberry, Professor at Fordham University, who served as moderator in the discussion. Watch a full video recording of the event here:
Takeaways:
The Qatari government is very eager for U.S. bases to remain open. As Asha Castleberry and Stephen Cheney opened the event, they noted that it was put together rather quickly, predicated upon the participation of their Qatari guest. Nasser Al-Attiyah, for his part, repeated that the government of Qatar has been a friend and steadfast ally to the US for over 20 years, as exemplified by readiness to accept American air forces after pressure from Saudi Arabia forced them to move in 2003. Al-Attiyah emphasized Qatar’s value to the United States in both economic terms (as the 2nd-largest global buyer of American weapons) and strategic (as Qatar plans to expand Al Udeid Air Base and construct a new US naval base in coming years). His government sees its relationship with the US “as one of our top priorities,” echoing the views of the Qatari palace.
Qatar has been a particularly comfortable host of American troops in the Middle East. Both Stephen Cheney and David Des Roches noted the tricky nature of hosting military bases in the Middle East. The US government insists on legal immunity for American soldiers, despite the Mideast’s distaste for “capitulations” to foreign powers. Bilateral relations can easily become strained. Qatar has given the US few headaches. American soldiers face fewer restrictions based on cultural taboos than other bases in the region (in contrast to Saudi, in particular). The air base at Al Udeid has been notably comfortable for American troops, with ample creature comforts and enough capacity to handle America’s largest aircraft.
The gains of keeping military bases abroad outweigh the liabilities. The speakers listed the benefits of having military bases distributed around the world: ability to respond to situations quickly, maintaining readiness for larger operations, training with allied nations, and allowing public diplomacy to the host country. But there are drawbacks too. Host countries can gain a certain amount of leverage over the United States by threatening to deny troops’ freedoms, but this is only possible when base residents were highly dependent on local infrastructure (as in Panama).
US strategy in the Persian Gulf benefits from keeping an array of regional allies. Building on Stephen Cheney’s comment that withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would be “inherently foolish” given US interests, Des Roches argued that keeping a “constellation of bases” in the region is an asset in case access to any one is suddenly rescinded. While Al-Attiyah assured that Qatar had agreed to lease its base at Al Udeid to the US until 2023, his promise was couched with the caveat that “in our region everything can be changed overnight.”
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Delay can be good
Yesterday’s bravado has given way to today’s hesitation. President Trump tweeted this morning:
Never said when an attack on Syria would take place. Could be very soon or not so soon at all!
This kind of inconsistency creates confusion and uncertainty that can undermine US standing in the world and even contribute to crisis escalation. Flip-flops are no better in diplomacy than they are in domestic politics. In addition, the delay has given the Syrian government time to park its aircraft and other assets close by the Russians, whom the Americans will not want to hit.
But this particular delay could still be a good thing, if it gives Washington time to do three things:
- Assemble unequivocal evidence that Syrian President Assad was responsible for the chemical attack last week on Douma;
- Plan a serious combined military and diplomatic campaign to end at least the use of chemical weapons in Syria, if not the war itself;
- Rally domestic as well as international support for that combined campaign.
I don’t see much sign that the US is working on any of these things, but it should.* This post is about what Washington should be doing now, before any military action.
First is to gather the evidence. Intelligence doesn’t flow instantaneously. Materials often have to be translated and analyzed, not the least for veracity. Many countries may have collected against Syrian targets. To put together an unclassified version of the evidence against the Syrian government, cleared by all those agencies and governments that have contributed something, takes time and concentration.
That material should then be presented publicly, first and foremost to the Congress. Members on both sides of the aisle are nervous about allowing the President to act without at least Congressional consultation, if not approval. They fear another exclusively presidential decision, like last year’s cruise missile attack on the Syrian base that had launched a sarin attack, would set an undesirable precedent for military action against North Korea and Iran. Some in Congress are also loathe to do anything that will get the US more involved in Syria, as the President has also been. Americans are not keen on taking on more responsibility for that devastated country.
Evidence against Bashar al Assad also needs to be presented internationally, both in classified and unclassified formats. France and the UK are thought to be considering participation in military action. Others, like Germany and Saudi Arabia, have good reason to be sympathetic with the US even if they are reluctant to participate. Russia de facto controls Syrian air defenses, which have mostly stood idly by while the US and especially Israel flies at will over and near Syria. If Moscow can be convinced to continue to hold its fire, Assad will be more chastened. It is not only cruise missiles that send a message.
A one-off strike, tightly targeted on those who launched the chemical attack on Douma, will do no more this year than last year. Assad is fighting not only to hold on to power, but also for his life. Only the prospect of a broad, sustained military campaign against his capabilities will affect his calculations about using chemical weapons, which are important to him because he is short of manpower after 7 years of war. The Administration needs to be asking whether targeting the presidential palace (with or without a warning) or the Syrian Air Force intelligence facilities that plan chemical attacks would send a stronger message than targeting just runways and aircraft.
