1. What Drives Violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle? | Tuesday, September 25, 2018 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am | U.S. Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
Violence and crime are the main drivers of mass immigration from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador into the United States. These countries form a region known as the Northern Triangle, which ranks in the top 10 worldwide for homicide, corruption, drug trafficking and gang violence. Non-state actors perpetuate insecurity, forcibly recruit individuals into their ranks and use sexual violence as a tool of intimidation and control.
Central America became a key area of U.S. foreign policy in the late 1970s, when a number of conflicts and revolutions broke out across the region. U.S. development assistance spiked during this period and during the early 2000s as conflict began to increase again. A significant amount of these funds were allocated to the war on drugs, rather than for security, peace and development. As conflict continues to escalate in Central America, how can the U.S. mitigate the violence, support and strengthen rule of law, and curb immigration?
Please join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the partners of the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum (CPRF) for a discussion on the issues facing Central America, and how the peacebuilding community can develop programming to prevent and mitigate violence, support community resilience and help stabilize the region. Join the conversation on Twitter with #CPRF.
Since 1999, the CPRF has provided a monthly platform in Washington that highlights innovative and constructive methods of conflict resolution. CPRF’s goals are to (1) provide information from a wide variety of perspectives; (2) explore possible solutions to complex conflicts; and (3) provide a secure venue for stakeholders from various disciplines to engage in cross-sector and multi-track problem-solving. The CPRF is hosted at USIP and SAIS and organized by the Conflict Management Program in conjunction with Search for Common Ground. The CPRF is co-sponsored by a consortium of organizations that specialize in conflict resolution and/or public policy formulation.
Speakers
Steve Hege
Senior Expert, Colombia, U.S. Institute of Peace
Enrique Roig
Director, Citizen Security Practice Area Creative Associates International
Others TBD
2. China: Managing Conflict and Competition | Thursday, September 27, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:00 pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
The evolution of U.S.-China relations over the last 40 years presents challenges that, if not properly managed, threaten American leadership in key places of strategic interest, from Asia to Africa to the Western Hemisphere. Please join us for a Bipartisan Congressional Dialogue with two members of Congress who see tension rising as cooperation recedes and the People’s Republic of China increases its malicious activity in cyberspace, expands its military capabilities and presence around the globe, and uses economic tools to gain strategic leverage and undermine democracy in fragile states.
Rep. Chris Stewart (R-UT) and Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD) are both members of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies. Rep. Stewart also serves on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Rep. Ruppersberger was the first Democratic Freshman appointed to the Committee and concluded his service on the Committee as the Ranking Member. Both Representatives will discuss Congress’ efforts to focus attention on China’s military, diplomatic, and economic approaches around the globe at USIP’s sixth Bipartisan Congressional Dialogue.
Moderated by Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
3. Double Game: Why Pakistan Supports Militants and Resists U.S. Pressure to Stop | Thursday, September 27, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | CATO Institute | 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 | Register Here
Featuring Sahar Khan, Visiting Research Fellow, Cato Institute; Ambassador Robin L. Raphel, Former Assistant Secretary of State, South Asia; moderated by John Glaser, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
The Trump administration has taken a hardline approach toward Pakistan, cutting military and security aid throughout 2018 and accusing Pakistan of not doing enough to combat militants operating on its soil. Pakistan, however, maintains that it has eliminated all safe havens and that the United States is unfairly targeting the country.
Washington’s conventional wisdom on Pakistan correctly links militant sponsorship with the state’s military and intelligence agencies. As such, U.S. policies to combat Pakistan’s militant sponsorship have primarily focused on pressuring the military. In a new report, Sahar Khan analyzes Pakistan’s anti-terrorism legal regime, judiciary, and police and finds that in the context of counterterrorism, civil institutions have developed policies and bureaucratic routines that reinforce the military’s policy of sponsoring militant groups. And this is one of the primary reasons why U.S. attempts to change Pakistan’s policy of militant sponsorship have failed.
Please join us for a lively discussion, with lunch to follow.
