Tag: Yemen
Show me
The Project on Middle East Democracy and the Hariri Center at the Atlantic Council put out a letter to President Obama on Yemen today that I signed. Here are the policy recommendations:
- Leverage the US government’s close relationship with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi of Yemen to strongly encourage his government meet the reform benchmarks to which he has committed and address human rights violations
- Support the National Dialogue in ways that empower independent voices—not only political party elites—and include more extensive outreach to Southerners and Yemenis outside of Sanaa and other urban areas
- Work within the Friends of Yemen group to ensure that the generous pledges committed to Yemen are delivered and that the government of Yemen has the capacity and resources it needs to implement projects
- Implement a more robust public diplomacy strategy to demonstrate that US interests in Yemen are not limited to counterterrorism and security issues
- Reevaluate reliance on drone strikes with the recognition that this approach generates significant anti-American sentiment and could strengthen the appeal of extremist groups
- Ensure that security restructuring achieves a unified command structure under civilian leadership and that US military assistance does not perpetuate the same mistakes made during former President Saleh’s tenure
- Increase economic assistance and draw upon regional funds to support Yemen, in addition to a bilateral assistance package
There are other ideas out there worthy of consideration. The well-meaning letter I signed does not provide a clear strategy for dealing with Al Qaeda, which is a serious threat to both Yemeni and American interests. Daniel Green over at the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs advocates a tribal-based approach to countering Al Qaeda, generated in the upcoming National Dialogue:
- A comprehensive political and security strategy to pacify al-Qaeda safe havens. Due to the centralization of the Yemeni state, local political authority has often been limited, creating a democracy deficit and prompting excluded tribes to use violence to achieve their goals. The United States should encourage participants in the National Dialogue Conference to discuss greater local political autonomy and authority within a more democratic framework.
- Efforts to legitimize tribal Popular Committees. Pacifying AQAP havens will require the assistance of tribal “Popular Committee” units, not just Yemeni army and police forces. As has been demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Yemen itself, a part-time tribal security force that is defensively oriented but recruited, trained, paid, and logistically supported by the state is central for enduring security. Tribes will support such an effort because it can provide security, employment, and a means of checking any abuses of power by expanding government forces. Washington should encourage Sana to legitimize these local units.
- Full accounting of al-Qaeda abuses. A great deal of emphasis has been placed on documenting abuses that Saleh’s forces perpetrated against protestors in 2011-2012. A similar effort must be undertaken to document al-Qaeda’s abuses, and to investigate whether security organizations colluded with the group when it expanded its presence in Yemen in 2011. The United States should encourage a full accounting on both fronts, including responsible prosecution of any security personnel who helped al-Qaeda.
- Working group of tribal and security leaders. Washington should urge conference participants to establish a working group of tribal, political, and security leaders from the areas most affected by al-Qaeda. This forum would help them share lessons learned in confronting the group, present a united reform agenda to the wider conference, and promote improved cooperation on shared goals after the conference.
While I might have some reservations about part-time tribal forces and their behavior, these recommendations have the virtue of dealing directly with the security issue.
These quite different approaches to Yemen have in common a sense that the drone war there is not working and may even be counter-productive. Former Yemen White House guru John Brennan, who has just become CIA Director, has long claimed that was not our strategy. Show me.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Islamists are coming
As a result of sweeping victories in elections, Islamists are emerging as strong political forces in post-revolutionary Arab states. Many argue that the Arab Spring has transformed into an Islamist winter and that Islamists will continue to dominate the political systems of post-revolutionary Arab countries for the foreseeable future. Others argue that the fate of these countries has not yet been entirely determined.
The Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center last week hosted a discussion of these and related issues under the title of “The Resistible Rise of Islamists.” Two distinguished experts on the region, Marina Ottaway and Leslie Campbell, offered perspectives on the causes of the rise of`Islamists and the possibility of non-Islamist governments in the Arab world.
Marina Ottaway, who is currently a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and previously at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focused her discussion on the rise of Islamists in three countries: Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia. Egypt’s Freedom and Justice and the Salafist Nour Party got 67 percent of the seats in parliament, Tunisia’s (Muslim Brotherhood) Ennahda got 37 percent, and Morocco’s Party for Justice and Development got 22 percent of the vote.
