What if Syria needs peacekeepers?

With each deterioration of the situation in Syria, I wonder how we could possibly see a democratic transition there–or any kind of transition that isn’t catastrophic–without an international peacekeeping presence.  Then I take a glance at Jim Dobbins’ cheat sheet for calculating the size of a peacekeeping mission.

I blanch.  Assuming the heavy peace enforcement model will be required–because there are well-armed and active warring parties on the ground–Syria would require upwards of 300,000 international personnel (more than 80% of them military) in an operation costing about $60 billion per year.  This is a lot of people and a lot of money.  Even the light peacekeeping model would require upwards of 35,000 internationals and over $6 billion per year.  That’s still a lot of people and money, though far more feasible than the heavier version.

Peacekeeping for Syria is something we need to be thinking about.  Sure, Libya got off without it.  But Libya is a far smaller and richer country in which the army evaporated rather than fight Qaddafi’s battles.  Egypt didn’t need it either, because the revolution turned the transition over to the army.  The Syrian army is not evaporating, and it is unlikely to inherit the revolution except by coup d’etat.

Once Bashar al Assad is gone, it and its paramilitary adjuncts will have to be separated from the Free Syrian Army and other assorted revolutionary fighters.  Then both will need to undergo the painstaking processes known as DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) and SSR (security sector reform), shrinking their numbers, unifying their command and improving their responsiveness to civilian authority.  International peacekeepers will, well, keep the peace in the meanwhile, hoping to see the quick emergence of a disciplined Syrian police force and military the population will appreciate.

The likely need for peacekeepers is one of many reasons why it is important to keep the UN monitoring mission (the UN Supervision Mission in Syria, or UNSMIS) in place.  As of the end of June, UNSMIS  had 278 military observers, 81 international civilian staff and 40 Syrian staff in place.  They have not been able to supervise a ceasefire that has never taken effect or monitor implementation of the Annan peace plan, which is a dead letter.  But they have greatly enhanced the visibility of what is going on in Syria and assigned responsibility for some of the worst abuses to the Asad regime.

They would also be a good advance party for an international peacekeeping force.  The UN is a relatively effective and economical mechanism for peacekeeping, but its deployments are notoriously slow.  Keeping UNSMIS in place would enable a much faster deployment than usual, even if the UN is not put in charge.  The UNSMIS personnel could be “rehatted” to another organization (Arab League?) or a coalition of the willing.

The UN Security Council this week extended UNSMIS for a month, with the fairly clear intention of terminating it if progress is not made in implementing a ceasefire and the Annan plan.   Many are arguing that its inability to perform its mandated tasks means it should be withdrawn.  Carne Ross tweeted yesterday:

Extension of #Syria UN monitoring mission a mistake; plays to Russian game; better 2 do nothing than pretend 2 do something

I don’t see it that way.  In fact UNSMIS has been useful, especially in assigning responsibility for atrocities.  The Asad regime will not be unhappy to see UNSMIS withdrawn.  Let’s see how the situation evolves, but keeping UNSMIS in place to provide whatever visibility it can and hasten deployment of a larger peacekeeping contingent sounds wise to me.