4. The Nation-State Law: Implications for Democracy and Peace in Israel/ Palestine | Thursday, September 27, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | Foundation for Middle East Peace | 1319 18th St NW, Washington DC 20036 | Register Here
In July of this year, the Israeli Knesset passed the “Nation-State” law, defining Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people exclusively. The law poses a major threat to the status of minorities in Israel, especially Palestinian citizens of Israel, who comprise around 20% of the population. Because it can be interpreted to apply to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, it is also poised to entrench Israel’s occupation. Join us for a conversation about the implications of the law for Israel’s minorities, Middle East peace, and the future of Israeli democracy.
Speakers:
Jafar Farah is the founder and the Director of Mossawa, the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel. Jafar is a long-time advocate and activist for civil rights for the Arab community. As a community organizer and activist he was involved in establishing several organizations such as I’lam, ACAP (Arab Center for Alternative Planning) and the follow up committee for Arab education. Before establishing Mossawa, Jafar worked as a journalist for the Local network of Ha’aretz and as a TV producer.
Nabila Espanioly is a feminist and peace activist who founded the Pedagogical Center and Multipurpose Women’s Centre in Nazareth (Al-Tufula) in 1989 and has served as the director since that time. She has an M.A. in Psychology from Bamberg University, Germany and a B.A. in Social Work from Haifa University.
Dr. Debra Shushan is Director of Policy and Government Relations at Americans for Peace Now. Prior to joining APN, she specialized in the politics of the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an Assistant Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, VA. Dr. Shushan’s writing appears in Haaretz and she is a regular guest on “The Spin Room” on Israel’s i24 TV.
5. Fixing Fragility in the Sahel | Friday, September 28, 2018 | 3:00 pm – 4:30 pm | Brookings Institution | 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
According to the 2018 Failed States Index, 10 of the world’s most fragile states are in Africa and the Sahel region is a particular locus of concern. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, are facing challenges associated with violent extremism, organized, and transnational criminal networks. During the past decade, terrorists groups such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Islamic State, and Boko Haram have killed thousands of people, displaced populations, and threatened stability and security.
Mali’s own efforts at national as well as Sahel-wide stabilization are instructive. In spite of the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali—MINUSMA—and the efforts of the G-5 Sahel, along with international efforts to bring peace and security, fragility continues to undermine socio-economic development progress. Creating a viable future for the region will require interlinked solutions at the nexus of economics, security, state capacity, humanitarian efforts, and international interventions.
On September 28, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings will host His Excellency Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, president of Mali and co-founder of the G-5 Sahel. President Keita will deliver opening remarks, after which he will sit down for an interview with Brookings President John R. Allen.
6. Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics | Friday, September 28, 2018 | 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm | CATO Institute | 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 | Register Here
Featuring the author Yochai Benkler, Berkman Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; with comments by Rebecca MacKinnon, Director, Ranking Digital Rights project, New America; moderated by Julian Sanchez, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute.
The internet and social media were supposed to radically democratize news and information—yet many observers now worry that they are undermining the preconditions for healthy democracies. Misinformation peddled by conspiracy theorists, unscrupulous clickbaiters, and even intelligence agencies spreads around the globe at the speed of light, while in the United States, citizens increasingly retreat into distinct media ecosystems so divergent as to be mutually unrecognizable. Can liberal democracy function in a world in which voters no longer inhabit the same universe of facts?
We’ll take up these questions with renowned scholar Yochai Benkler, coauthor of the important new book-length study Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics. We’ll take a close look at the dynamics of how propaganda, misinformation, and “fake news” propagate across modern information networks. Rebecca MacKinnon, author of Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom, and Cato senior fellow Julian Sanchez provide commentary.
My post yesterday has aroused some interesting responses. Most important: that I ignored Russia and its efforts to undermine both NATO and the EU.
It’s true. I did ignore Russia, because my primary purpose was to illustrate that we have come a long way. But future progress will encounter Russian-created obstacles. Moscow, which for many years was content to play a relatively minor and often positive role in the Balkans, has now decided instead to try to block NATO membership for those countries not yet in the Alliance: Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia.
The lengths to which Moscow is now prepared to go were apparent in Montenegro, where the Russians plotted and tried to execute an assassination/coup against President Djukanovic. That failed and Montenegro entered NATO, but the Russians continue to support the anti-independence, anti-NATO opposition in Montenegro, thus hindering the evolution there of a serious pro-EU, pro-reform political opposition, which the country needs.