The Administration also needs to consider what happens if Russians or Iranians or their proxies are killed, intentionally or unintentionally. Does the US have the capability to respond to escalation? Would it want to do so? Is it prepared for what Russia might do in Ukraine, the Baltics or the Balkans? Does it have the capability to respond to what Iran and its proxies might do in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, or even inside the US?
The Syrian conflict has widened from non-violent protests against autocracy to a civil war and now to a geopolitical contest between some of the most powerful states on earth. It behooves the US to think carefully about the many diplomatic, political, and military consequences that may follow from military action. Once it has carefully chosen a course of action, it needs to assemble as much support as possible and move decisively, not only in Syria but also defensively worldwide.
*Curt Mills at The National Interest attributes the hesitation to domestic, rightwing pressure. I suspect he is correct.
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Dare to dream
Alexandros Mallias, former ambassador of the Hellenic Republic to the US and now a special adviser to Eliamep, writes (based on his presentation to the 5th Hellenic High Strategy Conference, March 29 -30:
A process that runs from Tehran to Helsinki via Jerusalem? Madness, or surrealism? Call it utopia, but tomorrow it may become necessity. Allow me to identify six major problems and offer six proposals:
Mismatch between threats, military interventions and their consequences
The so-called “Arab Spring” is not simply a lost opportunity for the Arabs but also a great occasion missed by Europe and the United States as well. For the first time since the rise of “Arab nationalism” in the 1950s, the origin of the revolts did not target Europe, the United States, and Israel. What happened next was due also to our action, miscalculations or inertia and affects our own security and stability.
The unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants to Europe is the unavoidable “collateral damage.” The refugee and migration flows undermined the European integration process and pushed xenophobia and nationalism into mainstream politics. The refugee issue was the catalyst for the Brexit referendum. The European Union is losing a global politico-military partner and capabilities. I earnestly hope this trend will be reversed.
The EU was inadequate, divided and slow to assess the threat, to react, and to act. The lack of a common and integrated foreign policy as a functional common denominator is at the heart of the problem.
Proposal: prevention of population movements should be at the center of political decision-making
The following conditions need to be fulfilled before giving the “green light” for military power:
- Defining the problem: what threat was Libya’ s dictator Muammar Gaddafi to Europe’s security? Is today’s Libya a security provider for Europe?
- A clear political goal: what do we want to achieve? What does success consist of?
- A clear line between wishful thinking and what is possible: no early “mission accomplished” fireworks.
- Political objectives matched by appropriate economic, political, and military means.
Conflicts of interest of the Middle East actors
The vital interests of regional players diverge. They are part of the problem as well as of the solution.
Proposal: a new regional security system covering the Middle East and the Mediterranean
The proposed arrangement might include all MENA States, Iran included, the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the EU. This idea was floating in the UN Security Council Resolutions (Iran-Iraq cease fire) in the late 80’s.
Without a minimum understanding between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, there is no possibility of establishing balanced, interest-based security in the wider region of the Middle East and North Africa.
Saudi Arabia is changing. The modernization policies are essential for the Kingdom’s stability and security. Potentially aggressive behavior by Iran during the implementation of Saudi Arabia’s welcome reforms must be prevented. But the stabilization process of the wider Middle East is not achievable without Iran.
Logic dictates that long-term balance of power and interests should allow establishing the terms for the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and at a later stage Israel in a regional security arrangement, no matter how impossible this perspective looks today. However, logic rarely becomes a mainstream practice in international relations.
We should remember that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 cemented the era of détente and cooperation, before the end of the Cold War. It included recognition that: “The participating states are convinced that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole…”
We need to launch a process including the OSCE member-states and the MENA states. The participating states should undertake commitments similar to those adopted within the Helsinki Process. China should also participate.
Nuclear proliferation
The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East is real. It will become unavoidable if Iran gets nuclear capabilities. Already, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and possibly Egypt are contemplating their own nuclear ambitions.
Egypt’s well-known proposal for the creation of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Middle East sounds good. However, Israel has its own reasons not to back the Egyptian plan.
Proposal: a phased multilateral treaty
First : The elaboration and adoption of a binding multilateral treaty for the non-use of nuclear weapons in the greater Middle East (including Iran).
Second: the Treaty could include a clause that bans, within a defined time schedule (for example 20 years), nuclear weapons in the wider Middle East, establishing a nuclear-free zone. The Permanent Members (P5) of the UN Security Council and the European Union could also be contracting parties.
Ballistic missiles and conventional forces
Iranian ballistic missiles are a threat to Israel’s security. The anticipated improvements in their accuracy and delivery capacity will further increase Israel’s and others’ concern and need for security, deterrence and retaliation.
