Tag: United States
Peace picks July 21-25
- ISIS, Iraq, and the Gulf States Monday, July 21 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1799 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND A panel discussion with Dr. Shireen Hunter of Georgetown University, Dr. Abbas Kadhim of SAIS, Ali Al-Ahmed of The Gulf Institute, and Kadhim Al-Waeli, an Iraq military analyst, concerning the present and future of ISIS in Iraq and the Gulf States.
- Tariq Fatemi on Pakistan’s Vision for Regional Peace, Prosperity, and Economic Development Monday, July 21 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1799 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The upcoming U.S. exit from Afghanistan, the radicalization across the region, and persisting political rivalries continue to impede South Asia’s growth and economic integration. However, the election of business-oriented leaders in most of South Asia provides reason to hope that the quest for prosperity will at last become the main driver of political relations across the region. Ambassador Tariq Fatemi, special assistant to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, will discuss Pakistan’s vision for regional economic integration and enduring peace and prosperity.
- Iran’s Nuclear Chess: Calculating America’s Moves Monday, July 21 | 12:00 pm – 1:15 pm Woodrow Wilson Center, Fifth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The P5+1 and Iran have been negotiating since last January under a six-month deadline to convert an interim nuclear accord into a final agreement. The discussion will address the outcome of the negotiations—whether successful in yielding an agreement, extended to allow further negotiations, or at a point of breakdown. What are the implications for U.S. policy toward Iran moving forward? The meeting will feature discussion of the new Middle East Program monograph by Robert Litwak, vice president for scholars and director of international security studies at the Wilson Center.
- Libya: Update from the Field Monday, July 21 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Atlantic Council; 1030 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Libya’s democratic promise is more precarious than ever. The government recently reached a deal with armed groups over the oil field blockade; however, a political struggle is taking on an increasingly violent dimension. Fadel Lamen, nonresident fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center at the Atlantic Council, will discuss the status of Libya’s transitional processes, including the National Dialogue.
- Obama’s Foreign Policy and the Future of the Middle East Monday, July 21 | 2:00 pm – 4:30 pm Rayburn House Office Building; 45 Independence Ave. SW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Middle East Policy Council will hold its 77th Capitol Hill Conference. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings, following talks by Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, Paul R. Pillar, Senior Fellow at Georgetown University, Amin Tarzi, Director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University, and Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.
- The Impact of Ukraine in the Neighborhood Tuesday, July 22 | 10:00 am – 12:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center, Sixth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine is having ripple effects throughout Eurasia. But what has been the impact in the immediate neighborhood, the South Caucasus, Moldova, and Belarus as well as Ukraine itself? John Herbst, Atlantic Council, Eric Rubin, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Thomas de Waal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Hon. Kenneth S. Yalowitz, Former U.S. Ambassador to Belarus and Georgia, will examine recent developments and prospects in each focusing first on the situation on the ground in Ukraine, the performance of the Poroshenko government, and the latest Russian moves.
- U.S. Policy Today for Africa Tomorrow Tuesday, July 22 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm US Institute of Peace; 2301 15th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Home to burgeoning economies and brutal civil conflicts – sometimes coexisting in the same country – Africa is increasingly prominent in the foreign policy agendas of world powers. In early August, President Obama will convene most of the heads of state of the 54 nations of Africa in Washington, D.C. for the first-ever summit between U.S. and African leaders. Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Ambassador Princeton Lyman, and Ambassador George Moose will discuss Africa’s economic growth and poverty, growing trade between the U.S. and Africa, and concerns about closing political space in some countries, among many other topics.
- Hearing: Terrorist March in Iraq: The U.S. Response Wednesday, July 23 | 10:00 am – 1:00 pm Rayburn House Office Building; 45 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, D.C. The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs will have witness Mr. Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant for Iraq and Iran, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
- Confronting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: Challenges and Options Thursday, July 24 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Auditorium; 1619 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program at SAIS will host a discussion about combating the rising influence of ISIS. MEI scholars Richard A. Clarke, Steven Simon, and Randa Slim will examine the current status of the organization and its support network, focusing on the steps that Iraqi political actors and the U.S. administration can take to address the spread of its influence. Daniel Serwer (SAIS, MEI) will moderate the event.
