Lessons learned

The ongoing conflict in Syria has brought to attention the many approaches to stabilization that range from humanitarian aid to economic development. On Wednesday, the Stimson Center, in cooperation with United States Institute of Peace, hosted Mona Yacoubian to discuss her report “Lessons Learned on Stabilization in Syria.”

As the senior advisor for Stimson’s Middle East program and former senior program officer on the Middle East at USIP, Yacoubian discussed the takeaways from previous stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans. She emphasized the following eight lessons applicable to Syria:

1. It is crucial to understand conflict dynamics. We cannot ignore local politics or the impact stabilization efforts will have on the ground. Thus, it is necessary for greater community-level mapping to comprehend the conflict and the most effective means of assistance.
2. Stabilization in transition must take an integrated approach. These efforts must incorporate peace-building, security, and development principles on a wider scale. A concerted effort is needed to integrate these central stabilization components under a single authority.
3. We must mind the mutual dependencies that can serve as an entry point for negotiations at a local level. While Syria is in the midst of a brutal conflict with no end in sight, mutual dependencies are still present on a local and sub-conflict level. These domains pose opportunities for peace-building and stabilization efforts by concentrating on narrower disputes.
4. Local negotiations need to be undertaken by local actors. We must transition from negotiation efforts led by external players to resolutions directed by resident Syrian actors. Syrians should be identified and trained to head local-level disputes and facilitate greater dialogue.
5. A bottom-up approach is essential for progress on stabilization. Given Syrian regime hostility, stabilization activities should be small-scale in order to lead to gradual success. We must identify civilian council support to cooperate with local governance structures.
6. Stabilization efforts should be nimble and demand-driven. This approach must be centered on the needs and priorities identified by local actors on the ground as a means of expanding dialogue throughout Syrian civil society.
7. We need to engage nontraditional actors, specifically the large refugee community and Syrian youth. It is necessary to address the communities affected by both the immediate and longer post-conflict phase. Peace-building and conflict mitigation efforts should be directed in part at the continuously growing Syrian refugee population.
8. Washington-based obstacles and bureaucratic impediments should be overcome. Institutional barriers that hinder interagency cooperation need to be lowered. It is vital that we lessen the large divide between high-level decision makers and actors on the ground in Syria. Bureaucratic issues continue to undermine the role of the US in effective engagement and stabilization efforts.

James Schear, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, supported Yacoubian’s report, specifically in its focus on the potential opportunities that lie at the local level. Syria’s biggest obstacle is the tri-polarity of the conflict due to the continuous fighting among the government, Islamist extremists and more moderate insurgents. It has become necessary to engage these various groups through enhanced dialogue.

“We also need to look at the importance of participation and sustainability in these stabilization efforts,” responded Mercy Corps Director of Policy and Advocacy, Ann Vaughan. Donor-driven efforts have neither the most successful nor sustainable impact because their funding doesn’t incorporate local people. We need to look at long-term sustainability, which was not considered in Afghanistan and Iraq. These countries continue to need more and more funding because stabilization efforts were short-term and didn’t focus on sustainable practices. In Syria, we need smarter and more integrated responses that proceed at a slower pace, and most importantly get local actors involved.

These lessons learned from past intervention efforts provide insight for US policymakers in looking for the most effective approach in stabilizing assistance. However, Yacoubian emphasized that there are no direct parallels between these efforts in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Syria differs from these experiences namely because there is no US presence inside the country, and the Syrian regime remains in power.

“We can use diverse expertise to distill critical lessons and nuggets of experience that can be applied to the situation in Syria…” Yacoubian concluded. Nevertheless, we must recognize Syria as unique and look within civil society for effective and sustainable approaches.