Proposal: a “Middle East Conventional Forces Control and Reduction Treaty”
This would require the proportional and simultaneous reduction of ballistic and other conventional armaments. It could take the shape of a legally binding instrument similar to the November 1990 Paris “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.”
We could foresee an intermediate set of Confidence Building Measures, including international inspections and observation of military exercises.
Anachronism and dysfunction of the global collective security system
The UN is unable to discharge its duties as the global collective security system. Unilateral actions by the P5 without foresight actions are well illustrated through their involvement in the Syrian chaos.
Often acting at the margins of their mandate (mainly the UN Charter’s Articles 23 and 24 ) their acts are justified by self-interest. Their motivations are geopolitical; about prevailing and expanding or containing influence.
Proposal: The UN Charter to be revised and the Security Council updated
Τhe post-war composition and the abuse of veto power do not match the present global risks, balance of power and capabilities.
Conclusion
We need to dare to dream. Today’s impossible is tomorrow’s achievement. Peace in the Middle East is not beyond our reach.
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An artful Saudi charm offensive
Quite a bit has been written recently about the efforts of the Saudi state – and its de facto leader Mohammed bin Salman, in particular – to win influence in the White House. Little has been said, however, about the parallel track of Saudi public diplomacy aimed at shifting the opinion of the common American.
This charm offensive has ratcheted up in recent days since the announcement of Mohammed bin Salman’s multicity tour of the U.S., which began last Monday. Since then we’ve seen a rash of public-facing events featuring the ambitious Crown Prince: he’s meeting with Oprah; he’s getting a latte at Starbucks; his magazine is on sale at Rite-Aid.
One of the more illuminating events put on during bin Salman’s visit involved the Crown Prince only tangentially. On the night of March 21, the Saudi embassy in Washington teamed up with the Middle East Institute to organize a one-night-only exhibition of Saudi art at Foggy Bottom’s Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. The event was sponsored by MBS’ personal philanthropic venture the Misk Foundation, with art curated by the associated Misk Art Institute. Despite that morning’s snow, the event saw hundreds of attendees until late into the evening.
Great turnout out @miskartinst exhibition of #Saudi contemporary art. Tonight only at the Kennedy Center. pic.twitter.com/zS3ErYIhxX
— Middle East Institute (@MiddleEastInst) March 21, 2018
Unless you’re among a select sliver of the world’s population, you probably have little familiarity with the world of contemporary Saudi art. Let me assure you, this is exactly what the event’s organizers expect of you. A newly-published overview of Saudi art summarizes the conversation they want you to have:
For the Kennedy Center, Misk chose to feature a variety of pieces from Saudi artists, ranging from modernist installations to more traditional paintings. There were quasi-political works such as Ahmad Angawi’s installation Street Pulse, whose microphones reflect a thirst for free expression, and Nugamshi’s video Mirage, in which the artist uses crude oil to write out the title. Both Amr Alnagmah’s photography piece Digital Spirituality and Ahmed Mater’s Magnetism to frame the Kaaba in a new light, while Angawi’s Wijha 2:148 (see below) depicts the massive development taking place in Mecca since the 1980s. Not everything is new, however – the event also featured a number of massive murals, painted by a team led by husband and wife Ali Moghawi and Fatimah Hassan in a style known as Al-Qatt Al-Asiri, recognized in 2017 on UNESCO’s list of Intangible Cultural Heritage.
Ahmad Angawi – "Wijha 2:148 – And everyone has a direction to which they should turn" (2013) | One of the contemporary Saudi art works on display tonight only at the Kennedy Center | Information: https://t.co/mKFovRYELr pic.twitter.com/qHuE3LKq0v
— Middle East Institute (@MiddleEastInst) March 21, 2018
As if to certify the importance of the event, the exhibit was visited by a number of Saudi dignitaries, including Minister of Culture and Information Awwad al-Awwad and royal family member (and noted art enthusiast) Prince Badr bin Abdullah. If the intent behind visits from these big names was to draw in more attendees, I can vouch for its success – many people I spoke confessed they had no knowledge the event was happening until they spotted the Saudi delegation moving through the Kennedy Center. The extra publicity attracted some unfriendly attention as well, with protesters from Code Pink arriving early to demonstrate against the Saudi war in Yemen.
Beyond the quality of the art, what does all this effort say about the Saudi state? The ruling clique in Riyadh is trying to sell themselves as ambitious reformers of their aging system. So far, the Saudi soft power initiative has been focused on personal outreach. This event, however, confirms Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitions for advancing not just his own image to a US audience, but also the image of a new Saudi nation that he intends to debut. If the Misk Foundation’s art initiative is any indication of a trend, MBS aims to convince even the average American that a dynamic, cultured Saudi Arabia is on the rise. So yes, art from Saudi Arabia. And undoubtedly a whole lot more to come.
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