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Confusing, and disturbing

Colum Lynch reports yesterday that Sudan seems to be pursuing peace in one province even as it opts for war in another.  Khartoum has agreed to the deployment of Ethiopian peacekeepers in the disputed border region of Abyei, where the Sudanese army, provoked by an attack on a convoy by South Sudanese forces last month, has displaced something like 100,000 people.  Now, in Southern Kordofan, a province in the North, the Sudanese forces have started attacking forces loyal to South Sudan, apparently fearing that they might seek to secede from the North to join the South.

This has roused the American organizations that follow Sudan to issue a manifesto calling for a tough response to what they regard as primarily the North’s provocations.  The list of challenges they cite is impressive:

1. A peaceful and principled resolution to the crisis on the North-South border, including Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile
2. Peaceful resolution of other outstanding separation issues that could lead to a resumption of North-South war, including border demarcation, oil wealth sharing, and citizenship status
3. An end to the crisis in Darfur and a comprehensive peace agreed to by all parties
4. Security for all people in the Republic of South Sudan, including protection from militia violence, and responsible and accountable Southern security services
5. Tangible and measurable steps toward democratic governance in the North and the South
6. Accountability for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide

The solutions suggested mainly involve ratcheting up pressure on the Khartoum, by removing “carrots” and brandishing new “sticks,” as well as helping Juba (the capital of South Sudan) stabilize its territory.

None of that is objectionable, as Khartoum has repeatedly demonstrated bad faith and Juba unquestionably needs help, but you’ve got to wonder whether it is going to work.  The problem is that there are too many problems.  Virtually none of those described here in January have been solved.  When everything is a priority nothing is a priority.

In practice, the urgent prevails over the important.  Khartoum is making the border issues urgent, perhaps even with a view to using them as an excuse not to recognize newly independent South Sudan when July 9 comes.  It could get a lot worse if southerners start being expelled from around Khartoum, where several million took refuge during the civil war, or if the North cuts off export of the South’s oil.  While a full-scale resumption of the civil war seems unlikely–the North has no intention of risking its army once again in the far reaches of the South–independence day may well not be peaceful.

What can be done about all this?  Not a whole lot, if you think only military instruments will work.  But UN-appointed mediator Thabo Mbeki is trying diplomacy, with support from the Americans, Norwegians, British and other interested internationals.  Khartoum seems determined:  not to prevent the South’s independence, but to reassert its authority over territory in the North where there are southern sympathizers and to claim as much of Abyei, which produces oil, as possible.  The South has been correctly focused on making independence as smooth as possible, though it seems to be having trouble ensuring that its troops and militias don’t provoke the North.

The agreement on Abyei is a positive development, as is South Sudan’s impending independence.  But a lot of what is going on in Sudan today is confusing, and disturbing.

PS:  A U.S. Institute of Peace paper argues for a more comprehensive, holistic approach focused on reform in the North.  I’m afraid the North’s armed forces may be answering that appeal in Southern Kordofan.  Not much room for reform when you are killing and displacing your own population.

Better to jaw-jaw than to war-war

This could be said of many places of course, but it occurred to me today after a discussion with Sudan’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) negotiators Abdullahi Osman el Tom, Mahmoud Abbeker Suleiman and Tahir el Faki over at the now well-located offices of the Public International Law and Policy Group. I’ve often accused the head of that distinguished organization, American University law professor Paul Williams, of never having seen a territory so small he didn’t want to help it gain independence.

That would not be fair in this instance.  The JEM folks made it clear that they prefer a negotiated political solution that would leave Darfur within Sudan.  But failing that, they were also clear that they would seek independence by military means and confederation with Southern Sudan, which will become independent in July, hoping eventually that Southern Sudan would itself join Khartoum in a confederation (fat chance of that).  There was no sign that they had the military capability to achieve independence, but they thought they could prevent Khartoum from winning a decisive military victory.  Sudanese soldiers, they thought, had no reason to fight vigorously for President Bashir.

The problem is that the mediation in Doha, conducted by the African Union, is not going well.  The JEM negotiators have been given 10 days to react to a proposal they say was prepared without their participation and falls far short of what they would need in order to sign.  They are spending their time at PILPG preparing a markup of the mediator’s proposal, one that would make it more specific, enable displaced people to return safely to their homes, provide for return of property and accountability for crimes, and ensure that assistance money (Qatar has promised $2 billion) is spent to benefit Darfurians.  This would require a much more comprehensive and detailed agreement, subject to extensive verification, than the one the mediator has proposed.  They have nonetheless been told that failure to come to agreement by May 23 would lead to an end to the mediation.

That would trigger Khartoum’s “domestication” plan, which the JEM folks see as an effort to eradicate their movement (and other rebels), push the internationals out of Darfur, force repatriation of displaced people whether conditions are adequate or not, and impose Khartoum’s authority.  It would also divide Darfur along ethnic lines, something they oppose, and it would allow janjaweed, the army and intelligence forces free rein, leaving the drivers of conflict unresolved.

What are those?  In the view of the JEM people, the drivers of conflict are national, not Darfurian.  President Bashir has made it clear that with Southern Sudan’s secession he will govern what remains as an Arab and Islamic state, further marginalizing the peripheral regions.  JEM does not define itself in ethnic and religious terms, and most of its adherents are neither Arab nor Muslim.  They want a secular, democratic state, the New Sudan of John Garang being their ideal.  They welcomed the Arab spring but underlined that nonviolence would not work in Sudan and that they are committed to keeping their military option open.

JEM would like the other Darfurian rebels to join in a united negotiating front, but that seems unlikely.  They would like the U.S. to make an effort to unify the rebels, but blamed the international community for “recognizing” different groups and thereby promoting fragmentation.

I have my doubts that the May 23 deadline is really a firm one.  If there are signs of progress, I’d be surprised if the Qataris and Khartoum did not want to continue the effort.  It really is better, as Winston Churchill said, to jaw-jaw rather than to war-war.

Disingenuous is the polite term

President Omar al Bashir of Sudan is, to put it politely, disingenuous in this attempt at a straight-up interview by The Guardian.  He manages to underestimate the number of displaced people in Darfur by more than a factor of 10, suggests that demonstrations in Sudan failed only because the opposition had no support in the country, claims the International Criminal Court indicted him for political reasons and in the concluding moments offers to come to the aid of Southern Sudan to help it deal with its instability (no doubt caused in part by Khartoum). He wants only peace, not war.

It is only fair to note that he also declines the privilege of hosting Gaddafi in Sudan, noting the importance of friendship with the Libyan people. That’s about the clearest indication I’ve seen this week that Gaddafi is in real trouble.