Tag: UAE
US withdrawal makes everyone in the Middle East recalibrate
I have long believed the US is overcommitted in the Middle East, given its declining interests in the region, and needed to draw down. I confess I did not anticipate how clumsily we would manage to do it. I also did not fully anticipate how others would react. The American withdrawal has set off a cascade of efforts at improving relations both within the region and with external powers, mainly China and Russia. Not all the improvements are in the US interest, but several are interesting.
First example: the Abrahamic accords. The Saudis, Emiratis, and Bahrainis have understood for some time that the American commitment to their autocracies was weakening. The failure of Washington to react to the drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 confirmed that perception. They needed to think about replacing Washington’s security guarantees, which in any event were aimed at external enemies, while the main threat is in these three countries increasingly internal. They have turned to Israel for the technology required to guarantee that their monarchies remain stable.
But, you may object, Saudi Arabia hasn’t yet recognized Israel, as the UAE and Bahrain have. On that, I only have anecdata, but it is compelling. Sitting in a business class lounge in Riyadh some 2+years ago, I found myself surrounded by 40-something males speaking Hebrew. They carried an unusual number of hard-sided cases. When I asked the Israeli next to me why I was hearing so much Hebrew in Riyadh, he smiled coldly and said: “If I told you, I would have to kill you.” I concluded they were techies carrying lots of electronics after providing assistance to Saudi internal intelligence agencies. I suspect Israel’s improving relations with Egypt have a lot to do with internal security as well, inaddition to President Sissi’s attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Second I would cite the response to Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter plane in 2015. It initially caused tension in the bilateral relationship, but Turkey had a problem: the US and NATO were not backing Ankara up and instead the Americans were beginning to ally with Kurds, whom President Erdogan regards as terrorists and mortal enemies. Soon Ankara was apologizing, relations between Ankara and Moscow were improving and Turkey was participating in the Russian-sponsored Astana process for ceasefire/surrenders of the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime. Russian and Turkish troops have even patrolled together in both Idlib and northern Syria, though the relationship remains parlous.
Third are the tentative efforts by Saudi Arabia and Iran to come to some sort of modus vivendi. This has included high-level meetings in Baghdad as well as trips to Tehran and Riyadh. The Saudis and Iranians have no territorial dispute and many symmetrical interests, including not allowing an adversary to rile their respective Shia and Sunni minorities and maintaining their theologically-based and increasingly nationalist autocracies. A mutual stand-down from bilateral tensions could benefit both.
Fourth is the at least partial resolution of a conflict internal to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudis and Emiratis have essentially given up on their latest effort to bring Qatar to heel. Doha weathered the embargo and other sanctions better than the Kingdom and the Emirates anticipated, with assistance from Turkey, Iran, and the US, which wasn’t (yet) interested in abandoning its largest base in the region, Al Udeid. There was no point in continuing a fruitless campaign whose only real impact was to weaken the Gulf Arabs.
Fifth example: OPEC+. After a price war in 2020, the Saudis and Russians found common cause in maintaining higher oil prices, which are essential to both their national budgets. Riyadh and Moscow would prefer prices around $100/barrel, but they can’t push much above $70 or so because that would bring on unconventional sources in the US and elsewhere, especially in a low-interest-rate environment. So they are more or less content to leave prices where they have lingered for much of the epidemic, hoping that stronger growth later will bump up both interest rates and oil prices.
There are other examples: rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE, the UAE push for reconciliation with Syria, and Turkey’s sometime courting of Iran. The point is that US withdrawal is causing everyone to recalibrate and look for alternatives to American support that seems increasingly unlikely. I might like recalibration to push Israel into a more positive attitude toward Palestine, but that seems a bridge too far. Still, US withdrawal is getting the Middle East pregnant with possibilities.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, May 26
Former 5-term Senator John Warner, R-VA, died last night. He was 94. I worked with him on several issues, always admired his seriousness of purpose. Among his greatest achievements, in my estimation, were his sponsorship of the amendment requiring the president to produce a national security strategy report and his leadership of SASC at the time of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Warner was so appalled he held 6 SASC hearings into the matter while his GOP HASC counterpart didn’t want to have any, but finally held a truncated one.
– WSJ says UAE ties to China imperil F-35 sale.
-Defense News says US has lifted South Korean missile limits.
