The worst of all possible worlds

It is getting hard to keep score, though this graphic from Al Jazeera English may help.  Today’s big news is the defection of Syria’s prime minister, who didn’t like Bashar al Asad’s “war crimes and genocide.”  About time he noticed.  There are reports also of more military defections, even as the battle for Aleppo continues.

Does any of this matter?  Or does Bashar get to hold on to his shrinking turf despite going into hiding and losing the support of regime stalwarts?

Michael Hanna offers an important part of the answer in a Tweet this morning:

Syrian defections follow strictly sectarian pattern, likely hardening core support. 1st big Alawi defection, if it comes,will be devastating

The Asad regime is increasingly relying on a narrow base of Alawite/Shia (about 12-13% of the population) support, as Sunnis (like the prime minister) peel away and denounce Bashar’s violence against the civilian population, which is majority Sunni.  Christians and Druze have also been distancing themselves, and Kurds have taken up arms against the regime (without however aligning themselves with the opposition).  The opposition draws its strength from the majority population and is supported by Sunni powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.  What we are witnessing is a regional sectarian war in the making, one that could last a long time and involve ever-widening circles in the Levant.

The Alawites fight tenaciously because they think they know what is coming.  This is an “existential” war for them:  if the lose, they believe they will be wiped out.

That, along with Russian and Iranian support, could make this go on for a long time. If it does, the consequences for Syria and the region will be devastating.  Damascus has already unleashed extremist Syrian Kurds to attack inside Turkey.  Jordan is absorbing more than 100,000 Syrian refugees.  Iraq’s efforts to guard its border with Syria have led to a confrontation with its own Kurdish peshmerga.  Fighting between Sunnis and Alawites has spread to Lebanon, which is also absorbing large numbers of Syrian refugees.  The Syrian opposition claims to have captured 48 Iranians in Damascus, sent there to help the regime (Tehran unabashedly claims they were religious pilgrims).

Breaking this self-reinforcing cycle of sectarian polarization is an interest broadly shared in the international community.  As The Economist pointed out last week, Russian interests won’t be served if Syria descends into total chaos.  Some would like to suggest that territorial separation is a solution.  This is nonsense:  no one will agree on the lines to be drawn, which will be decided by force of arms directed against the civilian population.  That is the truth of what happened in Bosnia, however much the myth-makers delude themselves.

There are several ways the violence might end:

• a definitive victory by the opposition (it is hard now to picture a definitive victory by the regime).
• an international intervention to separate the warring forces and impose what the U.S. military likes to call a “safe and secure environment.”
• a coup from within the regime, followed by a “pacted” (negotiated) transition.

Any of these would be better than continuation of the current chaos, which is the worst of all possible worlds.  But I’m afraid that is the mostly likely course of events until Moscow and Washington get together and decide to collaborate in ending the bloodshed.