Moscow’s attention has now shifted to Macedonia. Both in Skopje and Athens it is supporting opponents of the Prespa Agreement that would allow North Macedonia to enter NATO and begin accession negotiations with the EU. Russia has several opportunities to block the agreement and its implementation:
The September 30 referendum could fail either because it does get 50% of yes votes or because more than 50% of registered voters don’t come to the polls.
Even once approved in the referendum, the implementing legislation could face difficulties in parliament.
The Greek parliament could fail to approve the agreement, or the government in Athens could fall before doing so, causing an inordinate delay.
The Russians are working on all these fronts to screw things up. Success on any one of them could cause real problems in Macedonia and elsewhere the region, where Skopje’s progress is regarded as vital to maintaining the West’s momentum.
In Kosovo, the Russians’ best bet for messing things up is support to the land/people swap that Presidents Vucic and Thaci are discussing. That would greatly enhance President Putin’s arguments in favor of independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as the annexation of Crimea. He is in fact likely to condition dropping the Russian veto on Kosovo’s UN membership, which Pristina thinks has to be part of any swap, on acceptance of those propositions. The Americans have made it clear they will not go along, which could mean Kosovo ends up doing the swap but still without UN membership.
Things are even easier for the Russians in Bosnia, where Republika Srpska (RS) is already owned by Moscow. The RS’s many vetoes and its substantial autonomy mean that Bosnia as a whole will progress only slowly towards the EU and not at all towards NATO. Russia pays for the RS President’s allegiance to its cause with cash as well as weapons and training for his increasingly militarized police and their various militia sidekicks, but it is fair to say that by now most of the population of the RS is thoroughly imbued with a pro-Russia narrative that will be difficult to erase. The pro-Russian narrative is also making headway among the Bosnian Croats, who are not immune to seeing their bank accounts fattened. Driving Bosnia towards a three-way partition suits Moscow’s purposes, as it makes NATO and EU membership unthinkable.
In Serbia, things are a bit more complicated. President Vucic has steered Serbia away from NATO membership towards military “neutrality” but is anxious for EU accession. His problem in getting there is not just the Russians. He must know that the EU will not accept Serbia without a free press and an independent judiciary, neither of which he has been willing to countenance. Moreover, his government is laden with pro-Russian sentiment, due at least in part to its role in preventing Kosovo from becoming a UN member. Beyond that, Moscow has little to offer: a few excess MiGs, an investment in the energy sector that secured the Russian veto, and likely some walking around money. But if Serbia wants serious reform, it won’t find it in Moscow, and if it wants to be considered neutral it will have to get rid of the Russian logistics base it has allowed near Nis.
So yes, the Russians can interfere with EU and NATO prospects for the remaining non-members in the Balkans. They have learned how to do it at low financial cost, including second-rate murder plots and lots Russia Today and Sputnik News broadcasting, as well as Twitterbots and other instruments of cyber warfare. But only a fool or a charlatan would trade the prospect of membership in NATO or the EU for an alliance with a declining regional power heavily dependent on hydrocarbon revenue and facing slow economic growth, even as it overextends itself into the Middle East, threatens the Baltics, and murders its defectors in Britain.
I prepared these notes recently for a briefing on the Balkans:
1. First, caveat emptor: my perspective is perforce a long term one. I first went to Bosnia more than 30 years ago. My inaugural UN flight into Sarajevo from Zagreb was hit by small arms fire.
2. I needn’t tell you how much it annoys me when Bosnians claim that nothing has changed while sitting with me in a café in Sniper Alley.
3. It annoys me even more when American and European academics regard the statebuilding enterprise in the Balkans as a failure.
4. I agree with all their complaints: there is too much corruption, too little ethnic reconciliation, too much state capture, too little rule of law, too much partitocracy, too little civic engagement.
5. I also agree that getting into NATO and the EU is hard and getting harder: enlargement exhaustion, concerns about immigration, worries about the Euro, and growing xenophobia will make accession difficult.
6. The tone of international relations has changed from the halcyon late 1990s, when the unipolar moment appeared to entail the triumph of liberal democracy and regional economic integration.
7. We are in a period of surging ethnic nationalist enthusiasm, including in the US. The Trump Administration is a white nationalist one whose empathy for Balkan nationalisms is evident.