- The Congressional Role in U.S. Military Innovation: Preparing the Pentagon for the Warfighting Regimes of Tomorrow Thursday, July 24 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Root Room; 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND While conventional wisdom holds that the U.S. Congress can be a hindrance to U.S. military planning and budgeting, history tells a different story. Rep. Forbes, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, and Rep. Langevin, ranking member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, will discuss the proper force structure and defense strategy for the U.S. military.
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A leopard proud of his spots
Former Vice President Dick Cheney, his wife Lynne, and their daughter Liz spoke on Monday at the Mayflower Hotel at an event hosted by Politico. The event was interrupted several times by members of Code Pink, who shouted, “Dick Cheney is a war criminal!” as they were dragged out of the auditorium.
The Vice President was unrepentant about the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. It was the right idea then, he said, and “in retrospect, it is the right idea now.” He added that the threat we face today is even greater than the threat we faced before 9-11. There is something more dangerous than box-cutter wielding terrorists, and that is a terrorist armed with weapons of mass destruction. According to RAND, Cheney said, there has been a 58% increase in al Qaeda type groups since 2010. The Islamic State, for instance, has attracted thousands of adherents over the last few weeks.
Cheney, who would “not going to into what [Iraq] did or did not have” in terms of WMDs in 2003, said that the proliferation of these weapons continues to be the greatest threat to our national security. After we invaded Iraq, he noted, Gaddafi immediately relinquished his WMDs. America’s current isolationism has made the situation more dangerous than ever. Pakistan has between 50 and 100 nuclear weapons, which could easily fall into the hands of terrorists. Today, our number one threat is a terror organization that controls large swaths of territory, which could allow it to develop its own WMDs.
Cheney blamed much of the situation on President Obama. The President, he said, denies that a problem exists. He claimed in 2011 that al Qaeda was dead. That is not to say that al Qaeda wouldn’t otherwise exist, but his isolationism has “left our allies out to dry.” Cheney admitted that Obama is responding to general battle fatigue in the US, as many people are “tired of war.” “It has been a long time since 9/11,” he added. However, “we cannot conclude but that ISIS and other groups” pose a direct threat to the United States.
He named two chief culprits for the chaos in Iraq. The first is Maliki, who failed to maintain the coalition the US built. Maliki purged many of the best generals because they happened to be Sunni. The second is Obama, whose unwillingness to maintain a military presence in Iraq led directly to the current situation. He accused Obama of knowingly allowing the Status of Forces negotiations agreement to break down. By 2009, he claimed, the terrorists in Iraq had been defeated. We allowed them to come back.
He commended Secretary of State John Kerry on securing a recount for Afghan elections. However, many of our allies do not believe in our ability to influence events. Israelis and Saudis are closer to each other than either one is to the US.
While Cheney declined to endorse any presidential candidates, he said he was worried about the growing isolationist strain in the Republican Party. His daughter Liz said of Senator Rand Paul, who is currently eyeing the nomination in 2016, that his foreign policy agenda “leaves something to be desired.” The Vice President added, “Anyone who thinks we can retreat behind our oceans” is out of their minds.
In a 2009 speech, Rand Paul accused Cheney of invading Iraq to line Halliburton’s coffers. He said that Cheney initially opposed the invasion, “saying it would be a bad idea. And that’s why the first Bush didn’t go into Baghdad. Dick Cheney then goes to work for Halliburton. Makes hundreds of millions of dollars, their CEO. Next thing you know, he’s back in government and it’s a good idea to go into Iraq.” Cheney called these accusations “totally fallacious.”
After the event, a throng of Code Pink protesters greeted guests outsides the hotel. One demonstrator, donning prison stripes and a papier-mâché Cheney mask, shouted derisively, “I admit, I was a little short on my prediction when I told you that we would make a stable democracy in Iraq!”
Eleven years after America’s invasion of Iraq, much of the debate remains unchanged. A leopard, it seems, does not easily change its spots.
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Finishing the job in the Balkans
I spoke yesterday on “Finishing the Job in the Balkans” with Dutch Foreign Ministry Europe Director Daphne Bergsma, Carnegie Europe’s Stefan Lehne, European Council on Foreign Affairs Sofia office director Dimitar Bechev and former Netherlands/NATO/EU diplomat Pieter Feith at the Hague Institute for Global Justice, former Macedonia ambassador Nikola Dimitrov presiding. Here are the notes that I prepared for myself, though I confess I departed from them to comment a bit on the International Crisis Group’s final report on the Balkans, along the lines I published yesterday:
1. The organizers of this event did me a great favor in announcing it. They reminded me what I wrote with Soren Jessen-Petersen in the International Herald Tribune:
Only when all the region’s countries are irreversibly on a course toward the E.U. will we be able to celebrate. Likely no more than five more years are required. Until then, we need to keep the Balkans on track, ensuring that Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia remain on the train.
