Arms and the man

My friends and colleagues are all over the lot on Syria.  One suggests we consider going to war against Bashar al Assad, but then offers more, and more powerful, arguments against than in favor of the proposition.  Some are criticizing the Obama administration for not supporting humanitarian safe zones and arming of the Syrian opposition, to be undertaken apparently by the Turks and Saudis respectively.  Others view diplomatic and political support for the opposition combined with nonintervention as a strategically correct choice, one that undermines Iran and Russia and hurts their standing with the Sunni Arab world.  Who is right?

It is of course difficult to say.  I don’t doubt anyone’s sincerity in advocating one way or the other.  But the arguments in favor of U.S. military intervention are simply not convincing:  the Arab League hasn’t asked for it, the Security Council won’t approve it, and the consequences are wildly unpredictable.  Besides, the U.S. needs to be ready in coming months to make a credible threat of the use of force against Iran’s nuclear program.  Attacking Syria would undermine American readiness and reduce the credibility of the threat against Iran, which is arguably much more important for U.S. national security than Syria.

Humanitarian safe zones and arming the opposition don’t come out any better.  Humanitarian zones are target-rich environments that will need protection from the Syrian army.  They are not safe unless made safe.  Doing so would be a major military undertaking, with all the disadvantages already cited.  Arming the opposition would intensify the civil war, make a collapse of the Syrian state more likely, and spread sectarian and ethnic warfare to Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey.  That is precisely what the United States should be avoiding, not encouraging.

The diplomatic approach the Administration has chosen is not fast and not easy, but it is beginning to show results.  Tom Pickering, who knows as much about these things as anyone on earth, sees the UNSC presidential statement as a step forward:

What we need now is a concerted effort to convince the Russians that Bashar is a bad bet.  If they want to keep port access in Syria, and arms sales there, they will need to switch horses and back a transition.  Bashar will not last long once they make that decision:  the Russians can cut off financial and military resources without which he knows he cannot survive.

The question is whether a threat to arm the opposition might help with the diplomacy.  This is arguable, it seems to me, and in any case it is what is happening.  Saudi Arabia and Qatar have made a lot of noise about arming the opposition.  It would be surprising if they weren’t already doing it, and preparing to do more.  I don’t expect it to have much impact on the battlefield, where the Syrian army has a clear advantage, especially when it uses artillery against civilian population centers.  But it could help to tilt the Russians against Bashar and create a sense of urgency about passing a UNSC resolution that begins the transition process.