– NYT says US is speeding up Afghan withdrawal, plans end in early July.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Landslide is the only solution
Bob Woodward’s confirmation that President Trump lied about the seriousness of Covid19 is no surprise. Anyone with a functioning brain knows that by now. But getting the admission on tape, along with the fact that the source of some of the information on contagiousness of the virus was Chinese President Xi, was a journalistic coup. It would have been even more so had Woodward published it earlier, but he claims he wanted to save it for his book because that afforded him the longer form to provide fuller context. It also of course helps him market his product.
In a rational world, Woodward’s revelation would end Trump’s ability to market himself. His “playing down” the virus cost more something like 150,000 lives, so far. Shutdowns, masks and social distancing earlier and more consistently would have saved about that many. People are still dying as a result of Trump’s neglect of the most important Presidential responsibility: to protect Americans. This appalling dereliction of duty has had real world consequences.
It is hard for me to imagine how anyone could vote for a President who did such a thing. His achievements are easy to list: appointing supposedly conservative but too often unqualified judges, a massive tax cut for the rich, and validation of white nationalism as a political force in the United States. His failures, in addition to his mendacious response to Covid19, take longer:
- Inability to cope with social justice protests in a productive way and encouragement of violence and threats of violence against peaceful protesters.
- A collapsed economy that even before the epidemic was growing no faster than in President Obama’s last three years.
- A ballooning budget deficit, again even before the epidemic hit.
- Unfounded attacks on the right to vote.
- Repeated efforts to deprive millions of Americans of the health insurance they obtained from Obamacare, without providing an alternative.
- Failure in the trade war with China, which has cost the US government many billions in agricultural and other subsidies to offset the export losses due to tariffs.
- Accelerated Iranian progress towards nuclear weapons, entirely due to Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the nuclear deal.
- North Korean refusal to give up their nuclear weapons, despite offers of massive economic assistance.
- Consolidation of President Maduro’s power in Venezuela.
Trump wants you to think that withdrawal of a few thousand troops from Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Israel/UAE deal were big achievements. Far from it: the US still has more troops in the greater Middle East than before he took office. The UAE/Israel deal only contributes to peace between two countries who have never been at war and have precious little reason to fight. It makes an Israel/Palestine deal more difficult, not less.
Even before the latest headlines, Jeffrey Goldberg had assembled the evidence of Trump’s disdain for the American military. That, too, was well-known to anyone paying attention to Trump’s mythical bonespurs and his public denunciation of John McCain, but the things Trump has said in private about the troops being “losers” and “suckers” compounded what some might have hoped to dismiss as misdemeanors into felonies. Polling of America’s troops suggests that they will be voting against a Republican for the first time in a long while.
The right thing for Trump to do now is resign and allow Pence to take over, hoping that would improve Republican prospects in the November 3 election. He could then re-assume the office and would be hard to fault for doing so, as the voice of the people would have been heard. He won’t do that, because he can’t afford to lose this election or even leave office for a few months. Both his finances and his freedom are at risk, because the Russians won’t continue anteing up and state Attorneys General will be indicting him on felony charges. So instead he will stay on the ballot and try to de-legitimize the election results, especially if they show him winning on election night but losing due to mail-in ballots a couple of days later.
The only way of preventing that is a landslide in favor of Biden, starting on election night. Even then, Trump may try to prevent Biden from getting a majority in the Electoral College by convincing Republican governors to withhold communication of their electoral votes. But a clear and unequivocal electoral vote victory, in addition to Biden’s all but certain popular vote margin, would do a great deal to save America from a chaotic outcome.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks | August 24 – August 28, 2020
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Gender Equality 100 Years After the 19th Amendment | August 24, 2020 | 2:00 – 4:00 PM EDT | Brookings Institution | Register Here
On August 26, 1920, the 19th amendment was adopted to the U.S. Constitution, granting some – though not all – American women the right to vote. 100 years later, relative equality at the ballot box has not been matched by equity in business, politics, the military, family life, and even retirement.
On August 24, as part of 19A: The Brookings Gender Equality Series, Brookings will host a webinar to examine the state of gender equality today and what needs to be done to achieve full equality for women in our society.
Tina Tchen, CEO of TIME’S UP Foundation and former executive director of the White House Council on Women and Girls will offer keynote remarks, followed by a conversation with Madeleine Albright, the first woman to serve as U.S. secretary of state. Susan Ware, who serves as the honorary women’s suffrage centennial historian at the Radcliffe Institute’s Schlesinger Library at Harvard, will provide a brief historical overview of the women’s suffrage movement. Then, Brookings experts Camille Busette, Elaine Kamarck, Isabel Sawhill, and Makada Henry-Nickie will convene a panel discussion to examine how gender equality has evolved since the amendment’s passage and what public reforms could address gender-based inequalities that persist today.
