Tag: United States
What they don’t say matters
I am reminded this fine DC morning that what politicians and officials don’t say in politics and diplomacy matters. Russian President Putin let loose yesterday a tirade against the US, but
when one British newspaper reporter asked him specifically about the repeated reports of Russian army troops operating in east Ukraine, Putin chose to ignore the question completely.
He has to. Despite his high standing in opinion polls, Russians overwhelmingly oppose direct military involvement in Ukraine. While his tirade will get lots of ink (and electrons) in the Western media, it may betray Putin’s weakness more than his strength. He would like to do more in Ukraine than the current surreptitious presence of a limited number of Russian army troops, which Russians refuse to acknowledge even if the documentation in the West is ample. He would have liked, among other things, to halt the Ukrainian parliamentary elections that will take place tomorrow. They will likely reduce pro-Russian representation in the Rada, if only because voting won’t be possible in separatist-controlled territory (or Crimea, which Moscow has annexed). Putin’s silence on Russian army troops in Ukraine betrays political weakness, not strength.
Wendy Sherman last week gave a talk on the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. While eminently clear on the US objective of preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, she ignored what has become a serious problem plaguing the negotiations: the possible military dimensions (PMDs they are called in the business) of past Iranian nuclear activities. To make a long story short, there is ample evidence that Iran in the past (prior to 2003) did conduct research connected exclusively to nuclear weapons. Tehran has not yet satisfied the International Atomic Energy Agency on this point. Tough-minded Americans want Iran to “come clean,” by giving a full explanation of these activities and providing ample assurances that they will not be renewed, including tight verification. This is difficult for the Iranians, not only because of the loss of face but likely also because these activities were conducted in secret by people and institutions not fully under the control of President Rouhani, who is leading the nuclear negotiations for Iran. This is not the first time Wendy has skimmed over the PMD issue. If an agreement is reached by the November 24 deadline, she’ll need to address it far more directly.
There are many other examples of how silence speaks louder than words in the diplomatic and political worlds. Think President Obama’s silence on how Syria is to be governed if the coalition war against the Islamic State is successful. Think Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s silence lately on concrete steps to form the provincially-based National Guard or prospects for resolving financial and other issues with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Politicians and diplomats will often say nothing on key issues because they have nothing to say that is acceptable, either to themselves or to their antagonists.
Those silences matter. We should listen to them attentively.
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Condemned to cooperate
Laurentina Cizza, a former Middle East Institute intern, writes:
Thursday’s event at the Stimson Center on “Iran and the World After the Nuclear Deal: Possible Scenarios” produced two main conclusions: the US and Iran will inevitably reach a deal, and the war against ISIS represents an area of competition, and possible cooperation, between Tehran and Washington. Presenters were
- Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Professor and Chair, Political Science, Syracuse University;
- Abbas Kadhim, Senior Foreign Policy Fellow, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Geneive Abdo, Fellow, Middle East Program, the Stimson Center, moderated.
A poverty of options on the nuclear issue
According to Boroujerdi of Syracuse University, both the US and Iran face a “poverty of options” when it comes to the nuclear deal. They have little choice but to continue talking. A nuclear deal is inevitable.
Despite coming to power on a wave of popular support, Iranian President Rouhani has struggled to push meaningful reforms past conservative elements of the establishment that have obstructed or criticized his policies. His honeymoon is effectively over. As a result, he has focused the momentum from his electoral victory on ending the nuclear deadlock and reviving the Iranian economy. A foreign policy victory in the form of a nuclear deal would strengthen Rouhani domestically, giving him greater political capital to negotiate with rival conservative elements on other hotly contested issues.
Western observers should view the nuclear negotiations within the context of vicious factional domestic Iranian politics. Rouhani cannot overhaul Iranian foreign policy by signing an unpopular nuclear deal. But failure to sign a nuclear deal would: a) waste the best opportunity for progress on the nuclear issue in at least a decade, and b) paralyze the Rouhani administration along a conservative-reformist divide. Boroujerdi argued that given the political costs of failure Iran and the US will eventually reach a resolution—even if not necessarily by the November 24 deadline.