8. But some things have not changed, at least in word and in part in deed: the promise of NATO and EU accession has been maintained, despite rumors of its demise.
9. All the countries of the Balkans are closer to the moment when they will qualify for NATO and the EU than they are to the early 1990s, when former Yugoslavia came apart.
10. No one can guarantee membership, as it is unclear when and if the political window will open. I trust the Trump Administration will keep the promise to get North Macedonia into NATO next year and that the EU will maintain its promise to open accession negotiations.
11. But after that, things will get harder. If the EU window does open in 2025, as Brussels has promised, it will certainly be a narrow one.
12. If I were a betting man, I’d put a small sum at good odds on Montenegro: it shows the kind of serious commitment to adopting and implementing the acquis communautaire required.
13. The big issue there is pluralism in a country much of whose opposition opposes independence as well as NATO membership. Montenegro needs a constitutional, pro-EU, pro-reform opposition. But it already has free media and a half-decent judicial system (that’s a B- in professorese).
14. Serbia in my view faces bigger problems. With a more complex economy, it will have more trouble implementing the acquis, even if it passes all the necessary legislation.
15. Just as important: Serbia lacks commitment to the needed political reforms. Neither its media nor its courts are independent. It is an electoral autocracy and also lacks a serious, pro-EU opposition.
16. For Macedonia, the main issue today is September 30: if the referendum passes, Skopje will have an opportunity to move quickly to NATO and begin serious EU accession negotiations, provided of course that the Greek parliament also approves the Prespa Agreement and Skopje manages to implement it.
17. Kosovo and Bosnia are the remaining laggards. But discussion of them requires that I deal with the current elephant in the room: swaps of land and people, border correction, partition, or whatever you want to call redrawing current borders to accommodate ethnic differences.
18. The idea is not new.
19. It was the basis of the Vance/Owen plan for Bosnia in the early 1990s, a plan that caused ethnic cleansing as ethnic nationalists tried to homogenize territory they expected to own.
20. Zoran Djindjic was pushing it for Kosovo before his assassination. Some even believe it was the motive for his murder, since it entailed giving up most of Kosovo.
21. Hashim Thaci and Aleksandar Vucic have been discussing it for years in their Brussels meetings, without however coming to a conclusion.
22. There are good reasons for that: Belgrade will not want to give up control of its main route south to Thessaloniki and the sea, and Pristina will not want its main water supply in Serbia.
23. I would add that if the north is incorporated into Serbia the viability of Serb communities south of the Ibar River is doubtful. But you don’t have to believe me: Father Sava, who in many respects is the leading light of the Serbian church in Kosovo, will tell you the same.
24. The issue of Greater Albania would then become a real one. That is the dog that hasn’t barked in the Balkans for decades.
25. Its bite could be much worse than its bark, requiring thousands of NATO troops to supervise the exodus of Serbs south of the Ibar and Albanians from Serb-majority areas in Serbia. How ugly would that be? And how expensive? Read more
“The territory controlled by the Syrian opposition must be demilitarized,” Erdogan told reporters in the Russian town of Sochi. “But together with Russia, we will put our efforts into clearing those territories of radical elements,” he said, referring to al-Qaeda-linked extremists in Idlib.
What could go wrong?
Everything. Such “safe zones,” where civilians are herded for supposed protection, are vulnerable. There are foreseeable problems:
They can’t protect themselves but will have to rely for protection on Turkish and Russian forces as well as restraint by the regime and Iranian-backed militias. The Russians are unreliable at best. The regime, the Iranians, and their friends are pernicious.
Provocateurs will hide in these safe zones and give nearby Syrian and Iranian-backed forces an excuse to attack them, most likely using barrel bombs and other stand-off weapons.
Eventually, the Syrian opposition people who take refuge in such safe zones will be turned over to a regime that has been killing “reconciled” fighters and likely also civilians.
People who fail to take refuge in what amount to unsafe zones will be subjected to the kind of brutal bombardments that have characterized the regime takeovers of East Ghouta, Aleppo, Daraa and other former opposition-controlled area.
To be effective, civilian protected zones would require the presence and active assistance of impartial military forces, which simply don’t exist in Syria, as well as a kind of restraint neither the regime nor the Iranian-backed forces have shown. Woe betide the innocent civilian who thinks she will be safe in a demilitarized zone.
