peacefare.net

Be prepared

After the calamitous failure of the Trump Administration’s attempt to take over the economic aspects of dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade, the European Union reasserted its primacy in a flurry of meetings last week between Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti with French President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel, and EU High Representative Borrell. Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak is putting the dialogue, which aims at achieving in months rather than years comprehensive normalization between Serbia and Kosovo, back on track within the European context, which is where it belongs. The Europeans are open to working in tandem with the US, which is necessary for success.

But haste can make waste. Preparation for negotiation is often more important than what is said at the negotiating table. I see lack of preparation in all four major capitals: Pristina, Belgrade, Brussels, and Washington.

Pristina

With President Thaci sidelined by a pending indictment, the Prime Minister will lead Kosovo’s negotiating team. His government has a razor-thin majority in parliament. It needs to strengthen that to more than two-thirds, and preferably 75%–before engaging seriously with Serbia. That would ensure that whatever he agrees in Brussels can be implemented in Pristina. It will also blunt the role of the Serb representatives, who are controlled by Belgrade, and enable election of a new President, if the indictment is confirmed and Thaci resigns.

Hoti has laid out a reasonable platform for his opening position, but I haven’t seen signs yet of serious preparation on the many issues that will be on the agenda, including major political items: will Kosovo aim for bilateral recognition by Serbia, or will it be content with UN membership? How can that be achieved? Will Kosovo allow formation of an Association of Serb Municipalities in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s requirements? How will disputes over property issues be settled in the aftermath of normalization? How will Serbs, Serb religious sites and other property in Kosovo be protected?

Belgrade

President Vucic has what Hoti lacks: more than two-thirds support in parliament, thanks to an election boycott by most of his opposition. He dominates the media and the courts in ways that any autocrat would admire. He also has an enviable best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA): he can live with the status quo, at least until the EU decides to make it painful for him or presents a more attractive alternative.

But he is trapped in that comfortable position. While most Serbs care far more about jobs and Covid-19 than Kosovo, Vucic has done nothing to prepare his citizens for acceptance that Kosovo is lost. He has instead repeatedly suggested that he would only give up Kosovo, which is no longer his, if he gets something in return. There isn’t much to be given. When former Finnish President Ahtisaari wrote the plan that led to Kosovo’s independence declaration, he gave Serbia everything it really wanted, because he thought Belgrade would recognize the new state.

Vucic, or some future leader of Serbia, needs to set out to convince its citizens that they would gain more from good, normalized, neighborly relations with Kosovo than from the current situation. Belgrade’s current stance–that Kosovo may not be under its control but that is no reason to give it up–is counter-productive for the Serbian economy and Serbia’s EU ambitions.

Brussels

Brussels has helped to kill the idea of a land and people swap between Belgrade and Pristina, which is what Vucic was hoping for. Now it needs to think about what it can offer as either carrots or sticks to get Vucic out of his comfortable stance. The carrots could include Covid-19 recovery aid, Green Deal funding, and a regional reconciliation fund. I can also imagine sticks: Serbia’s progress in accession talks with Brussels should be strictly conditional on its performance in the dialogue with Pristina, including implementation of existing agreements, renewal of prosecutions of war criminals, and willingness to accept essential elements of normalization like cooperation with the Kosovo army and intelligence services.

On the Pristina side of the equation, Brussels also has a lot of work to do:

1. Resolve member state objections to admitting Kosovo into the EU’s visa waiver program, the conditions for which Pristina long ago satisfied.
2. Invent a serious mechanism, if possible jointly with the US, to monitor and ensure implementation of existing and future agreements emerging from the dialogue.
3. Convince the five EU members that have not recognized Kosovo to pledge to do so not on accession, which is far in the future, but rather on achieving candidate status.

These moves would give Brussels the kind of credibility it needs, and currently lacks, in Kosovo. Of course it would lose that credibility quickly if any carrots offered to Belgrade are not also provided to Pristina.

Washington

Richard Grenell, still President Trump’s special envoy for the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue, is not a credible interlocutor for either Europe, which he has gone out of his way to offend on numerous occasions, or Kosovo, whose territory he would have happily traded away. He may continue his parallel, mostly uncoordinated effort to achieve economic agreements between Belgrade and Pristina, but the odds are long for anything substantial. He is already refocusing his attention on the election campaign, which all along was one of his motives in pursuing a diplomatic spectacular with Pristina and Belgrade.

Vice President Biden has made clear that he would return the United States to its normal posture in the Balkans: support for democracy, the rule of law, Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and normalization between Pristina and Belgrade. While Biden is far ahead in current polling, there are still more than three months left before the election, and six before inauguration day. It is hard for me to picture anything good coming from official Washington before Trump is out of office, though participation in an implementation monitoring mechanism should be feasible. Brussels, Belgrade, and Pristina should all be trying to ensure that if Biden is elected, they will be ready to welcome more serious American engagement.