Precarious ally

The Bahraini royal family needs to deliver credible reforms.  There was little difference of opinion on that point at the Carnegie Endowment’s discussion of US policy and the political impasse in Bahrain this week.  Greater debate surrounded the issue of US policy towards the country, particularly with respect to the Fifth Fleet.  Should the US use the Fifth Fleet as leverage with the Bahraini regime, or should the US prepare to relocate it?

Divisions within the various sectarian groups make the Bahraini impasse complex. The inability to produce meaningful reforms has eroded support for the mainstream Shia opposition, Al Wefaq, whose supporters are shifting their allegiance to the leaderless February 14 Youth Coalition.  The monarchy’s hardliners are stirring up sectarianism, isolating Sunni moderates and encouraging Sunni Islamists to redirect their class-based anger against the Shia.

Based on Frederic Wehrey’s paper “the Precarious Ally: Bahrain’s Impasse and US Policy,” the discussion concluded that the volatility of the internal political situation made the effects of relocating the Fifth Fleet impossible to predict.

Matar Ebrahim Matar, an MP belonging to the moderate Sunni opposition, blamed the regime’s marginalization of Sunni moderates in favor of Sunni Islamists for creating the inaccurate impression that no moderates exist among the Sunnis. Matar also characterized the Bahraini regime as “immature,” pointing to the “vengeful” force used in repressing the Pearl Roundabout protests. He warned that in the eyes of Bahrainis, continued provision of arms and recognition to the regime will taint American legitimacy in the country, inflaming anti-Americanism.

Regarding US policy and the Fifth Fleet, Matar suggested the U.S. should strongly remind the regime that the US-Bahrain defense relationship carries an obligation to reform. Failing that, the the US should relocate the Fifth Fleet. Otherwise, the Fifth Fleet will continue to be an obstacle to reform, one that causes Defense Department preferences to prevail over those of the State Department.

Jon Alterman of CSIS felt that US ability to influence political events in Bahrain is limited. He argued that moving the Fifth Fleet would do more damage to US and Bahraini interests than good, and that US or Saudi actions as external referees would definitely not solve Bahrain’s problem. Instead, the US should encourage dialogue among the parties, working to get those who reject dialogue back to the table.

Toby C. Jones of Rutgers University had a different view.  He thought the US needs to expand the US-Bahraini strategic relationship to include economic objectives. If the US focuses only on oil, counter-terrorism and Iran, its leverage will be limited. By expanding its focus to regional economic issues, including the huge weapons market, the US would increase its leverage.  The  debate regarding the Fifth Fleet should center less on location and more on its mission, which should be a broad political one.

If and when Bashar al-Asad falls, Bahrain will remain the only ruling sectarian minority left in the region. To avoid a difficult future, the royal family must compromise with the opposition. In the words of Matar, “the propagation of problems moves with repression, not reform.” The US and the Al Khalifa monarchy need to keep that in mind going forward.