The victories of Islamists at the ballot box were due in part to the weakness and fragmentation of the secular opposition. In Morocco, the danger of domination by Islamists is non-existent, because several other players present a counter-vailing balance. Morocco has a long history of well-established secular political parties that enjoy historical legitimacy due to their participation in the struggle for independence from the French. The palace is another major check on the power of Islamists.
In Tunisia and Egypt, Islamists are well-established and have strong support bases. The secular opposition is not only fragmented, but some of its parties and leadership were coopted by the authocratic regimes.
In Tunisia, the General Labour Union enjoys huge support but does not run in the elections. The center parties are fairly weak but have potential to grow in power. The Salafists are active in street demonstrations and will likely participate in future elections.
The Egyptian case is the most complicated of all. The Egyptian secular parties are weaker and more fragmented in comparison to their Tunisian and Moroccan counterparts. Only the National Salvation Front has real prospects. But once it decides to run in elections, its coalition will break down due to quarrels over leadership and lack of a unified message, other than saying ‘no’ to everything the Islamists want.
The rise of Islamists is resistible, not inevitable. Their success is due to the inaction and lack of organization among the secular parties. The opportunity for democratic governance in the Arab world is not lost. The Islamists are not necessarily more authoritarian or democratic than the secularists.
Democracy depends on “establishing a better balance between the Islamist and secular forces…and on establishing a pluralistic and more balanced political spectrum.” The real danger to democracy in the Arab revolution countries comes from the weakness of the secular forces and their inability to overcome their fragmentation. Balance can only be achieved by electoral outcomes.
Leslie Campbell, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the National Democratic Institute, said there are two reasons for optimism. First, the inexperience of the Islamists with governing will make their continuation in power unlikely due to the disillusionment of some of their own constituencies. Second, there are “signs that secular parties can have ample strength once they organize properly…as with Yemen’s socialist parties.”
Most of Campbell’s discussion focused on possible means through which the secular forces could be empowered. He said that “globalization in politics is of extreme importance.” The secular parties and forces in the Arab world could benefit greatly from establishing links with and learning from the experiences of parties in other parts of the world.
Ottaway and Campbell agreed that the weakness of the secular parties is an important factor that cannot be overlooked when trying to understand the sweeping victories of the Islamists, especially in Egypt. The threat to democracy does not come from the Islamist nature of the parties that are governing now. They may, Campbell noted, be the most liberal of the emerging parties in the Arab transitions to democracy.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks: March 4 to March 8
Quite a busy week:
1. Understanding the Behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Monday March 4, 9:00 AM- 11: 00 AM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Mohsen Milani, Bijan Khajehpour, Geneive Abdo, Ellen Laipson, Sebastian Gräfe
You are invited to a discussion of a new paper by two Iranian scholars that examines the behavior of Iran’s government in a broad range of areas, including nuclear negotiations. The paper is based on discussions during the meeting of the Iran Advisory Group that the Stimson Center and the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted last November in Berlin, Germany.
Panelists will review critical negotiations that begin Feb. 26 in Kazakhstan between the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany and Iran designed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The panelists will shed light on the constellation of political power in Iran, discuss the behavioral patterns of the Iranian government, and suggest steps that can be taken to affect Iran’s behavior.
Website: http://www.boell.org/calendar/VA-viewe…
2. Unwilling to Wait: Why Activists are Taking the Initiative on the Peace Process, Monday 4, 12:00 PM-1:00 PM, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20004
Speakers: Wasim Almasri, Tom Bar-Gal
This event is co-sponsored with OneVoice.
Two youth activists from OneVoice Palestine and OneVoice Israel will speak about their motivations to take personal responsibility to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through grassroots activism. In speaking about the ongoing challenges to resolving the conflict, they will discuss civil society efforts to overcome these obstacles. Given the many transitions taking place in the region, and OneVoices experience in the past ten years, Almasri and Bar-Gal will speak about their vision of where future opportunities for Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution lie and about the important role of the American foreign policy community in moving the peace process forward.