2. That was more than three years ago. Where are the Balkan laggards now?
3. Kosovo, I’m happy to say, is making real progress, due in part to Pieter Feith, who presided over the post-independence transition there. A vigorous EU initiative with German—and off-stage American—support is reintegrating its northern municipalities. It recently ran a decent election with Serb participation. If the government formation process has been slow, that is nothing unusual in parliamentary systems.
4. It is clear enough that Kosovo and Serbia will both someday become EU members if they keep on their current courses—and they’ve pledged not to slow each other down. There are still serious obstacles—perhaps the most important is non-recognition of Kosovo by five EU members—but there is time to overcome them.
5. Macedonia has made some progress, but its human rights situation has seen some backsliding. Sad to say it remains stalled in the EU accession process. The accursed name issue haunts Skopje and Athens.
6. I won’t say much about this: I am a notorious advocate of recognizing people and countries by the names they call themselves. I don’t think modern day Athens has an exclusive claim to the name “Macedonia,” which happens to be attached to 1257 places in the United States. Failure of the Europeans to unite and insist on a resolution of this issue is in my view shameful.
7. But the worse shame is Bosnia. There the US and Europe are at odds.
8. Let me start with the conventional wisdom, which I think is correct: Bosnia is stuck because its constitution ensconced ethnically nationalist political parties in positions of power from which only more nationalist parties are be able to remove them.
9. Dayton ended the war but failed to provide the country with a central governing structure capable of negotiating and implementing the requirements of NATO or European Union membership.
10. This didn’t matter much for the first decade after the war. There were lots of things that needed doing, and NATO and EU memberships were not much of an issue. Using virtually dictatorial powers, the international community force-marched Bosnia away from war.
11. By 2005/6 the constitutional problems were all too evident. A team of Americans tried to start fixing the constitutional problem by facilitating preparation by the Bosnian political parties of constitutional amendments later known as the April package.
12. The package clarified group, individual and minority rights, as well mechanisms for protecting the “vital national interests” of Bosnia’s constituent peoples. It also included reforms to strengthen the government and the powers of the prime minister, reduce the president’s duties, and streamline parliamentary procedures.
13. They failed in parliament to achieve the 2/3 majority required by two votes. The responsibility was clear: one political party that had participated fully in the negotiations blocked passage, in order to ensure its leader election to the presidency.
14. Whatever the faults of the April package, its passage would have opened the way for a different politics in Bosnia, one based more on economic and other interethnic issues and less on ethnic identity.
15. I confess I thought its defeat would only be temporary. I thought for sure the package would be reconsidered the next year and passed.
16. I failed to understand that the moment was not reproducible. Over the past eight years, the situation has deteriorated markedly. Only one constitutional amendment has passed during that period, under intense international pressure, to codify the status of the Brcko District in northeastern Bosnia.
17. Meanwhile, the country has fallen further and further behind most of its neighbors in the regatta for EU membership and now looks likely to end up in last place, with little hope of entering the EU before 2025 or even later.
18. Those who advocate that the High Representative responsible for interpretation of the Dayton agreements be removed and Bosnia’s problems be left to the EU accession process for resolution have little evidence that will work.
19. All the leverage of EU accession did not work to get Bosnians to align their constitution with a decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Nor has it accelerated the adaptation of Bosnia’s court system to European standards.
20. So what is to be done?
21. I think there is no substitute for the Bosnians solving their own problem. They could do worse than return to the April package, fix whatever problems existed in it, and get on with the process of constitutional revision.
22. I also think there are directions that would not be fruitful.
23. Some would like to see even greater group rights and ethnic separation than provided for in the Dayton agreements. That is not in my view a fruitful direction. Apart from its impact on Bosnia, it would have the undesirable effect of encouraging separatism in Ukraine and elsewhere.
24. Others would like to further weaken the central government or allow the entities to negotiate separately their entry into the EU. Those in my view are not fruitful directions.
25. There is a simple test for any proposal for reform in Bosnia: will it make the government in Sarajevo more functional? The corollary question is whether it will accelerate Bosnian entry into NATO and the EU.
