Square one

Having written about nothing but Syria for the better part of a week, it is time to take a glance back at Egypt, where the wise-beyond-his-years Ahmed Maher is telling it like it is:

We view ourselves back at square one, because what is happening now could be more dangerous, more complicated than what was there before January 25, 2011

I fear he is right.  The Egyptian army has taken back power and appears determined to repress the Muslim Brotherhood, whose leadership is to be prosecuted and whose membership is to be harassed to an even greater degree than under Hosni Mubarak.  Guys like Ahmed, a leader of the April 6 movement that helped precipitate the revolution, aren’t safe either, because they speak up for the rights of Islamists and others.

Disappointed as I am by this turn of events, things are never quite the same as the first time around, as Ahmed implies.  It’s a bit like turning up at “Go” in Monopoly.  The board has changed a bit since last time you were there.  It may be more dangerous and complicated, but there are also more people who have tasted something like basic freedoms and will be unwilling to let the savories disappear.  I wish Ahmed well in forming a coalition that will harness that sentiment and push for a return to a democratic path.

That will take time and effort.  One of the many shortcomings of the Egyptian revolution was that it failed to mobilize grass roots support for a clear roadmap to a democratic outcome.  Instead it entrusted the country’s future first to the military, which failed to deliver, then to President Morsi, who failed to deliver, and now again to the military, which is likely to fail to deliver again.

With each failure, the Islamist/secularist divide in Egypt has widened, making it difficult at this point to imagine that the Muslim Brotherhood will participate in the referendum to approve a revised constitution and elections promised for early next year.  Though they supported the July 3 coup, even Salafist participation is in doubt.

Breadth of participation matters, but apparently not to the Egyptian army, which is forging ahead with the expectation that its diktat will rule Egypt for the foreseeable future.  General Sissi is definitely not the self-restrained George Washington of Egypt.  It looks very much as if he is preparing for a long period in power.

What should the United States do in this situation?  I really don’t see much point in cutting off military assistance, as the Saudis have vowed to replace whatever the Americans cut.  We can of course still do it as a symbolic act, and there are many in Washington arguing that we have to in order not to be seen as complicit in restoring the Egyptian army to power.  But the aid is tied to the peace treaty with Israel, at least in the minds of the Egyptians, which means the Israelis will be pressing us hard to maintain it.

If we do decide to cut off military aid, I hope we can do it in a way that sends a clear message in favor of a serious democratic outcome.  I’d wait for some egregious act to which we could respond.  More than likely, the Egyptian army will give us cause by committing another mass atrocity,  conducting show trials, departing dramatically from the schedule for a new constitution and elections, or some other outrageous move.

In the meanwhile, we need to do what we can to protect people like Ahmed who are daring to speak out even under newly repressive conditions.  We can’t want democracy for Egyptians more than they want it for themselves, but we can support those who are taking serious risks even as the country returns to square one.