The Obama administration’s dearth of foreign policy success heightens the need to reach a resolution to the Iran nuclear issue. Despite the administration’s claims that “all options are on the table,” Boroujerdi argues that the administration would never risk giving the Middle East another failed state by bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The race against ISIS
Irrespective of the outcome of the current nuclear talks, ISIS provides a palatable second option for agreement between the US and Iran. The two powers are likely to pursue their mutual goals on separate tracks while competing for regional recognition of their efforts.
Boroujerdi argued that since the ISIS capture of Mosul in July, Iran has demonstrated remarkable flexibility and pragmatism. The Iranians blessed Iraq Prime Minister Maliki’s removal, refrained from criticizing the US-led air campaign against ISIS, and began supplying weapons to the Lebanese army—not just Hezbollah. Boroujerdi suggests this new pragmatism extends to Syria as well: the Iranians would be willing to throw Assad under the bus so long as their greater strategic interests could survive without him. In Iraq, Maliki’s departure did not weaken Iran’s unfaltering influence in the country, which is concentrated in Karbala.
In the fight against ISIS, Iran has taken care to jump ahead and take credit for being the first to act. When the militants overran Mosul, Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa provided the Iraqi army with the boost of morale and reserves necessary to face ISIS. The US stood idle on the sidelines. When the US finally announced its intention to arm the Kurds, pictures emerged of Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleymani training Kurdish peshmerga forces.
Kadhim argued that members’ conflicting priorities will doom the US-led coalition to failure. Although the US wants to tackle ISIS first and Assad second, coalition members such as Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia would rather see events occur in the reverse order. Kadhim likened inviting Saudi Arabia to join an anti-terror coalition to inviting Al Capone to a coalition against organized crime. The presence of pro-ISIS members, he argued, is bound to doom the coalition. Boroujerdi echoed this concern: the US strategy of fighting ISIS and Assad simultaneously is “unrealistic.” The US—he suggested—could learn a thing or two from Iranian pragmatism.
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The ADD nation fights ISIS
Last Wednesday American University’s School of International Service hosted its professor and former ambassador Akbar Ahmed, Politico correspondent Susan Glasser, and Washington Post columnist, David Ignatius to discuss Fighting ISIS: The Future of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East. David Gregory, the former moderator of Meet the Press, presided.
President Obama some weeks ago stated his goal of degrading and defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with air power and a dynamic, committed coalition but the campaign thus far has been unimpressive. Ignatius defended the President stating, “wars often start badly” but questioned whether the President has a concrete strategy to accomplish his goal. While President Obama sought to turn the page of America’s legacy in the Middle East, he has been “sucked back” into the region. The President’s insistence on changes to the Iraqi government as well as demands for regional actors to become involved are promising first steps. Although the coalition does not have a UN mandate, it avoids the “go it alone ethos” of the Bush administration or the lead from behind approach in Libya.
How will ISIS be defeated in Syria? In Iraq? While there are plans for the CIA and military to train guerilla fighters in Syria, Ignatius notes that history shows us this approach is rarely successful. With internal conflicts plaguing both Syria and Iraq, a coherent strategy is lacking. This will be a test for President Obama as he faces a group that has an “apocalyptic view.” Ignatius noted Osama Bin Laden and the writings of his final days, in which he outlines his feelings of failure and his intention to rename Al-Qaeda. The Muslim leaders whom he respected had come to hate Al Qaeda, which its leader feared would lead to its downfall. Ignatius believes the same goes for the “savagery” of ISIS, hated by both the Muslim world and the West.
While all three speakers underlined the President’s reluctance to become involved, Glasser focused on the public debate that transpired between the President and the Pentagon. This friction has largely gone uncovered. Glasser believes the United States is in a quagmire that will not end well.
Ahmed believes that the US has forgotten the lesson of Afghanistan, where it entered without any understanding of tribal wars. There is a parallel situation in Iraq, but along sectarian divisions. ISIS vaunts the golden age of early Islam but Ahmed disputes this. He instead believes “justice, knowledge, equality and tolerance” are embedded in Islam, none of which are included in the ISIS movement.