What would be better? Agreement for the Turks to take over all of Idlib and do what they can to disarm and arrest extremists would be better. Non-extremist fighters would then cooperate with the Turks and ensure the safety of the entire province, provided the regime and its friends would agree not to attack. That is what the regime should want if it looks forward to the eventual reintegration of Idlib with the rest of the country.
But Assad is not into peaceful reintegration. He is trying to prove his state so fierce (the word Steve Heydemann uses to great effect) that no one will ever try to buck his rule again. This is achievable, as the Algerian regime has demonstrated, and Egypt’s President Sisi is trying to confirm. When you’ve gone to war for more than seven years and presided over the deaths of more or less half a million people, people would be stupid not to be afraid. Now all Assad has to do is kill a few thousand more and he’ll have achieved a large part of his objective.
He will still however have a big chunk of his country outside his regime’s: control: the north and east are in the hands of the Turks and Americans, supported by Turkman, Kurdish and Arab allies. If they could somehow act in a unified way, Ankara and Washington would have some serious cards to play in the coming diplomacy over post-war Syria. We’ll have to wait and see whether they can somehow make their common interests in not returning the areas they occupy to Syrian and Iranian control prevail without a political transition in Damascus over their differences with respect to the Kurds. Either they hang together, or they hang separately, in Benjamin Franklin’s striking phrase.
Here are Putin and Erdogan announcing their agreement:
1. China’s Role in Myanmar’s Internal Conflicts | Monday, September 17, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
As China becomes more assertive internationally, it has begun to encounter conflict and instability in fragile states worldwide. Nowhere is this truer than in Myanmar, where China is a key actor in the peace process and has come to the defense of the government over the Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State. Assessing China’s role in and perspectives toward Myanmar’s internal conflicts can offer important insights into conflict dynamics inside the country and help inform potential U.S. peace support policies.
For six months this year, USIP convened a group of 13 senior experts to examine China’s involvement in Myanmar’s internal conflicts—particularly those in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states—and peace process. Join USIP on September 17 for a discussion with the group’s co-chairs on the main findings of their report, which is the first in USIP’s China Senior Study Group series examining China’s influence on conflict dynamics around the world.
Speakers
Nancy Lindborg, opening remarks
President, U.S. Institute of Peace
Ambassador Derek Mitchell
President, National Democratic Institute
Co-chair, USIP China-Myanmar Senior Study Group
Daniel Twining
President, International Republican Institute
Co-chair, USIP China-Myanmar Senior Study Group
David Steinberg
Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies Emeritus, Georgetown University
Member, USIP China-Myanmar Senior Study Group
Jennifer Staats, moderator
Director, East and Southeast Asia Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace
Executive Director, USIP China Senior Study Groups Series
2. Food Insecurity as a Security Challenge | Monday, September 17, 2018 | 6:00 pm – 7:00 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Please join the Center for Strategic and International Studies for a Smart Women, Smart Power conversation with Ambassador (ret.) Ertharin Cousin, former executive director of the World Food Programme. She will discuss global food insecurity and hunger and the role they play in other security issues, including violent extremism.
Ambassador Cousin served as executive director of the World Food Programme from 2012 to 2017. It’s the world’s largest humanitarian organization, with 14,000 staff who aid some 80 million people in 75 countries. She previously served as the U.S. ambassador to the UN Agencies for Food and Agriculture in Rome.
Prior to her global work on food security, Ambassador Cousin was executive vice president and chief operating officer of America’s Second Harvest, which is now known as Feeding America, a confederation of more than 200 U.S. foodbanks that serve more than 50 million meals annually.
She currently serves as the Payne Distinguished Lecturer and Visiting Fellow at the Center on Food Security and Environment and the Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She is also a Distinguished Fellow of Global Agriculture at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Ambassador Cousin is a Chicago native and holds degrees from the University of Illinois at Chicago and the University of Georgia School of Law. She was named one of TIME’s “100 Most Influential People,” and Foreign Policy magazine’s “500 Most Powerful People on the Planet.” She has also been named to the Forbes “100 Most Powerful Women” list and as the Fortune “Most Powerful Woman in Food and Drink.”
