Islamists in the political vortex

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace launched its most recent report this week with a panel on Islam and Politics in the New Egypt. Author Nathan Brown focused primarily on the long term outlook for religion and politics in Egypt, purposefully avoiding entanglement in the day-to-day political chaos of Egypt.  Jocelyne Cesari of Harvard University and Jonathon Brown of Georgetown joined him in analyzing the motivations and interactions of the three major Islamic forces in Egypt:  the Muslims Brotherhood, the Salafis and al-Azhar University.

The current power holder, the Muslim Brotherhood, defines itself as a reform movement, built on an Islamic foundation. Before the 2011 revolution the Brotherhood saw itself as representing a silent majority with only distant aspirations to govern. Their rise to power was so rapid that their political calculations have been reduced to day-to-day reactions with no time for long-term reflection. Cesari commented that the Brotherhood has been successful at the new political game, but that does not mean that it actually has the capacity to govern. One of its biggest blunders was to pose as winners after the election. This behavior polarized the opposition, thwarted dialogue and stunted the pluralism necessary for democracy.

The Salafi movement has also enjoyed substantial electoral success.  It claims to stand for religious truth and proper practice of Islam in Egypt and internationally. But like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis have to think politically for the first time:  ‘what does it mean to be a political party?’ and ‘how should we vote and what should we ally ourselves with?’ The political competition has been much more intense than the Salafis anticipated.  This has led to recruitment of much needed political experts, who do not necessarily identify with Salafism. Adjusting to competitive politics, the Salafis are going to have to endure an unprecedented amount of criticism and even ridicule in Egypt’s post-revolutionary, relatively open society.

Al-Azhar, Egypt’s center of Sunni learning, has always striven to understand and interpret Islam in a scholarly way. The institution has never been fundamentally political, but sees itself as a moral voice of Islamic interpretation caught up in political games. The university wants to emerge as the central voice in all religious political debates. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement latch onto al-Azhar as a source of Muslim understanding and national pride. This gives al-Azhar the opportunity to mediate. Al-Azhar’s centrality is critical right now, but in the long term it could become a political football once other parties become more polarized. Nathan Brown writes in the introduction of his report “al-Azhar in particular may find that every step towards increased centrality moves it further away from autonomy.”

None of these three entities were ever entirely about politics, but the revolution sucked each into the vortex of governing and power. They were given an unprecedented opportunity to achieve a more valuable place in Egyptian society. If they allow themselves to be too tempted by power, then they are going to have to face the consequences down the road. Jonathan Brown thought the  ideological leanings of each group not entirely distinct and decreasingly important. Increasingly, international funding has turned internal Egyptian politics into a contest among various Gulf states, which have aligned either with the Brotherhood or the Salafists.