Wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds

Yesterday’s Security Council decision to end the UN Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) is one of those inevitable moves that makes me wonder how the international system, such as it is, manages to survive.  We had several hundred trained observers in Syria in close contact with officials of the Asad regime and at least some of the opposition activists.  They played a critical role in reporting what was going on in Syria for several months and in assigning responsibility for events like the Houla massacre.  We know we are going to need that kind of knowledge of the local terrain whenever a transition away from the Asad regime begins.  What do we do?  We withdraw the observers.

Fortunately the UN is wise enough to leave a couple of dozen international officials behind in Damascus.  Their immediate concerns will be coordination of humanitarian assistance and support for the newly named UN/Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi.  But they will also be the vital brain trust of any future UN transition mission.  My compliments to friend and colleague Edmond Mulet, who heads of UN peacekeeping, for maintaining at least a seed of something that can grow if and when circumstances permit.

While it is amply clear that the Annan plan failed, largely because the opposition was unwilling to negotiate with the regime so long as Bashar al Asad remains in place and Asad was unwilling to step aside, it is not clear if the savvy Brahimi has better prospects.  He has rightly spent the last week or so trying to ensure stronger and more unified Security Council support for his mission, but he does not seem to have succeeded yet.  The Americans have decided to go around the UN to collaborate with Turkey and provide more direct support to the Syrian revolutionaries.  The Russians canceled a meeting scheduled for today in New York of the “action group” for Syria.  When diplomats cancel meetings, things are not going well.

I won’t be surprised if withdrawal of the observers precipitates intensification of the fighting in Syria.  With less likelihood of being observed internationally, both sides will try to gain advantage.  The sectarian dimension of the fighting will deepen.  The Iranians are playing a more and more critical role in supporting the regime, with the opposition reporting not only Iranian boots on the ground but also direct engagement in fighting.  Saudi Arabia and Qatar will be upping their ante in the form of weapons for the opposition, which is begging for shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs) to counter Asad’s increased use of aircraft.

None of this is good news.  While conventional wisdom holds that Asad cannot last, when and how he goes will be important.  Continuation of the violence for even a month or two more risks serious regional destabilization, which is the worst outcome for the United States.  It is not uncommon these days for people to question whether the territorial division in the Levant, rooted in the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, can last.  If the state structure of the region starts to implode, the consequences could be a good deal more chaotic, and geographically more widespread, than what happened during Iraq’s sectarian civil war in 2006-7.

I am wishing Brahimi well, despite the odds.