Tag: United States
True, but irrelevant
Republican senators have written an open letter to Iran’s leaders warning them that any agreement with the United States on its nuclear program not approved in Congress can be revoked “with the stroke of a pen” by the next President. That’s true, but irrelevant.
For several reasons:
1. The Iranians already know it. Does anyone in Congress imagine that no one in Tehran knows the difference between a “mere executive agreement” made by the President on his own and a treaty ratified by the Senate? The Iranians are difficult, but not dumb.
2. If a deal is struck, it will have to be one that demonstrably restrains Iran from getting nuclear weapons and gives the world advance warning if it moves in that direction. The Administration is aiming for a one-year breakout time. Does anyone think the next president will jettison an agreement of that sort without any substitute?
3. A move to junk an agreement would not find support even from the United Kingdom and France, much less Germany, Russia and China. Without the support of these other P5+1 countries, the US would be unable to reimpose multilateral sanctions on Iran and would be reduced to the kind of unilateral effort that has proven so fruitless for more than 50 years against Cuba.
I imagine someone in the Iranian Majles is arguing for a reply to the Senators that might read, if it were honest, along the following lines:
If our two current presidents reach an agreement and a future American president reneges on it, our Supreme Leader will ditch Iran’s obligations and do as he wishes. This could include pursuit and deployment of nuclear weapons, though you won’t know because the extra monitoring of our nuclear program provided for in the agreement will no longer apply.
The Iranians of course are far too sophisticated to reply along those lines, but the Senatorial letter will certainly bring joy to the hearts of those hardliners who would like to do so.
The letter is clearly intended to make the negotiations more difficult. Some might even say it is an effort to interfere in them, making the letter a potential violation in spirit of the (never enforced) Logan Act, which prohibits private correspondence with foreign governments “in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States.” That is presumably one of the reasons it is an “open” letter.
The Senators’ letter is of course not really about Iran but about American politics, in particular Republican relations with President Obama. The Republicans are trying to restrain him from what they regard as his unjustified and allegedly illegal efforts to shape policy, in particular on immigration, health care and global warming but also more generally on anything they think a Republican president would do differently.
I really don’t know what the next president will do with any nuclear deal the current one comes up with by the end of the month. If the Administration were to ask for Congressional approval, the agreement would be far more binding and harder for the president to undo. It might be preferable if it were an executive agreement and therefore readily abrogated if the need arises. That is something the Republicans should reflect on.
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Another March madness
I was reminded this week of the CNAS report If All Else Fails: The Challenges of Containing a Nuclear-Armed Iran, by Colin Kahl, Jacob Stokes and Raj Pattani in 2013 when Colin was out of government. It makes particularly interesting reading in the run-up to a possible nuclear deal with Iran. March is the make or break month for at least a framework agreement.
The report is a reminder of what we are going to need to do if there is no agreement and Iran manages (whether or not there is a military strike on its nuclear facilities) to get nuclear weapons. Our objectives would then number 11:
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Prevent direct Iranian use of nuclear weapons;
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Prevent Iranian transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists;
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Limit and mitigate the consequences of Iranian sponsorship of conventional terrorism, support groups and conventional aggression;
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Discourage Iranian use of nuclear threats to coerce other states or provoke crises;
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Dissuade Iranian escalation during crises;
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Discourage Iran from adopting a destabilizing nuclear posture that emphasizes early use of nuclear weapons or pre-delegates launch authority;
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Persuade Israel to eschew a destabilizing nuclear posture that emphasizes early use of nuclear weapons or hair-trigger launch procedures;
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Convince other regional states not to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities;
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Limit damage to the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. nonproliferation leadership;
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Prevent Iran from becoming a supplier of sensitive nuclear materials; and
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Ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf.
