Get serious

Pantelis Ikonomou, a former IAEA inspector and nuclear security consultant, writes: 

President Trump’s sudden decision, two months ago, to meet the DPRK’s Kim Jong-un was enigmatic in its cause and ambiguous to its goal.  Some observers regarded it as opportunity while others as trap. Then through a polite letter to his counterpart few days ago, the President announced his decision to cancel their summit. Yet, preparations are still currently in process.

Would the swinging between ‘’summit,’’ “no summit,’’ and again “summit” result in new disappointments or in relief? As long as question-marks are hanging over the summit, uncertainty grows, as does danger.

What is the summit’s attainable goal? Do both sides have the same understanding of “denuclearization”? What is the “no summit” follow-up plan? What is this pendulum’s driving force? Is there inability to comprehend the complex nature of a nuclear crisis? It is worth recalling Obama’s confession to Bob Woodward on his thoughts during a sensitive nuclear briefing he was given at a secure facility in Chicago: “It’s good that there are bars on the windows here because if there weren’t, I might be jumping out.”

Summit or no summit, proper consideration of some key facts is paramount for the peaceful solution of DPRK’s nuclear crisis:

1. Pursuing denuclearization by force is impossible. A nuclear holocaust would be the result.
2. The DPRK giving up its nukes completely and effectively, within a reasonable time and in an agreed, verifiable and irreversible manner, would be an improbable expectation. As the most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment says:“ Pyongyang’s commitment to possessing nuclear weapons …. while repeatedly stating that nuclear weapons are the basis for its survival, suggests that the regime does not intend to negotiate them away.”
3. States who acquired nuclear weapons outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), like India, Pakistan and allegedly Israel, never abandoned them. They were and remain their strongest deterrence. The exception of South Africa in 1991 was forced by the end of apartheid.
4. Nuclear weapons outside the international legal frame constitute a well-defined global threat. The global nuclear security architecture would be severely undermined by accepting new nuclear weapons owners.
5. Mitigation of risks related to nuclear threat is a top priority task, according to IAEA’s nuclear security guidelines and to any serious national security response plan.

Political determination is the precondition for a successful agreement. Erratic decisions detached from comprehensive planning and expert advice would not engage the DPRK nuclear crisis at the level of its complexity and with the importance it deserves.