Serbia visits Sarajevo

Yesterday Danas, a Belgrade daily, published this interview with me by Matja Stojanovic and Snezana Congradin:

1. [Serbian] President Tadic will soon make his first official visit to the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) capital. How do you comment the fact that it took him so long, having in mind that in the course of that prolonged period, Serbia-Banja Luka relations flourished?

A: Belgrade, while insisting loudly that it supports One Bosnia, has in practice been focused on supporting Republika Srpska (RS) and [its President] Milorad Dodik in its quest for maximum autonomy.  But Belgrade will not want Dodik to move in the direction of independence, since that would put Tadic in a difficult position:  recognize the RS and give up hope for early entry into the EU, or not recognize and give up hope for reelection.

2. What has changed comparing to the past, in your opinion, that made such official visit possible?

A: Certainly the arrest of Ratko Mladic and his transfer to The Hague make a visit to Sarajevo much easier, both for Tadic and for Bakir Izetbegovic, the Bosniak member of the Bosnian presidency.  Maybe RS has also realized that building power plants on the Drina and other pet projects aren’t going to happen without Sarajevo’s concurrence.

3. Is that visit a consequence of pressure coming from the international community, in connection with meeting the EU candidacy criteria, or that is a matter of something else?

A: I imagine both Europeans and Americans have urged Tadic to visit Sarajevo and to rebalance Serbian policy in the direction of supporting the Bosnian state, rather than just Republika Srpska.

Tadic won’t be disappointed by the way:  I was in Sarajevo week before last and found it vastly improved from 10 years earlier.  It is truly a beautiful city.

4. Support for the BiH EU integrations process is among the Sarajevo meeting announced topics. Would you agree that means that Tadic will be expected to influence Dodik, and if so, how should we see that in terms of BiH sovereignity, having in mind that doing so, one of the most important BiH questions – EU integrations – will be “controlled” (or at least directly influenced) by a president of another country?

A: It has long proved necessary to go to Belgrade to influence Banja Luka.  It is also necessary to go to Zagreb to influence some Bosnian Croats.  I might wish it weren’t that way, but that doesn’t change the facts of life.

5. Do you expect that the Dayton agreement will be amended, and if so – when?

A: Yes.  It has to be amended to conform to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights on its discriminatory provisions.  I hope it will also be amended to give the Sarajevo government all the authority needed to negotiate membership in the European Union.  There will be other amendments needed as Bosnia proceeds through the EU accession process.

I have no idea when these amendments will be passed.  Experience suggests that it will only be when external forces make it absolutely clear what is needed in order to gain some concrete benefit, as happened in the case of the visa waiver.  But pressures for change are also growing within Bosnia—I hope to see them grow more.  Citizens shouldn’t be happy to see Bosnia fall behind other countries in the EU “regatta.”

6. Do You expect Dodik to oppose or cooperate in the process of the BiH EU integration, and the necesary centralisation of power in the country?

A: Dodik will make every effort to get the EU to deal directly with Republika Srpska in the process of EU integration, as he did successfully with the “structured dialogue” on the justice sector.  Brussels needs to get smarter about this and make it absolutely clear that it is the Sarajevo government that joins the EU, not the Federation or Republika Srpska.  If Brussels were to fail to do this, it could well cause the breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is unlikely to be a peaceful process.  Moreover, the outcome would not be one Zagreb or Belgrade would want.