Fellow and Director for Outreach, International Security Program, and Director, Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative
3. One State/ Two States: Pathways for the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute | Tuesday, September 18, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
U.S. policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is shifting rapidly. After the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference brought Israelis and Palestinians together in direct negotiations for the first time, an international consensus emerged that the eventual solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would involve the creation of a Palestinian state existing in peace and security with the state of Israel. But an actual agreement has proved elusive. Today, the idea of a two-state solution is under serious challenge due to political shifts in the Israeli and Palestinian camps, changes on the ground, and changes in the US stance. Do we need new ideas based on the emerging one-state reality? Or do we need new determination and political will behind a two-state solution?
Please join the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy for a discussion of their latest report on future pathways for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Edward P. Djereijian of the Baker Institute and Marwan Muasher from the Carnegie Endowment will present their findings of their report. An expert panel discussion will follow.
A light lunch will be served from 12:00 to 12:30 p.m. The presentation and panel discussion will begin at 12:30 p.m.
EDWARD P. DJEREJIAN
Edward P. Djerejian is the director of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy and the former U.S. ambassador to Israel and Syria.
MARWAN MUASHER
Marwan Muasher is vice president for studies at Carnegie, where he oversees research in Washington and Beirut on the Middle East.
NATHAN J. BROWN
Nathan J. Brown is a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow with the Carnegie Middle East Program.
ZAHA HASSAN
Zaha Hassan is a visiting fellow with the Carnegie Middle East Program and human rights lawyer.
GILEAD SHER
Gilead Sher is a former Israeli senior peace negotiator and chief of staff to Prime Minister Ehud Barak. He heads the Center for Applied Negotiations (CAN) of the Institute for National Security Studies.
JOYCE KARAM
Joyce Karam is the Washington correspondent for The National.
4. RESOLVE Network 2018: Innovative Approaches to Understanding Violent Extremism | Thursday, September 20, 2018 | 9:00 am – 5:00 pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, Dc 20037 | Register Her
The threat of violent extremism is evolving. However, significant knowledge gaps continue to pose obstacles to those seeking to prevent and address it. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the RESOLVE Network for the Third Annual RESOLVE Network Global Forum on September 20 to explore new research angles and approaches for prevention and intervention of violent extremism in policy and practice.
As the territorial hold by violent extremist organizations diminishes, new problems are emerging as these groups evolve and others seek to manipulate governance and security vacuums to spread their warped mission to new populations and locations. To effectively address dynamic global trends, policymakers and practitioners require a holistic understanding of the nature of violent extremism at both the global and local level.
This forum will build from the RESOLVE Network’s previous efforts to meet the needs of policymakers and practitioners to better address the significant gaps in research, evidence, and data on drivers of violent extremism and conflict. The forum will convene RESOLVE’s partner organizations, international researchers, practitioners, and policymakers for thought-provoking TED Talk style presentations and salon-style discussions in addition to engaging breakout discussions, presenting an opportunity to learn from experts from across the globe and contribute your own knowledge and expertise to the discussion. Join the conversation on Twitter with #RESOLVEForum.
