Tomorrow’s Kosovo elections

As for voter turnout, politicians can do their best to encourage people to vote, but cannot force them to do so. Everyone has their own right to decide for themselves whether or not to cast a ballot. In the case of those who will eventually boycott the vote, the key question is how many of them will abstain because they really don’t want to participate in the election (regardless of anyone’s personal reasons), and how many due to fear of Serb extremists like those seen in the Youtube video below. The latter concern logically raises the question of what kind of and how large security presence will be needed to avoid any possible incident during the elections and thus keep the voters safe.

While the EU, Kosovo and Serbia share a common interest that the number of Serb voters – especially in the northern municipalities – be as large as possible, there is a notable difference between Belgrade and Priština in terms of the desired outcome. Priština wants to see Serbs voting in large numbers in hope that it will help integrate them into Kosovo’s legal and political systems, but at the same time fears an election result that would enable Belgrade to retain, or even increase, its political influence in the north with which it could attempt to undermine Kosovo’s independence, or at least political stability, at some (opportune) point in the future. And the outcome Priština fears most is exactly the one Belgrade is hoping for, which is why the Serbian government has been actively promoting the so-called “Srpska” initiative at the expense of other Serb candidates.

Still, the government in Belgrade is more than keen on making substantial progress toward EU membership, so it will look to avoid any move that can put the process at risk. It is therefore important that Brussels express its appreciation for Belgrade should the elections proceed smoothly and commend the Dačić-Vučić administration in order to preserve the momentum while continually keeping a close eye on how Serbia handles its relationships with the neighboring countries, which it traditionally sees as its “areas of special interest”, in the first place Kosovo and Bosnia, but potentially also Montenegro.