Tag: Taiwan
Peace Picks | May 3 – May 7, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
1. Rebalancing security and governance in the Sahel: Possible avenues for German intervention | May 3, 2021 | 9:30 AM – 10:30 AM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Andrew Lebovich: Policy Fellow, ECFR
Heike Thiele: Director, Civilian Crisis Prevention and Stabilisation, Federal Foreign Office (TBC)
Denis Tull: Africa and Middle East Fellow, SWP
Theodore Murphy (moderator): Africa Programme Director, ECFR
In the past several years, Germany has repeatedly expressed its strong commitment to stabilisation in the Sahel, and pushed for approaches encouraging political reform and improvements in governance and in internal security provision in the region. However, ongoing insecurity and international critiques of European approaches in the region show the need for continued rebalancing in international approaches. This panel will examine Germany’s approaches to stabilisation in the Sahel and how new approaches and policies could help improve the region’s tumultuous conflicts and political uncertainty.
2. Report launch—The impact of Western sanctions on Russia | May 3, 2021 | 11:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Speakers
Anders Aslund: Resident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center
Maria Snegovaya: Nonresident Fellow, Eurasia Center
Sergey Aleksashenko: former deputy chairman, Central Bank of Russia
Elina Ribakova: deputy chief economist, the Institute of International Finance
Ambassador Daniel Fried (moderator): Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council
Since 2014, the US and its allies have countered the Kremlin’s growing “hybrid warfare” with sanctions. Moscow’s malign activities have included military aggression in Ukraine, election interference, cyberattacks, assassinations, and disinformation. Western sanctions have imposed serious costs on the Russian economy and President Vladimir Putin’s cronies, though the Kremlin and some others question the efficacy of sanctions on Russia. How successful have the sanctions been in altering Putin’s actions? How can future sanctions become more effective in imposing costs on the Kremlin?
3. New START: The Future of Arms Control Diplomacy and U.S.-Russian Relations | May 3, 2021 | 4:00 PM – 5:00 PM ET | Belfer Center | Register Here
Speakers
Rose Goettemoeller: Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Stanford University
Matthew Bunn: Professor, Harvard University
Ambassador Paula Dobriansky: Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
Ambassador Doug Lute: Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
Nicholas Burns: Professor, Harvard University
The extension of New START – the last remaining treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces — sustains verifiable limits on Russian nuclear weapons that can reach the United States for the next five years. Can that time be used to negotiate a follow-on accord that serves both sides interests? With the collapse of the INF Treaty following Russian cheating and U.S. withdrawal, what can be done to address threats to U.S. and Russian security posed by INF-range missiles? What other key issues need to be addressed in strategic stability talks – with Russia, with China, or with others? How can the world community best address the danger of nuclear proliferation – especially when ongoing nuclear modernization in all of the nuclear-armed states is adding to long-standing tensions between nuclear haves and have-nots? Could the United States and Russia revive their past cooperation to control proliferation and prevent nuclear terrorism? Given the challenging relationship between Russia and the United States, Russia’s violations of some arms control agreements, its annexation of Crimea and military and cyber incursions and provocations along its border and beyond – and Russia’s equally long list of complaints about the United States – what might strategic arms diplomacy look like in the future? How can the proposed U.S.-Russia Summit advance arms control, nonproliferation, and a broader working relationship between the two countries?
4. Negotiating New START | May 4, 2021 | 3:00 PM – 4:00 PM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Speakers
Rose Gottemoeller: nonresident senior fellow, Nuclear Policy Program
Peter Baker (moderator): chief White House correspondent, New York Times
In February, the Biden administration extended the New START treaty with Russia for another five years, buying time and space for future arms control with Russia. Secretary of State Blinken promised to use future arms control efforts to address all of Russia’s nuclear weapons and reduce dangers from China’s modern and growing nuclear arsenal. As the United States embarks on this new arms control approach, what can we learn from the negotiations of the last remaining strategic arms control treaty?
Join us for the launch of Rose Gottemoeller’s new book, Negotiating the New START Treaty, and a discussion with Peter Baker on the New START negotiations with Russia and the biggest hurdles, challenges, and insights that can serve as a window to the future of U.S.-Russia arms control.