Gregory asked a question that went largely unanswered. What are we protecting the US and our allies from? Ignatius believes that ISIS is such an aggressive adversary that we should have seen it coming. While there is no current intelligence that ISIS is planning an attack on the United States, ISIS poses a serious threat to Jordan’s monarch, a key US ally.
Ignatius refers to the media as playing to an “ADD nation,” with a dwindling attention span to critical foreign affairs. The consequences of not being patient will hurt the United States. There is no overnight solution. Stability will not be achieved until there is reconciliation between Sunni and Shia and between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Proxy wars are “eating up” the Middle East, which will need restoration of strong security institutions.
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Geopolitics of lower energy prices
Oil prices are down by about 20% from their recent peak (or 15% from their three-year plateau around $100 per barrel) and likely to stay low for months if not years. Downward pressure will continue unless the Saudis are prepared to rein in their production (no sign of that yet) or prices decline enough (to $70 or less) to turn off the flow of tight oil and gas in the US, which has become a major factor on world markets.
There is a lot of benefit to be seen from lower oil prices. From the US perspective, cutting revenue flow to the governments of Russia, Iran and Venezuela is a big plus. Putin, who is already feeling substantial pressure from European Union and US sanctions, faces serious financial difficulties. Iran, likewise hurt by sanctions, will find it difficult to generate anything like the revenue it needs to fund economic recovery, even if sanctions are lifted. Venezuela was already headed towards a financial crisis. Its budget is almost entirely dependent on oil revenue.
Major oil and gas producers in the Gulf will be hit as well. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates , Kuwait and Qatar as well as Iraq will feel the pinch. They are far more likely to cut their spending on various international causes than risk austerity at home. That could mean scarcer resources for the restored military autocracy in Egypt, Yemen’s besieged government and Syria’s opposition. It could also mean less revenue for Islamist extremists of various stripes, including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, for which oil sales are a significant portion of revenue.
Lower oil prices will also give a boost to global economic growth, particularly in the US and Europe but also in China and India. The Economist worries that the lower prices may be due to slack economic growth and that lower prices will do little for consumers, but then it gives ample evidence that the lower prices are in fact due to higher production. If past patterns hold, global economic growth could gain by a significant 1% over current 3.3% predictions for 2015.
What has happened in the past couple of weeks is part of a broader secular trend that will have profound impacts on geopolitics and economics for a long time to come. Production of oil and gas is rising sharply in the Western Hemisphere, especially in the US, Canada and Brazil. Demand is rising principally in the East, where economic growth is strong, the economies are still heavily dependent on energy, and energy resources are scarce. This trend has implications for future security risks and burden sharing: it will not make much sense for the US to carry most of the burden of ensuring the security of the strait of Hormuz when 90% or more of the oil shipped through this classic “choke point” is going to India, China and other Asian consumers.
Asian consumers should be stocking 90 days of imports, as members of the International Energy Agency are required to do. They should also be providing some of the naval assets to protect the strait of Hormuz. That will require a major rethink on the part of the US, as well as creation of a multinational force that the Asians can feel comfortable joining.
There are calls in Congress to curtail the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is slated for use in an oil supply disruption. That would be an unwise move, as a major disruption of oil markets anywhere means a hike in prices everywhere. The US may be much less dependent on the Middle East in the future, but it will still be vulnerable to the economic damage of an oil supply interruption.
We have tended to view the rise of Asia as a challenge. But of course it is also an opportunity. The US will soon be the world’s largest oil and gas producer. If the Washington can continue to moderate American demand and in addition decides to allow oil and gas exports, the assumption of its declining influence could soon be proven, once again, a mirage.
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The peace process is dead, for now
The Israeli Conflict: Has the US Failed? The panel assembled Wednesday at the Middle East Council’s Capitol Hill Conference leaned towards answering in the affirmative. Omar Kader, MEPC chairman, moderated a panel comprising former Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer, Foundation for Middle East Peace President Matthew Duss, Brookings Fellow Natan Sachs, and Yousef Munayyer, Executive Director of the Jerusalem Fund and The Palestine Center. Thomas Mattair, MEPC Executive Director was the discussant in a conversation addressing the US role – past and future – in the Middle East peace process.