26. The April package would have done that. I think it is time to return to it and get the difficult job of constitutional reform started.
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Afghans want legitimacy
As Afghanistan awaits the result of the second round of elections, countless allegations of fraud have arisen between candidates Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, bringing the legitimacy of this first peaceful transfer of power into question. On Wednesday, the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) discussed “Afghanistan’s Future: Politics, Prosperity, and Security Under New Leadership” with keynote speaker Ambassador James Dobbins, Ambassador Omar Samad, Clare Lockhart, and Hassan Abbas.
While some argue that US efforts in Afghanistan have been futile, Ambassador Dobbins, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the US Department of State, said this is inaccurate. Political and economic investments have yielded substantial changes over the past decade. The economy has expanded by more than 400%, the literacy rate has doubled, and longevity has increased by 20 years. UN Development Programme studies have shown that Afghanistan has made more progress than any other country over the past decade. Afghan society has experienced remarkable changes, specifically in its evolution into an urbanized, informed and technological nation.
These social and economic changes are largely a result of the significant US commitment to Afghanistan, which will decline in the near future. According to Dobbins, the success of the transition ultimately depends on three factors. First is the shift to an Afghan-led and managed security force. This process is largely complete. Second, declining US and international financial support will affect the national economy. Third is the behavior of neighboring states. The instability surrounding Afghanistan and the possible influx of militants could have a significant impact on how the country will transition to self-reliance.
While this will be a challenging process in the future, the most potent issue that Afghanistan currently faces is its electoral dilemma. Ambassador Samad, Senior Central Asia Fellow at New America Foundation, discussed the complex political process surrounding the presidential election. A corrupt system has taken hold. The fraud allegations in the recent presidential election are very real. President Karzai has used patronage to create a political mafia. It is vital for the country to restore trust in the system and legitimately elect a new leader. Afghans view this election as a reflection of their newfound political voice and free will. Afghans have had enough—they are committed to a credible election.
Clare Lockhart, Director and Co-Founder of the Institute for State Effectiveness, emphasized the preservation of constitutional law in the Afghan political system. It is vital to maintain the legitimacy of the constitutional order as a means of counteracting political and economic deterioration. However, this should be addressed not from a political dialogue standpoint, but rather from a conflict resolution approach. Afghan leaders must consider what inclusivity truly means and learn from the mistakes of the Bonn Agreement of 2001.
“People will not accept fraud. They want a mechanism that is credible,” concluded Abbas. It must be clear who won and exactly how Karzai’s successor will move forward. According to Abbas, the US needs to provide the confidence that justice will be done and that the rightful winner of the election will take office.
Afghans are more than ready for a legitimate election. They have waited ten long years to gain their political voice. They will not stand for candidates stuffing the ballot box.
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Two states or else
In the last week, Israel has cratered Gaza with dozens of airstrikes. Hamas has fired hundreds of rockets into southern Israel. Following on the murders of four teenagers, Palestine could be on the cusp of a third intifada. At the Wilson Center Monday, moderator David Aaron Miller joined panelists Hussein Ibish, Shibley Telhami, and Robert Danin to discuss recent events.
Telhami noted a number of parallels between 1987, the eve of the First Intifada, and today. In the 1980s, the Iran-Iraq war dominated the headlines, and Israel-Palestine had ceased to command much attention. With the world focused on Syria and Iraq, this is also the case today. He also pointed to the weakness of Palestine’s leaders. In 1987, much of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership was living in exile. At present, they might as well be. Unable, or unwilling, to administer much of Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is wholly disconnected from the people who elected them.
The political landscape in Palestine is marred by inaction and despair, said Danin. Hamas and the PA are reacting to, rather than leading, events. With the last election more than five years ago, both lack political legitimacy. Indeed, the increasing irrelevance of the two factions was crucial to the formation of the Hamas-PA unity government.
PA leader Mahmoud Abbas has been branded a traitor for cooperating with Israelis to apprehend the men who kidnapped and murdered three Israeli teenagers. Meanwhile, 50,000 government workers have not been paid in the last month. Hamas is also in a difficult position, as they need to reign in militants while not appearing to placate Israel.
The panelists agreed that Hamas’s leadership is not inclined to intensify the conflict. Some Israeli leaders, including Netanyahu, are equally reluctant to escalate. Israel looks to Hamas to enforce order in Gaza, and is concerned with the rise of more radical movements like Islamic Jihad. Hamas is willing to play this role, but needs a political out.