5. They call it diplomacy: A conversation on the broader Middle East and the critical role of diplomats | May 5, 2021 | 2:00 PM – 3:15 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Suzanne Maloney (moderator): Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy
Bruce Riedel: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
Sir Peter Westmacott: Former British Ambassador to the US
In his new memoir “They Call it Diplomacy,” former British Ambassador to the United States Peter Westmacott looks back on 40-years of service as a diplomat for the United Kingdom. Over the course of his distinguished career, Ambassador Westmacott served in many important roles, including as ambassador to Turkey, ambassador to France, and most recently, as ambassador to the United States. His career spanned the end of the Cold War to the post-9/11 era. And as second secretary in Tehran, Ambassador Westmacott spent four years as a diplomat in Iran in the lead up to the 1979 revolution. As the Biden administration develops its strategy for U.S. foreign policy and charts a way forward in arms control and nuclear policy, it is a critical time to evaluate the importance of diplomats and the role they play in engaging on the ground with communities in key regions across the globe.
6. Report Launch | Russia in the Middle East: National Security Challenges for the United States and Israel in the Biden Era | May 5, 2021 | 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Major General Amos Gilead: Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy
James F. Jeffrey: Chair, Middle East Program
Matthew Rojansky: Director, Kennan Institute
Udi Evental: Senior Researcher, Institute for Policy and Strategy
Ksenia Svetlova: Senior Researcher, Institute for Policy and Strategy
Michael Kimmage: Professor, Catholic University of America
Susan Glasser (mooderator): Founding Editor, Politico Magazine
As U.S.-Russian tensions continue to escalate, Russia’s role in the Middle East is of urgent concern both to Israel and the United States. Potential flashpoints include Syria and Iran, new spheres of Russian engagement from Afghanistan to North Africa, and sensitive cybersecurity issues. Russia is also moving in tandem with China to push back against U.S. dominance, including in the Middle East. Leading experts from Israel and the United States address these challenges in a new report published by the Kennan Institute and the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. In an upcoming discussion moderated by Susan Glasser, the report’s contributors will address the challenges Russia poses in the region and the decisions that policymakers in the U.S. and Israel face.
7. Transatlantic relations after President Joe Biden’s first 100 days in office | May 5, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 8:45 AM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Jeppe Kofod: Minister for Foreign Affairs, Denmark
Mark Leonard: Director, ECFR
Lykke Friis (moderator): Director, Think Tank Europa
President Joe Biden has come into office with the promise of restoring alliances and having the US reengage in global issues like climate, tax and fighting the covid-19 pandemic. At the top of the new administration’s agenda is also the approach to China. Where does this leave the EU and transatlantic relations? How central is the EU to the US and its interests in Europe?
8. The Post-Cold War Middle East: Iran, Iraq and International Politics in the 1980s | May 6, 2021 | 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Timothy Nunan: Freigeist Fellow, Center for Global History
Katelyn Tietzen: Military Historian, US Army Center for Military History
Samuel J. Hirst (moderator): Associate Director, Bilkent CRS
Barin Kayaoglu: Professor, American University of Iraq
The fourth event of the Global Middle East Seminar Series, organized in partnership with the Center for Russian Studies at Bilkent University, features Timothy Nunan and Katelyn Tietzen. They will be joined by Barin Kayaoğlu, who will act as discussant. The panelists will discuss Iranian and Iraqi foreign policies in the 1980s, and they will look beyond the Iran-Iraq War to questions about the transformation of the international politics of the Middle East in a formative decade. Among other issues, they will examine the Iranian and Iraqi pursuit of influence abroad, including through the activities of transnational actors in Lebanon and Libya. Situating Iranian and Iraqi politics in these terms highlights a moment that transcended Cold War divisions and reshaped regional politics in ways that remain significant today.
9. What’s Next for U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations? | May 6, 2021 | 7:00 PM ET | Hoover Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Evan A. Feigenbaum: vice president for studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Kharis Templeman: Research Fellow, Hoover Institute
Innovation has been a source of comparative advantage for Taiwan—and an important basis for American firms, investors, and government to support Taiwan’s development while expanding mutually beneficial linkages. Yet Taiwan’s innovation advantage is eroding in the face of technological change and strategic risk. What should the next phase of U.S.-Taiwan economic cooperation look like? And how can the new U.S. administration work with Taiwan not just to build on legacy advantages, like in semiconductors, but also to invest in the emerging fields that are rapidly reshaping the future of work, industry, service delivery, and defense?
