There is still time

Yesterday was a big day for Serbian diplomacy.  President Nikolic spent 40 minutes this morning at the UN denouncing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  Former Foreign Minister and now President of the General Assembly Jeremic claimed Serbia is committed to peace based on rule of law while continuing to disagree with the International Court of Justice on whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence breached international law (the result of a question Jeremic himself posed while foreign minister).  The Prime Minister took himself off to Moscow, where Prime Minister Medvedev pledged to back whatever Serbia wants on Kosovo.

This trifecta tells us something about where Serbia is headed:  it intends to maintain its claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo, backed by Moscow.  It will defy and criticize decisions of international tribunals whenever they do not accord with Belgrade’s own views.  Its interest in EU membership is relative.  It will not compromise even over the northwestern 11% of Kosovo, where fewer than half the Serbs in Kosovo live.

I imagine all of this defiance plays well for the domestic Serbian audience, where Nikolic, Jeremic and Dacic may all be campaigning sooner rather than later.  Deputy Prime Minister Vucic, who increasingly is the real power in Serbia because of the popularity of his (once also Nikolic’s) “Progressive” Party, is widely thought to be contemplating early elections.  Vucic’s anti-corruption campaign has garnered him a lot of support.

There is every reason to believe that nationalists will emerge from new elections even stronger than they are today.  This is a Serbia pointed in the wrong direction:  it is choosing a retrograde and quixotic claim to Kosovo over the EU and continuing to deny its role in the wars of the 1990s, or seeking to balance out that role by reference to the misdeeds of others.  I share Belgrade’s unhappiness that more non-Serbs have not been convicted for crimes against Serbs, but that in no way relieves Serbia of responsibility for acts committed on its behalf.

American and European Union efforts to persuade Serbia to moderate its views on Kosovo have so far failed.  Western policy has essentially been all carrot, no stick.  Washington agreed to disagree on Kosovo while fully supporting Serbia’s efforts to gain access to EU benefits.  The EU, until Angela Merkel’s tough stand against Serbia’s parallel institutions in northern Kosovo, was holding the door wide open to Serbia, hoping that its entry into the accession process would be sufficiently attractive to end its claim to sovereignty over Kosovo, or at least allow it to disband the Serbian institutions in the north.

Serbia prides itself on “non-alignment,” even after the end of the Cold War.  It now risks condemning itself to a future aligned with Putin’s Russia, which has already tied Serbia tight with energy deals of dubious merit.

There is still time to choose the EU–Catherine Ashton won’t submit her report on efforts to normalize relations between Pristina and Belgrade until April 16.  Vucic is burning up the telephone lines. My understanding is that Pristina and Belgrade delegations are expected to reappear in Brussels before then.  Both capitals will be better off if Serbia finds a way to declare victory and reverse its stand on an agreement that will protect most Serbs in Kosovo better than if the negotiations fail.

 

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20 thoughts on “There is still time”

  1. Dadic got ritualistic support from Moscow for whatever Kosovo policy Belgrade decided on, but was told his government could not expect Russia to be “more Serbian than the Serbs.” So the idea that Russia would be leading the charge to bring negotiations on “Kosovo’s final status” to UN (Russia/China) auspices was shot down – Belgrade had irresponsibly agreed to allow the EU to take control of talks, and it is too late now to expect Russia to come riding to the rescue. (They will also be giving Serbia a loan of only half the $1bln requested, and $200 million of that only after Belgrade is back in the IMF’s good graces. A reduction of the 25% tariff they charge on the Fiats Serbia was hoping to export in huge numbers to Russia also seems unlikely – they have their own auto industry to support, after all.) So aside from the touching pictures of embracing politicians, Serbia doesn’t seem to have come away with much. Frankly, Russia just doesn’t seem all that into Serbia these days.

  2. According to what was published in Serbian media (B92), seems like Dacic had some messages:

    1. Russians were angry since Kosovo issue was given to the EU (instead of UN).
    2. Dacic would like to see Kosovo issue at UN but that is impossible as new resolution of UNGA should be adopted (very unlikely)
    3. Dacic explained to Russians as Serbia wants the EU as it is the best way for better life of Serbia’s citizens.
    4. There is no question, he added, whether Serbia wants EU or Russia since the EU is the choice but “bearing in mind the Russia is Serbia’s best friend”
    5. Dacic also said that “Serbia, because of geographical position, doesn’t belong to Russian integration processes and organizations”
    6. Dacic also said that he had been promised by Putin that he will talk to western politicians, including the US “to let them know for Kosovo problems”.

    Seems like Dacic went to Moscow to let them know that (in the end) the EU is the choice for Serbia and wanted pressure from Mr Putin to western diplomats so the latter would press Pristina for more concessions.

