The nuclear race has begun

As Iran steps up its enrichment of uranium, the harbingers are clear:

• Turkish President Erdogan is asking questions out loud about why his country doesn’t have nuclear weapons,
• Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince is making it clear the Kingdom won’t be left far behind,
• Israel is lying low with its 100 or more warheads somewhere between ready and almost ready to launch, and
• North Korea is successfully resisting American pressure to give up its dozen or so nukes, making it clear to the whole world that Washington is a toothless tiger when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation.

The nightmare many of us feared in the 1970s and 1980s of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East has begun.

The trigger was President Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) and reimposition of sanctions have released Tehran from its obligations, which it is gradually and deliberately breaching. Turkey, which has long relied on the American nuclear umbrella and NATO, has cozied up to Russia–even purchasing its advanced air defense system–as relations with Washington worsened over how to deal with the Syrian Kurds. Erdogan has no doubt heard the talk about removing American nuclear weapons from Turkey and has drawn the obvious conclusion: if the American umbrella won’t protect you, get your own.

The Saudis increasingly view President Trump as unreliable, especially vis-a-vis Iran. They would be fools not to try to keep pace with the Turks in the race with Iran for nuclear weapons capability. What they can’t develop themselves, they’ll buy. The once prevalent and now quaint notion that no nuclear-savvy country would sell its crown jewels disappeared with Pakistani nuclear merchant A.Q. Khan. The Saudis can pay any price if need be.

The Middle East had gotten used to the Israeli nuclear capabilities, which have been regarded for decades as a deterrent for use only as a last resort. They play little roll in the balance of power beyond ensuring that Israel will continue to exist. The same cannot be assumed about Iranian, Turkish, and Saudi capabilities. Multi-sided games are much more complex than one- or two-sided ones. We can be thankful for the modus vivendi between nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan, but it is no harbinger for a four-sided nuclear standoff in the eastern Mediterranean. And the subcontinent’s standoff may not last forever, since at least Pakistan regards nuclear weapons as useful in warfighting, not just the last resort.

We have at least a few years, perhaps even a decade, before this race reaches some sort of equilibrium. In the meanwhile, the push and shove will be made all the more dramatic by US withdrawal from the Middle East. Its interests there have declined markedly with the development of advanced oil and gas recovery technology and the continued reduction of the US economy’s dependence on energy, especially in the form of hydrocarbons.

The big challenges for American diplomacy today are to slow the Middle East nuclear arms race and build some sort of regional security structure in which the Turks, Iranians, Saudis, and ultimately Israelis can work out their differences without resort to either the proxy wars they are already engaged in or the nuclear exchanges that will all-too-soon become possible. US withdrawal from its over-exposure in the Middle East is inevitable and desirable. But the risks are colossal. Diplomacy can reduce but likely not eliminate those risks.