Munayyer argued that the US has abjectly failed to resolve the conflict. If peace was the US objective in Gaza this summer, then it has failed. But Munayyer suggests that if US primary objectives were to preserve the free-flow of resources in the region while continuing to secure the survival of Israel, then US policy has in fact succeeded. He suggested that peace between Israel and Palestine is not a priority for the US government.
This position was too far for much of the rest of the panel. Daniel Kurtzer countered that regardless of whether US policy has been carried out intelligently or successfully, the peace process is of great importance to the national interest. Duss noted that there are great costs to US interests as the conflict runs on and on. Citizens of other nations – particularly those in the Middle East – have their opinions of the US and its policies shaped through this emotive issue. The conflict can make it much harder for leaders with sizable populations sympathizing with Palestine to work productively with US officials. Ongoing injustices – whether perceived or real – foment mistrust towards the US because of its support for the Israeli government and its inability to deliver on calls for peace. Groups like al-Qaeda draw recruits to fight against the US by playing on anger felt at its perceived role in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Beyond the obvious humanitarian and ethical reasons for peace, it is also of utmost importance to US policy.
So has the US failed? So far, it seems clear it has. Much of the onus for building peace is on the Israelis and Palestinians themselves, but there was also a feeling that success – and failure – is greatly influenced by US policy.
The US has failed the peace process, in Munayyer’s view, by allowing Israel to preserve its status quo, continuing to build settlements in the territories and reneging on its promises. The US has failed to use its leverage over Israel to comply with international law – instead using its leverage internationally to allow Israel to never have to acquiesce to the law. US attempts to discourage Palestine from using the preexisting international framework to address grievances has left the only option for resolution through the US – which he termed “Israel’s lawyer.” The US bias towards Israel makes it hard for Palestinians to gain anything from the peace process: for successful negotiations, both sides must gain more politically than they stand to lose.
Sachs and Duss agreed with this assessment. For the process to succeed, both actors must take difficult steps in order to move towards a lasting accord. Duss sees the US as having the power to help Israel take those difficult steps towards building a lasting peace. To do this US support must be absolute – but while providing support, the resolve to ensure those difficult steps are actually carried through must also be there. The presence of US support without the will to enforce policies that will lead to peace has led to a belief in some quarters in Israel that the current status quo is sustainable. But that will not lead to a lasting peace.
Kurtzer stressed that defining the goals and parameters of negotiations will be key. He feels recent US administrations have failed to decide on a strategy before initiating negotiations. There has also been a degree of naïvety. For example, he acknowledges ongoing settlements are a problem but points out that simply demanding that the Israeli Prime Minister freeze them will not work. If Netanyahu acquiesces, he will pay a political price in the Knesset. To achieve results on this demand – and others – the political payoff must offset the price to the leaders. Indeed – a sustainable process must include gains for both sides that outweigh the challenges they face.
The US tendency to settle for short-term fixes was also criticized. The last decade is littered with ceasefire agreements, but Kurtzer questions whether any further progress is made once the ceasefires are implemented. If only the proximate causes of violence are fixed, and not the root causes, then we will be fated to see further violence in the future. A commitment to more than just rebuilding must be made in the wake of the cessation of violence.
Equally important to Kurtzer is the importance of holding the parties accountable to their agreements and promises. If there are no consequences for bad behavior during negotiations, then violations will occur. Important as keeping both sides at the table is the legitimacy of the peace process, which is severely harmed by duplicity.
There have undoubtedly been failings in the US attempts to bring peace to Israel and Palestine, even if less egregious than the failures of the Palestinian and Israeli governments. But Sachs believes that now is not moment to consider who is at fault in the Gaza and beyond. As anger on both sides grows and the prevailing view in political circles in Israel moves further towards accepting the current status quo, now is the time to learn from previous failings, and to try again – before mistrust and hatred make any resolution impossible.
Here is the video of the event:
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Not a hopeless mess
I spent a week yesterday talking with well-informed, Syria opposition-sympathizing people in Istanbul. I heard some interesting things.
