Tag: United States
Is Syria like the Balkans?
I have long resisted parallels between the Balkans, in particular Bosnia, and Syria. Here are the notes on the subject I prepared for a recent presentation on the subject:
1. Context counts. One sense in which the context is similar is that the Balkans and Syria were once part of the Ottoman Empire. Their populations were not homogenized into nation states. They preserve distinct ethnic and sectarian characteristics to a far greater extent than in Western Europe.
2. But otherwise the context really is different
• Ethnic nationalism was a cause of the war in Bosnia, among the most important of them. Heightened sectarian and ethnic feeling is a consequence of the war in Syria.
• In Bosnia, the neighbors were actively trying to divide the territory. In Syria, the neighbors are supporting proxies but still trying to avoid getting too involved and fearing division of the territory.
• Russia is supplying and financing the regime in Syria. It was not playing nearly so active role in supporting the Serbs in Bosnia.
• Russia was Yeltsin’s, not Putin’s: it was retreating from the world stage, not trying to force its way on.
• The United States in the 1990s was at the peak of its unipolar moment. Today it faces serious challenges throughout the Middle East and in Asia and war fatigue at home.
3. The Dayton negotiations produced a territorial division of Bosnia along ethnic lines and saved the Serbs from defeat.
• Milosevic came to Dayton suing for peace, because he feared a mass exodus of Serbs from Bosnia along the lines of what had happened a few months before in Croatia.
• The Americans compelled President Izetbegovic to agree to a settlement he regarded as unjust.
• Almost 20 years of effort has not reversed the ethnic cleansing and separation caused by the war, whose territorial dimension is a major barrier to peace implementation.
4. If there is a parallel to Syria in the Balkans, it is Kosovo, not Bosnia.
• There Milosevic was trying to assert control over territory that belonged to Serbia.
• He violated even minimal standards of decency by attacking civilian populations, chasing people from their homes and rendering something like half the population refugees.
• The US took advantage of the unipolar moment to launch a war without UN Security Council approval. Milosevic was indicted at The Hague Tribunal during the war.
• The outcome in Kosovo was not ethnoterritorial, except for a small portion in the north that is now being reintegrated with the rest of the territory.
• Ethnoterritorial separation may look desirable to end a war, but it creates conditions in which a real peace process is difficult if not impossible to implement within the context of a single sovereign state.
5. The military intervention against Yugoslavia was a vital prelude to the Kosovo settlement.
• Serbia became concerned that damage to its infrastructure from NATO bombing would be irreversible, making it difficult for Milosevic to remain in power.
• The Serbian army withdrew from Kosovo, Belgrade lost all control of the situation there, and the refugees returned en masse.
• Though defeated militarily, Milosevic remained in power for another year or so, until his own people brought him down at the polls.
• He fell at an election, having allowed local observers and vote counting at the polling places.
6. Nothing like these conditions exist today in Syria.
• Assad is winning, not losing. From the opposition perspective, leaving him in power is not an option. From the regime perspective, removing him is not an option.
• Military intervention by Iran and Russia continues. Any definitive military intervention on behalf of the opposition seems far off.
• An election in Syria today would unquestionably produce an outcome favorable to Assad, with many people not voting and the polling far from free and far.
7. (only if needed) A quick word also about Crimea.
• President Putin’s playbook there is not borrowed from the Americans in Kosovo, as he sometimes implies.
• The US did not in Kosovo unilaterally occupy and annex a province. There was no quicky referendum, but rather a well-coordinated declaration of independence after eight years of UN administration and several years of UN-led negotiation.
• Kosovo is now recognized by over 100 sovereign states.
• Putin’s playbook is copied from Milosevic, who used military force claiming to protect co-nationals and re-establish full control over territory he regarded as rightfully his own.
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Libya adrift
Wednesday’s lunchtime assessment of Libya sponsored by the Middle East Institute was one of those rare events: excellent, if gloomy, analysis by Charles Dunne (who moderated), Karim “the light at the end of the tunnel is a train coming this way” Mezran on politics, and militiaman Fred Wehrey on security, followed by an equally excellent but wonderfully judicious set of policy recommendations for the US Government from David Mack.
