Blessed are the peacemakers
With the former Syrian prime minister predicting that the Asad regime is close to collapse, it is high time that the international community considered what comes next. The heavy betting is on a chaotic and difficult to manage situation, but Rami Khouri offers a contrarian view: a peaceful post-Asad order is probable, he says. Is he right?
Khouri describes the conventional wisdom well:
The prevalent perceptions…include that Syria will long remain locked in domestic strife; the Alawites will face eternal hostility and revenge; sectarian civil war is likely to break out; the post-Assad struggle for power will be chaotic and perhaps violent; Syria could easily break up into several smaller ethnic statelets linked to neighboring states or compatriots; Syria’s collapse will trigger warfare across the region, and a few other such scenarios.
He rightly notes:
The evidence from other Arab transitions offers no support for the expectation that Syria’s transition will be a sectarian free-for-all. Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya’s self-ignited regime changes (unlike Iraq’s Anglo-American initiated mess) have not only avoided major sectarian troubles or violence, but in fact the re-legitimized constitutional processes have included a serious and deliberate attempt to make sure that all population groups are given equal opportunity to partake in public life and governance – not on the basis of sectarian quotas, but on the basis of equal citizenship.
But then, alas, he goes astray:
The Syrian people are too intelligent, sophisticated and cosmopolitan to allow themselves to sink into a dark pit of sectarian warfare, even if their sick Baathist-led, Alawite-run power elite uses sectarianism and the specter of post-Assad chaos as tools of intimidation – tools that have failed miserably, in any case.
Oh, how I wish it worked this way! But it doesn’t. Witness the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan.
I entirely share Rami Khouri’s admiration for the revolutionary councils that by all reports have provided extraordinary services during the past year and a half. I even believe, as he does, that they could provide the basis for future governance, provided the departure of Asad is not accompanied by widespread bloodletting.
But bloodletting is highly likely, not improbable. When law and order break down, there is a race to the bottom: the worst instincts of the most violent become the new normal. Worse: people retreat to sectarian and ethnic identities for protection, which encourages others to do likewise. Sure it is possible the better angels of human nature will prevent this in Syria, but it is unlikely.
That is why Richard Gowan’s piece on peacekeeping in post-Asad Syria interested me (unfortunately it hides behind the World Politics Review paywall). He argues well that a peacekeeping force will be needed, but that the most likely contributors (Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey) could end up dividing Syria rather than keeping it unified. His two cures for this disease are a UN mandate and participation of European troops.
The former is relatively easy, so long as the Russians are getting their piece of the action. The latter is far more difficult, but Gowan explains:
European forces might not be able to opt out so easily. Deploying as part of a potentially dysfunctional coalition of peacekeepers to calm a festering conflict is certainly not an appealing concept. But leaving the conflict to get worse — or letting Russia and regional powers carve up Syria, almost certainly fostering future wars — could be far more dangerous. All of this means that, whether it wants to or not, Europe may not be able to avoid playing a leading role in efforts to stabilize Syria.
Rami Khouri might well argue that it would be better to keep all the peacekeepers out and let the Syrians handle the situation as best they can. That may well be what happens, as the likely troop contributors are certainly not ready and willing. But it would be far wiser to consulting the Syrians on what they think will be required. If they insist on handling it themselves, as the Libyans did to some good effect, so be it.
But I’ll bet that the wiser of them will recognize that “blessed are the peacemakers.”
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2 thoughts on “Blessed are the peacemakers”
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The problem is that among the rebels are those who, like in Nigeria, not only that do not care about the UN at all, but are willing to attack it. Let us recall that this happens from time to time, like on the Balkan UN peacemakers were chained to posts by Karadzic’s criminals.
Khouri seems to have missed that Gaddafi fought to the bitter end and that it is not unlikely that Syria’s Alawites may do the same. If you set people up so that they have no choice that is what they do.
Khouri forgets that large tracts of rebel held land have been deserted by virtually all their Christian and Alawite inhabitants. He forgets that there is a considerable number of fighters that fight for conservative Sunni ideals and aims for rule by them, not democracy.
The only way to work towards peace is to have negotiations now. Such negotiations would force the opposition to select leaders. It would force them to select a policy and to publicly defend that. It would end the situation where each rebel group can hold its own ideals about a future Syria and yet claim that they all fight for the same thing.
Will negotiations work? We don’t know. They have never been tried. The only negotiations that ever have been held are some between Assad and the local opposition in Damascus who didn’t have any mandate to make concessions for the SNC, FSA and other insurrectionist organizations. The latter have always refused to negotiate.
Negotiations shouldn’t be conditional on a truce. That is not how it works in other conflicts in the world either. It works rather the other way: in a complicated situation like Syria truce violations are very likely and without continuous negotiations to work them out they will blow up a truce.
Even if negotiations wouldn’t deliver a solution they still would force both parties to take defensible positions and that would exclude more extremist positions. They would also build some trust that would be very valuable when the conflict is ended.