No easy call

Having written Tuesday that President Obama should be considering a no-fly zone in Syria, I was surprised but pleased to read this tactical level account confirming my view that this is preferable to safe zones or humanitarian corridors.  They wouldn’t make much difference at this point because the opposition already control wide swaths of territory.  But of course a no-fly zone over all of Syria would need to be strategically as well as tactically good in order to convince a president.

Steven Lee Myers and Scott Shane of the New York Times summed up the argument against any Western military intervention this way:

American military operations against Syria, officials reiterated on Tuesday, would risk drawing in Syria’s patrons, principally Iran and Russia, at a much greater level than they already are involved. It would allow Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, to rally popular sentiment against the West and embolden Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups now fighting the Assad government to turn their attention to what they would see as another American crusade in the Arab world.

The risk is not only greater Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria, but also losing Russia’s cooperation on Afghanistan and on trying to restrain Iran’s nuclear program.  These are serious risks involving important American interests.

But Iran and Russia are already heavily involved in Syria, and it is also an important American interest to prevent the war in Syria from “grinding on,” as Andrew Tabler puts it.  That would increase the likelihood of Al Qaeda and other jihadi involvement.  It will also increase the risk to Syria’s neighbors.  Lebanon and Jordan are already in difficulty, the former from sectarian fighting provoked in part by the Syrian conflict and the latter from the burden of tens of thousands of refugees.  Iraq could also be threatened.  Kurdish extremists are increasing operations in Turkey, presumably egged on by the Syrian regime, but the Turks can counter that effort both diplomatically (by getting the Iraqi Kurds to restrain their Syrian brethren) and militarily.

A no-fly zone could significantly shorten the conflict in Syria, but of course a great deal depends on how it is authorized and who engages in it.  There seems no possibility of UN Security Council authorization.  Moscow won’t allow it.  The Arab League would need to ask for it.  That seems within the realm of possibility. The Americans would have to undertake the major military operation needed to defeat Syria’s Russian air defense system, giving the Iranians a pretty good picture of how we would go about a similar attack on them.  A continuing effort to patrol the skies and strike occasionally afterwards might rely on Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

The alternative, or possibly a supplement, to a no-fly zone is to supply the Syrian revolutionaries with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADs).  The risk is that these would fall into the wrong hands, as they did in Afghanistan and Libya.  Few however have been used effectively against Western targets.  I imagine that our geniuses have managed to create MANPADs that don’t last long and are therefore useless after a few months, but I don’t actually know it (and Al Qaeda might be able to defeat any technological wizardry).

I don’t think a no-fly zone or giving the revolutionaries anti-aircraft capability is an easy call.  But refusing to somehow redress the imbalance that Bashar’s air force is exploiting to kill civilians also has consequences.  President Obama appears to have already made his decision not to intervene (I am less sure that we aren’t giving the revolutionaries some anti-aircraft capability), but the mounting toll, especially in Aleppo and Damascus, means that the issue will have to be revisited.