Speakers:
John R. Allen: President, Brookings Institution
Camille Busette: Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Governance Studies, Metropolitan Policy Program
Tina Tchen: President & CEO, TIME’S UP Foundation
Madeleine Albright: Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group
Tamara Cofman Wittes: Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Susan Ware: Honorary Women’s Suffrage Centennial Historian, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University
Makada Henry-Nickel: Fellow, Governance Studies
Isabel V. Sawhill: Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Center on Children/Families, Future of the Middle Class Initiative
Elaine Kamarck: Founding Director, Center for Effective Public Management & Senior Fellow, Governance Studies - Prospects for Peace in Sudan: Insights From the Armed Movements & Analysts | August 25, 2020 | 11:00 AM EDT | Atlantic Council | Register Here
The transition to civilian rule in Sudan took place one year ago this month, and the success of that transition depends in part on the successful conclusion of an internal peace agreement between the new transitional government in Khartoum and the various armed movements across Sudan’s regions. Though progress has been made, several of the largest and most powerful groups remain outside the peace process, while many of the issues at the heart of Sudan’s difficult center-periphery dynamics have yet to be addressed. Issues of power-sharing, federalism, restitution, and the role of religion in the state all remain unresolved. Even as the talks approach a hoped-for conclusion, several of Sudan’s regions are at the same time experiencing an uptick in violence and instability, underscoring the urgency around achieving a durable peace.
Speakers:
General Abdelaziz al-Hilu: Chairman, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North
Dr. Gibril Ibrahim: Chairman, Justice & Equality Movement
Dr. Elshafie Khidiri: Sudanese Political Advisor & Commentator
Dr. Annette Weber: Senior Fellow, German Institute for International & Security Affairs
Mr. Cameron Hudson: Senior Fellow, Africa Center, Atlantic Council - A Conversation With Afghan Acting Foreign Minister Mohammed Haneef Atmar | August 27, 2020 | 9:00 – 10:00 AM EDT | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
Afghanistan’s peace process has faced hurdles—some familiar, some new—in recent months. There is increased hope that long-awaited negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban will begin imminently. But despite recent momentum following the Eid cease-fire at the end of July and the Loya Jirga organized by President Ghani at the beginning of August, major barriers remain ahead of talks. The levels of violence against Afghan security forces and civilians remain at unsustainable levels, and continued disputes over prisoner releases may delay the process further.
The lead up to intra-Afghan talks has made it clear that a sustainable peace in Afghanistan will require intensive international and regional support, both during negotiations and following any political settlement. Afghanistan’s acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Haneef Atmar, has led Afghanistan’s efforts to consolidate international support for the peace process in Afghanistan—including diverse neighbors, regional powers, and supportive western nations.
Join USIP as we host Minister Atmar for a virtual discussion about the Afghanistan peace process as talks with the Taliban get set to begin. The foreign minister will speak about the Afghan government’s ongoing efforts for peace and stability, as well as the role of the regional and international community in supporting peace efforts.
Speakers:
Andrew Wilder (Moderator): Vice President, Asia Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
H.E. Mohammed Haneef Atmar: Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan - The Mental Health Costs of Displacement | August 27, 2020 | 10:00 – 11:00 AM EDT | Middle East Institute | Register Here
In addition to economic and legal insecurity, many refugees and IDPs suffer from the immediate and long-term effects of PTSD and other mental health issues resulting from their experiences with conflict, displacement, and discrimination in their new environments. While government and NGO initiatives exist in Jordan, Iraq, and other host countries to promote mental health awareness and services in refugee communities, these resources are insufficient to address this dire need.
How can aid and development programs prioritize mental health as a key component of refugee support? What are the gaps in the regional mental health systems that must be bridged in order to serve refugee communities? What initiatives exist to empower refugee communities at the grassroots level to advocate for mental health services?