  3. A couple of questions:
    1. “Serbia prides itself on “non-alignment,” even after the end of the Cold War. It now risks condemning itself to a future aligned with Putin’s Russia, which has already tied Serbia tight with energy deals of dubious merit.” How does this not apply to Germany too with “North Stream”? Why are Serbia’s deals dubious and not Germany’s? Does Serbia realistically have any other energy alternative?
    2. “My understanding is that Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade delegations are expected to reappear in Brussels before then. Both capitals will be better off if Serbia finds a way to declare victory and reverse its stand on an agreement that will protect most Serbs in Kosovo better than if the negotiations fail.” What kind of protection are we talking about here? Is this a direct threat with violence? This is EXACTLY why the Kosovo Serbs do not want to have anything to do with the Albanian government in Priština. And you are supporting this?
    Also, in all of your posts regarding Kosovo, you do not have a hint of a proposal for the Albanian side to give up on something. It is always “Serbia needs to do this, Serbia needs to do that.”

    1. PetarMKD,

      You say: “This is EXACTLY why the Kosovo Serbs do not want to have anything to do with the Albanian government in Priština. And you are supporting this?”

      How long will it take such “not wanting” to have anything with “Albanian gobernment i Pristina”???

      Is it going to take one, five, twenty, fifty years??

      1. forever fadil,just like the kosavars dont want anything to do with belgrade the northern kosovo serbs dont want anything to do pristina.

        1. Forever Peter, just like 100,000 Albanians in southern Serbia did not want living within Serbia and accepted the reality, the same applies for 40,000 Serbs in northern Kosovo.

          This is a parallel. Your parallel has nothing to do with reality. Comparing Kosovo as an entity with veto power in Yugoslav federation with almost 2 million of people, in one side, and 40,000 people living in three municipalities, in other side, is not absolutely a healthy logic.

    2. About South Stream and Serbia’s energy options:

      of course there are other options, South Stream is not going to be the only pipeline bringing gas from the east. There’s a European consortium making its final decision in the next few weeks on whether to go with West Nabucco (Bulgaria – Romania) or TAP – the Transadriatic Pipeline that will run across the north of Greece, through Albania, then under the Adriatic to southern Italy. Both are well along in terms of routing and engineering design work, and Albania and Greece are actually cooperating politically, for the first time since probably the Bronze Age. What either option would deprive Serbia of is the hoped-for ability to exert pressure on the rest of Europe, something that hardly seems in Russia’s interest – after all, they’ve been pushing ahead with an economically unjustifiable project in order to deprive the Ukraine of just this ability, since this was also a way of pressuring Russia. When a Russian spokesman was recently asked at a public meeting how Serbia could become more than “just a transit country” he was brushed off.

      This all assumes that South Stream is even going to be built – with the lower price that Russia can now impose because of the greater supplies of LNG available in the world, and the need for capital investments it’s finding more difficulty coming up with, Russia could leave Serbia holding the bag on this. It sounded recently, when some official complained about Serbia not meeting deadlines, that it might be looking to pull out in a huff, blaming Serbia for the fall-though of the entire project. (The Serbians immediately responded that they were on schedule with all commitments.)

      Germany will also no longer be as dependent on Russian gas in the quantities and at the price Russia unilaterally decides on, but that’s for another day. In any case, as Russia’s largest gas customer, they have some negotiating power themselves.

      At a press conference during his trip, Dacic called Russia Serbia’s best and closest friend. For the first time, I felt sorry for Ivica Dacic.

  4. “Non-aligned” Serbia is begging to become a Russian puppet. It has not become one simply because of Moscow has little use for it.

  5. there is still time for what exactley?The serbs and albanians dont seem to want to budge from there positions even with hollow promises.Time for a more radical approach to the problem.I know people on this site(mr.serwer)dont want to hear about partition but i think thats were this is eventually heading.

    Ashtons report seems not to mean as much after it was revealed even if serbia agreed to everything including handing over their first born it would not get guarantee them a date for opening EU ascersion.

  6. peter,

    Partition is out of agenda. Time for partition was during Ramboullet talks on February 1999 so Milosevic would withdraw from the rest of Kosovo and keep forces in the north. Of course recognizing the rest as independent state. Something now would be more than appreciated in Belgrade.

    Northern, Kosovo Serbs do not have any other alternatives than their compatriots in the south of river Ibar. I think that professor of political sciences in Belgrade, Vladimir Pavićević, is right (B92, March 24, 2013 “utisak nedelje”) when he said: “There is wrong thinking that Serbia doesn’t control Kosovo and Kosovo doesn’t control northern part so let make the parallel”. “This is wrong” he suggested, “because Serbia can’t have a role in Kosovo militarily, legally and politically while Kosovo authorities can take actions militarily, legally and politically in the north but are prevented form the same states which er involved in the talks”.

    So either will be agreement (peaceful one) or Kosovo authorities must act and restore order in the north. I do not mean any actions similar to Croatian “storm” but some other actions could be an option.

