Tag: Syria
Eid mubarak!
Today and tomorrow mark the end of the month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast during the day. Tonight and tomorrow night they feast.
It has been a truly terrible Ramadan in Syria, where Kofi Annan’s peace plan has died (along with thousands of additional Syrians) and the Asad regime has intensified military action, especially in Aleppo. Prospects are not good: Asad refuses to step aside and the opposition refuses to negotiate with him. We are not yet at Bill Zartman’s “mutually hurting stalemate,” when both sides see no gain in continuing to fight and decide instead to talk.
Egypt has taken another unexpected turn, with elected President Morsy taking over by decree the executive and legislative powers that the military had previously reserved for itself. He did it with savoir faire: previous military leaders were retired with medals and new ones chosen from just below them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Morsy hails, and the military have reached a mutual accommodation, leaving Egypt’s secular revolutionaries out in the cold, which isn’t very refreshing in Egypt at this time of year.
In Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, the revolutions are looking a lot better. Libya‘s General National Congress, elected July 7, convened on schedule and chose as President Magarief, who promises to be a unifying figure. Tunisia is struggling to produce a constitution, with final approval delayed at least to April 2013 rather than October 2012. Yemen has made a start with military reform and is now embarking on preparations for its national dialogue, to be held in November and followed by constitution-writing.
Elsewhere counter-revolution is winning. Bahrain has sentenced human rights activist Nabeel Rajab to three years in prison. I wonder if he would have attracted more attention if his name were Pussy Riot. Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia have stifled any serious reform moves. In Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki has weathered political challenges and continues to accumulate power even as frictions between Baghdad and Kurdistan grow.
It looks as if the Arab awakening will continue mainly in North Africa, where it began in early 2011. While Libya has ample oil and gas resources, none of the other countries in which revolutions have come to fruition does. Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen all have serious economic challenges ahead. Syria will be an economic basket case the day after Asad is gone. If we want anything like democracy to prevail in these places, there is going to be a substantial bill to pay.
Marc Lynch has called this a cruel summer. It has certainly been that and worse in Syria. But those of us who have experience with transitions, especially in post-conflict environments, set the bar low. There has been progress elsewhere, even if halting and slower than hoped.
The big open questions are these: is Egypt getting back on track, or are we seeing a new, Islamist autocracy in the making? Can Saudi Arabia manage the succession to next-generation leadership without upheaval? Can the regional war that has begun in Syria be ended before it engulfs several other countries? Can Iran‘s nuclear ambitions be ended at the negotiating table, or will Israel or the United States attack?
No answers are needed today. It suffices to salute those who observe Ramadan with “Eid mubarak!”
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds
Yesterday’s Security Council decision to end the UN Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) is one of those inevitable moves that makes me wonder how the international system, such as it is, manages to survive. We had several hundred trained observers in Syria in close contact with officials of the Asad regime and at least some of the opposition activists. They played a critical role in reporting what was going on in Syria for several months and in assigning responsibility for events like the Houla massacre. We know we are going to need that kind of knowledge of the local terrain whenever a transition away from the Asad regime begins. What do we do? We withdraw the observers.
Fortunately the UN is wise enough to leave a couple of dozen international officials behind in Damascus. Their immediate concerns will be coordination of humanitarian assistance and support for the newly named UN/Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. But they will also be the vital brain trust of any future UN transition mission. My compliments to friend and colleague Edmond Mulet, who heads of UN peacekeeping, for maintaining at least a seed of something that can grow if and when circumstances permit.
While it is amply clear that the Annan plan failed, largely because the opposition was unwilling to negotiate with the regime so long as Bashar al Asad remains in place and Asad was unwilling to step aside, it is not clear if the savvy Brahimi has better prospects. He has rightly spent the last week or so trying to ensure stronger and more unified Security Council support for his mission, but he does not seem to have succeeded yet. The Americans have decided to go around the UN to collaborate with Turkey and provide more direct support to the Syrian revolutionaries. The Russians canceled a meeting scheduled for today in New York of the “action group” for Syria. When diplomats cancel meetings, things are not going well.
I won’t be surprised if withdrawal of the observers precipitates intensification of the fighting in Syria. With less likelihood of being observed internationally, both sides will try to gain advantage. The sectarian dimension of the fighting will deepen. The Iranians are playing a more and more critical role in supporting the regime, with the opposition reporting not only Iranian boots on the ground but also direct engagement in fighting. Saudi Arabia and Qatar will be upping their ante in the form of weapons for the opposition, which is begging for shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs) to counter Asad’s increased use of aircraft.
