Good news for Kosovo, but tough talks ahead

I count as good news both the formation of the second Hashim Thaci government in Kosovo as well as the conviction of Serbia’s former assistant Interior Minister of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Hague Tribunal.

Of course the story is more complicated than that.  Thaci still faces accusations, but little evidence and no indictment, for serious crimes associated with organ trafficking that allegedly occurred in the aftermath of the NATO/Yugoslavia war more than a decade ago.  His choice of Behgjet Pacolli as President of Kosovo, essential to gaining a majority in parliament, has also raised questions, as Pacolli’s construction business prospered doing work in Russia, which has opposed Kosovo’s independence.  He was Both Pacolli and Thaci gained their positions with razor thin majorities.

Whatever the allegations and the size of their majority, their elections, and the appointment of a Serb as deputy prime minister, demonstrate that Kosovo’s institutions are functioning, if occasionally with difficulty.  The need to repeat December’s elections in several municipalities showed both the challenges governance faces in Pristina and the capacity of its institutions to correct mistakes.

That said, Thaci and Pacolli have a difficult road ahead.  Declaring yourself ready for talks with Belgrade and preparing for them seriously are two different things.  Will they go to talks with Belgrade as a government with a razor-thin majority?  Or will Pristina form a broader negotiating team, as it did for the Ahtisaari negotiations?  The naming of the talented and tough-minded Edita Tahiri to lead the Kosovo team bodes well.

I hear the Europeans will focus in the first instance on customs on the Serbia/Kosovo border (boundary to the Serbs).  This is an issue with virtues:  there could be real benefits to the Kosovo, if Serbia agrees to accept its products.  In addition, cooperation on customs implies some level of recognition that the authorities you are dealing with are properly constituted and have at least some sovereign attributes.  There could also be some real benefits to Serbia, if smuggling comes under better control and if the European Union is willing to count the outcome of the dialogue as sufficient to allow Serbia to proceed to candidacy status.

But if the EU is going to go that far, Pristina will need to be certain that Serbia cannot become an EU member without accepting and recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state.  Several EU members have now said as much, but agreement on that position at 27 is difficult because of the five EU members that have not recognized Kosovo.  Pristina is going to need some real statecraft to ensure that EU interest in accelerating Serbia’s membership does not come at Kosovo’s expense.