10. Fragility in Chad and counterterrorism strategies in West Africa | May 7, 2021 | 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Kamissa Camara: Senior Visiting Expert for the Sahel, United States Institute of Peace
John Mukum Mbaku: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development
Joseph Siegle: Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Vanda Felbab-Brown (moderator): Director, Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors
The April 20 death of the President of Chad, Idriss Déby, and the subsequent military coup have profoundly destabilized the country and other parts of West Africa. Likewise, over the past year, the security situation has deteriorated significantly in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and northern Nigeria. The region is facing many severe challenges from climate change and desertification, poverty, and inequality to poor governance, militancy, and terrorism, precipitated by a diverse set of local militants and international terrorist groups. During President Déby’s three decades of authoritarian rule, Chad came to be seen as a crucial lynchpin of counterterrorism in the region and a key ally of the United States and France. Yet President Déby’s death once again highlights the dangers of building counterterrorism strategies around authoritarian leaders and the struggle to find effective policy alternatives.
On May 7, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host a panel of experts to examine the latest developments in Chad, as well as the regional implications and deeper policy dilemmas of counterterrorism, stabilization, and good governance.
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Stevenson’s army, April 30
– In class, we talked about originalism as a school of judicial interpretation. The Yale law prof who has used history for more liberal conclusions is Akhil Reed Amar. And Slate has a new piece arguing that a pending gun laws case poses a dilemma for originalists who oppose restrictions.
– I recently saw a stunning new documentary, The Hunt for Bin Laden. Politico has an article drawing on the oral histories used in that documentary.
– FP argues that US withdrawal from Afghanistan will be very expensive.
– DNI warns about China’s reaction to change in US Taiwan policy.
– CFR report says there’s still hope for arms control.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Watch this space: 10 challenges Biden wishes he didn’t have
President Biden is preoccupied with domestic issues: the economy, COVID-19, race and inequality. But of course foreign policy waits for no president.
The current picture is gloomy:
- Russia has been threatening renewed hostilities against Ukraine. Moscow is claiming it is all Kiev’s faulty, but I suspect Putin is getting nervous about improved performance of the Ukrainian Army. Perhaps he thinks it will be easier and less costly to up the ante now. Besides a new offensive would distract from his domestic problems, including that pesky political prisoner and hunger striker Alexei Navalny.
- Iran and Israel are making it difficult for the US to get back into the nuclear deal. Israel has somehow crashed the electrical supply to Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Tehran has amped up the IRGC/Supeme Leader criticism of President Rouhani, making it harder for him to ease conditions for Washington’s return to the nuclear deal. A vigorous Iranian reaction to the Israeli sabotage would make the Americans hesitate.
- Peace talks between Afghanistan and the Taliban for a transitional power-sharing government are not going well. How could they? The Taliban want an Afghanistan in which President Ghani would have no place. Ghani wants an Afghanistan in which the Taliban would have no place. Powersharing requires a minimum of mutual tolerance that appears lacking.
- North Korea is renewing its missile and nuclear threats. President Trump pretty much poisoned the diplomatic well with Pyongyang by meeting three times with Kim Jong-un without reaching a serious agreement. Kim seems to have decided he can manage without one, so long as his nuclear weapons and missiles threaten South Korea, Japan, and even the continental United States.
- China is menacing Taiwan. I doubt Beijing wants to face the kind of military defense and popular resistance an invasion would entail, but ratcheting up the threat forces Taipei to divert resources and puts an additional issue on the negotiating table with Washington, which doesn’t want to have to come to Taipei’s defense.
- Syria’s Assad is consolidating control and preparing for further pushes into Idlib or the northeast. While unquestionably stretched thin militarily and economically, Damascus no longer faces any clear and present threat to Assad’s hold on power. He hasn’t really won, but the relatively liberal opposition has definitely lost, both to him and to Islamist extremists.
- Central Americans are challenging American capacity to manage its southern border. The increase of asylum seekers, especially children, presents a quandary to the Biden Administration: shut them out as President Trump did, or let them in and suffer the domestic political consequences. Biden has put Vice President Harris in charge, but it will be some time before she can resurrect processing of asylum seekers in their home countries and also get the kind of aid flowing to them that will cut back on the economic motives for migration.
- The Houthis aren’t playing nice. America’s cut in military and intelligence support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE is giving their Yemeni adversaries a chance to advance on the last remaining major population center in the north still nominally held by President Hadi’s shambolic government. If the Houthis take Marib, the consequences will be catastrophic.
- Addis Ababa isn’t either. Africa’s second most populous country, Ethiopia, has gone to war against its own Tigray region, which had defied Addis’ authority on control of the military and holding elections. The Americans want Addis to ease up and allow humanitarian assistance and media in. Ethiopia’s reforming Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy is playing rope-a-dope with the Americans and keeping up the pressure on the Tigrayans.
- You haven’t heard much about it lately, but nothing good is happening in Venezuela, where President Maduro has survived efforts to oust him and now is enjoying one of what must be at least 9 lives.