The facts speak for themselves. Libya has been unable to establish the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, its parliament has been reduced to an Islamist rump, the elections for its constitution drafting committee saw minimal turnout and election of only 47 out of 60 members, its government was sacked after being unable to prevent export of pirated oil, the population lacks confidence in the institutions and the institutions lack legitimacy. What else could go wrong?
Karim Mezran managed a moment of sunshine with mention of the national dialogue, whose preparatory committee is now traveling around the country holding town hall meetings. It is searching for the missing link: a serious political compact. But its funding for the next phase is not guaranteed. Another ray of sunshine is last summer’s National Democratic Institute poll. Libyans want democracy. They just don’t know how to get there from here.
The obvious barrier is the militias, which were vital to fighting Qaddafi but have now taken on criminal and political roles. Fred Wehrey noted the Catch 22 security dilemma: the militias can’t be gotten rid of because the politicians are afraid doing so will leave them exposed, so other politicians up the ante, which makes the situation worse. The political institutions are bankrupt and state capacity at the national level is lacking. At the local level there are effective social contracts, mainly negotiated by the tribes, but this makes the situation even more complicated. Libya is many problems, not one.
Even the General Purpose Force of up to 28,000 troops now being trained by internationals is a problem. It is intended to protect the government, but politicians, militias and people are all frightened it will be used against them. The initial recruits were not properly vetted, there are problems of regional representation, and a political compact governing its use has not been reached. Many fear that General Sisi’s example in Egypt will be followed in Libya, returning the country to autocracy.
While acknowledging all these issues, David Mack soberly noted that Libya is not a big factor in world energy markets but rather a regional player with potential to become a major oil and gas producer to Europe, replacing Russian gas. Even in the Middle East, Washington is more concerned with the Israel/Palestine negotiations, the war Syria, and Egypt’s revolution gone awry, not to mention Ukraine and other issues farther afield. Libya has the potential to be a Somalia on the Mediterranean, but it can also be a prosperous country with a serious commitment to human rights. It has the resources to rebuild. What it needs is a bit of help getting on the right track.
The US needs to help where it can, David suggested, but keep a low profile and stay out of internal Libyan politics. Leading from behind is not a four letter word. In this situation, it is better to put good ideas through the UN than to offer them up wrapped in an American flag. Libyan backlash against foreign intervention, especially from the US, could be dramatic.
Still, the US has things it can and should offer. David favors private sector assistance, including an Overseas Private Investment Corporation agreement and strong Foreign Commercial Service representation. He also wants to see expanded educational collaboration with US universities, and possibly contractor help in building the Libyan armed forces and police. All this requires consular services in Tripoli for both Americans and Libyans.
David considers some additional options for fuller governmental engagement, especially on the security and counter-terrorism fronts, as well as an option for deferring to the Europeans. These he allows to fall away, leaving US policy largely in the hands of private sector actors for implementation. Some of us familiar with the difficulties of US contractors in other non-permissive environments may have our doubts that this is sufficient, but it is a rare and precious diplomat who so consciously and assiduously seeks to limit commitments to a country he has followed for decades, for our sake as well as theirs.
Libya is adrift. I might opt for one of David’s more forward-leaning options, but only keeping his warnings in mind.
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I call Macedonia Macedonia
A loyal reader writes: “Mr. Serwer is being quoted as the USA should pressure Greece in regards to fyrom ascension to NATO. I would really appreciate him to post something on his blog so we can discuss it.” This presumably refers to remarks I made by Skype Tuesday to a class on Macedonia at University College ISPE in Pristina. Here are my notes on the name question and NATO for that lecture, which was observed by a Macedonian journalist:
Macedonia’s external problem remains what it has been since independence: Greece’s unwillingness to accept its name.
Let me admit that I am not neutral on this subject. I advocated American recognition of Macedonia by its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) well before Washington did it.
I think any country has a right to call itself what it wants, so long as it does not harbor irredentist designs on its neighbors. This applies to the United States of Mexico, and to the US state of New Mexico, as much as it does to Macedonia and Greece.
In fact, Macedonia has already changed its constitution and flag to accommodate Greek concerns.
I am convinced that Macedonia does not have irredentist designs on Greece. Greek preoccupation with this issue is rooted in Athens’ own attitude towards minorities within Greece, as it denies they exist, and concern about Greek identity.