While the reelection of Ahmad Tomeh as prime minister of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) has been bumpy due to a boycott by some members of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), it is a done deal. The issue now is who the ministers will be. Their number will shrink to eight or nine. They are supposed to be capable technocrats but will come through a committee of the SOC, which will shift its role to that of a legislative body with oversight responsibilities, instituted through new bylaws. So the ministers will have to pass political muster, and be politically balanced, even if they are supposed to be technocrats. Executive functions will reside with the SIG, whose staff has been getting a lot of training over the past year. Its capacity to govern is improving.
The SIG’s priorities at the moment are clear. Number 1 is food security. Syria faces a massive grain shortfall this winter, due to a dramatic drop in production (by 75% since the year before the war) and a cut in funding to the World Food Programme. Opposition areas need close to 250,000 (presumably) metric tons. Less than this will risk starvation, which would not only be a humanitarian disaster. It means people will flee opposition areas. The war can be lost in many ways, including by losing the population to regime- and Islamic State (ISIS)-controlled areas and to Syria’s neighbors.
Number 2 priority is getting the SIG back into Syria. Already three-quarters of its personnel are said to be there, but the leadership is still in Istanbul and Gaziantep, on the Turkish/Syrian border. It won’t do any good to get them back in unless they, and the people who work for them and benefit from the SIG’s limited services, are reasonably safe.
Here things get complicated. The SIG and SOC want a safe area inside Syria, presumably along the border with Turkey but possibly also in the south. This would require the Americans to lead a coalition effort committed to enforcing it, by pledging to attack anyone or anything that bombarded the safe zone. A no-fly zone is really not sufficient, since a safe area along the Turkish border would also be vulnerable to artillery bombardment. It was a Serb mortar attack on the Sarajevo safe area that precipitated the air attacks on Serb military installations and led to the end of the Bosnian war in 1995. The no-fly zone had not been violated.
The Americans know that the significance of safe areas resides mostly in their failure. An attack on a designated safe area initiates broader military action. They don’t want to start down that slippery slope in Syria. But the SIG and the Turks want the safe area, the former so they can start governing within Syria and establishing their credentials as a serious institution and the latter to slow the massive influxes of refugees (Turkey is now hosting more than 1.5 million).
There is a deal to be had here, because the Americans want the Turks to take up the cudgels against ISIS, in addition to supporting the rebellion against Syrian President Assad. Ankara hasn’t wanted to do as much as it might to support the fight against ISIS, mainly because the people fighting ISIS at the moment along the border with Turkey are Kurds allied with Assad who have also supported a rebellion inside Turkey.
So let’s make a deal: the Turks and the SIG/SOC get their American-protected safe zone, but only if they agree with the Americans to help the Kurds they don’t like to push ISIS away from the border.
In this scenario, Washington would have to twist the Kurds’ arm hard to get them to disassociate from the Assad regime and join the anti-Assad coalition, also pledging not to support insurgency inside Turkey. Otherwise the Turks could find themselves moving into Syria and having to fight both ISIS and the Kurds, which would make a real hash of things.
Washington is still refusing, claiming that it has no ally on the ground in Syria to fight Assad, so it has to limit itself to attacks on ISIS. This is specious. There is even less of an ally on the ground to fight ISIS. Washington is apparently planning to fight a war of attrition against ISIS exclusively from the air, while training a new Syrian opposition force from scratch over the next couple of years. That is not a formula for a quick end to this agony. And I wonder how ISIS, the Kurds and the Free Syrian Army are going to greet the newcomers if and when they finally arrive?
There is some good news. Small but important water, agriculture and energy projects are beginning to take root in opposition-controlled parts of Syria. The multi-donor Syria Recovery Trust Fund is beginning to move money to infrastructure projects that will bring electricity, water, health care and food to liberated areas. Its short life hasn’t been easy, but it is up and running faster than previous trust funds, which have had the benefit of World Bank and EU expertise and have not faced the same conflict conditions or the same political uncertainties in the host country.
Syria is a mess. But it is not a hopeless mess. Defeating both ISIS and Assad will however require a good deal more cooperative commitment from the Americans, the Turks and the Syrian opposition.
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