While some of these objectives are already operable (especially the last), it is eminently clear that Iranian nuclear weapons would be a major challenge. According to Kahl, Stokes and Pattani, the responses would have to include:
Deterrence to prevent Iranian nuclear use and aggression through credible threats of retaliation by:
- Strengthening U.S. declaratory policy to explicitly threaten nuclear retaliation in response to Iranian nuclear use and strengthening commitments to defend U.S. allies and partners;
- Engaging in high-level dialogue with regional partners to extend the U.S. nuclear umbrella in exchange for commitments not to pursue independent nuclear capabilities;
- Evaluating options for the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear forces;
- Providing Israel with a U.S. nuclear guarantee and engaging Israeli leaders on steps to enhance the credibility of their nuclear deterrent; and
- Improving nuclear forensics and attribution capabilities to deter nuclear terrorism.
Defense to deny Iran the ability to benefit from its nuclear weapons and to protect U.S. partners and allies from aggression by:
- Bolstering U.S. national missile defense capabilities;
- Improving the ability to detect and neutralize nuclear weapons that might be delivered by terrorists;
- Improving network resilience to reduce the threat posed by Iranian cyber attacks;
- Maintaining a robust U.S. conventional presence in the Persian Gulf and considering additional missile defense and naval deployments;
- Increasing security cooperation and operational integration activities with Gulf countries, especially in the areas of shared early warning, air and missile defense, maritime security and critical infrastructure protection; and
- Increasing security cooperation with Israel, especially assistance and collaboration to improve Israel’s rocket and missile defenses.
Disruption to shape a regional environment resistant to Iranian influence and to thwart and diminish Iran’s destabilizing activities by:
- Building Egyptian and Iraqi counterweights to Iranian influence through strategic ties with Cairo and Baghdad, leveraging assistance to consolidate democratic institutions and encourage related reform;
- Promoting evolutionary political reform in the Gulf;
- Increasing assistance to non-jihadist elements of the Syrian opposition and aiding future political transition efforts;
- Shaping Iran’s nuclear posture through a U.S. “no-first-use” pledge;
- Persuading Israel to eschew a preemptive nuclear doctrine and other destabilizing nuclear postures;
- Establishing crisis communication mechanisms with Iran and exploring confidence-building measures;
- Limiting U.S. military objectives in crises and conflicts with Iran to signal that regime change is not the goal of U.S. actions; and
- Providing the Iranian regime with “face-saving” exit ramps during crisis situations.
Denuclearization to constrain Iran’s nuclear weapons program and limit broader damage to the nonproliferation regime by:
- Maintaining and tightening sanctions against Iran; and
- Strengthening interdiction efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, to limit Iran’s access to nuclear and missile technology and stop Iran from horizontally proliferating sensitive technologies to other states and non-state actors.
I suppose there is some universe in which the United States can do all these things successfully and at the same time shift its strategic attention out of the Middle East towards countering an aggressive Russia and a rising China, but it is not the real universe in which you and I live.
Prime Minister Netanyahu argued that an agreement would pave Iran’s way to a bomb. But that was a rhetorical flourish, not serious analysis. The worst that can be said of an Iran/P5+1 agreement is that it is irrelevant: Iran is more likely to sneak out through a clandestine program than break out by diverting nuclear material from its civilian nuclear program. I can see no way an agreement that expands IAEA inspections can make it easier for Tehran to divert nuclear material to a bomb-building effort. And the military strike option–which would certainly cause Iran to try to accelerate bomb-making efforts–would remain open if there are violations of an agreement.
Containment requires far more of Washington than it can reasonably be expected to deliver. That is a good reason for preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. And an agreement is the best bet for that. Anything else would be March madness.
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Bluster with consequences
Prime Minister Netanyahu was better today in Congress than yesterday at the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee. But still blustering.
He argued that the nuclear deal with Iran currently under consideration is bad because
- it leaves a lot of nuclear infrastructure in place (enabling what he regards as a minimal one-year breakout time);
- Iran could evade the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections or evict the inspectors, as North Korea did;
- It would leave Iran unconstrained in a decade.
