Thinking things through

The evidence is building that the murder of Jamal Khashoggi was not an accident or the result of a fight but rather a planned operation. The Turks have made available video of a “body double” dressed in Jamal’s clothes (unsullied by a fight) leaving the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. This comes on top of other hints: the presence of up to 15 Saudis sent to the consulate for the occasion, the identity of at least one of these as close to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), allegations about the professions of some of the others, and suggestions that the Saudis scouted locations where a body might be hidden near Istanbul. 

All of this needs to be received with some skepticism. It is coming from the Turkish government, which is gunning for MbS and has its own malfeasances to account for, including the jailing hundreds of journalists and the beating demonstrators in Washington by President Erdogan’s security agents. Those who come to equity should do so with clean hands, but those are hard to come by in the Middle East. 

Still, the question of why the Trump Administration is doing its best to stay close to the Saudi royal family is a valid one. Let me count the reasons:

1. The White House needs the Saudi Arabia for its campaign against Iran. 
2. Especially important is the Kingdom’s ability to blunt a further rise in oil prices as sanctions are reimposed on Iran two days before the November 6 mid-term election.
3. Without the pressure the Kingdom can bring to bear on the Palestinians, there is no hope at all for Jared Kushner to produce the “deal of the century” with Israel that President Trump has promised. 
4. The Americans also need Saudi Arabia for the fight against jihadi terrorism, including the financial constraints that Treasury Secretary Mnuchin discussed with MbS this week even after cancelling his appearance for an investment conference.

There are two other factors personal to Trump:

1. Purchases of and investment in Trump real estate, about which the President has bragged in public.
2. Weapons deals, which Trump claims total an entirely mythical $110 billion (there is no evidence they have amounted so far to more than $5 billion, much of it agreed under President Obama). 

What it all adds up to is a powerful incentive to maintain relations with Saudi Arabia as best can be done under the circumstances. 

Congressional reaction to Jamal’s death has focused on the war against Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen, about which there are doubts on both sides of the aisle. The Washington Post wants to end American support for the Saudi/Emirati campaign, which depends heavily on US intelligence, equipment, maintenance, and supplies. 

But no one seems to have thought this idea through to its manifold consequences. What would ending US support mean for the Houthi threat to shipping in the Red Sea and to its southern choke point, the Bab al Mandeb? What would it mean for the American drone and special operations attacks on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? What would it mean for southern secessionist sentiment, which has been growing even as southerners carry a big part of the burden of fighting against the Houthis? What would it mean for humanitarian relief, stabilization, and reconstruction in Yemen, the poorest and now one of the most devastated countries in the Middle East? 

If Jamal’s death teaches nothing else it should at least be a lesson in making sure we think things through before taking action.