Website: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/unwi…
3. Can We Call Iraq a Success?, New America Foundation, 1899 L St., NW, Washington, DC 20036, Monday, March 4, 1:00 PM- 2:30 PM
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L St, NW, Suite 400, Washington DC 20036
Speakers: Lt. Col. Joel Rayburn, U.S. Army Military Fellow, New America Foundation; Peter Bergen Director, National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation; Douglas A. Ollivant, Senior National Security Fellow, New America Foundation
As we approach the 10-year anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, news of that country has largely faded from American headlines. But a myriad of questions remain to be answered about the eight-year American involvement in the Iraq War. Specifically, what were the major decision points for the United States, and what directions did the conflict take after those decisions were made? What was gained from the deaths of many of tens of thousands of Iraqis and thousands of Americans, and hundreds of billions of dollars the war also consumed? And where is Iraq now in terms of security, economic strength, political stability, and alignment with U.S. regional interests?
Please join the New America Foundation’s National Security Studies Program for a debate over these questions and more between Douglas A. Ollivant, who was Director for Iraq at the National Security Council during both the Bush and Obama administrations, and Lt. Col. Joel Rayburn, who served on the staff of General David Petraeus in Baghdad in 2007 and 2008, where he focused on political-military issues.
Website: http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/…
4. Constitutionalism and Human Rights in Tunisia: The Islamist-Led Democratic Transition Post-Arab Spring, Johns Hopkins SAIS, Tuesday March 5, 9:00 AM- 4:00 PM
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS- NItze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington DC, 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Speakers: Nejib Ayachi, Mohamed Mattar, Issam Saliba, William Zartman, Alexis Arieff, Alaya Allani and more
Experts and policymakers will discuss post-revolution political and constitutional transitions, the future of minority rights and freedom of expression in Tunisia, and the relationship between Islamists in power and democratic transition in the context of the Arab Spring. For a complete conference agenda, visitbit.ly/YzShnG.
Website: http://sais-jhu.edu/events/2013-03-05-…
5. Understanding Conflict and Ethnic Violence in Kyrgyzstan, Elliot School of International Affairs, Tuesday March 5, 12:00 PM- 2:00 PM
Venue: Voesar Conference Room, Elliot School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052
Speaker: Neil Melvin
Neil Melvin, Director, Program Armed Conflict and Conflict Management, SIPRI
Over the last two decades, Kyrgyzstan has experienced two major outbreaks of violence involving the main ethnic communities in the country: the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks. These violent incidents have generally been viewed as ethnic conflicts and much of the response to the violence from the government, local communities, and the international community has been framed within this understanding. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan has also experienced other, less significant violent events and political crises that have often been linked temporally to the ethnic conflicts. This suggests that a full understanding of the nature of armed conflict in Kyrgyzstan and the involvement of ethnic communities in violence at a minimum requires a broader examination of the context of the violence.
RSVP: tinyurl.com/March5-Melvin
Sponsored by the Central Asia Program
Website: http://www.elliottschool.org/events/ca…
6. Palestinian Refugees in a Changing Middle East, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Tuesday March 5, 12:00 PM- 1:00 PM
Venue: Middle East Institute, 1761 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Filippo Grandi
While profound changes sweep across many parts of the Middle East today, the plight and status of the Palestine refugees—a present day reminder of one of the very first Middle East crises in 1948—remain left behind, unresolved and in the shadows of these uncertain times. The dynamism of change for others in the region contrasts with the growing sense of stagnation, marginalization and new dangers faced by Palestine refugees. Since its creation in 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has been at the forefront providing essential humanitarian and human development services to the now approximately 5 million registered Palestine refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza. The challenges to the Agency and its beneficiaries are many—from continuing to operate in some of the most dangerous parts of Syria, to addressing the aftermath of the recent war in Gaza, to providing care and protection to now 2nd and 3rd time Palestine refugees from Syria seeking safety and shelter in Lebanon and Jordan. UNRWA Commissioner-General Grandi will offer an update on the rising tensions in the region, the international community’s response and new dangers that lie ahead from the perspective of the Palestine refugee.
Filippo Grandi was appointed Commissioner-General of UNRWA on January 20, 2010 having previously served as Deputy Commissioner-General since October 2005. Prior to joining UNRWA, he distinguished himself in a variety of headquarters and field functions around the globe for the United Nations encompassing refugee assistance, protection, emergency management, donor relations, and humanitarian and political affairs.