None of this is good news. While conventional wisdom holds that Asad cannot last, when and how he goes will be important. Continuation of the violence for even a month or two more risks serious regional destabilization, which is the worst outcome for the United States. It is not uncommon these days for people to question whether the territorial division in the Levant, rooted in the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, can last. If the state structure of the region starts to implode, the consequences could be a good deal more chaotic, and geographically more widespread, than what happened during Iraq’s sectarian civil war in 2006-7.
I am wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
There is good news and bad news
The good news is that Iraq has lots of oil. The bad news is that Iraq has lots of oil. That was the main message out of today’s Middle East Institute discussion of “Iraq and the Politics of Oil,” moderated by Allen Keiswetter (who amiably noted that he served in the U.S. Interest Section in Baghdad when Saddam Hussein was the vice chairman of the Ba’ath party).
Iraqi embassy commercial counselor Naufel al-Hassan opened emphasizing the positive: the main focus of American interest in Iraq is no longer military but economic. Oil production, which supplies 95% of the government’s revenue and employs 100,000 Iraqis, is up to 2.7 million barrels per day. Reserves are the third largest in the world, production costs are very low, Iraqi refining capacity is increasing (from 340 million barrels per day to 567 now) and there is lots of natural gas that is not yet exploited. Iraq needs and wants increased international company investment and technology, which will require a hydrocarbon law that is already eight years in the making.
PFC Energy’s Raad al-Kadiri took a less optimistic view. Oil is, as a Venezuelan oil minister once put it, “the devil’s excrement.” One can even hypothesize that whenever Iraqi oil production hits 3 million barrels per day it means war, previously with neighbors but now perhaps internally. Iraq is politically more polarized now than at any time since 2003. The state is fragile.
This is raising difficult questions about federalism, with the Kurds wanting a confederal arrangement with Baghdad and the Sunnis now opting for regionalism out of frustration. National reconciliation has not been achieved. The government is dysfunctional, undermining investor confidence. Chaos in Syria also makes international investors nervous. Iraq has the potential to produce 3-6 million barrels per day within a few years, but doing so seems more likely to exacerbate political tensions than resolve them.
Denise Natali, the Minerva Chair at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies focused on Baghdad/Erbil relations, which have deteriorated even as Kurdistan Region Government (KRG) relations with Turkey have improved. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and KRG President Barzani differ on Syria. Iraqi Arab nationalism and resentment of the Kurds is on the increase as Maliki seeks a rapprochement with his Sunni Arab opponents. Nevertheless, no sustained armed conflict within Iraq is likely. Baghdad and Erbil are likely to muddle through with temporary fixes and without passing an oil law.
The State Department’s senior advisor on Iraq Brett McGurk emphasized lessons learned from his experience in Iraq, especially on oil:
- There is no substitute for sustained engagement.
- We have to have relationships with all the stakeholders.
- There is a real need for “prenegotiation,” that is informal negotiation before formal talks.
- Patience is vital.
U.S. troop withdrawal (first from cities, then two years later from all of Iraq) made it easier to settle oil issues, not harder, because it removed an irritant that aroused Iraqi suspicions. The failure of the 2009 bid round set the stage for a much more positive Iraqi popular and government attitude toward the international oil companies, which needed greater incentives to come into Iraq. U.S. priorities now include helping to mend Baghdad/Erbil relations, helping with energy production and export, facilitating regional reconciliation (especially between Baghdad and Ankara) and promoting transparency and accountability in the oil sector and government operations.
Asking the first question, I got on my hobby horse and wondered whether we would do well to focus on the direction in which oil is exported if we are concerned about Iraq’s political orientation. Most of its oil is currently exported through the Gulf and Hormuz. It would be far better to tie Iraq more closely to the West by exports to the north and west.
This elicited, to my surprise, unanimous sounds of agreement from the panel. I had thought they might tell me this was a pipe dream, given the parlous relations between Erbil and Baghdad. Instead they agreed this was a key issue. Even using existing pipelines, some of which need refurbishment, Iraq could export more than 600,000 barrels per day without going through the Gulf. There are real possibilities for increasing this amount markedly, but the Iraqis are hesitating.
The other big issue in the Q and A was Kurdistan independence. The panel differed, with Raad al-Kadiri indicating that he thinks the Kurds want it (though they have so far been willing to accept a confederal relationship with a weak government in Baghdad) and might do it if they could export their own oil without Baghdad approval. But a lot still depends on Ankara’s attitude, which is vigorously opposed, as a Turkish embassy representative made clear. But the regional trend, especially considering what is going on in Syria, is downward, and the whole Middle East framework may be coming apart. Acquiescence by Iraqis to the current political arrangements should not be mistaken for (permanent) acceptance.
