Day: September 18, 2015
Protecting civilians as a strategic necessity
The Atlantic Council hosted an event Wednesday afternoon on “Protecting Civilians in Syria: Parameters of the Problem and Policy Options.” Congressman Ed Royce, chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Medical Director Rola Hallam, of Hand in Hand for Syria, Executive Director Valerie Szybala of the newly established Syria Institute, and the Atlantic Council’s Fred Hof argued that civilian protection is a vital strategic necessity in the Syria conflict.
Royce said 90% of attacks in Syria are on civilian locations such as markets, schools and hospitals. He quoted Congressman Engel’s 2013 statement predicting that lack of US engagement would generate chaos in Syria. Responsibility falls on policy makers who, he suggested, have dragged their feet.
Royce highlighted use of chemical weapons, involvement of organizations like Hezbollah and ISIS, and the activities of Russia and Iran. The Syrian Government is by far the largest abuser of chemical weapons. Chlorine and mustard gas are dropped from helicopters, which only the government operates. The purpose is trauma and terror, generating ethnic cleansing. It is a mistake to allow chemical weapons use to go unpunished.
Russia and Iran have further complicated the situation. Russia is bringing aircraft and tanks into Syria. Both Iran and Russia have increased diplomatic tension in the region with the suspicious “eleventh hour” efforts to lift the arms embargo on Iran in the nuclear deal.
Royce urged decisive action against Assad: “Assad must go.” Working to eliminate his deliberate targeting of civilians is an important step in ending the the conflict and slowing the advance of ISIS, especially the influx of individuals from outside Syria who have transpired from the “Virtual Caliphate” to physical fighters. He also supported a safe-zone to protect the Syrian civilians.
The second half of the event was a discussion on medical neutrality, sieges and barrel bombs. Hallam gave a moving statement on the reality of grassroots medical efforts. Her organization has established six hospitals in northern Syria. Rather than picking locations by supply routes or most demand, the organization unfortunately must choose places with the least risk of bombing. Safety is the number one priority. Over 300 hospitals have been specifically targeted, 90% by the government.
The crisis is political and military rather than humanitarian. Food baskets and stethoscopes do not stop barrel bombs. “Humanitarians are fattening up the cow before the slaughter” one Syrian told her. What is needed is strong political leadership to stop the bleeding. This will be remembered as the biggest catastrophe of the century.
Szybala shed light on besieged individuals in Syria in hopes of inspiring smarter policy options. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians are living under siege surrounded by armed actors who intentionally block the supply of aid over an extended period of time. Sieges are a “method of punishment” classified by Szybala as an “invisible crisis” under-reported by the UN. Besieged populations are targets of excessive violence and chemical attacks.
Hof concluded that the Security Council must take action. Civilian protection is a strategic necessity. What is happening is no longer mass murder but genocide, which requires an international response. Diplomacy has to focus on getting Russia and Iran to abandon their Syrian client.
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Uncensored
Iran’s Fars News Agency asked me some good questions. Parts of the interview were included in this article, but parts were also cut, as one might expect. I am publishing here the full text, which I hope will find its way into print also in Iran:
Q: What is your opinion about Iran’s plan to resolve the Syria tension?
A: As I understand Iran’s “plan,” it involves 1) a ceasefire, 2) formation of a national unity government, 3) a rewritten constitution and 4) national elections. This is an outline many can accept, even if some might quarrel with the order.
But “the devil is in the details” we say in English:
1) How does the ceasefire come about? Who monitors and enforces it? What sanctions are there against those who violate it? What if some armed groups refuse to participate in it?
2) Who participates in the national unity government? Does Bashar al Assad step aside or remain as president? How is the security of opposition people participating in a national unity government ensured?
3) Who rewrites the constitution? Within what guidelines? How is a new constitution approved?
4) Who calls elections? Who supervises them? Who ensures a safe and secure environment for the campaign as well as the elections? Who counts the votes?
I suspect there will be many more differences over these questions than over the four-point “plan.”
Q: The UK recently announced that the conflict in Syria will not be resolved unless Russia and Iran use their influence on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to help reach a political solution. What do these signals mean?