The good news, said Ibish, is that if a majority of Palestinians wanted an intifada, there would be one. On the Israeli side, many are aware that if a two-state solution doesn’t happen now, it may never happen. In a political climate that has Netanyahu looking like a moderate, however, a return to negotiating table appears unlikely. Still, both sides are terrified of the rising chaos in the region. With one eye towards Syria and Iraq, they are aware that things could be much worse.
Danin noted that the current bout of violence didn’t come out of nowhere, and is not simply a product of a failed peace process. There has been an uptick in so-called “Price Tag” attacks in last few years. John Kerry is not to blame for this. Still, there is a diplomatic vacuum right now, and the US doesn’t have a strong hand to play.
If it is too late for a two-state solution, Telhami said, then one state, with equal citizenship, is the only morally acceptable alternative. This scenario is unlikely, however. In fact, Kiryat Arba and other settler groups have already taken advantage of the chaos to establish new outposts in the West Bank. Danin countered that a one-state “solution” does not exist. Ultimately, there is no smorgasbord of outcomes. The possibilities are binary: a two-state solution, or unremitting bloodshed.
Since 1967, Israelis have wielded the power of the strong, while Palestinians have wielded the power of the weak. It is within this context that children become targets, and diplomacy gives way to blood debt. There is only one way out of this cycle of violence, and that is through a two-state solution.
If the peace process can be revived, Netanyahu might yet have a role to play. After all, the history of peacemaking is a history of transformed hawks.
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Independence is overrated
I’m late with this post, but so be it. Independence is overrated. Here’s why I say so.
Consider American independence. Declared July 4, 1776. Then seven years of war with Britain, renewed for a couple of more in 1812. Followed by a vast westward land grab against Native American resistance and a four-year Civil War that set records for fraticidal homicide.
Think America is uniquely violent? Try Sudan: almost 40 years of civil war, independence in 2011, then civil war within South Sudan starting last year. Or Kosovo: declared independence the first time around in 1992, war in the late 1990s, independence finally in 2008, still trying to establish full sovereignty over its territory and full recognition by the international community.
The downsides of independence are particularly relevant at the moment. Scotland will vote on independence September 18. If it passes, it won’t precipitate war, but it will cause a major headache for the European Union. Catalonia would like to follow suit, but Spain’s constitution does not provide for a referendum. The Catalans may proceed anyway, creating another major headache for the EU.
If either of these referenda pass, it will make a referendum in Kurdistan, which is guaranteed to pass, all the more likely. Parts of eastern Ukraine already held referenda earlier this year, but they were ambiguous and no independence has resulted. Instead, Kiev is making progress in reclaiming territory. If ever eastern Ukraine were to succeed in seceding, Transnistria, a breakaway province of Moldova, would follow.
South Ossetia and Abhazia, both breakaway bits of Georgia, have already declared independence, but recognition has been hard to come by. They are far from independent, but no longer governed as part of Georgia.
The point is not that independence is a mistake. Certainly the United States was not going to remain forever a British colony. Serbia did nothing for nine years after the war with NATO to make unity attractive to Kosovars. Sudan behaved pretty much the same way towards South Sudan. Independence for Pristina and Juba was the best remaining option, not the worst.
The point is that even the best option is not without difficulties. Clean breaks like Slovakia’s with the Czech Republic are the exception to the rule. While de-colonialization after World War II was absolutely necessary and desirable (for the sake of the nother countries as well as their colonies), it rarely produced the glorious results its advocates advertised. And it sometimes produced mass atrocities on a prodigious scale, as in the partition and independence of India and Pakistan, not to mention the continuing conflict in the Middle East arising from Palestine’s partition and Israel’s independence.
I enjoy July 4 as much as the next American. But it had very different implications for Thomas Jefferson, who was able to keep his slaves far longer than would have been the case had America been ruled from London, and his fellow signer of the declaration John Adams, who had to accept the “peculiar institution” in order to ensure independence. They both died on July 4, 1826, satisfied I suppose that the first 50 years of the republic were worthy of their revolution but unaware of the accounting on slavery still to come.
We celebrate independence with fireworks, drink and flag-waving patriotism. But we ignore all the complications. There are usually a lot of them. Independence is overrated. More on that later, as I consider the case of Kurdistan.
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