While claiming continuity with ancient Greece, Greek identity is much more clearly rooted in the early 19th century.
But whatever the origins, the result is a pernicious one. Greece’s current prime minister has gone as far as to say that he wants to see the dissolution of Macedonia and the formation of a Greater Albania, rather than accept a solution to the “name” issue.
This would be nothing more than comedic except for one thing: Greece’s attitude on the name issue is blocking Macedonian membership in NATO and holding up its progress towards negotiating EU membership.
The EU has been clever and invented a “high-level dialogue” that in essence substitutes for the EU accession negotiations, which in any event won’t be concluded during this decade.
The NATO issue is more urgent. Albanians in Macedonia regard NATO membership as vital to their own security, a kind of guarantee that the Macedonian state will continue in the direction of treating them properly.
Macedonia has met NATO’s criteria for membership. Its army has even fought under US command in Afghanistan and still protects NATO headquarters there.
I’ve spoken with the Vermont National Guard commander who integrated Macedonian troops with his own fighting in Afghanistan. He told me he relied on them as he would on American troops.
But Greece shows no sign of easing its veto on membership by the time of the next NATO summit in Cardiff, Wales in September.
Washington has unfortunately said that NATO membership for Macedonia depends on its resolving its problems with Greece, a position that essentially turns American leverage over to Athens.
This in my view is a serious mistake, but so far at least I’ve been unable to convince my American colleagues that they should take a more proactive role.
My own preference would be that Washington seek to end the UN mediation, which has produced nothing in almost 20 years of effort, and tell Athens that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will become a member of NATO in Cardiff, along with Montenegro, in the fall.
At the same time, Brussels should make clear to Skopje that it will need to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation with Greece before it can become an EU member.
Athens can of course still veto Macedonia’s membership in NATO, where decisions are taken by consensus.
But that would be a serious mistake if Brussels and Washington are prepared to press the issue at the highest levels. Cash-strapped Greece is in no position to annoy, much less anger, the Americans, Germans and other Europeans.
Nor is it wise for Greece to continue to ignore the 2011 decision of the International Court of Justice, which found by a 15 to 1 margin that Athens has breached the Interim Accord and rejected its allegations against the Skopje government.
While Greeks continue to claim that the Court failed to adopt any remedies, the decision was clearly a binding one that the ICJ expected Athens to implement. The court in fact has no power to enforce its decisions.
Let me be clear: the Macedonian government, while held not to have violated the Interim Accord, is not entirely without its own responsibility in this matter, especially in recent years.
Prime Minister Gruevski has played to his own constituency by emphasizing connections to ancient Macedonia that are even more far-fetched than those of Prime Minister Samaras, which is saying something.
What we’ve got here are two democratically elected leaders who each feed the beast of ethnic nationalism in ways that are destabilizing and dangerous.
There is a real risk that they have unleashed sentiments that will be difficult to put back in Pandora’s box, which is an appropriate label given the context.
Neither Greece nor Macedonia can cause the kind of military damage that Milosevic’s Serbia did, but they can certainly cause political instability, especially if their dispute unleashes a third ethnic nationalism: the Albanian one.
I inserted as well a few remarks based on my experience in Italy, where I met only one person (in 10 years of living there) who claimed descent from the ancient Romans. Italians know that the Romans were conquered by various “barbarians”–Goths, Vandals, and the like–so that modern-day Italians are thoroughly mixed genetically. Rome at one point had a population of only 85,000 people (at the peak of the Empire and today it has more like 3 million). How could any but a handful of Italians claim genetic descent from ancient Rome? How much better, or worse, is the Greek claim to descent from the ancient Greeks?
Even in the US we claim descent from Greco-Roman culture. Washington DC was designed to be the “New Rome.” Such claims deprive Italy and Greece of nothing. Pride in one’s heritage should mean pride in seeing others attach themselves to it.
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90 miles from you know where
Politico Magazine yesterday published my piece based on a visit to Cuba last week under the heading “The Dangers of Collapse in Cuba.” Here is the lead paragraph:
Cuba’s 1950s cars and Havana’s crumbling facades have long been its iconic symbols in the American imagination. They don’t disappoint, as I discovered on a trip to Cuba last week. But I didn’t expect zippy Hyundais with Miami FM on their radios or a private collection of contemporary Cuban art, installed floor to 20-foot ceiling in a fabulous apartment with a terrace overlooking the Gulf of Mexico. Both the apartment and the art would put many wealthy New Yorkers to shame.