Biden deserves a lot of credit for what he is doing domestically, and he is the best versed president on foreign affairs in decades. But the international pressures are building. It is only a matter of time before one or more of these ten issues, or a half dozen others, climb to the top of his to-do list. None of them are going to be easy to handle. Watch this space.
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Stevenson’s army, April 8
– FP says Philippines now willing to accept US troops.
– NYT says ISIS is linking to African militants.
– Israel may have attacked Iranian ship.
– NYT reports US divisions over Taiwan policy.
– Opponents of rare earths mine win in Greenland.
– FT has leaked audio of pressure on Jordan’s former Crown Prince
– Democratic majority in House down to 2. Death or even absence because of illness in Senate or House could thwart legislative plans.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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When long shots are worth taking, in soccer and foreign policy
The return to normal that started on January 20 is now palpable. America is administering more than 3 million COVID-19 shots per day, the economy is revving up, our days are not devoted to dealing with Donald Trump’s latest foolishness. Some things are noticeably better than before. The trial of the policeman who killed George Floyd in Minneapolis has featured testimony for the prosecution from his colleagues, including the police chief. That has rarely happened in the past. A Democratic-controlled Congress has passed a massive economic stimulus bill and is proposing to do more focused on infrastructure and health care. Republicans are fighting back by trying to limit voting state-by-state, most notably in Georgia and Arizona , but they are getting substantial backlash from the business community. Abusing minorities is no longer a winning market strategy.
In foreign affairs there is also a return to normalcy: the Administration is trying to negotiate its way back into the Iran nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actiton or JCPOA) and appears to have decided not to withdraw US troops completely from Afghanistan by May 1, as the Trump Administration had agreed to do. Secretary of State Blinken has reaffirmed American commitment to NATO and the Administration has met with Asian Pacific allies Japan and South Korea as well as India. Biden has been explicitly critical of China’s treatment of its Uyghur population, a Turkic Muslim minority millions of whom have been put into reeducation camps. Trump had signaled no objection and even approval of this outrage. Biden has also signaled renewed support for a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians, but without reversing Trump’s relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem or for now withdrawing Trump’s recognition of Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights.
There are other areas of continuity between Trump and Biden on foreign policy. Trump’s tariffs on China are still in place, apparently as an incentive for Beijing to agree to beef up its respect for foreign intellectual property. Biden is continuing the Trump practice of more open engagement with Taiwan’s officials. So far, Biden, like Trump, has done nothing to respond to human rights violations by friends like Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
A return to normal does not however guarantee success. The two biggest Biden foreign policy initiatives so far face long odds.
America was clearly better off with the JCPOA than without it. Return to the agreement will require not only complex choreography with Tehran but also with the US Congress, where even some Democrats are hardline. The US will need to provide sanctions relief while Iran will need to return its nuclear program to the status quo ante. Both will be difficult. Parsing which sanctions are “nuclear” and which were levied because of human rights and terrorism is not going to be easy. Nor will it be easy for Iran to give up the more advanced enrichment technology it has acquired. In both countries, domestic resistance will make the process more difficult, as will Iran’s June election.
Withdrawal from Afghanistan depends on an agreement between the Taliban and President Ghani, both of whom are notably consistent in pursuing maximalist goals. For now, the Taliban appear to have the advantage on the battlefield, but Ghani is not giving in to the American suggestion of a power-sharing government with some sort of Taliban participation. How can he? He advocates far more democratic, far less religious, far more inclusive, and far more normal governance than the Taliban do. They have no interest in a pluralist polity with equal rights for women and minorities. If there is no agreement, the Americans can of course still withdraw, but most of the smart money is betting that the consequence will be a Taliban takeover or, worse, a multi-faceted civil war. The experts are pessimistic. View this discussion Monday from the Middle East Institute:
That said, the experts are sometimes wrong. Long shots are worth taking when they are not costly and there is little or no alternative. That score against Spain is a fine example.
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Stevenson’s army, April 7
– Next week, for the first time since 2019, the two intelligence committees will hold open hearings with the leading IC officials for worldwide threat briefings.
– No leaks from the Biden White House, WaPo says.
-No change for now on land mine policy.
– Russia talks to India about arms.
-An anti-waste group criticizes DOD’s unfunded priorities lists.
[Background: SecDef Gates tried to block them.]
– Academic study of Jan 6 rioters finds surprises.
Late additions:
Likely special envoy on Nord Stream 2.
While Xi appeals to Merkel.
And AP says US worries about Taiwan.
And USN does a FONOP.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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