    1. Any military action from Albanians or any one will threaten a outbreak across the region. besides I don’t know how much us, eulux and NATO forces can do since they can’t take out barricades let alone invade the north.

      If anything the military action is the least scenario.there have been leaks from these talks that both thaci and dacic favor partition the most but there are higher powers that frown on the idea. we will see.

      1. No need for military action as nobody mentioned that. I find ridiculous “inability” of breaking barricades. Take for example barricade at Mitrovica bridge when Kosovar man wanted to remove barricade with his bulldozer but Kosovo police arrested him. So if one person can remove barricades we can just assume what Kosovo authorities can do.

        What must be done is more agile penetration of Kosovo institutions in the north and paralyzing illegal activities of illegal structures there.

    2. Fadil Hoxha is threatening again use of force helped by article written by Daniel Serwer?

      1. No. You are demonstrating functional illiteracy and bad intentions by misinterpreting what was said.

        1. Daniel, how shall interpret “Both capitals will be better off if Serbia finds a way to declare victory and reverse its stand on an agreement that will protect most Serbs in Kosovo better than if the negotiations fail”.

          Do you mean if Serbian government does not accept the deal, most of Kosovo Serbs (I assume south of Ibar) will be not protected as they would if the deal is accepted?

          Maybe you should listen to what Rada Trajkovic said in her interview about Kosovo’s institutions. Let me translate for you what she said “You have to understand that institutions in Pristina are extremely discriminatory (towards Serbs)”.

          There is big difference what is written in Kosovo’s constitution and how is implemented in practice.

          So why Kosovo’s institutions do not implement what was written in Ahtisaari’s plan? What is stopping them? Is it Belgrade’s refusal to sign a deal?

          It is completely false that Serbs south of Ibar are well integrated inside Albanian part of Kosovo. Those people live in enclaves (ghettos) and they are scared to death what future might bring to them.

          And regarding Fadil Hoxha comments, he has been threatening on your blog (for a while now) saying that Kosovo’s authorities might resort to force(let me cite him, Fadil_H says: March 29, 2013 at 2:40 pm) “modified action “storm 2.0″ like Croatian forces on 1995 in Croatia” https://www.peacefare.net/?p=14193

          I really don’t understand how you can say that I have bad intentions and you keep publishing comments from Fadil and Amer (commenting that Serb Churches should be relocated from Kosovo).

          You are barking at the wrong door as I am not supporter either of Dacic or Vucic, nor their parties. And I support Vojvodina’s autonomy to the fullest.

          Still remember what you wrote about Albanian riots in 2004. “While investigations continue, this much seems clear: a report attributing the deaths of three Albanian children to Serbs triggered some inflammatory media coverage and rioting by both Serbs and Albanians in Mitrovica”. What was the rioting by Serb in Mitrovica in 2004? They were protecting themselves (not rioting) from angry mob very well orchestrated by their Albanian leaders.

          You are just continuing with what you have started in Bosnia and keep spreading your anti Serb propaganda, blaming Serbs for everything bad what happened in Yugoslavia. I just wonder which intentions are bad, yours or mine.

      2. Dan responded to you perfectly but let me quote again my last sentence: “No need for military action as nobody mentioned that.”

        If this seems to you as “threatening” then I fully agree with Dan on what he said in this regard.

        How did Serbia “solve” the issue of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja more than 10 years ago?

        What must be done in absence of agreement is that KFOR must fulfill its mandate given by UN SC by resolution 1244 to secure freedom of movement and that mean removing barricades in roads. KFOR also should expel illegal presence in Kosovo of security forces from Serbia as it is, again, in breach of UN SC resolution 1244. Kosovo custom personnel and police should not have any obstacle accessing border crossings with Serbia i.e gates 1 and 31. All illegal, so called “alternative crossings” should be closed.

        All people in northern Kosovo should be provided with services of Republic of Kosovo. New local elections in northern Kosovo should be held once citizens of that part of Kosovo are ready for that process.

  7. “So either will be agreement (peaceful one) or Kosovo authorities must act and restore order in the north. I do not mean any actions similar to Croatian “storm” but some other actions could be an option”

    THis is adovocating either peaceful resolution OR NON-PEACEFUL

    1. Fadil Hoxha threatening violence against Serbs, encouraged by Daniel’s writings.

      Fadil_H says on March 29, 2013 at 2:40 pm) “modified action “storm 2.0″ like Croatian forces on 1995 in Croatia” https://www.peacefare.net/?p=14193

      1. No, as usually you are misinterpreting and manipulating things. A “modified” action in the north excludes any actions or violence against Serbs in northern Kosovo.

        The action is needed against illegal presence of security forces from Serbia in Kosovo, being present in Kosovo in breach of UN SC resolution 1244. Of course as a last option since an agreed withdrawal of such illegal presence is expected.

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