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Ukraine isn’t over
With the G7 countries issuing a strongly worded statement yesterday against Russia’s annexation of Ukraine, optimists will want to go back to worrying about Malaysia Airlines flight 370. That would be a mistake. Despite President Putin’s disavowals, there is still serious risk to Ukraine from a Russian push into its southern provinces, perhaps as far as the Russian-occupied Transnistria area of Moldova:
Why? Let me count the gains to Moscow:
- Crimea would no longer be cut off from Russia proper.
- The southern provinces of Ukraine are home to heavy industries that cater in part to Russia’s military.
- Having annexed Crimea, pro-Russian political forces are unlikely in the future to win any national elections in Ukraine, so “protection” of Russian speakers requires their incorporation into Russia.
- Ukraine would be reduced to a landlocked remnant with little prospect of being more than a burden to the European Union and the United States.
- Rump Ukraine will find it necessary to make its peace with natural gas supplying Russia.
If thinking along these lines predominates in Moscow, it is hard to imagine anything the EU and US could or would do to prevent a Russian military move. The Ukrainian army is in no position to resist. Washington and Brussels imagine that Ukrainians would mount an insurgency against Russian occupation. That could be a sanguinary affair that could last a decade or more.
It is not easy to come up with reasonable policy options. Deployment of observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is already in progress, is a good idea. But if Putin decides to move, they will stand by to document how many tanks and armed personnel carriers have entered and where they are located.
Military options are out. Though the credibility of the Alliance is at stake, NATO has no obligation and few means with which to defend Ukraine, even though it is a member of Partnership for Peace. The Alliance will have its hands full protecting its Baltic and other easternmost neighbors. It may be able to provide some intelligence and logistical support to Ukraine, but that’s about it.
Thoughts fly to the money Kiev owes Moscow. Does it really have to pay its debts if Russia invades? Probably not, but it would then have to worry about where to find natural gas for heating next winter. There is no quick alternative available, so far as I know.
The ruble and the Russian stock market are already down, but that is likely to be a temporary response with no substantial long-term impact. Only if the EU and US come up with sanctions that really bite Russian banks hard is Moscow likely to pay attention. That’s unlikely, as the Europeans export too much to Russia and depend too much on Russian gas to get serious about financial sanctions anytime soon.
It looks as if we are in for a long-term response to the annexation of Crimea and whatever other parts of Ukraine Putin goes after. We’ve been in this situation before. We had no really good policy response to the Soviet occupation of the Baltics at the end of World War II, of Hungary in 1956 or of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Nor have we done anything substantial about South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which declared independence from Georgia in 2008.
What we had going for us during the Cold War was strategic patience. In the 1950s, I was taught in junior high school that the Baltics were “captive nations.” It seemed quixotic at the time to imagine that they would ever be free. But they were liberated at the end of the Cold War and have since become NATO and EU members.
We have wanted to believe that the ideological contest that gave us strategic patience is gone. Unfortunately, a new one appears to be taking its place. Autocrats like Putin are not relying any longer on state-controlled economies. They are not even pretending to read Marx or Engels. They are enjoying the fruits of at least partly free economies, under the control of their favored oligarchs. We may need even more patience than in the four decades or so of the Cold War in order to see the backs of Putin and his like.
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Cuba is an island, but…
Though in many respects isolated, Cuba is like most countries–especially small ones–in depending for its fate on the rest of the world. It was once a Soviet satellite that agreed to host nuclear weapons targeted against the US and tried to export its revolution throughout Latin America (including Puerto Rico) and to Africa, where they say 2400 Cubans died in what they consider liberation wars. Judging from my visit to Havana last week, Cuba is now more interested in its relationship with Venezuela and the United States, the two most important sources of its vital hard currency.
The relationship with Venezuela echoes Cuba’s revolutionary past. The Castros shared with Hugo Chaves, whose face still graces more than one wall in Havana, a belief in social revolution and a “Bolivarian” alternative to capitalism. Caracas still helps to keep Cuba financially afloat with subsidized oil supplies, payments for Cuban doctors, and other less transparent transfers. Cubans understand this reliance on cash-strapped Venezuela is likely coming to an end. That generates at least part of their sense of urgency about economic reform.