Netanyahu wants a better agreement that continues sanctions and restrictions on the nuclear program until Iran stops its aggression and support for terror in other countries (he mentioned Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon in this connection) and ends its threat to annihilate Israel. Failing this, Netanyahu wants no deal.
Netanyahu failed to explain how the US would be able to get the kind of deal he is talking about. The Europeans, Russia and China are unlikely to continue sanctions if the current deal is not concluded. Without multilateral sanctions, Iran would still be feeling some pressure from the oil price collapse and unilateral US sanctions, but it is hard to picture Tehran signing on to something more restrictive with a disunited international community than with a united one.
Netanyahu also said explicitly that he prefers no deal to the current deal, which he described as paving the way for an Iranian nuclear weapon. That’s loony. Without some sort of deal–at least extension of the interim Plan of Action–Iran would be free to race for a nuclear weapon without constraints other than the existing IAEA inspections. If Netanyahu thinks they are inadequate in the deal being negotiated, which beefs them up significantly, why would they be any better without a deal?
Looking beyond the bluster, there were a few interesting commissions and omissions in the speech. Netanyahu dropped the explicit threat of war. He did say Israel can defend itself and will stand alone if necessary, but he neither demanded that the US go to war against Iran nor stated clearly what Israel would do. He presumably has come to understand that the military option is a bad one: it won’t succeed in destroying everything, it would accelerate Iran’s nuclear efforts and it would have to be repeated in a few years time. Iran’s nuclear program involves many installations, some of which are buried deep underground. Even the US would have trouble damaging it beyond repair.
I share Netanyahu’s concern with Iranian behavior throughout the Middle East (and occasionally beyond, witness the terrorism it sponsored in Argentina). I’m not sure he is correct that Iran is as radical as ever, but let’s concede that premise. He imagines maintaining sanctions will be useful in moderating Iranian behavior or bringing about regime change. There are two problems with this hypothesis. There is no reason to believe it true–countries isolated by sanctions often become more radical, not less–and there is no way to maintain the sanctions.
So what we got this morning was more classic Netanyahu: bluster without any serious effort to explain how his newly discovered alternative, a better deal, could be achieved. I trust the speech will help him in his electoral campaign in Israel, if only because it shifts the debate there away from his vulnerabilities (economic and social policy) and towards security, which favors the Israeli right wing (though not necessarily Netanyahu himself). Here in the US, it will make life harder for the Obama Administration, as it implicitly roused the Congress to oppose any deal Secretary Kerry brings home.
I suppose Speaker Boehner, who invited Netanyahu to address Congress without informing the White House, is satisfied and hopes this show will help him face down a brewing revolt against his leadership among House Republicans. Netanyahu hopes Israelis won’t notice that he has put the country’s relationship with the United States at risk. I hope both lose those bets.
PS: Some Israelis seem to agree with me:
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Chutzpahdik
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s warm-up pep talk today at AIPAC (the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee) was a classic chutzpahdik performance: he claimed respect for President Obama and his office, appreciation for unprecedented US assistance, and insistence on the importance of bipartisan support in the US for the close relationship with Israel. He even lauded his wife, who has been a serious source of embarrassment.
Netanyahu cited agreement between the US and Israel that Iran should not have nuclear weapons but disagreement on the methods to achieve that goal. Israel, he said, has to worry about its survival, whereas the US worries about its security. Netanyahu claimed Israel can and will defend itself, citing the attack on the Osiraq reactor, the invasion of Lebanon and other instances where the US and Israel disagreed. Israel weathered these disagreements and will weather the current one because of common values and (metaphorical as well as real) family relationships.
The alliance, Netanyahu said, is strong and get stronger.