Denise Natali thought independence was simply not in the cards and that the status quo won’t change much for the foreseeable future. Naufel Al-Hassan hoped that the oil issues, and consequently tensions between Baghdad and Erbil, would be resolved soon. Brett McGurk was not making any predictions.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
On course for war with Iran
Ilona Gerbakher reports from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:
Yesterday’s Middle East Institute panel at SAIS presented a report on “Prospects for US-Iran Relations on the Nuclear Issue in the Year Ahead.” The predominant mood was tempered pessimism. War is a real possibility, so it behooves us to redouble diplomatic efforts.
Alan Keiswetter (a scholar at the Middle East Institute, senior consultant at C&O Resources and an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland) thought the nuclear negotiations stalemated and likely to remain that way until after the U.S. election. The parameters of a possible agreement are clear: enrichment allowed up to a low level (3.5-5%) combined with strict safeguards and shipment out of Iran of its more highly enriched uranium.
But it is unclear whether Iran wants a negotiated solution or is just stringing along the negotiations to gain more time. Sanctions alone are unlikely to force agreement, as Iran is ready to hunker down as necessary. Some kind of meatier inducement is going to be needed.
Calls in the Israeli government for military action are growing louder and more strident. Israel perceives an Iranian nuclear capability as an existential threat. The debate among Israelis is no longer “will we strike” but “will the strike be effective enough.” It would be a serious mistake to dismiss the possibility of a unilateral Israeli attack. Some Israel watchers say Prime Minister Netyanyahu thinks he can do what he wants without U.S. concurrence; others feel he is bluffing, to force the U.S. to take a hard line and scare Iran into concessions.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is more united in fear of Iranian pretensions in the Gulf than the Iranians imagine.
Next year will be a real turning point in US-Iran relations over the nuclear issue. Without significant diplomatic progress, the trajectory we are on will lead to military confrontation.
Geneive Abdo, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, contrasted the current tense diplomatic situation with Iran-US relations in 2003, when Tehran cooperated on Afghanistan and was more open to negotiation but Washington was not. Supreme Leader Khamenei sent a letter to then-President Bush proposing a diplomatic breakthrough. Today even a minimal goal of building trust with Iran seems hard to reach. Iranian leaders are convinced that the ultimate U.S. goal is regime change. Khamenei’s hardline conspiratorial beliefs about the U.S. are self-fulfilling prophecies.
The Revolutionary Guard, which has grown powerful under Khamenei, no longer bothers to hide its regional interventions in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. Although arguably they stand the most to lose from sanctions, a military attack on Iran would serve their interests by reaffirming their ideological position.
Also troubling is the decline of Iran’s educated middle class. Those who once called for reform and might have questioned the nuclear program are marginalized. They were our best hope for breaking three decades of hostility but their voices have been silenced. An attack led by the U.S. or Israel would stifle prospects for democratic reform even further.
Israel is not helping matters with its increasingly hardline rhetoric. The way is being paved for it to appear that all options except an Israel-led attack have been eliminated. Don’t expect President Obama to take action until after the election. The best diplomatic option for the moment seems to be to buy more time.
Roby Barrett, the president of a consulting firm specializing in defense and security technology applications, was dismissive of the possibility of a diplomatic solution because “Iran is not really interested in negotiation.” For Iranian leaders and citizens the nuclear program has become a point of national pride. Iran sees nuclear capability as a part of its destiny as a regional power in the Gulf.
The GCC has resigned itself to the fact that Iran will not give up nuclear weapons capability and that the U.S. will need to do something about it. The alternatives are either a nuclear Iran or war. Despite the consequent global economic disturbance, the GCC wants the Iranian nuclear program stopped by hook or by crook. The idea of a nuclear Iran is a redline issue for most Arab states.
We should “never say never,” but diplomatic efforts will probably not stop the march towards war. Given the calcifying hardline between the Israeli and Iranian positions and the distance between America and Israel on this issue, there is a high probability an Israeli attack will go forward. It is unlikely that the U.S. will initiate a strike or engage cooperatively with Israel.
Israel knows they don’t have the military capacity to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. If they strike, it will be in desperation, with the objective of bringing the U.S. into the conflict. That is possible if Iranian retaliation makes the mistake of striking back at the U.S.
In closing, Genieve Abdo raised a vital point: what will happen the morning after? What will be the economic and military fallout of an attack? Will an attack have to be repeated to prevent an intensified Iranian effort to gain nuclear weapons? What are the implications of repeated attacks on Iran?
Daniel Serwer, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a senior research professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, acted as moderator. He noted that some countries have stood back from nuclear programs, including Brazil and Argentina. Iran is a more difficult case, because Israel will not give up its nuclear weapons and there are several other potential nuclear powers in the region. But if Iran thinks hard about what nuclear weapons might mean for its own security as well as long-term regional and economic stability, it may conclude they are not a good idea.