The relationship with the United States is far more fraught. Opposite my favorite Cuban jazz bar in Obispo stands a Western Union office, where Cubans line up to get transfers from relatives in the US and elsewhere. Like this young woman in American flag tights:
The sign in the window shows Fidel and Raul under the heading
The Revolution, thriving and victorious, goes forward.
Pardon the poor photography:
It doesn’t get a lot more ironic than that: powered by US dollars sent from Miami.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. The original idea of the American embargo, which the Cubans call a blockade, was to starve the regime of the resources it needed to survive, causing collapse of the Castro regime. Various presidents have tightened and loosened the embargo, depending not only on what is going on in Cuba but also on American politics. Even in its current relatively loose form, the embargo certainly hurts the Cuban economy. Because of US legislation restricting access to ports and banks by non-American (as well as American) companies that do business in Cuba, many cruise and cargo ships don’t call at Cuban ports and many companies don’t officially transact business with Cuba.
Cubans are resourceful though and one way or another manage to get access to most of the US equipment they need, including Apple computers and sophisticated sound boards for their recording studios. It is expensive and difficult, but possible. Along the way, a good deal of illicit money presumably changes hands.
The question is what purpose this serves. Most Americans, and most Cuban Americans (even in Florida), believe the policy should change. It is an older generation of members of Congress who keep the embargo in place. It is unclear to me at this point what Cuba would have to do to get it removed, though I suppose the issue of property claims is close to the top of the list.
A US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has certified 5911 claims worth $6.4 to $20.1 billion, depending on whether you compound the interest or not. Even if he has lived rent-free, I can only imagine how a Cuban who has lived 55 years under the Castro regime will feel when a foreign claimant arrives to take possession of her house. Or how the successor regime will feel about digging into its empty pockets to compensate the claimants, plus 6% interest accumulated over 41 years (I don’t know why 41).
What the embargo has not done is cause the collapse of the regime. Quite to the contrary, the Castros seem to revel in isolation and hostility, which helps them to claim a legitimate role as defenders of Cuba’s independence. One loyalist told me that in the end the Revolution is mostly about “dignity,” which he associated with Cuba’s ability to make its own way in the world, and “respect,” which he associated with pride in its uniqueness. This should sound familiar to those who have been following the Arab uprisings. Vague as they are, these sentiments are not to be trifled with.
But dignity and respect won’t go far without a stronger economy, which is where I started this series of posts on Cuba. What the Cubans want from the United States above all is more tourism, which will depend I imagine on building far better hotels. The shabbiness and poor management of the once fashionable Plaza, where we stayed at a cost of about $150 per night, is almost unbelievable, even for someone who travels as much as I do in poor countries and conflict zones.
Increased tourism will also depend on simplifying the process for going there. This is a Washington issue, not a Havana problem. At least for those on group tours, the Cubans issue tourist cards easily and require you to fill out a simple health form. Procedures at passport control both entering and leaving were not onerous (certainly not as onerous as some instances non-American friends recount about entering the US). There are charter flights, including some operated by American Airlines, non-stop from Miami (and Tampa) to Havana. Based on the experience of my fellow travelers, those are far more reliable and no more expensive than flying from Cancun (avoid Cubana!).
It’s the US government that requires you to read complicated licensing rules and threatens you with exorbitant fines if you violate their less than clear provisions. More than one Cuban asked who we think we are punishing. They have a point, especially as the tourist industry is the leading edge of capitalism in Cuba.
The Cubans would also like the US to use the monster container port they have built at Mariel, once the jumping-off point for so many Cubans to leave the island because it is so close to Florida. The odds of that seem low at this point, but importing goods into the US from Cuba would somehow be a fitting end to an embargo whose logic and purpose seem lost.
The United States is no more an island than Cuba when it comes to interacting with its neighborhood. Cuba will be a major issue for us as it transitions, if only because of geography, family ties and property claims. We need to be thinking now about how to help enable post-Castro Cuba to achieve a dignified and respectful outcome for the island’s more than 11 million inhabitants.
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