Website: http://www.eventbrite.com/event/564758…
7. The Rise & Fall of Iran in Arab and Muslim Eyes- A New Poll, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Tuesday March 5, 12:30 PM- 2:00 PM
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington DC, 20004
Speakers: Jane Harman
Zogby Research Services will release their latest poll of views on Iran and its policies from 20 Arab and Muslim nations including the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula States, the Maghreb, Egypt and Sudan and non-Arab Muslim neighbors of Turkey, Pakistan and Azerbaijan.
Website: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-…
8. Obama and the Middle East Peace Process: Déjà Vû?, New America Foundation, Washington DC 20036 Wednesday March 6, 9:15 AM-10:45 AM.
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L St., N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Daniel Levy, Husam Zomlot, Hisham Melham, Matt Duss
On the heels of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reelection and in anticipation of President Obama’s forthcoming trip to Israel, the West Bank, and Jordanthe New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force will host a discussion on expectations for the visit and for the president’s second term.
We’ll examine the likely motivations for and possible outcomes of the President’s upcoming trip. Is the visit an attempt to reinvigorate his administration’s relationship with Netanyahu, restart peace talks, or an equal effort to achieve both objectives? Is the newly reelected Obama serious about an Israeli-Palestinian settlement? Does the new Israeli government (and a weakened Netanyahu) present a fresh opportunity for dialogue on a settlement? Or, will other regional conflicts take precedence on the agenda.
Join us for an in-depth analysis of these issues and more on March 6.
On Twitter? Follow @MideastChannel to join the conversation online.?
Website: http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/…
9. The Rise of Islamism: Its Impact on Religious Minorities, Hudson Institute, Washington DC 20005, Wednesday March 6, 12:00 PM-1:30 PM.
Venue: Hudson Institute, 1015 15th Street, NW, 6th Floor
Speakers: Nina Shea, Farahnaz Ispahani, Jamsheed K. Choksy, Anthony Vance, Stephen Schwartz
Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom invites you to attend
The Rise of Islamism: Its Impact on Religious Minorities
Wednesday, March 612:00 1:30 PM
Lunch will be served.
This event will be streamed live here: www.hudson.org/WatchLive.
Submit questions via Twitter: @HudsonInstitute
With the rise of Islamism in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa, religious minorities have come increasingly under siege. Already this year, nearly two hundred Hazara Shiite Muslims in Baluchistan, Pakistan have been killed in bombings launched by the Sunni extremist group Lashkar-e-Jangvi. In Egypt, the nation’s new constitution denies Baha’is the right to houses of worship, while Iran’s denies Baha’is any rights at all. In Mali, Islamists have destroyed historic Sufi shrines, and in Iraq, a campaign of terrorist violence has driven almost the entire Mandean community from its ancient homeland. Across a broad geographic area and in once culturally diverse societies, Christians, Jews, Baha’is, Ahmadi Muslims, Zoroastrians, Sufis, Shiites, Mandeans, Yizidis, Sikhs, Hindus, and other religious minorities face a range of threats from ascendant Islamists.
Please join moderator Nina Shea, Hudson Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Religious Freedom, and our expert panel to discuss Islamism’s impact on religious minorities and recommendations to strengthen the cause of religious freedom and cultural pluralism.
Panelists will include former Pakistani Parliamentarian (2008-12) Farahnaz Ispahani; Professor of Iranian, Central Eurasian, and Islamic Studies at Indiana University Jamsheed K. Choksy; Director of the Office of Public Affairs for the Baha’is of the United States Anthony Vance; and Executive Director of the Center for Islamic Pluralism and author Stephen Schwartz.
Website: http://hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction…
10. What should Obama do on North Korea?, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Thursday March 7, 9:00 AM
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington
Speakers: Victor D. Cha, Walter L. Sharp
A Korea Chair Platform event with
Dr. Victor D. Cha
Senior Advisor and Korea Chair, CSIS
General (Ret) Walter L. Sharp
Former Commander of U.S. Combined Forces Command & USFK and
Amb. Joseph R. DeTrani Special Envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea
Please join us for a Korea Chair Platform event with Victor Cha, Walter L. Sharp, and Joseph R. DeTrani. In the wake of the December 2012 missile launch and the February 2013 nuclear test, our distinguished panelists will share their views on the road ahead and what President Obama should do on North Korea. We hope you can join us!
To RSVP for this event, please email KoreaChair@csis.org.
The Korea Chair Platform is made possible by the generous support of Samsung Electronics America.
