Who doomed Iraq?

Three of Iraq’s leading politicians write in the New York Times this morning:

Unless America acts rapidly to help create a successful unity government, Iraq is doomed.

Is it true?  And if so, who doomed it?

I confess my strong sympathy with the plight of these Iraqiyya leaders:  former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, current parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and current Finance Minister Rafe al-Essawi garnered more seats in the March 2010 elections than any other coalition but for almost two years have been unable to convert that victory into meaningful power.  Their complaints about Prime Minister Maliki, who dreads the prospect of a Ba’athist coup, are well founded:  he does abuse the security services and manipulate the courts.

I nevertheless find myself gagging on their plea for American help.  These are the same politicians who refused to speak up publicly for a continuing American troop presence in Iraq.  Their colleagues–Vice President Tariq al Hashemi and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq–were among the strongest voices calling for American withdrawal.  They are now hiding out in Kurdistan, having lost the protection that the American troop presence once provided.

Looking more closely at the New York Times piece, the plea sounds more like a threat.  Nowhere is there any sign that Iraqiyya is prepared to go into opposition, ally with other political forces to bring down Maliki’s government in parliament, or take other political measures to solve the problem.  They say they will come to an American-supported national conference aiming to resuscitate a power sharing government, but the preconditions for doing so are legion:

But first, Mr. Maliki’s office must stop issuing directives to military units, making unilateral military appointments and seeking to influence the judiciary; his national security adviser must give up complete control over the Iraqi intelligence and national security agencies, which are supposed to be independent institutions but have become a virtual extension of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa party; and his Dawa loyalists must give up control of the security units that oversee the Green Zone and intimidate political opponents.

In other words, Maliki has to disarm first, or else.

What is this “else”?  Are our Iraqiyya friends threatening civil war, as the Times headline writer suggests?  Or are they just suggesting that they will press for further regionalization, trying to free Iraq’s Sunni-majority provinces from Baghdad’s rule?  I might wish it were the latter, but there is no sign at all in their piece that this is the case.  And to be fair, Maliki has done everything he can to block regionalization efforts, in both Sunni and Shia majority areas. It was unsettling, and possibly instructive, that the warrant for Tariq al Hashemi’s arrest quickly generated an Al Qaeda in Iraq spate of bombings targeting mainly Shia in Baghdad.  Are our Iraqiyya friends getting support from those committed to violence?

Vice President Biden, who once proposed that Iraq be broken up along sectarian and ethnic lines, is now scrambling to keep the country together.  He has leverage over Maliki, who values American security assistance and intelligence cooperation as well as diplomatic help in reestablishing Iraq as a regional power.  Using that leverage is not cost-free however.  At the very least, he should insist on peaceful methods from all sides, including those who say:

For years, we have sought a strategic partnership with America to help us build the Iraq of our dreams: a nationalist, liberal, secular country, with democratic institutions and a democratic culture. But the American withdrawal may leave us with the Iraq of our nightmares: a country in which a partisan military protects a sectarian, self-serving regime rather than the people or the Constitution; the judiciary kowtows to those in power; and the nation’s wealth is captured by a corrupt elite rather than invested in the development of the nation.

Hard to dissent from the preferences expressed here, and America should be prepared to help.  I have spent many hours in recent years talking with Iraqi parliamentarians about national reconciliation.  They need to begin doing some.  The issues are difficult but not insoluble.

If Iraq is doomed, it is Iraqis who are dooming it.