A: I’m not sure what the UK meant. It is certainly the consensus in Europe and the US that there is no political solution in Syria if Bashar al Assad insists on staying in power. His opposition won’t stop fighting as long as he is there. Iranian and Russian support enables him to remain. I see no sign that either Moscow or Tehran is prepared to risk losing their influence in a post-Assad Syria, which will surely resent the enormous support they have provided him.
Q: What are Turkey’s roles in Syria and the region? Do you confirm its policy in the Middle East?
A: Turkey has four main interests in Syria: it wants Bashar al Assad gone, it wants Kurds in Iraq and Syria to stop supporting the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey, it wants defeat of the Islamic State, and it wants Syrian refugees to return to Syria. The proposed “safe zone” in northern Syria and the Turkish attacks on the Kurds and Islamic State aim to achieve all four objectives, though success is still a long way off.
Q: We know that Turkey had zero foreign policy sometime and it had gains some achievements but today it has taken distance from that. What were and are their problems?
A: As noted above, it has problems with Bashar al Assad, with the Kurds, with the Islamic State and with refugees.
Q: Why is the west silent on Turkey’s support for Daesh?
A: The West has longed implored Turkey to close its border to Daesh fighters and supplies. They have tightened up a lot since ISIS attacked inside Turkey.
It is a figment of Tehran’s imagination that the West is silent. Or maybe a creation of Iran’s propagandists. One of the things most resented in the West is Iran’s implication that the West is not really opposed to Daesh. Nonsense is the polite word we use for that allegation.
Q: Has the US-led coalition succeeded against Daesh?
A: No, but it has had some successes, taking back about one-quarter of the territory Daesh once controlled, depriving it of some of its revenue and killing quite a few of its commanders.
That one-quarter is mostly Kurdish-populated territory. Taking back Sunni-populated territory, especially in Iraq, is proving far more difficult.
Q: How can Muslim countries across the region led by Iran stand against Daesh?
A: The Sunni Muslim countries of the region don’t want to be led by Iran. They are fighting Daesh, but as part of a Western-led Coalition. Iran is also fighting Daesh, but coordination is difficult so long as Iran fails to distinguish between Daesh and more moderate Syrian fighters. From the Western and I think Arab perspectives, it looks like Iran is fighting to defend Assad for sectarian reasons more than it is fighting Daesh.
Q: Let’s go to Iraq. How do you evaluate the ongoing Iran/ Iraq relation? What about the future?
A: Iran has supported Iraq’s response to Daesh quickly and effectively, fearing Daesh success in Iraq would mean trouble sooner or later also for Iran.
But it has used the opportunity in particular to support Shia militias (Hashd, Popular Mobilization Units). That is a mistake, because it exacerbates sectarian tensions in Iraq and increases the likelihood of a breakup of the Iraqi state that Tehran says it does not want.
It seems to me that a strong but non-threatening and unified Iraq is what Iran should be aiming for. I don’t see it doing that at present. Instead the IRGC is pursuing a less wise policy of arming and otherwise supporting sectarian forces that will make keeping the Iraqi state together very difficult.
Q: What is your opinion about latest Russia military developments and build up in some parts of Europe and the Arctic? I do not mean Ukraine at all.
A: The Russians have legitimate interests in the Arctic. But past experience suggests they will try to bite off more than they can chew. They are already overextended in Ukraine and the Middle East. Putin has strong domestic political support, but he lacks the money and military capacity to sustain his aggressive foreign policy.
Q: And thank you for your participating. Could you please explain about Iran/West relations after the deal?
A: I don’t see Iran/West relations much changed, except for the prospect of much greater trade and investment, especially between Europe and Iran, once sanctions are lifted. But Iranian authorities have reiterated their hostility to the United States, which always gets a lot of coverage here.
Washington doesn’t care much about that but wants Iran to stop threatening Israel’s existence and subverting Gulf neighbors through a highly sectarian policy of supporting Shia forces (sometimes political, sometimes military), especially in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon and Kuwait. Iran and the US share an interest in defeating Daesh, but active cooperation on that requires that Iran stop subversion of American friends and allies in the region. As we know only too well, subversion breeds resentment, not influence.
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