Website: http://csis.org/event/what-should-obam…
11. Reporting on Conflict in Burma: Challenges and Opportunities, US Institute of Peace, Thursday March 7, 10:00 AM- 11:30 AM
Venue: US Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.
Speakers: Stephen Gray, Thiha Saw, Kyaw Zen Thar, Theo Dolan, John Knaus
This event will be webcast live beginning at 10:00am ET on March 7, 2013 at www.usip.org/webcast. Join the conversation on Twitter with #BurmaMedia.
The opening of media freedoms in Burma by the government of Thein Sein has been gradual, but encouraging. The phasing out of formal censorship and the reinstitution of private daily newspapers are positive steps toward informing a public which is increasingly seeking out news and information. However, reliable coverage of ongoing conflicts in Burma, such as in Kachin and Arakan states, has been difficult to obtain. With information on these conflicts still largely controlled by the government, local journalists struggle to present a holistic picture of the violence.
This event will explore the steps that can be taken by the Burmese media, government and other key stakeholders to advance existing media freedoms in order to report more effectively on conflict. Experts will present an overview of the present conflicts in ethnic states and prospects for peace an analysis of media sector reforms, including current challenges and opportunities; and perspectives on conflict reporting from a journalist from Arakan state.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/reporting-c…
12. Yemen’s Political Transition and Public Attitudes Toward the National Dialogue, National Democratic Institute, Thursday March 7 12:00 PM- 1:30 PM
Venue: National Democratic Institute455 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, 8th Floor Washington, DC
Speakers: Barbara Bodine, Les Campbell, John Moreira, Brian Katulis
The agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for political transition in Yemen calls for a National Dialogue Conference to help the country’s leaders develop consensus for draft constitutional reforms and prepare for elections in 2014.During the past year, the transition has faced considerable challenges from wrangling among competing political factions to violent activity by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, tribal disputes, and a southern secessionist movement. Later this month, the country’s leaders will finally join together for the start of the National Dialogue Conference in an effort to end gridlock on the country’s stalled political reform process and address worsening economic conditions.
As the country heads into this important dialogue, how does the Yemeni public view the future of the nation and the priorities they want their leaders to address? What are the key points of consensus and disagreement we can expect during the dialogue? How can the United States government support Yemen’s political transition as it seeks to advance other national security interests?
Please join the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Center for American Progress for a joint panel discussion featuring Barbara Bodine, Lecturer and Director of Scholars in the Nation’s Service at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen; Les Campbell, NDI Senior Associate and Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa who has recently returned from pre-Dialogue discussions in Yemen; and John Moreira, lead consultant for Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research who oversaw recent polling in Yemen.
In conjunction with this event, the National Democratic Institute will release the results of a new public opinion poll conducted in Yemen.
Website: http://www.ndi.org/node/20111
13. Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians in South Sudan: Rhetoric and Reality, US Institute of Peace, Friday, March 8, 10:00 AM- 11:30 AM
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.
Speakers: Hilde Johnson, Jon Temin
This event will be webcast live beginning at 10:00am ET at www.usip.org/webcast.
The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) maintains civilian protection as one of its core responsibilities. However, ethnic tensions and a weak national security architecture across South Sudan, coupled with UNMISS’s own limited resources, have made this objective of protecting civilians from physical violence difficult to achieve. There have been sporadic, violent tribal clashes in several South Sudanese states, most notably inter-communal violence in Jonglei state that has claimed hundreds, if not thousands, of lives.
USIP is pleased to host Ms. Hilde Johnson, special representative of the U.N. secretary-general and head of UNMISS, to discuss some of the challenges that UNMISS has faced and lessons learned in striving to protect civilians.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/peacekeepin…
14.The Arab Awakening: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Friday March 8, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington DC, 20004
Speakers: Rami Khouri, Robin Wright
Rami Khouri, Former Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center; Director, Islam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut, Lebanon; Editor-at-large, The Daily Star
Robin Wright, Journalist and Author/Editor of eight books, most recently editor of ‘The Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are’
Website: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-…
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Lawful but awful
I don’t usually get worked up over the drone wars and killing terrorists. I’d rather see many of them dead before a single innocent victim is killed or maimed. But the Justice Department “white paper” on “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qa’ida or an Associated Force” has chilled my blood.
I hasten to note that I am not a lawyer. If you want the opinion of one, try Lawfare. But I spent decades as a bureaucrat. I could drive a massacre through the policy loopholes outlined in this memo.
