It’s not over until the Afghans decide it is

I thought Laurel Miller of the International Crisis Group got Afghanistan right on Morning Edition today:

Like many decisions that get to the President, withdrawal from Afghanistan is a close call. It could give terrorists a chance to return there and use the country as a safe haven, but more likely post-US Afghanistan will be too unstable and violent to be attractive Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. The Americans can act from outside the country, especially if they manage to preserve at least some of their intelligence capabilities. Certainly, as Eliot Cohen argues, we owe to Afghans wanting to escape Taliban rule an open door to allow them to immigrate to the US, as we managed to do for the South Vietnamese after the North took over there.

The risks of withdrawal are real. The analogy with Iraq is imperfect, but we would do well to remember that withdrawal from there in 2011 led by 2014 to ISIS takeover of about one-third to the country. There is little question but that a consolidated Taliban regime in Kabul like the one that ruled there during the 2001 US invasion would be inimical to US interests and open to hosting international terrorists. It will now be up to Afghans to prevent the Taliban from consolidating power, a task that should be easier than ridding the country of their presence in the countryside, but one that will ensure conflict continues for years if not decades more.

That said, the two-decade US and allied military and civilian effort to build a viable, democratic, and self-sustaining state in Afghanistan has failed. President Ghani literally wrote a book on state-building that I use in my SAIS course. It hasn’t helped in Afghanistan. Two key obstacles, noted by Laurel and Jim Dobbins years ago, were never overcome: the resistance of local elites and the hostility of neighbors, in particular Pakistan but also Iran. The US effort was mainly a military one, but with a pretty strong civilian counterpart from the mid 2000s, when George W realized he wouldn’t be able to get out of Afghanistan without a serious stabilization effort. But Afghanistan was too poor, too illiterate, too fractious, too large, too violent, too religious, too remote, and too traditional to respond to Western formulas.

Two decades of effort–even if at times insincere or ill-conceived–will have to suffice. Afghans may still surprise us with their resourcefulness, either in reaching an agreement that stabilizes the country or in defeating the worst of the extremists. More likely, chaos will prevail for some time, as it did in the 1990s after the successful rebellion against the Communist regime until the Taliban imposed draconian order. The American role may be over, but the conflict is not. Now it is up to the Afghans to decide when the time comes.