Past the twelfth hour

So Iraq has finally, in the 11th hour (actually the 12th, since it happened after midnight Baghdad time) told the Americans it is willing to talk about a continuing American troop presence past the end of 2011, mainly to train the Iraqi air force and navy.  According to the LA Times, Prime Minister Maliki and his archrival (and coalition partner) Iyad Allawi used the occasion to hash out an agreement on how nominees to the still unfilled positions of Defense and Interior Minister will be handled.

The agreement to talk is important, but there are still necessarily a lot of unanswered questions.  Will the Americans have any combat or counter-terrorism role?  Will they continue to play a role in the confidence building measures (CBMs) between the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish peshmerga?  Will they be permitted to defend themselves?  Will they be held accountable if they kill or injure someone unjustifiably in an Iraqi court or in an American one?  Who will pay for this training mission, the hard-strapped United States or the Iraqis, who have been collecting close $100 per barrel for oil?

The Sadrists appear to have objected but not so strongly as to prevent the negotiations from starting.  They lack the votes in parliament to stop the move on their own, but they could certainly make life difficult for Prime Minister Maliki.  I wonder what he promised in exchange for their quiescence.  Or have the Sadrists come to realize that an American presence in Iraq as a counterweight to Iran is not such a bad thing even from their perspective?

If we can presume for the moment that these talks will in fact lead to 10,000 American troops remaining in Iraq, is that a good thing, or not?  In my book it is.  It will help to ensure a united Iraq that can defend and maintain itself in a rough neighborhood, and give the Americans an opportunity to engage constructively with its armed forces, which are bound to remain a key institution there.  A more or less democratic Iraq that aligns itself with the U.S. and Europe on issues like Iran’s nuclear program or democractic transition in Syria would not pay back all the effort we have made and the losses we have suffered there, but it would be a positive mark in a foreign policy ledger that has not accumulated many in recent years.

I know Americans are tired of Iraq, but it remains an important piece of the Middle East jigsaw.  As I’ve noted previously, a large military training program is only one dimension of American relations with the new Iraq.  Also important is the direction of its oil and gas pipelines, which could literally tie Iraq more closely to Europe by flowing north and east.  I can do no better than quote myself on this subject:

In my view, another important contribution to Iraq’s future international alignment could come from its capability to export oil other than by loading it on ships and moving it through the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz. The Gulf export facilities are already a bottleneck, not to mention the risk that conflict there could disrupt Iraq’s exports.

But Iraq is geographically advantaged. It can export oil (and gas) to the north and west, reaching European markets more directly and cheaply than through the Gulf. My understanding is that even Iraq’s southern oil fields can export more economically to the north and west, provided the “strategic pipeline” that once linked them to northern Iraq is repaired and enlarged.

If the Americans really want an Iraq that will see its interests more aligned with the West, oil and gas pipelines to the north and west are likely to be at least as important as F-16′s and American troops in the long run. There is no time like the present to get busy making the long run happen.