A big hole in the IRGC

On January 3, 2020, a United States drone strike killed Major General Qassem Soleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force. Soleimani was arguably Iran’s most powerful military leader, and his death marked a critical juncture in US-Iran relations. On August 6, the Middle East Institute convened a panel to discuss the impact of Soleimani’s death on the Islamic Republic. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below.

Alex Vatanka (Moderator): Director, Iran Program, Middle East Institute

Tarek Osman: Author & Broadcaster

Ariane Tabatabai: Middle East Fellow, Alliance for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund of the United States

Morad Vaisibiame: Journalist & Editor, Radio Farda, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Immediate Aftermath
Soleimani, like Iran itself, was received differently across the Middle East. Some revered him, some feared him, and others thought of him infrequently, if at all. His assassination, however, caught the attention of the entire region, and most people worried that US-Iran conflict was imminent. 

Some days later, it became clear that violent conflict was unlikely. Iran’s response was relatively small in scale, and the US did nothing to further escalate tensions. To many, Tarek Osman included, this confirmed that the success that Iran had experienced over the last decade, epitomized by improved relations with parts of the Arab world, was over. Iran lacked the will or the means to retaliate proportionately for Soleimani’s assassination. 

Long-Term Changes
In spite of its apparent weakness, Iran regularly confronts the United States, albeit in a less-than-noteworthy manner. Iran targets US forces and personnel on a weekly basis. Though these skirmishes rarely make the news, they are playing out in the Arab world, Iraq especially.

In Soleimani’s absence, the core of Iran’s national security strategy remains unchanged: the Islamic Republic wishes to preserve its influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. It achieves its objectives by working with co-sectarian forces, including the Shi’a in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen. Tabatabai posits that this will continue to serve as Iran’s modus operandi, as it is both inexpensive and fairly effective. 

Observers who predicted the fall of the regime overestimated the role of individuals like Soleimani in the decision-making process, argues Tabatabai. Soleimani was an influential figure but ultimately not essential to the regime’s survival. When he died, the institutions to which he belonged simply found new leaders. 

Morad Vaisibiame contends that, though the leadership structure is the same, the dynamic is markedly different. Qassem Soleimani was well-known, highly regarded, and thus quite influential; he was able to impact both domestic and foreign policy. His replacement, Ismail Ghani, is not as widely respected. Under his tenure, the Quds Force no longer has a particularly “special” relationship with the Supreme Leader. Ghani commands less respect from the other Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders, as well as from his own subordinates. He also holds less influence over the commanders of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansar Allah in Yemen. In this sense, Qassem Soleimani’s absence is deeply felt. 

To watch the event in full, please click here.