Agenda
8:30am – 9:00am: Informal RESOLVE Stakeholder Meet and Greet
9:00am – 9:20am: Welcome & Introductory Remarks
Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace, @nancylindborg
Ms. Leanne Erdberg, Director of CVE, U.S. Institute of Peace
9:20am – 10:30am – Session 1: Individual and Social Conduits of Violent Extremism – TED-Talk Style Presentations
Radicalization & Reintegration: Mr. Jesse Morton, Parallel Networks, @_JesseMorton
Neuroscience & Conflict: Mr. Michael Niconchuk, Beyond Conflict, @mcniconchuk
Social Media & New Threats: Ms. Julia Ebner, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, @julie_renbe
Historical Grievances & Data: Dr. Chris Meserole, Brookings Institute, @chrismeserole
10:30am – 11:30am: Breakout Discussions
11:30am – 1:30pm – Morning Salon: Secularism in the Lake Chad Basin
Dr. Ousmanou Adama, RESOLVE Network Research Fellow – Cameroon
Dr. Brandon Kendhammer, RESOLVE Network Principal Investigator – Cameroon
Dr. Remadji Hoinathy, RESOLVE Network Research Fellow – Chad
Dr. Daniel Eizenga, RESOLVE Network Principal Investigator – Chad
Dr. Medinat Adeola Abdulazeez, RESOLVE Network Research Fellow – Nigeria
Dr. Abdoulaye Sounaye, RESOLVE Network Principal Investigator – Nigeria
Moderator: Dr. Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob
12:30pm – 1:30pm: Lunch
1:30pm – 2:45pm – Session 2: From Complex Systems to Meaningful Interventions – TED-Talk Style Presentations
Role of Traditional Media: Dr. Emma Heywood, University of Sheffield, @emmaheywood7
Everyday Peace Indicators: Dr. Pamina Firchow, George Mason University, @everydaypeacein
Comedy & Creative Communications: Mr. Pryank Mathur, Mythos Labs, @PriyankSMathur
Nonviolent Action: Dr. Maria J. Stephan, U.S. Institute of Peace, @MariaJStephan
2:45pm – 3:45pm: Breakout Discussion
3:45pm – 5:00pm – Afternoon Salon: Practical Applications of Research to Policy and Practice
5:00pm: Closing Remarks & Reception – Mr. Pete Marocco, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
5. China, America, and the New Competitive Space | Thursday, September 20, 2018 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am | New America | 740 15th St NW #900 Washington, DC 20005 | Register Here
Keynote remarks:
Honorable Randy Schriver
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
Panel discussion to follow on natural resources, innovation, and cultural and economic power, featuring:
Nancy Sung, Senior Science Advisor, National Science Foundation;
David Rank, Senior Advisor to the Cohen Group and former Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Beijing;
Andrew Gulley, Mineral Economist at the United States Geological Survey; and
Leon Clarke, Senior Scientist at the Joint Global Change Research Institute.
Breakfast will be served.
6. The Liberal International Order: Past, Present, and Future | Thursday, September 20, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:15 pm | CATO Institute | 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 | Register Here
Recent political tumult and the election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency have driven anxious commentators to lament the collapse of a post-1945 liberal world order. Invoking the supposed institution building and multilateralism of the last 70 years, the order’s defenders urge U.S. leaders to restore a battered tradition, uphold economic and security commitments, and promote liberal values. Others caution that nostalgia has obscured our understanding of the old order’s hard edges and its shortcomings, and has forestalled a serious assessment of the changes that will be needed going forward.
Panelists will discuss the core principles of the liberal international order — both as those principles have been professed by its defenders and as they have been practiced by U.S. and world leaders. They will also consider the present and future of the liberal order. What revisions, if any, are necessary? Should U.S. leaders embrace the old liberal international order and reaffirm American leadership within that order? Or is it time to reassess U.S. grand strategy and bring U.S. goals in line with modern-day realities? Join us for an important and timely discussion.
Featuring Patrick Porter, Professor of International Security and Strategy, University of Birmingham and Senior Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute; Michael Mazarr, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation; Jake Sullivan, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Co-chair, National Security Action; moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
7. U.S. – Japan Cooperation Strategic Island Defense | Friday, September 21, 2018 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | Hudson Institute | 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
China’s rising military capabilities and increased assertiveness in the East China Sea pose a challenge to the Japanese Ryukyu Islands and by extension the United States, which maintains a strategic military presence on the largest island of Okinawa. Along with the islands of Taiwan and the Philippines, the Ryukyu Islands represents a geographic chokepoint for China’s naval and civilian activities. As a strategic impediment to China’s power projection, the island chain has been a major focal point of Beijing’s recent military modernization and expansion.
In their recent report U.S.-Japan Strategic and Operational Cooperation on Remote Island Defense, General James Conway USMC (Ret) and Hudson Senior Fellows Seth Cropsey and Jun Isomura lay out recommendations for how the United States and Japan can strengthen their operational and strategic cooperation in defense of the Ryukyus.
Please join Hudson Institute on September 21 for a discussion of the report, the importance of joint U.S.-Japanese defense of Japan’s southwest islands, and the broader significance of the bilateral security relationship between the two countries for the region.
Speakers
General James T. Conway Speaker
Fmr. Commandant, USMC (Ret)
Seth Cropsey Speaker
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for American Seapower
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