The obvious first: the memo focuses on “imminent” threats, but then it includes in “imminent” an operation that hasn’t even yet been planned. That’s a neat trick. By that standard, Ron Paul’s election as president was imminent before he announced he was running. That’s not what the word means. If you call a horse’s tail a leg, how many legs does a horse have?
Capture has to be “infeasible” for the killing to be lawful. But infeasible is in the eye of the beholder. I suspect it is infeasible more often than not because we no longer have anyplace to put such captives. Or is it only infeasible because a military operation with capture as its purpose cannot be mounted without unreasonable risks? And what would unreasonable risks be?
But the problems don’t end there. The decision-maker in the memo is not the president of the United States. It is a well-informed senior official. Presumably he or she gets a delegation of authority from the president. Do we really think killing a U.S. citizen in Yemen by a drone operator in Utah does not require the decision of an elected leader? It should be done by a GS-15? Admittedly we delegate the authority to decide whom to kill on a battlefield to 18-year-old soldiers. But that is the difference between targeted killing at a great distance and conventional warfare requiring split-second decisions to protect our forces.
What is a “senior operational leader?” Here the white paper is more explicit: it is someone known to be “actively engaged in planning operations to kill Americans.” I’ve got no problem with targeting someone who is targeting Americans. But how do we know that a particular person is a senior operational leader? The obvious problem is someone like Anwar al Aulaqi, who certainly encouraged killing Americans but publicly available evidence that he was an operational commander at the time of his killing in 2011 was thin. Did the Administration have more? Or is the definition of “senior operational commander as loose as the definition of imminence? Did some well-informed senior official get worked up over Aulaqi’s explicit incitement of violence against Americans?
Then there’s that “associated force” loophole. Is the Taliban a force associated with Al Qaeda? Their goals are certainly distinct, but they have been associated. Is the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (the Tuareg rebel organization in northern Mali) associated with Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM)? It certainly was for a while last spring, but right now it seems to be helping the French do in AQIM. Is the Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence directorate “associated” with the Haqqani network? Some days yes, who knows right now?
Let’s not forget the problem of collateral damage: innocent people (including children) who happen to be nearby when a Predator strikes, or targeting errors. That too is a problem on the conventional battlefield, but I might hope that it could be considered more fully when our own soldiers are not at risk. We need to ask the obvious question: are drone strikes creating more enemies than they are killing? Are we raising the risks to ourselves rather than lowering them?
What difference does it make that the person killed is a U.S. citizen? A lot of the problems I see would be just as troubling if the person were not. Nor do I see much in this paper that makes me think it could not also be applied inside the United States. Now that gets a bit paranoid, but would we feel comfortable with drone strikes against terrorists–U.S. citizen or no–holed up in a bunker in Alabama?*
This white paper raises more questions than it answers. It is hard to imagine that no mistakes are made. Judicial review is the method we use to avoid mistakes in the criminal justice system. A soldier’s behavior on the battlefield is subject to military judicial review. But there is no judicial review of drone strikes, before or–if the Administration continues to have its way–after the fact. Nor is it clear that the bureaucratic process envisaged is adequate to minimize error.
I’m convinced: killing terrorists is not unlawful. But for more than legal reasons we need to be careful about who, how, when, where and why we do it. The white paper suggests the system in place is still far from adequate, even after several hundred drone strikes that have killed thousands. That really is awful.
*PS, March 6, 2013: For those who think I was hallucinating about drone strikes inside the US, read what Attorney General Eric Holder has now said on the subject.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Not a foreign policy Inaugural, but…
President Obama said little about foreign affairs in his Inauguration speech, but what he said bears more attention than it is getting. After a tribute America’s armed forces (and mention that we are ending a decade of war), he went on to say:
But we are also heirs to those who won the peace and not just the war, who turned sworn enemies into the surest of friends, and we must carry those lessons into this time as well.
We will defend our people and uphold our values through strength of arms and rule of law. We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully — not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear. America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe; and we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation. We will support democracy from Asia to Africa; from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom. And we must be a source of hope to the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice — not out of mere charity, but because peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes: tolerance and opportunity; human dignity and justice.
