A soggy version of the Arab spring

Big Carnegie Endowment/Harvard discussion of Arab Spring yesterday.  Outcome:  pretty gloomy.  But these are experts, who admittedly failed to see the budding of the Arab Spring and are unlikely to be able to predict its course either.  They all acknowledged the many unknowns and the difficulties of prediction.

Marwan Muasher, who prefers reform from above, thinks doing nothing in response to the protests is no longer an option but also noted there is more “empire strikes back” (Libya, Yemen, Syria) and “buying time with money” (the Gulf) than “promises of reform” (thin in Jordan, a bit more serious in Morocco).  And his criteria for successful reform from above were exacting:  it has to be holistic and inclusive, power has to be shared seriously, it should be gradual and measurable.  Nothing makes the cut yet.

No optimism from Marina Ottaway either.  She noted that even in Tunisia and Egypt there are problems of political will to complete the reform process, that some of the politicians formerly associated with the ruling parties will be able to recycle themselves, that secular parties are weak and fragmented, that Islamists may be a bit stronger but also fragmented, with Salafi influence rising.  It is not clear yet what the protesters will be able or willing to do politically, and it is too early to count the military out.

Tarek Masoud did not like what he sees in Egypt.  He noted the intense conflict among political forces and between political forces and the military, with the military wary of democracy.  They don’t want democratic oversight, fear the demand for justice and don’t want to break with past policy on Israel and the U.S.  The military would like to reign without ruling, keeping out of the public eye and avoiding responsibility for governing.  They have already made mistakes by scheduling the constitutional referendum, then having to fix the amended constitution with their own constitutional declaration.  Early elections will favor Islamists, and opening the constitution to a constituent assembly will open the question of the relationship between state and religion, which is not a good idea.  The future holds more discord.

So spring wasn’t so cheery.  How about the U.S. policy response?

Nick Burns praised President Obama’s relatively rapid and thoroughly nuanced response in a difficult international situation.  He was not too late to support the Tahrir protesters, correctly hesitated about Libya but signed on in response to the Arab League appeal in light of Gaddafi’s threat to Benghazi, and gave the Gulfies more slack because there was no rebellion to sign on to in Saudi Arabia, Oman or Qatar.  Only under questioning did Nick state baldly that he could not understand why we hadn’t zapped Bashar al Assad earlier and admit that in Bahrain Washington had chosen interests over values.  Nick urged that we focus on Egypt, decrease out focus on governments  and security, increase our focus on development and outreach to people, move on Israel/Palestine and shift to a containment policy on Iran.

Agreeing that the case-by-case contextual approach was the right one, Steve Walt concluded that we would soon face Arab governments more sensitive to public opinion, that there would be no easy fixes for the problems of over-centralization and corruption in the Arab countries, Western governments are not flush and would find it hard to ante up, Israel’s position would be weakened as Egypt and Jordan became less compliant to U.S. wishes and that U.S. strategy in the region is obsolete even if its interests are the same as always:  unhindered flow of oil and gas, nuclear nonproliferation, countering terrorism and protecting Israel.  A more effective policy would pay more attention to Arab public opinion, embrace reform, sustain multipolarity in the region, get U.S. troops out (to an offshore balancing role, naturally, that would still prevent others from exerting control), internationalize the Israel/Palestine peace process (including encouragement of European support for the Palestine resolution at the GA and a possible settlement imposed by the Security Council).  Most importantly:  we need to stop threatening Iran, which gives Tehran incentives to build nuclear weapons and attempt more creative (unspecified) diplomacy. In response to a question, Walt said he also thought we need a residual force in Iraq to counter Iran.

Chris Boucek, focused mainly on Yemen, warned of economic meltdown, suggested we manage the Saudis better and noted that the youthful protesters are espousing our ideals.

There was a good deal more, but this gives you the flavor:  the U.S. focus on stability, peace and democracy has failed:  no stability, little prospect for peace and not much for democracy either.  Burns and Walt, each in his own way, thought the U.S. could still play an important role, but no one was sanguine about the prospects for the Arab spring or U.S. interests in its aftermath.