Pharaonic Islam

A day after cooperating with the United States in achieving a shaky ceasefire in Gaza, Egypt’s President Morsi arrogated to himself essentially absolute authority.  You have to wonder:  did he mention this in his several phone calls with President Obama in recent days, or in his conversations with Secretary of State Clinton?  His new constitutional decrees do many things that amount to one big thing:  the president is omnipotent.  The courts cannot challenge him or the remaining legislative bodies (the Shura council and the constituent assembly), which are under Muslim Brotherhood domination.  Morsi had already given himself the legislative powers of the lower house of Parliament, dissolved by military decree.

There is a good deal of “I told you so” tweeting back and forth in my feed.  None of that matters much.  The question is whether Morsi’s assumption of dictatorial powers really matters to the United States and if so what should we do about it?

We lived with an allied but autocratic Egypt for more or less 40 years, first under Anwar Sadat and later under Hosni Mubarak.  The difference is that Morsi will be an Islamist autocrat, not a secularist one.  And he has hijacked a revolution that appeared at least at times headed in the direction the United States would certainly have preferred:  a modern, pluralist democracy.  The Muslim Brotherhood from which Morsi emerged is neither modernist nor democratic (nor pluralist).

Morsi’s assumption of autocratic powers puts the Obama administration in an awkward situation.  It needs Egypt not only to help with the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel but also to maintain the peace treaty with Israel and fight growing extremism on the border of Israel in the Sinai Peninsula.  Trying to condition U.S. aid to Egypt on internal political liberalization could put at risk Egypt’s cooperation on international priorities concerning not just Israel but also Iran, Syria and other Middle East challenges.

Egypt however is not in a strong position.  On economic questions, it has been falling into line with International Monetary Fund and World Bank requirements, because it needs their money to survive the economic downturn that has accompanied the revolution and is likely to persist for some time, especially in light of Europe’s recession.  Aid does not flow readily from international financial institutions without American support.

Washington should use what leverage it has to push Morsi in the right direction, in particular in formulating Egypt’s new constitution.  This is the vital issue:  if it protects individual rights, including for women and minorities, there is some hope that the “spirit” of Egypt’s revolution (as understood by the youthful secularists who precipitated it) can be preserved, if only through painstaking efforts in court.  If however the constitution installs Sharia and provides only limited opportunities for individuals to protect their rights through the courts, we are in for a long, dark period of Pharaonic Islam.  That won’t be good for the United States, Israel or Egypt’s own people.