This is fantasy. Netanyahu has done serious harm to relations with the United States by disrespecting its president, accepting a one-party invitation to address the Congress, bringing his re-election campaign to Washington, and opposing an agreement with Iran without proposing an alternative that would make Israel more secure. He has split the American Jewish community, most of which is far more interested in an agreement not only with Iran but also with the Palestinians than Netanyahu is. Israel is losing ground steadily and irreversibly among young American Jews.
We’ll have to wait for tomorrow’s speech in Congress to hear Netanyahu’s substantive arguments against a nuclear agreement with Iran that lengthens the time it would need to make a nuclear weapon to a year and imposes strict monitoring requirements.
It is hard to picture how Israel would end up better off without such an agreement. Iran would then be free to pursue nuclear weapons at whatever pace it decides. Israel lacks the military punch required to take out dozens of often underground nuclear facilities farther from its territory than the single Syrian and Iraqi reactors it destroyed in the past. Even if it could damage vital nuclear facilities, the Iranians would reconstitute their program and forge ahead, making it necessary to attack the nuclear facilities again within a few years. The sanctions regime that has slowed the Iranian nuclear program and brought Tehran to the negotiating table will fall apart if there is no agreement.
I can agree with Netanyahu’s concerns about Iran’s support for terrorism. Not just its nuclear program but also its support for extremists in many parts of the world are deplorable. But unless he has an alternative worth considering, tomorrow’s speech on the nuclear issue will be nothing but more bluster.
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Unprofessional and misleading
I am grateful to readers of peacefare.net for pointing out that the Serbian media has published accounts of my post on Serbia: media and government | peacefare.net., clearly attributed to a “knowledgeable friend,” as my own view. This is unprofessional and misleading.
Worse: the Serbian press is suggesting that I said “Mediji nisu u službi premijera Vučića” (D. Serwer: the media is not in the service of Prime Minister Vucic). That attributes to me views that are not mine and is at best a distortion of my friend’s views. The author never said there is no censorship. The piece tries to explain how and why the media is pro-Vucic, not that it isn’t. The author gives several reasons: most people, including in the media, think the prime minister is doing the right things, and some people in the press are sychophantic towards the government because of opportunism or cowardice, including fear of losing government advertising. He also says media conditions are nowhere near as bad as they were under Milosevic.
You are entitled to wonder, what do I think? Do I agree with my friend?
One of the reasons I asked my friend’s opinion is the difficulty in forming my own. Beyond “kako ste” and “dobro dan,” I am not a Serbian speaker. I read the Serbian press mostly through Googletranslate and on B92’s English service, which is an eclectic mix that I find useful but not necessarily representative. My friend’s response was more nuanced and interesting than a lot of the commentary on press freedom in Serbia that I see in English-language media, so I thought it interesting enough to put in the public domain, even though it had to be published anonymously. It tried to explain the several mechanisms that make the press pro-government, rather than simply blaming ill-defined censorship. Whether I agreed or not was not an issue in deciding to publish it.
The Serbian press reaction and abuse of this blogpost is a true reflection of the state of the Serbian media, as one of my correspondents suggested today. It was unprofessional to attribute the views in the post to me personally. It is also inaccurate to suggest that the post exonerates the Serbian government.
As I see it, there is a tendency in Serbia, as in other transition countries, for the authorities to attack the messenger rather than respond to the message. This happens occasionally in mature democracies–President Obama a year or so ago was sharply critical of Fox News–but it is relatively rare. The press is doing its job in a democratic society when it reports unsavory facts or uncovers what it thinks is malfeasance. The right response 98% of the time is to the facts or the allegations, not to attack the media.
The situation is complicated in Serbia and elsewhere in the Balkans because some of the media more critical of the government and more willing to report what it regards as malfeasance is supported internationally. This can be unsettling to politicians, who are too often inclined to think the money is explicitly aimed at discrediting them. The “Sanader effect” (Ivo Sanader was a pro-EU prime minister of Croatia who has gone to prison for malfeasance) makes politicians in the Balkans particularly sensitive.
