Still on the roller coaster

The Russia-US agreement on a Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons is certainly a breakthrough with respect to chemical weapons, if it is implemented with anything like the thoroughness and timeliness specified.  John Kerry has delivered on paper what President Obama has wanted:  an end not just to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, but destruction of Syria’s capability to make them and use them by the middle of 2014.

But the agreement, even fully implemented, does nothing to solve three other problems:  Bashar al Asad’s continued hold on power and attacks on Syria’s civilian population, radicalization of his opposition and his supporters, and destabilization of the region.  The number of people killed in chemical weapons attacks is no more than 2% of the total casualties in the past 2.5 years.  While the August 21 attack is said to have killed more than 1400, which would almost surely make it the most horrific single incident of the war, that number are killed more or less every week by more conventional means.

There is no reason to believe that this agreement, even if fully implemented, will reduce the overall level of violence and casualties. The agreement makes Bashar al Asad indispensable.  Neither Russia nor America will want to see him deposed until the job is done.  That of course gives him a license to kill and good reason to delay implementation as much as possible.  There has already been an uptick in regime violence.  He will certainly try to dawdle.  The Chapter VII threat of military intervention in the agreement is clear, but not automatic or unilateral:

The United States and the Russian Federation concur that this UN Security Council resolution should provide for review on a regular basis the implementation in Syria…and in the event of non-compliance, including unauthorized transfer, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in Syria, the UN Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

If I were a betting man, I’d put money on implementation still unfinished by the end of 2014 and Asad trying hard to make the process last even longer, while Syrian forces continue their conventional military effort and Moscow blocks any move in the UNSC.

But even if that is wrong, the agreement really does nothing to deal with the two other key issues at stake for the US in Syria.  The opposition will be sorely disappointed now that the threat of force is off the table, at least for now.  Its more radical fringe will gain adherents as a result.  The regime’s more radical supporters–in particular Hizbollah and the Iranians–will feel emboldened to see their man’s position virtually guaranteed.  My Syrian friends–the nonviolent activists seeking a true civic democracy–will feel undermined.

With radicalization and weakening of moderates will come more fighting inside Syria, more displacement, more sectarian and ethnic homogenization, and more refugees, endangering not only the Syrian state but also its neighbors.  Unless and until Moscow and Washington relaunch the search for a serious political settlement, which John Kerry is trying to do, my more moderate friends are going to find themselves stranded in a sea of confused violence.  That will slow implementation of the agreement and extend Bashar’s lease on power even further.

Given American priorities, which gave first place to chemical weapons, the agreement is likely the best outcome the Administration could hope for.  But it is not the end of a saga that threatens to destabilize and radicalize the Levant, with serious consequences for US interests in Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey.  Keep your seatbelts on.  We are still on the roller coaster.