This is extraordinarily general, or maybe tantalizingly vague. I think I know what it means for Iran: continuation of negotiations, at least for a while. But what does it mean for the brave Syrians who are fighting what is proving to be a frighteningly violent regime? It certainly aligns America with support for the Arab awakenings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, but what does it mean for Bahrain? Or Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states? Or, even more importantly, for China, where “those who long for freedom” are increasingly speaking out?
What we know from Obama’s first term is that he balances ideals and reality in each case based on specific circumstances. He is lawyerly in approach, treating each contingency on its merits rather than laying out a more generally applicable “Obama” doctrine (other than support for democracy and concern for the disadvantaged). This is very different from his predecessor, who set out general principles and tried to apply them to specific cases without much regard for the particular circumstances, with disastrous results.
My guess is that circumstances will force the President to say and do a great deal more about Iran, Syria, China and other situations in short order. His reference to American alliances and “those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad”–that’s presumably the UN, OSCE, OAS and the rest of the alphabet soup of international organizations, including non-governmental ones–is a clear indication that he will be looking for help from others when he decides to act internationally.
What he did not say–but none of us should forget–is that America’s financial situation and its internal politics will constrain what it can do internationally for at least the next four years. We are broke, as the Republicans like to say. But we’ll have to wait at least for the State of the Union message if not longer to see what the Inaugural message means for resources to support both our military and civilian efforts abroad.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Light where we can, heavy when we must
Today’s New York Times declares victory for those in the Obama Administration who favor a light footprint abroad. The members of the new national security team–Hagel, Kerry and Brennan–each leans in that direction. Though Hagel voted as a senator for the Iraq war, he later became a doubter. His Vietnam experience and Kerry’s make both new cabinet members hesitant about the use of American military force abroad. Brennan, while always talking a good line in favor of a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in Yemen, is the brains behind the canonical light footprint drone war there against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The light footprint approach is also getting a boost in Afghanistan, where the White House is leaning towards leaving fewer troops after 2014 than some would like. Zero is even a possibility. The leaks to this effect are all too clearly intended to get President Karzai, who is visiting Washington this week, to stop his mouthing off against the American presence and to convince the Taliban that they can get half a loaf if they come to the negotiating table. But feints in diplomacy have a way of becoming reality. America’s parlous fiscal situation will make many members of Congress look benignly on cutting back the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
I need hardly mention that the Administration has already taken a light footprint approach to Syria–maybe more like a no footprint approach. It provides humanitarian assistance through nongovernmental organizations and as well as political support to the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and other Syrian opposition organizations. It is also setting up Patriot batteries in Turkey and turning a blind eye to arms flowing from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The results so far have fallen well short of the goal of ending the Asad regime and risk letting Syria fall into the hands of Sunni extremists. But the burden on the United States is mainly diplomacy and foreign assistance, not the far more expensive military.
I find it hard to fault the Administration for trying to limit commitments and save money at a time of serious fiscal strain. But it is a mistake to think we will always want to avoid the heavier footprint: troops and civilians on the ground to establish a safe and secure environment and plant the seeds for governance in states that may fail in ways that endanger vital American interests. The problem I see so far is not so much the President’s preference for the light footprint, but rather the assumption that it will ever be thus. Each and every president since the end of the Cold War has tried to avoid state-building efforts abroad. Each and every one has concluded that they were needed in one place or the other. This includes President Obama, who has quietly and correctly (if not alway successfully) indulged in civilian statebuilding to prevent violence in South Sudan since independence (the troops are cheap since they come from the UN). Obama also tried statebuilding in Afghanistan, where it was not a brilliant success.
We need to maintain the capacity to do heavier footprints, civilian as well as military, even as we try to avoid situations in which they are likely to be needed. This is the equivalent of asking the U.S. government to walk and chew gum at the same time. It has a hard time doing that. It is much more inclined to dismantle the extensive apparatus and experience built up during more than 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan than to husband and sustain it. The Civilian Response Corps President George W. Bush established, after declaring as a candidate his disdain for “a nation-building corps,” is already gutted. We’ll be reinventing that wheel if ever there is intervention in Syria, Mali, Iran or half a dozen other places where it might be needed in the next decade. This is not wise or economical.
Our mantra should be: light where we can, heavy where we must.
PS: David Rothkopf hopes what he calls the “disengagers” will redouble diplomatic efforts. Would that it be so.
RSS - Posts