I can’t speak for the European Union, but I know that when US government money goes to support foreign media it is intended to support professional and accurate reporting, as well as a wide range of views. Even government-owned Voice of America aims for professionalism and accuracy. In my hundreds of interviews with VOA, RFE/RL and other government-supported outlets no one has ever tried to tell me what to say. Years ago I was present when Vice President George H.W. Bush, upset with something VOA had published about him, ordered a US embassy official to fire the correspondent. The diplomat had to tell the vice president that could not be done.
Of course this doesn’t mean that either I or the outlets that carry my interviews are 100% correct or in some absolute sense unbiased. I have colleagues who believe they are not asked to give interviews by VOA because their views diverge too much from those of the US government. There is no absolute purity in the media business. Influence is exercised in many different ways, not only in Serbia but also in the United States.
That said, there is a big gap between the relatively independent press in mature democracies and the kind of shabby and sycophantic coverage my blogpost on the Serbian government and media got this week. There will always be some media that toe government lines. But I like to hope that things will evolve in a more professional and mature direction. I’ll be amused to see if the Serbian press publishes an accurate account of this, my followup post.
And no, I don’t think things are worse today than under Milosevic. Nor do I think things were better in the Balkans in Tito’s time, as so many in the seven countries derived from Yugoslavia like to say. These invidious comparisons fail to give credit where it is due: things have improved and I hope will continue to improve, even if I am among those who would like improvement to come faster.
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Boycott Bibi
I more often resist comment on Israel than I give in to it. I am a Jew and only too well aware of the baggage that identity carries, both for me and for others. I cannot be indifferent to the security and welfare of fellow Jews and may be tempted to exaggerate the threats. We have suffered far too much to run the risks of another attempt to obliterate us.
But I cannot keep silent when a Prime Minister of Israel decides to bring his election campaign to the US Congress and tries to narrow the options of the US Administration in its effort to block Iran from getting nuclear weapons. I am also an American, of the second generation born in this country. I see no contradiction at the current juncture between my Jewish and American identities: both want to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.
What Prime Minister Netanyahu wants is different. He wants Iran to give up all its nuclear capability, or at least its enrichment and reprocessing technology. He knows this is impossible. The technology is in the heads and hands of Iranians. There is no way to get rid of their capabilities, even if Tehran were so inclined. But Bibi figures insisting on it will help his re-election bid.
Netanyahu has also made it clear during this election campaign that he opposes giving up the West Bank. He is convinced that doing so will provide a haven for terrorists. This is entirely consistent with his family history, which includes a father who opposed partition of Palestine in 1948 because he believed all the land west of the Jordan River belonged by biblical right to the Jews. Bibi’s father wanted the Palestinians just to evaporate. Bibi wouldn’t mind that, but he more realistically wants them to accept second-class status within an explicitly Jewish state whose eastern border is de facto (if not de jure) the Jordan River.
This combination of unrealistic demands–of Iran and of the Palestinians–is antithetical to American and Israeli interests. It pushes Israel into political isolation with unrealistic goals and leaves Washington with a stark choice: join Israel in defying the rest of the world or abandon the close ties with Israel in favor of settling big issues with the Iranians and Arabs.
Netanyahu’s speech in Congress March 3, if it comes off, will be his opportunity to make his unrealistic demands, cloaking them in claims that Israel is America’s most important ally in the Middle East and the only functioning democracy there. Those claims may be true, but they are also misleading. An Israel that takes Netanyahu’s approach to Iran and the Palestinians will drag the US into an impossible situation. And Israel’s claim to being democratic depends on getting its friends in the US to ignore its treatment of Arabs, both inside and outside the country’s still unsettled borders.
Netanyahu has refused to meet with vigorous Israel-supporting Democrats during his March visit to DC. This makes things easier. For those who disagree with Netanyahu and disapprove of his conniving with John Boehner for an invitation to address the Congress shortly before an election, the right response is to boycott his speech. Let him preach to the converted.
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