PS: The video of the event can be downloaded from C-Span.
PPS: Bennett Ramberg comes to similar conclusions.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Blessed are the peacemakers
With the former Syrian prime minister predicting that the Asad regime is close to collapse, it is high time that the international community considered what comes next. The heavy betting is on a chaotic and difficult to manage situation, but Rami Khouri offers a contrarian view: a peaceful post-Asad order is probable, he says. Is he right?
Khouri describes the conventional wisdom well:
The prevalent perceptions…include that Syria will long remain locked in domestic strife; the Alawites will face eternal hostility and revenge; sectarian civil war is likely to break out; the post-Assad struggle for power will be chaotic and perhaps violent; Syria could easily break up into several smaller ethnic statelets linked to neighboring states or compatriots; Syria’s collapse will trigger warfare across the region, and a few other such scenarios.
The evidence from other Arab transitions offers no support for the expectation that Syria’s transition will be a sectarian free-for-all. Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya’s self-ignited regime changes (unlike Iraq’s Anglo-American initiated mess) have not only avoided major sectarian troubles or violence, but in fact the re-legitimized constitutional processes have included a serious and deliberate attempt to make sure that all population groups are given equal opportunity to partake in public life and governance – not on the basis of sectarian quotas, but on the basis of equal citizenship.
The Syrian people are too intelligent, sophisticated and cosmopolitan to allow themselves to sink into a dark pit of sectarian warfare, even if their sick Baathist-led, Alawite-run power elite uses sectarianism and the specter of post-Assad chaos as tools of intimidation – tools that have failed miserably, in any case.
European forces might not be able to opt out so easily. Deploying as part of a potentially dysfunctional coalition of peacekeepers to calm a festering conflict is certainly not an appealing concept. But leaving the conflict to get worse — or letting Russia and regional powers carve up Syria, almost certainly fostering future wars — could be far more dangerous. All of this means that, whether it wants to or not, Europe may not be able to avoid playing a leading role in efforts to stabilize Syria.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
How we spend resources
Yesterday my wife and I took in the Newseum, which is an example of my thesis that creation of museums marks the acme of power. This extraordinarily lavish tribute to the news media dates from 2000, when the land for the half-billion dollar project was acquired (ground was broken in 2003). Oh, how the mighty newspapers and networks have fallen since then! Voting in the Newseum shows almost half its visitors get their news online, not on paper. Home delivery of the Times and Post is definitely an anachronism, but my spouse insists on it.
This is nonetheless a thoughtful and interesting museum (it had better be at the $21.95 admission price, $17.95 for oldsters). Its display of paper artifacts (mainly front pages) may be figuratively (and literally) dated, but it is really more interesting than the frequent and distracting videos showing hilarious episodes of Stephen Colbert and Jon Stewart (both of whom I enjoy watching, but why not at home?). Who knew that W.E.B. Dubois died in the same week as the 1963 March on Washington? Nor did I know that the first two amendments to the U.S. constitution (on the size of Congress and its pay) were not approved by the states. I would not have been able to name the five freedoms specified in the first amendment that did pass: speech, press, religion, assembly and petition (Roosevelt’s four kept the first two but added freedom from want and freedom from fear).
When it comes to war and peace, the Newseum minces few words and presents a lot of pictures, without however quite capturing the horror of the enterprise. The memorial wall to slain journalists is tucked away outside the main flow of museum traffic, as is the introductory film that presents the “war and peace” theme quickly but well (along with life and death, love and hate and some others I can’t remember). You would know from this museum what bullets do to a Toyota pickup truck or a road sign but relatively little about what they do to human flesh. I suppose the Newseum knows its audience (me included).
There is a good deal more focus on human tragedy in the section devoted to 9/11. Its focus–part of the antenna on top of one of the World Trade Center buildings–is odd but somehow works, its twisted metal symbolizing the incredible physical, psychological and human toll of the event. The dramatic photography and film of that dreadful day heightens the impact, as does the timeline that surrounds the antenna.
The question is whether the nation that can afford such a spectacular tribute to freedom of expression still has the edge required to help others enjoy its benefits? The part of the Berlin wall that adorns the lower level with pastel graffiti is a stark reminder of the human costs that have been paid: 5000 Germans died trying to escape its confines. We rightly celebrate freedom and the wall’s fall, but could the process have been accelerated? How many of those 5000 might have been saved? How many more suffered without trying to escape, trapped in a system that ruined countless lives?
The questions are still with us: how many Syrians will die fighting the Asad dictatorship? We are up to something like 20,000. I am among those who doubt that intervention would improve the situation, but I never stop wondering. The privilege of living in a country that sports the Newseum comes with the responsibility to worry about how we expend our resources and what we might do better than we have done in the past.
RSS - Posts