Speakers:
Amira Roess (Moderator): Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Institute
Essam Daoud: Co-Founder & Director, Humanity Crew
Mohammad Abo-Hilal: Founder, Syria Bright Future - Palestine & the Arab World: A Relationship in Crisis? | August 27, 2020 | 4:00 – 5:15 PM AST | Brookings Institution | Register Here
For more than sixty years, the centrality of the Palestinian cause to the Arab world was without dispute, capturing the hearts and minds of people throughout the region and commanding the support of their governments. Today, however, this position has eroded and more Arab countries are pursuing enhanced relations with Israel despite its continued occupation and settlement of Palestine. This month, the United Arab Emirates announced it would establish official ties with Israel, and other countries are reportedly considering following suit. These developments beg the question: What has happened to Palestine’s place in the region and its relationships to regional allies?
The Brookings Doha Center invites you to attend a webinar on Palestine and the Arab world, which will consider the current state of relations and what it means for the Palestinian liberation movement today and in the future. The discussion will address questions such as: How and why have relations arrived at this point? How has Palestine’s diplomacy evolved and how adeptly has its leadership navigated the changing geopolitics of the region? What roles have been played by other countries—such as Egypt, Jordan, and the United States—and by the Palestinian diaspora? And what will the end of Oslo and the possibility of Israeli annexation mean for the region’s future?
Speakers:
Omar H. Rahman (Moderator): Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Nour Odeh: Political Analyst & Public Diplomacy Consultant
Shibley Telhami: Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, U.S. Relations With the Arab World
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, August 14
French navy goes to help Greece against Turkey.
Chinese navy near Taiwan.
US seizes ships with Iranian oil.
David Ignatius praises UAE-Israel agreement.
Slate has more background.
I recently read Robert Draper’s excellent book on the start of the Iraq war. Here’s the NYT review.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Good but…
The deal between Israel and the United Arab Emirates on its face does good things. It prevents Israeli annexation of a big piece of the West Bank and will establish normal diplomatic relations and other ties between the two countries. Hard to object to any of that.
But in diplomacy the devil is in the details, especially the details of implementation. There are a lot of still unanswered questions. Is the bar on annexation permanent, or are the Israelis going to be able to threaten it over and over again in order to gain recognition by Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and maybe Qatar?* Or will those countries raise the ante and get further concessions for Palestinian interests in return for normalization?
On implementation, skepticism is in order. Egypt and Jordan have normal diplomatic relations with Israel, but their peace is not a uniformly warm one. Security cooperation is embraced, but economic and commercial relations are far from maximized. Even travel among the three countries presents serious bureaucratic barriers, not to mention the cultural inhibitions against Arabs going to Israel (and Israel’s Jews going to Arab countries).
There are three strong factors favoring UAE/Israel rapprochement.
First is Israeli security assistance. The UAE is concerned about homegrown Islamists, especially those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. You only need sit for an hour in a business class lounge in Riyadh or Dubai to meet Israeli males with square jaws and muscular physiques, along with a group of nerds. When I asked one in Riyadh why there were so many Israelis in the lounge, he replied with an icy smile, “If I told you I would have to kill you.” My impression is that Israel has bought a lot of good will in the Gulf by helping its autocratic regimes to ensure that nothing like the Arab Spring can succeed there.
Second is a lack of bad blood at the personal level. While the UAE has recognized and support Palestine, there is no decades-long history of war with Israel and subsequent occupation, as there was with Jordan and Egypt. Nor is there a history of Jews being expelled from the Emirates, so far as I can tell. There has been a synagogue in Dubai for decades that is now officially recognized. Ordinary Emiratis may not like the deal, but mass dissent inside the UAE is unlikely, as both its citizens and non-citizens are under tight control. Your traffic ticket arrives by text message within minutes of a violation. Any negative reaction in the “Arab street” will not be in Dubai or Abu Dhabi.
Third is the common enemy: Iran. The Israelis will no doubt want and get intelligence and military cooperation with the UAE, which is conveniently located just on the other side of the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Israel will presumably be glad to provide missile defense and other high tech weaponry. The UAE was never going to be able to stand aside if war happens between Iran and Israel, so it makes sense for Abu Dhabi to get what it can to defend itself, especially after the Iranian attacks on its tankers in 2019.
The Palestinians are objecting vigorously to the UAE/Israel deal, because it rewards Israel for not doing something it should never have threatened to do and gains nothing substantial for Palestine. But the Arab world has mostly been ignoring the Palestinians lately. Certainly the Trump Administration will be uninterested in their complaints. The Palestinians will need to hope that the next Arab country to recognize Israel drives a harder bargain.
*PS: I failed to notice yesterday when drafting this that the Israelis have only suspended their annexation, which means they will try to sell that concession again to the next Arab country wanting to establish normal relations.
RSS - Posts
